Types of Naval Officers 



Works by Captain A. T*. Mahan. 



The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 
1660-1783. 

The Influence of Sea Power upon the French 
Revolution and Empire. Two vols. 

The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the 
Sea Power of Great Britain. Two vols 

The Life of Nelson. Popular edition. One vol. 

The Interest of America in Sea Power, 
Present and Future. 

Lessons of the War with Spain, and Other 
Articles. 

The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon 
International Policies. 

Types of Naval Officers, with Some Remarks 
ON THE Development of Naval Warfare 

DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CeNTURY. 



\ 



Edward, Lord Hawke, 



Types 0/ Naval Officers 

Drawn from the 

History of the British Navy 

With Some Account of the Conditions of Naval 

Warfare at the beginning of the Eighteenth 

Century^ and of its subsequent develop- 

ment during the Sail Period 



A> rrMahan, D.C.L., LL.D. 

Captain, United States Na<vy 

Author of the " Influence of Sea Power upon History, 

1 660-1 7 8 3," and *<Upon the French Revolution 

and Empire;" of "The Life of Nelson," 

and a " Life of Farragut " 



Boston 

Little, Brown, and Company 

1901 



The library of 
oo^jgress, 

Two Cur^iES Received 

NOV. 21 1901 

COPVRIOHT ENTRY 

CLASS <^XXa. No. 
COPY J. 



n/^vv 



Copyright, iSgj, 
By Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 

Copyright, igoi. 
By a. T. Mahan. 



All rights reserved 



November, 1901 



•r • •• 



UNIVERSITY PRESS • JOHN WILSON 
AND SON • CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A. 



I 



PREFACE 

ALTHOUGH the distinguished seamen, whose lives 
and professional characteristics it is the object 
of this work to present in brief summary, belonged 
to a service now foreign to that of the United States, 
they have numerous and varied points of contact with 
America; most of them very close, and in some in- 
stances of marked historical interest. The older men, 
indeed, were during much of their careers our fellow 
countrymen in the colonial period, and fought, some 
side by side with our own people in this new world, 
others in distant scenes of the widespread strife that 
characterized the middle of the eighteenth century, the 
beginnings of " world politics ; " when, in a quarrel 
purely European in its origin, " black men," to use 
Macaulay's words, " fought on the coast of Coromandel, 
and red men scalped each other by the great lakes of 
North America." All, without exception, were actors 
in the prolonged conflict that began in 1739 concerning 
the right of the ships of Great Britain and her colonies 
to frequent the seas bordering the American dominions 
of Spain ; a conflict which, by gradual expansion, drew 
in the continent of Europe, from Russia to France, 
spread thence to the French possessions in India and 
North America, involved Spanish Havana in the western 
hemisphere and Manila in the eastern, and finally 



vi Preface 



entailed the expulsion of France from our continent. 
Thence, by inevitable sequence, issued the indepen- 
dence of the United States. The contest, thus com- 
pleted, covered forty-three years. 

The four seniors of our series, Hawke, Rodney, Howe, 
and Jervis, witnessed the whole of this momentous 
period, and served conspicuously, some more, some less, 
according to their age and rank, during its various 
stages. Hawke, indeed, was at the time of the Ameri- 
can Revolution too old to go to sea, but he did not die 
until October i6, 1781, three days before the surrender 
of Cornwallis at Yorktown, which is commonly accepted 
as the closing incident of our struggle for independence. 
On the other hand, the two younger men, Saumarez and 
Pellew, though they had entered the navy before the 
American Revolution, saw in it the beginnings of an 
active service which lasted to the end of the Napoleonic 
wars, the most continuous and gigantic strife of modern 
times. It was as the enemies of our cause that they 
first saw gunpowder burned in anger. 

Nor was it only amid the commonplaces of naval 
warfare that they then gained their early experiences in 
America. Pellew in 1776, on Lake Champlain, bore a 
brilliant part in one of the most decisive — though 
among the least noted — campaigns of the Revolutionary 
contest ; and a year later, as leader of a small contingent 
of seamen, he shared the fate of Burgoyne's army at 
Saratoga. In 1776 also, Saumarez had his part in an 
engagement which ranks among the bloodiest recorded 
between ships and forts, being on board the British 
flagship Bristol at the attack upon Fort Moultrie, the 



Preface vii 

naval analogue of Bunker Hill ; for, in the one of these 
actions as in the other, the great military lesson was the 
resistant power against frontal attack of resolute marks- 
men, though untrained to war, when fighting behind 
entrenchments, — a teaching renewed at New Orleans, 
and emphasized in the recent South African War. The 
well-earned honors of the comparatively raw colonials 
received generous recognition at the time from their op- 
ponents, even in the midst of the bitterness proverbially 
attendant upon family quarrels ; but it is only just to 
allow that their endurance found its counterpart in the 
resolute and persistent valor of the assailants. In these 
two battles, with which the War of Independence may 
be said fairly to have begun, by land and by water, in 
the far North and in the far South, the men of the same 
stock, whose ancestors there met face to face as foes, 
have now in peace a common heritage of glory. If 
little of bitterness remains in the recollections which 
those who are now fellow-citizens retain of the struggle 
between the North and the South, within the American 
Republic, we of two different nations, who yet share a 
common tongue and a common tradition of liberty and 
law, may well forget the wrongs of the earlier strife, and 
look only to the common steadfast courage with which 
each side then bore its share in a civil conflict. 

The professional lives of these men, therefore, touch 
history in many points; not merely history generally, 
but American history specifically. Nor is this contact 
professional only, devoid of personal tinge. Hawke was 
closely connected by blood with the Maryland family 
of Bladen ; that having been his mother's maiden name, 



Vlll 



Preface 



and Governor Bladen of the then colony being his first 
cousin. Very much of his early life was spent upon the 
American Station, largely in Boston. But those were 
the days of Walpole's peace policy ; and when the mari- 
time war, which the national outcry at last compelled, 
attained large dimensions, Hawke's already demonstrated 
eminence as a naval leader naturally led to his employ- 
ment in European waters, where the more immediate 
dangers, if not the greatest interests, of Great Britain 
were then felt to be. The universal character, as well as 
the decisive issues of the opening struggle were as yet 
but dimly foreseen. Rodney also had family ties with 
America, though somewhat more remote. Caesar Rod- 
ney, a signer of the Declaration of Independence from 
Delaware, was of the same stock; their great-grand- 
fathers were brothers. It was from the marriage of his 
ancestor with the daughter of a Sir Thomas Caesar that 
the American Rodney derived his otherwise singular 
name. 

Howe, as far as known, had no relations on this side 
of the water ; but his elder brother, whom he succeeded 
in the title, was of all British officers the one who most 
won from the colonial troops with whom he was asso- 
ciated a personal affection, the memory of which has 
been transmitted to us ; while the admiral's own kindly 
attitude towards the colonists, and his intimacy with 
Franklin, no less than his professional ability, led to his 
being selected for the North American command at the 
time when the home country had not yet lost all hope 
of a peaceable solution of difficulties. To this the Howe 
tradition was doubtless expected to contribute. Jervis, 



Preface ix 

a man considerably younger than the other three, by the 
accidents of his career came little into touch with either 
the colonies or the colonists, whether before or during 
the Revolutionary epoch ; yet even he, by his intimate 
friendship with Wolfe, and intercourse with his last days, 
is brought into close relation with an event and a name 
indelibly associated with one of the great landmarks — 
crises — in the history of the American Continent. Al- 
though the issue of the strife depended, doubtless, upon 
deeper and more far-reaching considerations, it is not 
too much to say that in the heights of Quebec, and in 
the name of Wolfe, is signalized the downfall of the 
French power in America. There was prefigured the 
ultimate predominance of the traditions of the English- 
speaking races throughout this continent, which in our 
own momentous period stands mediator between the 
two ancient and contrasted civilizations of Europe and 
Asia, that so long moved apart, but are now brought 
into close, if not threatening, contact. 

Interesting, however, as are the historical and social 
environments in which their personalities played their 
part, it is as individual men, and as conspicuous ex- 
emplars — types — of the varied characteristics which go 
to the completeness of an adequate naval organization, 
that they are here brought forward. Like other profes- 
sions, — and especially like its sister service, the Army, 
— the Navy tends to, and for efficiency requires, speciali- 
zation. Specialization, in turn, results most satisfactorily 
from the free play of natural aptitudes ; for aptitudes, 
when strongly developed, find expression in inclination, 
and readily seek their proper function in the body 



Preface 



organic to which they belong. Each of these distin- 
guished officers, from this point of view, does not stand 
for himself alone, but is an eminent exponent of a class ; 
while the class itself forms a member of a body which 
has many organs, no one of which is independent of the 
other, but all contributive to the body's welfare. Hence, 
while the effort has been made to present each in his 
full individuality, with copious recourse to anecdote and 
illustrative incident as far as available, both as a matter 
of general interest and for accurate portrayal, special 
care has been added to bring out occurrences and actions 
which convey the impression of that natural character 
which led the man to take the place he did in the naval 
body, to develop the professional function with which 
he is more particularly identified ; for personality under- 
lies official character. 

In this sense of the word, types are permanent ; for 
such are not the exclusive possession of any age or of 
any service, but are found and are essential in every 
period and to every nation. Their functions are part of 
the bed-rock of naval organization and of naval strategy, 
throughout all time ; and the particular instances here 
selected owe their special cogency mainly to the fact 
that they are drawn from a naval era, 1739-18 15, of 
exceptional activity and brilliancy. 

There is, however, another sense in which an officer, 
or a man, may be accurately called a type ; a sense no 
less significant, but of more limited and transient appli- 
cation. The tendency of a period, — especially when 
one of marked transition, — its activities and its results, 
not infrequently find expression in one or more histori- 



Preface xi 



cal characters. Such types may perhaps more ac- 
curately be called personifications; the man or men 
embodying, and in action reahzing, ideas and processes 
of thought, the progress of which is at the time un- 
noted, but is afterwards recognized as a general char- 
acteristic of the period. Between the beginning and 
the end a great change is found to have been effected, 
which naturally and conveniently is associated with the 
names of the most conspicuous actors; although they 
are not the sole agents, but simply the most eminent. 

It is in this sense more particularly that Hawke and 
Rodney are presented as types. It might even be said 
that they complement each other and constitute together 
a single type; for, while both were men of unusually 
strong personality, private as well as professional, and 
with very marked traits of character, their great rela- 
tion to naval advance is that of men who by natural 
faculty detect and seize upon incipient ideas, for which 
the time is ripe, and upon the practical realization of 
which the healthful development of the profession de- 
pends. With these two, and with them not so much 
contemporaneously as in close historical sequence, is 
associated the distinctive evolution of naval warfare in 
the eighteenth century; in their combined names is 
summed up the improvement of system to which Nelson 
and his contemporaries fell heirs, and to which Nelson, 
under the peculiar and exceptional circumstances which 
made his opportunity, gave an extension that im- 
mortalized him. Of Hawke and Rodney, therefore, it 
may be said that they are in their profession types of 
that element of change, in virtue of which the profession 



xii Preface 



grows ; whereas the other four, eminent as they were, 
exemplify rather the conservative forces, the permanent 
features, in the strength of which it exists, and in the 
absence of any one of which it droops or succumbs. It 
does not, however, follow that the one of these great 
men is the simple continuator of the other's work; 
rather it is true that each contributed, in due succession 
of orderly development, the factor of progress which his 
day demanded, and his personality embodied. 

It was not in the forecast of the writer, but in the 
process of treatment he came to recognize that, like 
Hawke and Rodney, the four others also by natural char- 
acteristics range themselves in pairs, — presenting points 
of contrast, in deficiencies and in excellencies, which 
group them together, not by similarity chiefly, but as com- 
plementary. Howe and Jervis were both admirable gene- 
ral officers ; but the strength of the one lay in his tactical 
acquirements, that of the other in strategic insight and 
breadth of outlook. The one was easy-going and in- 
dulgent as a superior ; the other conspicuous for sever- 
ity, and for the searchingness with which he carried the 
exactions of discipline into the minute details of daily 
naval life. Saumarez and Pellew, less fortunate, did not 
reach high command until the great days of naval war- 
fare in their period had yielded to the comparatively 
uneventful occupation of girdling the enemy's coast with 
a system of blockades, aimed primarily at the restriction 
of his commerce, and incidentally at the repression of 
his navy, which made no effort to take the sea on a 
large scale. Under these circumstances the functions 
of an admiral were mainly administrative ; and if Sau- 



Preface 



Xlll 



marez and Pellew possessed eminent capacity as general 
officers on the battle-field, they had not opportunity to 
prove it. The distinction of their careers coincides with 
their tenure of subordinate positions in the organisms of 
great fleets. With this in common, and differentiating 
them from Howe and Jervis, the points of contrast are 
marked. Saumarez preferred the ship-of-the-line, Pellew 
the frigate. The choice of the one led to the duties of 
a division commander, that of the other to the compara- 
tive independence of detached service, of the partisan 
officer. In the one, love of the military side of his call- 
ing predominated ; the other was, before all, the seaman. 
The union of the two perfects professional character. 

The question may naturally be asked, — Why, among 
types of naval officers, is there no mention, other than 
casual, of the name of Nelson? The answer is simple. 
Among general officers, land and sea, the group to 
which Nelson belongs defies exposition by a type, both 
because it is small in aggregate numbers, and because 
the peculiar eminence of the several members, — the 
eminence of genius, — so differentiates each from his 
fellows that no one among them can be said to represent 
the others. Each, in the supremacy of his achievement, 
stands alone, — alone, not only regarded as towering 
above a brilliant surrounding of distinguished followers, 
but alone even as contrasted with the other great ones 
who in their own day had a like supremacy. Such do 
not in fact form a class, because, though a certain com- 
munity of ideas and principles may be traced in their 
actions, their personalities and methods bear each the 
stamp of originality in performance ; and where origi- 



xiv Preface 

nality is found, classification ceases to apply. There is a 
company, it may be, but not a class. 

The last four biographies first appeared as contribu- 
tions to the ''Atlantic Monthly," in 1893 and 1894. I 
desire to return to the proprietors my thanks for their 
permission to republish. The original treatment has 
been here considerably modified, as well as enlarged. I 
am also under special obligation to Mr. Fleetwood Hugo 
Pellew, who gave me the photograph of Lord Exmouth, 
with permission also to reproduce it. It represents that 
great officer at the age most characteristic of his particu- 
lar professional distinction, as by me understood. 

A. T. MAHAN. 
October, 1901. 



CONTENTS 



I 

Page 

Introductory. — Conditions of Naval Warfare at 

THE Beginning of the Eighteenth Century . . 3 

II 

Progress of Naval Warfare during the Eighteenth 
Century 
Hawke : The Spirit 77 

III 

Progress of Naval Warfare during the Eighteenth 
Century {Continued) 
Rodney : The Form 148 

IV 

Howe: The General Officer, as Tactician . . . 254 

V 

Jervis : The General Officer^ as Disciplinarian and 

Strategist 320 

VI 

Saumarez : The Fleet Officer and Division Com- 
mander 382 

VII 
Pellew : The Frigate Captain and Partisan Officer 428 



Index 479 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



Edward, Lord Hawke Frontispiece 

From an engraving by W. Holl, after the painting by Francis Cotes 
in the Naval Gallery at Greenwich Hospital. 

Page 

Plan of Byng's Action off Minorca, May 20, 1756 48 
George Brydges, Lord Rodney 148 

From an engraving by Edward Finden, after the painting by W. 
Grimaldi. 

Richard, Earl Howe 254 

From a mezzotint engraving by R. Dunkarton, after the painting 
by John Singleton Copley. 

John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent 320 

From an engraving by J. Cook, after the painting by Sir William 
Beechey. 

James, Lord De Saumarez ...382 

From an engraving by W. Greatbatch, after a miniature in posses- 
sion of the family. 

Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth 428 

From the original painting in the possession of Orr Ewing, Esq. 



L^ 



\y^ 



t/^ 



TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS 



TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS 



INTRODUCTORY 

Naval Warfare at the Beginning of the Eighteenth 
Century 

THE recent close of the nineteenth century 
has familiarized us with the thought that 
such an epoch tends naturally to provoke an 
estimate of the advance made in the various 
spheres of human activity during the period 
which it terminates. Such a reckoning, however, 
is not a mere matter of more and less, of com- 
parison between the beginning and the end, 
regardless of intermediate circumstances. The 
question involved is one of an historical process, 
of cause and effect ; of an evolution, probably 
marked, as such series of events commonly are, 
by certain salient incidents, the way-marks of 
progress which show the road traversed and the 
succession of stages through which the past has 
become the present. Frequently, also, such de- 
velopment associates itself not only with conspic- 
uous events, but with the names of great men, 
to whom, either by originality of genius or by 
favoring opportunity, it has fallen to illustrate in 



4 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

action the changes which have a more silent 
antecedent history in the experience and reflec- 
tion of mankind. 

The development of naval warfare in the 
eighteenth century, its advance in spirit and 
methods, is thus exemplified in certain striking 
events, and yet more impressively is identified 
with the great names of Hawke and Rodney. 
The period of nearly half a generation intervened 
between their births, but they were contempora- 
ries and actors, though to no large extent asso- 
ciates, during the extensive wars that occupied 
the middle of the century — the War of the Aus- 
trian Succession, 1 739-1 748, and the Seven 
Years War, 1 756-1 763. These two conflicts 
are practically one ; the same characteristic jeal- 
ousies and motives being common to both, as 
they were also to the period of nominal peace, 
but scarcely veiled contention, by which they were 
separated. The difference of age between the 
two admirals contributed not only to obviate riv- 
alry, by throwing their distinctive activities into 
different generations, but had, as it were, the 
effect of prolonging their influence beyond that 
possible to a single lifetime, thus constituting it 
into a continuous and fruitful development. 

They were both successful men, in the ordi- 
nary acceptation of the word success. They were 
great, not only in professional character, but in 
the results which do not always attend profes- 
sional desert ; they were great in achievement. 



of the Eighteenth Century 5 



Each name is indissolubly linked with a brilliant 
victory, as well as with other less known but 
equally meritorious actions; in all of which the 
personal factor of the principal agent, the dis- 
tinctive qualities of the commander-in-chief, 
powerfully contributed and were conspicuously 
illustrated. These were, so to say, the examples, 
that enforced upon the men of their day the pro- 
fessional ideas by which the two admirals were 
themselves dominated, and upon which was form- 
ing a school, with professional standards of ac- 
tion and achievement destined to produce great 
effects. 

Yet, while this is so, and while such emphatic 
demonstrations by deeds undoubtedly does more 
than any other teaching to influence contempo- 
raries, and so to promote professional development, 
it is probably true that, as a matter of historical 
illustration, the advance of the eighteenth century 
in naval warfare is more clearly shown by two great 
failures, for neither of which were these officers 
responsible, and in one only of which in fact did 
either appear, even in a subordinate capacity. 
The now nearly forgotten miscarriage of Ad- 
miral Mathews off Toulon, in 1744, and the 
miserable incompetency of Byng, at Minorca, in 
1756, remembered chiefly because of the conse- 
quent execution of the admiral, serve at least, 
historically, to mark the low extreme to which 
had then sunk professional theory and practice — 
for both were there involved. It is, however, not 



6 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

only as a point of departure from which to esti- 
mate progress that these battles — if they deserve 
the name — are historically useful. Considered 
as the plane to which exertion, once well directed 
and virile, had gradually declined through the 
prevalence of false ideals, they link the seven- 
teenth century to the eighteenth, even as the 
thought and action — the theory and practice — 
of Hawke and Rodney uplifted the navy from 
the inefificiericy of Mathews and Byng to the 
crowning glories of the Nile and Trafalgar, with 
which the nineteenth century opened. It is thus, 
as the very bottom of the wave, that those singu- 
lar and signal failures have their own distinctive 
significance in the undulations of the onward 
movement. On the one hand they are not unac- 
countable, as though they, any more than the 
Nile and Trafalgar, were without antecedent of 
cause ; and on the other they serve, as a back- 
ground at least, to bring out the figures of the 
two admirals now before us, and to define their 
true historical import, as agents and as exponents, 
in the changes of their day. 

It is, therefore, important to the comprehen- 
sion of the changes effected in that period of 
transition, for which Hawke and Rodney stand, 
to recognize the distinctive lesson of each of 
these two abortive actions, which together may 
be said to fix the zero of the scale by which 
the progress of the eighteenth century is de- 
noted. They have a relation to the past as well 



of the Eighteenth Century 



as to the future, standing far below the level 
of the one and of the other, through causes that 
can be assigned. Naval warfare in the past, in 
its origin and through long ages, had been waged 
with vessels moved by oars, which consequently, 
when conditions permitted engaging at all, could 
be handled with a scope and freedom not secur- 
able with the uncertain factor of the wind. The 
motive power of the sea, therefore, then resem- 
bled essentially that of the land, — being human 
muscle and staying power, in the legs on shore 
and in the arms at sea. Hence, movements by 
masses, by squadrons, and in any desired direc- 
tion corresponding to a fixed plan, in order to 
concentrate, or to outflank, — all these could be 
attempted with a probability of success not pred- 
icate of the sailing ship. Nelson's remarkable 
order at Trafalgar, which may almost be said 
to have closed and sealed the record of the sail 
era, began by assuming the extreme improba- 
bility of being able at any given moment to 
move forty ships of his day in a fixed order 
upon an assigned plan. The galley admiral 
therefore wielded a weapon far more flexible and 
reliable, within the much narrower range of its 
activities, than his successor in the days of sail ; 
and engagements between fleets of galleys accord- 
ingly reflected this condition, being marked not 
only by greater carnage, but by tactical combina- 
tions and audacity of execution, to which the 
sailing ship did not so readily lend itself. 



8 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

When the field of naval warfare became ex- 
tended beyond the Mediterranean, — for long 
centuries its principal scene, — the galley no 
longer met the more exacting nautical condi- 
tions; and the introduction of cannon, involv- 
ing new problems of tactics and ship-building, 
accelerated its disappearance. The traditions of 
galley-fighting, however, remained, and were rein- 
forced by the habits of land fighting, — the same 
men in fact commanding armies on shore and 
fleets at sea. In short, a period of transition 
ensued, marked, as such in their beginnings 
are apt to be, by an evident lack of clearness 
in men's appreciation of conditions, and of the 
path of development, with a consequent confu- 
sion of outline in their practice. It is not always 
easy to understand either what was done, or what 
was meant to be done, during that early sail era ; 
but two things appear quite certainly. There 
is still shown the vehemence and determination 
of action which characterized galley fighting, 
visible constantly in the fierce effort to grapple 
the enemy, to break his ranks, to confuse and 
crush him ; and further there is clear indication 
of tactical plan on the grand scale, broad in out- 
line and combination, involving different — but 
not independent — action by the various great 
divisions of the fleet, each of which, in plan at 
least, has its own part, subordinate but contrib- 
utory to the general whole. 

The results, though not unimportant, were not 



of the Eighteenth Century- 



satisfactory, for men were compelled to see that 
from various causes the huge numbers brought 
upon the field lapsed into confusion, and that 
battle, however well planned in large outline, 
resolved itself into a mere mass of warring units 
incoherently struggling one with another. There 
was lack of proportion between effort exerted 
and effect achieved. A period of systematization 
and organization set in. Unwieldy numbers 
were reduced to more manageable dimensions by 
excluding ships whose size and strength did not 
add to the efficiency of the order of battle ; the 
powers and limitations of those which remained 
were studied, and certain simple tactical disposi- 
tions, fitted to particular emergencies, were recog- 
nized and adopted, — all tending to impart unity 
of movement and action, and to keep the whole 
in regulated order under the hand of the com- 
mander-in-chief, free from confusion. 

To this point there was improvement ; but re- 
action, as often, went too far. The change in 
accepted ideas is emphatically shown by a com- 
parison of the Fighting Instructions of 1740 and 
1756, when the crystallization of the system was 
complete but disintegration had not yet begun, 
with those issued in 1665 by the Duke of York, 
afterwards James 1 1., at the beginning of the second 
of the three Anglo-Dutch Wars. His in turn 
are directly deducible from others framed shortly 
after the first war, in 1652-1654, when sail tactics 
had not passed the stage of infancy, and were 



lO Naval Warfare at the Beeinni 



ginning 



still strongly affected by the galley tradition. 
There is here found, on the one hand, the pre- 
scription of the line of battle, — a single column 
of ships formed in each other's wake, — with the 
provision that if the enemy is to leeward, and 
awaits attack, the headmost squadron of the Brit- 
ish shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's 
ships. This accords with the general tenor of 
the later Instructions; but there occurs else- 
where, and previously, the direction that, when 
the enemy is to windward, if the leading British 
Squadron finds it can weather any considerable 
part of them, it is to " tack and stand in, and 
strive to divide the enemy's body," and that, " be- 
ing got to windward, is to bear down on those 
ships to leeward of them," which have thus been 
cut off. 

The thing to be observed here is the separate, 
but positive, initiative prescribed for a portion of 
the fleet, with a view to divide the enemy, and 
then concentrate the whole fleet upon the frac- 
tion thus isolated. The British van takes a par- 
ticular, but not an independent, action ; for the 
other divisions contribute their part to the com- 
mon purpose. *' The middle squadron is to keep 
her wind, and to observe the motion of the 
enemy's van, which" [that is, "which" action of 
the middle squadron] "the last squadron — the 
rear — is to second ; and both of these squadrons 
are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first 
squadron, that divided the enemy's fleet." Evi- 



of the Eighteenth Century 1 1 

dently here we have tactical combination in 
order to decisive action ; clearly contemplated 
also beforehand, not merely by a capable individ- 
ual general, but by the consensus of professional 
opinion which such a paper as the Fighting 
Instructions necessarily reflects. The stamp of 
the galley period is upon this : strenuous and 
close battle, the piercing of the enemy's order, the 
movement of the squadrons differentiated, in 
order that they may in a real and effective sense 
combine, instead of being merely distributed, as 
they afterwards were by both the letter of the 
later Instructions and the tradition by which 
these became encrusted. Nor should there be 
overlooked, in this connection, the discretion al- 
lowed the centre and rear. They are to " keep 
their wind ; " an expression which leaves optional 
whether to tack, or stand as they are, whether to 
engage the separated enemies to windward or to 
leeward, as occasion may offer, in support of the 
van. The provisions of 1665 afterwards dis- 
appear. In 1740, and even as late as 1781, they 
are traceable only in certain colorless articles, 
suggestive of the atrophied organs of a body 
concerning whose past use physiologists may 
speculate. 

As in the restoration of sounder methods, with 
which we shall be concerned, this degeneration of 
ideals was a work of time. In June, 1666, the 
British met with a severe check in the Four Days 
Battle, in which Monk, a soldier, commanded in 



12 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

chief. This reverse is chiefly to be attributed to 
antecedent strategic errors, which made a portion 
only of the available British force bear the brunt 
of the first three days ; but, among the inevitable 
criticisms, we find stress laid upon fighting in 
line as essential to success. This insistence 
upon the line as an effective instrument pro- 
ceeded, among others, from Sir William Penn, a 
seaman, and was at that time in the direction of 
professional advance. The line had not yet ob- 
tained the general professional acceptance needed 
to establish and utilize its indisputable value. 
This process was gradual, but when effected it 
followed the usual laws of human development ; 
from a valuable means, it became in men's estima- 
tion an exaggerated necessity. It came to pass 
in time that the line no longer existed for tactics, 
but tactics for the line, in which they found their 
consummation and end. 

There intervened, however, a happier period, — 
one of transition, — and in the third Anglo-Dutch 
war, 1 672-1 674, we seem to find a close approach 
to just proportion between regularity of formation 
and decisive tactical purpose ; in which the prin- 
ciple of the line is recognized and observed, but 
is utilized by professional audacity for definite 
and efficient tactical action, aiming at conclusive 
results. The finest exponent of this, the culmi- 
nating epoch of naval w^arfare in the seventeenth 
century, is the Dutchman Ruyter, who, taken 
altogether, was the greatest naval seaman of that 



of the Eighteenth Century 13 

era, which may be roughly identified with the 
reign of Charles II. After that, naval warfare 
was virtually suspended for fifteen years, and 
when resumed in the last decade of the century, 
the traces of incipient degeneracy can already be 
noted amid much brilliant performance. From 
that time completeness of military achievement 
became in men's minds less of an object than 
accurate observance of rule, and in practice the 
defensive consideration of avoiding disaster began 
to preponderate over offensive effort for the de- 
struction of the enemy. 

In the development of tactical science, the 
French had played a leading part, as they usually 
have where reflective mental processes and formal 
evolution of ideas are concerned. Among admi- 
rals, the greatest name of this later period is the 
French Tourville, a master of the science of his 
profession, and gifted with a personal courage of 
the heroic type; while the leading exponent of 
Tourville's ideas, as well as historian of his 
achievements, was the French priest Paul Hoste, 
— chaplain to his fleet, and the father of the sys- 
tematic treatment of naval evolutions. But with 
Tourville's name is associated not only a high 
level of professional management, but a caution 
in professional action not far removed from 
timidity, so that an impatient Minister of Marine 
of his day and nation styled him "poltroon in 
head, though not in heart." His powers were 
displayed in the preservation and orderly move- 



14 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

ment of his fleet ; in baffling, by sheer skill, and 
during long periods, the efforts of the enemy to 
bring him to action ; in skilful disposition, when 
he purposely accepted battle under disadvantage; 
but under most favorable opportunities he failed 
in measures of energy, and, after achieving par- 
tial success, superfluous care of his own com- 
mand prevented his blows from being driven 
home. 

Tourville, though a brilliant seaman, thus not 
only typified an era of transition, with which 
he was contemporary, but fore-shadowed the 
period of merely formal naval warfare, precise, 
methodical, and unenterprising, emasculated of 
military virility, although not of mere animal 
courage. He left to his successors the legacy 
of a great name, but also unfortunately that of 
a defective professional tradition. The splendid 
days of the French Navy under Louis XIV. 
passed away with him, — he died in 1701 ; but 
during the long period of naval lethargy on the 
part of the state, which followed, the French 
naval officers, as a class, never wholly lost sight 
of professional ideals. They proved themselves, 
on the rare occasions that offered, before 171 5 
and during the wars of Hawke and Rodney, not 
only gallant seamen after the pattern of Tour- 
ville, but also exceedingly capable tacticians, 
upon a system good as far as it went, but de- 
fective on Tourville's express lines, in aiming 
rather at exact dispositions and defensive security 



of the Eighteenth Century 15 

than at the thorough-going initiative and persist- 
ence which confounds and destroys the enemy. 
" War," to use Napoleon's phrase, " was to be 
waged without running risks." The sword was 
drawn, but the scabbard was kept ever open 
for its retreat. 

The English, in the period of reaction which 
succeeded the Dutch wars, produced their own 
caricature of systematized tactics. Even under 
its influence, up to 1715, it is only just to say 
they did not construe naval skill to mean anxious 
care to keep one's own ships intact. Rooke, off 
Malaga, in 1704, illustrated professional fearless- 
ness of consequences as conspicuously as he had 
shown personal daring in the boat attack at 
La Hougue ; but his plans of battle exemplified 
the particularly British form of inefficient naval 
action. There was no great difference in aggre- 
gate force between the French fleet and that 
of the combined Anglo-Dutch under his orders. 
The former, drawing up in the accustomed line 
of battle, ship following ship in a single column, 
awaited attack. Rooke, having the advantage 
of the wind, and therefore the power of engaging 
at will, formed his command in a similar and 
parallel line a few miles off, and thus all stood 
down together, the ships maintaining their line 
parallel to that of the enemy, and coming into 
action at practically the same moment, van to 
van, centre to centre, rear to rear. This ignored 
wholly the essential maxim of all intelligent 



1 6 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

warfare, which is so to engage as markedly to 
outnumber the enemy at a point of main col- 
lision. If he be broken there, before the remain- 
der of his force come up, the chances all are that 
a decisive superiority will be established by this 
alone, not to mention the moral effect of partial 
defeat and disorder. Instead of this, the impact 
at Malaga was so distributed as to produce a 
substantial equality from one end to the other 
of the opposing fronts. The French, indeed, by 
strengthening their centre relatively to the van 
and rear, to some extent modified this condition 
in the particular instance ; but the fact does 
not seem to have induced any alteration in 
Rooke's dispositions. Barring mere accident, 
nothing conclusive can issue from such arrange- 
ments. The result accordingly was a drawn 
battle, although Rooke says that the fight, which 
was maintained on both sides "with great fury 
for three hours, . . . was the sharpest day's ser- 
vice that I ever saw ; " and he had seen much, 
— Beachy Head, La Hougue, Vigo Bay, not to 
mention his own great achievement in the capture 
of Gibraltar. 

This method of attack remained the ideal — if 
such a word is not a misnomer in such a case — 
of the British Navy, not merely as a matter of 
irreflective professional acceptance, but laid down 
in the official " Fighting Instructions." It cannot 
be said that these err on the side of lucidity ; but 
their meaning to contemporaries in this partic- 



of the Eighteenth Century 17 



ular respect is ascertained, not only by fair infer- 
ence from their contents, but by the practical 
commentary of numerous actions under common- 
place commanders4n-chief. It further received 
authoritative formulation in the specific finding 
of the Court-Martial upon Admiral Byng, which 
was signed by thirteen experienced ofHcers. 
"Admiral Byng should have caused his ships 
to tack together, and should immediately have 
borne down upon the enemy; his van steering 
for the enemy's van, his rear for its rear, each 
ship making for the one opposite to her in the 
enemy's line, under such sail as would have 
enabled the worst sailer to preserve her station in 
the line of battle." Each phrase of this opinion 
is a reflection of an article in the Instructions. 
The line of battle was the naval fetich of the day; 
and, be it remarked, it was the more dangerous 
because in itself an admirable and necessary 
instrument, constructed on principles essentially 
accurate. A standard wholly false may have its 
error demonstrated with comparative ease; but 
no servitude is more hopeless than that of unin- 
telligent submission to an idea formally correct, 
yet incomplete. It has all the vicious misleading 
of a half-truth unqualified by appreciation of 
modifying conditions; and so seamen who dis- 
dained theories, and hugged the belief in them- 
selves as "practical," became doctrinaires in the 
worst sense. 

It would seem, however, that a necessary 



1 8 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

antecedent to deliverance from a false concep- 
tion, — as from any injurious condition, — is a 
practical illustration of its fallacy. Working con- 
sequences must receive demonstration, concrete 
in some striking disastrous event, before improve- 
ment is undertaken. Such experience is painful 
to undergo ; but with most men, even in their 
private capacity, and in nearly all governmental 
action where mere public interests are at stake, 
remedy is rarely sought until suffering is not 
only felt, but signalized in a conspicuous incident. 
It is needless to say that the military professions 
in peace times are peculiarly liable to this apathy; 
like some sleepers, they can be awakened only 
by shaking. For them, war alone can subject 
accepted ideas to the extreme test of practice. It 
is doubtless perfectly true that acquaintance with 
military and naval history, mastery of their teach- 
ings, will go far to anticipate the penalty attach- 
ing to truth's last argument — chastisement ; but 
imagination is fondly impatient of warning by 
the past, and easily avails itself of fancied or 
superficial differences in contemporary condi- 
tions, to justify measures which ignore, or even 
directly contravene, ascertained and fundamental 
principles of universal application. 

Even immediate practical experience is misin- 
terpreted when incidents are thus viewed through 
the medium of a precedent bias. The Transvaal 
War, for instance, has afforded some striking 
lessons of needed modifications, consequent upon 



of the Eighteenth Century 



particular local factors, or upon developments in 
the material of war ; but does any thoughtful mili- 
tary man doubt that imagination has been actively 
at work, exaggerating or distorting, hastily waiv- 
ing aside permanent truth in favor of temporary 
prepossessions or accidental circumstance ? It is 
at least equally likely that the naval world at 
the present time is hugging some fond delusions 
in the excessive size and speed to which battle- 
ships are tending, and in the disproportionate 
weight assigned to the defensive as compared to 
the offensive factors in a given aggregate ton- 
nage. Imagination, theory, a priori reasoning, is 
here at variance with rational historical precedent, 
which has established the necessity of numbers 
as well as of individual power in battle-ships, and 
demonstrated the superiority of offensive over 
defensive strength in military systems. These 
— and other — counterbalancing considerations 
have in past wars enforced the adoption of a 
medium homogeneous type, as conducive both to 
adequate numbers, — which permit the division 
of the fleet when required for strategic or tactical 
purposes, — and also directly to offensive fleet 
strength by the greater facility of manoeuvring 
possessed by such vessels ; for the strength of a 
fleet lies not chiefly in the single units, but in their 
mutual support in elastic and rapid movement. 
Well tested precedent — experience — has here 
gone to the wall in favor of an untried forecast 
of supposed fundamental change in conditions. 



20 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

But experience is uncommonly disagreeable when 
she revenges herself after her own fashion. 

The British Navy of the eighteenth century in 
this way received an unpleasant proof of the 
faultiness of its then accepted conclusions, in the 
miscarriages of Mathews off Toulon, in 1744, 
and of Byng off Minorca, in 1756. So fixed were 
men's habits of thought that the lessons were not 
at once understood. As evidenced by the dis- 
tribution of censure, the results were attributed 
by contemporary judges to particular incidents 
of each battle, not to the erroneous underlying 
general plans, contravening all sound military 
precedent, which from the first made success 
improbable, indeed impossible, except by an 
inefficiency of the enemy which was not to be 
presumed. These battles therefore are important, 
militarily, in a sense not at all dependent upon 
their consequences, which were ephemeral. They 
are significant as extreme illustrations of incom- 
petent action, deriving from faulty traditions ; 
and they have the further value of showing the 
starting point, the zero of the scale, from which 
the progress of the century is to be measured. 
In describing them, therefore, attention will be 
given chiefly to those circumstances which ex- 
hibit the shackles under which fleet movements 
then labored, not only from the difficulties inher- 
ent to the sea and sailing ships, but from the 
ideas and methods of the times.'- Those incidents 
also will be selected which show how false stan- 



of the Eighteenth Century 21 

dards affected particular individuals, according to 
their personal characteristics. 

In Admiral Mathews' action, in February, 
1744, an allied fleet composed of sixteen French 
ships-of-the-line and twelve Spanish lay in Tou- 
lon, waiting to sail for a Spanish port. The 
British, in force numerically equal, were at 
anchor under the Hyeres Islands, a few miles to 
the eastward. They got underway when the 
allied movement began on February 20th ; but 
anchored again for the night, because the enemy 
that day came no farther than the outer road of 
Toulon. The next morning the French and 
Spaniards put to sea with a wind at first westerly, 
and stretched to the southward in long, single 
column, the sixteen French leading. At 10 a. m. 
the British followed, Vice- Admiral Lestock's 
division taking the van ; but the wind, shifting 
to east, threw the fleet on the port tack, on which 
the rear under Rear-Admiral Rowley had to lead. 
It became necessary, therefore, for this division 
and the centre to pass Lestock, which took some 
time with the light airs prevailing. Two or 
three manoeuvres succeeded, with the object of 
forming the fighting order, a column similar and 
parallel to that of the enemy, and to get closer to 
him. When night fell a signal was still flying 
for the line abreast, by which, if completed, the 
ships would be ranged on a line parallel to the 
allies, and heading towards them ; consequently 
abreast of each other. It would then need only 



22 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

a change of course to place them in column, sides 
to the enemy; which, as before said, was the fight- 
ing order — the " line of battle." 

The line abreast, however, was not fully formed 
at dark. Therefore the admiral, in order to hasten 
its completion, soon afterwards made a night sig- 
nal, with lanterns, for the fleet to bring-to, — that 
is, bring their sides to the wind, and stop. He 
intended thereby that the ships already in station 
should stand still, while the others were gaining 
their places, all which is a case of simple evolu- 
tion, by land as by sea. It was contended by the 
admiral that Vice-Admiral Lestock's division was 
then too far to the right and rear, and hence too 
distant from the enemy, and that it was his duty 
first to get into his station and then to bring-to. 
To this the vice-admiral on his trial replied, first, 
that he was not out of his station ; and, second, 
that if he were, the later signal, to bring-to, sus- 
pended the earlier, to form line abreast, and that 
it was therefore his business, without any discre- 
tion, to stop where he was. Concerning the first 
plea, a number of witnesses, very respectable* in 
point of rank and opportunity for seeing, testified 
that the vice-admiral did bring-to three or four 
miles to the right and rear of his place in the 
line abreast, reckoning his station from the admi- 
ral's ship; yet, as the Court peremptorily rejected 
their evidence, it is probably proper to accept the 
contemporary decision as to this matter of fact. 

But as regards the second plea, being a matter 



of the Eighteenth Century 23 

of military correctness, a difference of opinion is 
allowable. The Court adopted as its own the 
argument of the vice-admiral. Without entering 
here into a technical discussion, the Court's ruling, 
briefly stated, was that the second signal super- 
seded the first, so that, if the vice-admiral was in 
the wrong place, it was not his duty to get into 
the right before stopping ; and that this was 
doubly the case because an article of the Night 
Signals (7) prescribed that, under the conditions 
of the alleged offence, " a fleet sailing before the 
wind, or nearly so, if the admiral made the signal 
for the fleet to bring-to, the windward ships 
should bring-to first." Therefore, if Lestock was 
to windward, as the charge read, it was his duty 
to bring-to first and at once. It is evident, how- 
ever, that even the Sailing Instructions, cast-iron 
as they were, contemplated a fleet in order, not 
one in process of forming order; and that to 
bring-to helter-skelter, regardless of order, was to 
obey the letter rather than the spirit. Muddle- 
headed as Mathews seems to have been, what he 
was trying to do was clear enough ; and the duty 
of a subordinate was to carry out his evident aim. 
An order does not necessarily supersede its pred- 
ecessor, unless the two are incompatible. The 
whole incident, from Lestock's act to the Court's 
finding, is instructive as showing the slavish 
submission to the letter of the Instructions; a 
submission traceable not to the law merely, but 
to the added tradition that had then fast hold of 



24 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

men's minds. It is most interesting to note that 
the unfortunate Byng was one of the signers of 
this opinion, as he was also one of the judges 
that sentenced Mathews to be dismissed from the 
navy, as responsible for the general failure. 

During the night of the 21st the allies, who 
had stopped after dark, appear again to have 
made sail. Consequently, when day broke, the 
British found themselves some distance astern and 
to windward — northeast; the wind continuing 
easterly. Their line, indifferently well formed in 
van and centre, stretched over a length of nine 
miles through the straggling of the rear. Les- 
tock's ship was six miles from that of Mathews, 
whereas it should not have been more than two 
and a half, at most, in ordinary sailing; for battle, 
the Instructions allowed little over a half-mile. 
Accepting the Court's finding that he was in 
position at dark, this distance can only be at- 
tributed, as Lestock argued and the Court 
admitted, to a current — that most convenient 
of scape-goats in navigation. The allies, too, 
had a lagging rear body, five Spanish ships 
being quite a distance astern; but from van to 
rear they extended but six miles, against the 
British nine. It was the distance of the British 
rear, not straggling in van or centre, that consti- 
tuted this disadvantage. 

Mathews wished to wait till Lestock reached 
his place, but the allies were receding all the 
time ; and, though their pace was slackened to 



of the Eighteenth Century 25 

enable the five sternmost Spaniards to come up, 
the space between the fleets was increasing. It 
was the duty of the British admiral to force an 
action, on general principles ; but in addition he 
believed that the French intended to push for 
Gibraltar, enter the Atlantic, and join their Brest 
fleet, in order to cover an invasion of England by 
an army reported to be assembling at Dunkirk. 
Clearly, therefore, something must be done ; yet 
to enter into a general engagement with near a 
third of his command out of immediate support- 
ing distance was contrary to the accepted prin- 
ciples of the day. The fleet was not extended 
with that of the enemy, by which is meant that 
the respective vans, centres, and rears were not 
opposed ; the British van being only abreast of 
the alHed centre, their centre of the allied rear, 
Lestock tailing away astern and to windward, 
while the dozen leading French were some dis- 
tance ahead of both bodies. Now the Fighting 
Instructions required that, " If the admiral and 
his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they 
have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the 
van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the 
van of the enemies, and there to engage them." 
There was no alternative course laid down ; just 
as there was no punishment alternative to death 
in the Article of War under which Byng was 
shot. 

Yet the indications all were that to wait for 
this most formal and pedantic disposition, which 



26 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

ignored every principle of warfare, would be to 
throw away the chance of battle. The French, 
fresh from port and clean-bottomed, out-sailed 
the bulk of the British, as did the Spaniards, 
though to a less degree ; and it was part of 
Lestock's defence, admitted by the Court, that, 
doing his utmost, his division, as a whole, cer- 
tainly could not get abreast the allied rear. Les- 
tock, indeed, directly submitted to the Court that 
the commander-in-chief was at fault in not waiting 
till his line was thus extended and formed, and 
then all bearing down together, in line abreast; 
although by his own contention no such issue 
could have been reached that day, unless the 
allies were obliging enough to wait. " I aver, and 
I shall die in this opinion, that no man that is an 
officer, who knows his duty, will make the signal 
for line abreast to steer down upon an enemy, 
until the fleet has been stretched and extended 
in a line of battle, according to the 19th Article 
of the Fighting Instructions. Can it be service," 
he adds, " to bear down so much unformed and 
in confusion, that the van cannot possibly join 
battle with, or engage the van of the enemy, the 
centre with the centre, and the rear with the 
rear?" 

Mathews not being then on trial, the Court in 
its finding did not reply directly to this question ; 
but indirectly it left no doubt as to its opinion. 
" The Admiral, by bearing down as he did 
upon the rear division of the combined fleet, 



of the Eighteenth Century 27 

excluded the Vice- Admiral from any part of the 
engagement, if he could have come up; for if 
both lines had been closed, when the Admiral 
engaged the Real, there would have been no 
more than one ship of the enemy's fleet for 
the Vice-Admiral and his whole division to have 
engaged." Again, " It does not appear that the 
Vice-Admiral was in any part the cause of the 
miscarriage of his Majesty's fleet in the Mediter- 
ranean ; the brijiging on of the general engage- 
ment according to the igth Article of the Fight- 
ing Instructions . . . not depending upon him." 
Sixteen officers of the rank of captain and above 
signed these opinions, and there is no denying 
the words of the 19th Article; yet one wonders 
to see no recognition of the necessity of using 
your opportunity as you find it, of the moral 
effect of an approaching reserve, which Lestock's 
division would have constituted, of the part it 
may take in improving or repairing the results of 
an action — taking the place of injured friends, 
preventing injured foes escaping, turning doubtful 
battle into victory. But no ; these commonplaces 
of to-day and of all time were swamped by the 
Fighting Instructions. It will be seen in the 
sequel what a disastrous moral influence Lestock's 
aloofness exercised upon a few timid captains, and 
not improbably upon the entire subsequent course 
and worst errors of his unfortunate superior. 

One of the witnesses in the ensuing Courts- 
Martial testified that the commander-in-chief. 



28 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

under these perplexing circumstances, went into 
the stern gallery of the flag-ship Namur, and 
called to Captain Cornwall of the Marlborough, 
next astern, asking what he thought. Cornwall 
replied he " believed they would lose the glory of 
the day, if they did not attack the Spaniards," — 
i. e., the allied rear-centre and rear, — " the Vice- 
Admiral — Lestock — being so far astern." To 
which the admiral said, " If you '11 bear down 
and attack the Real'' — the Real Felipe, Spanish 
flag-ship, — "I'll be your second." This was 
about one o'clock, and the signal to engage had 
been made two hours earlier, probably with the 
double object of indicating the ultimate intention 
of the movements in hand, and the immediate 
urgency of forming the line. The admiral's 
words betray the indecision of an irresolute 
nature and of professional rustiness, but not of 
timidity, and Cornwall's words turned the scale. 
The course of the flag-ship Namur had hitherto 
been but a little off the wind, " lasking " down, 
to use the contemporary but long obsolete ex- 
pression, in such manner as to show the admiral's 
desire to engage himself with the enemy's centre, 
according to the Fighting Instructions; but now, 
in hopelessness of that result, she kept broad 
off, directly for the nearest enemy, accompanied 
closely by the Norfolk, her next ahead, and by 
the Marlborough. Rear- Admiral Rowley, com- 
manding the van, imitated the admiral's example, 
bringing the French ship abreast him to close 



of the Eighteenth Century 29 

action. He also was thoroughly supported by 
the two captains next astern of him, the second 
of whom was Edward Hawke, — afterwards the 
brilliant admiral, — in the Berwick. Two Brit- 
ish groups, each of three ships, were thus hotly 
engaged ; but with an interval between them of 
over half a mile, corresponding to the places 
open for six or seven other vessels. The con- 
duct of the ships named, under the immediate 
influence of the example set by the two admirals, 
suggests how much the average man is sustained 
by professional tone ; for a visible good example 
is simply a good standard, a high ideal, realized 
in action. 

Unfortunately, however, just as Hawke's later 
doings showed the man able to rise above the 
level of prescribed routine duty, there was found 
in the second astern of the Namur a captain 
capable of exceptional backwardness, of reason- 
ing himself into dereliction of clear duty, and 
thus effecting a demonstration that the example 
of timidity is full as contagious and more master- 
ful than that of audacity. The flag-ships and 
their supporters ranged themselves along the 
hostile line to windward, within point-blank 
range ; according to the 20th Article of the 
Fighting Instructions, which read, " Every Com- 
mander is to take care that his guns are not fired 
till he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a 
point-blank ; and by no means to suffer his guns 
to be fired over any of our own ships." The 



30 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

point-blank is the range of a cannon laid level, 
and the requirement was necessary to efficient 
action in those days of crude devices for pointing, 
with ordnance material of inferior power. Even 
sixty years later Nelson expressed his indifference 
to improvements in pointing, on the ground that 
the true way of fighting was to get so close that 
you could not miss your aim. Thus Mathews' 
captain placed the Namur, of ninety guns, within 
four hundred yards — less than quarter of a mile 
— of the Spanish flag-ship, the Real Felipe, 
of one hundred and ten guns ; and Cornwall 
brought the Marlborough immediately in the 
wake of the Namur, engaging the Spanish Her- 
cules, But the Dorsetshire, which should have 
followed the Marlborough, was stopped by her 
commander, Captain George Burrish, at a dis- 
tance which was estimated by several witnesses 
to be from half a mile to nearly a mile from the 
enemy, or, to use a very expressive phrase then 
current, " at random shot." The Court-Martial, 
however, in pronouncing upon this point, decided 
that inasmuch as a bar-shot came on board the 
Dorsetshire in this early part of the engagement, 
she must be construed to have brought-to within 
extreme point-blank. In view of the mass of 
testimony to the greater distance, this seems to 
have been simply giving the benefit of a doubt. 

Thus situated, the action between the Namur 
and Marlborough on the one side, and the Real 
Felipe and Hercules on the other, was for some 



of the Eighteenth Century 31 

time very hot ; but the Marlborough^ moving 
faster than the Namur, closed upon her, so that 
she had to get out of the way, which she did by 
moving ahead and at the same time hauling to 
windward, till she reached as far from the Span- 
ish line as the Dorsetshire had remained. The 
Court in this matter decided that, after the 
admiral had thus hauled off, the Dorsetshire was 
in a line, or as far to leeward — towards the 
enemy — as the admiral. The Marlborough was 
thus left alone, exposed to the fire of a ship 
heavier than herself, and also to that of the 
Hercules, which was able to train upon her a 
considerable part of her battery. Under these 
circumstances, it was the duty of the Dorsetshire, 
as it was the opportunity of her commander, by 
attacking the Hercules, to second, and support, 
the engaged ship ; but she continued aloof. 
After two hours — by 3 p. m. — the main and 
mizzen masts were cut out of the Marlborough, 
and she lost her captain with forty-two men 
killed, and one hundred and twenty wounded, 
out of a crew of seven hundred and fifty. Thus 
disabled, the sails on the foremast turned her 
head towards the enemy, and she lay moving 
sluggishly, between the fleets, but not under con- 
trol. The admiral now sent an officer to Bur- 
rish — the second that morning — to order him 
into his station and to support the Marlborough ; 
while to the latter, in response to an urgent rep- 
resentation by boat of her condition, and that she 



32 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

was threatened by the approach of the hitherto 
separated ships of the Spanish rear, he replied 
that the Namur was wearing and would come to 
her assistance. 

When Burrish received his message, he sent for 
his lieutenants on the quarter-deck, and spoke to 
them words which doubtless reflect the reasoning 
upon which he was justifying to himself his most 
culpable inaction. " Gentlemen, I sent for you 
to show you the position of our ships to wind- 
ward," (i. e, the ships of the centre division 
behind him, and Lestock's division), "likewise 
those five sail [Spanish] of the enemy that are 
astern of us. I have my orders to engage the 
Real, and you see I am bearing down for that 
purpose." The lieutenants remarked that he 
could do so with safety. To this he rejoined, 
with a curtness that testifies to the uneasiness of 
his mind, " I did not send for you to ask your 
opinions, but only to observe that not one of our 
ships is coming down to my assistance, in order 
to cut those five sail off, and in case those five 
sail should oblige me to haul my wind again, and 
leave the Marlborough, that you may be able to 
indemnify my conduct, if called in question." 
One witness also testified that he " was angry 
that Admiral Lestock's division did not bear 
down," — which was just enough, — and that "he 
thought it most advisable to keep his station ; " 
meaning by this, apparently, to remain where he 
was. His cross-examination of the evidence was 



of the Eighteenth Century ^2 

directed to prove the danger to his ship from 
these remaining Spaniards. This anxiety was 
wholly misplaced, and professionally unworthy. 
Quite independent of orders by signal and mes- 
sage, he was bound, in view of the condition of 
the Marlborough, to go to her relief, and to as- 
sume that the three English ships of the centre 
division, in his rear, would surely sustain him. 
To base contrary action upon a doubt of their 
faithfulness was to condemn himself. Four ships 
to five under such conditions should be rather 
a spur than a deterrent to an officer of spirit, who 
understands the obligation of his calling. 

Till this, the Dorsetshire had been under her 
three top-sails only. She appears then to have 
stood down under more sail, but very slowly, and 
here occurred another disaster which was largely 
chargeable to her being out of her station. See- 
ing the desperate state of the Marlborough, 
Mathews, who throughout managed blunder- 
ingly, with the single exception of the original 
attack, had thought^to aid her and divert the fire 
of the Real by sending against the latter a fire- 
ship. It was elementary that vessels of this class 
needed energetic support and cover in their des- 
perate work. Small in size, of no battery-force 
except against boat attacks, loaded with combus- 
tibles and powder, success in the use of them 
under an enemy's guns required not only imper- 
turbable coolness and nerve, but the utmost 
attainable immunity from the attention of the 

3 



34 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

enemy. This could be secured only by a heavy 
and sustained fire from their own fleet. With 
the Norfolk^ Namur, Marlborough^ and Dorset- 
shire in close line, as they should have been, and 
heavily engaged, a fire-ship might have passed 
between them, and, though at imminent hazard 
even so, have crossed the four hundred yards of 
intervening water to grapple the hostile flag-ship; 
but with the Marlborough lying disabled and 
alone, the admiral himself acting with indecision, 
and the Dorsetshire hanging aloof, the attempt 
was little short of hopeless. Still it was made, 
and the Anne Galley — such was her odd name 
— bore down, passing close by the Dorsetshire, 

It became doubly the duty of Burrish to act, 
to push home whatever demonstration was in 
his power to make ; the fire-ship, however, went 
by him and was permitted to pursue her des- 
perate mission without his support. The Real, 
seeing the Anne approach, bore up out of 
her line, and at the same time sent a strongly- 
manned launch to grapple and tow her out of 
the way. This was precisely one of the measures 
that it was the business of supporting ships to 
repel. The captain of the fire-ship, thrown upon 
his own resources, opened fire, a most hazardous 
measure, as much of his priming was with loose 
powder; but the launch readily avoided injury 
by taking position directly ahead, where the guns 
would not bear. The crew of the Anne were 
now ordered into the boat, except the captain 



of the Eighteenth Century 35 

and five others, who were to remain to the last 
moment, and light the train ; but from some 
cause not certainly demonstrated she exploded 
prematurely, being then within a hundred yards 
of the Real, It is necessary to say that the 
Court-Martial acquitted Burrish of blame, because 
he " had no orders to cover the fire-ship, either 
by signal or otherwise." Technically, the effect 
of this finding was to shift an obvious and gross 
blunder from the captain to some one else ; but 
it is evident that if the Dorsetshire had oc- 
cupied her station astern of the Marlborough^ 
the fire-ship's attempt would have been much 
facilitated. 

The Court decided unanimously that Burrish 
"ought to have borne down as far to leeward 
as where the admiral first began to engage, 
notwithstanding that the admiral might be 
hauled off before the Dorsetshire got so far to 
leeward." The point upon which the line should 
have been formed was thus established by the 
Court's finding. The subsequent proceedings 
of this ship need not be related. She now came 
slowly into close action, but that part of the 
enemy's order was already broken, and their rear 
vessels, the fear of which had controlled her 
captain, passed by as they came up without 
serious action. 

How far Burrish's example influenced the 
captains immediately behind him cannot certainly 
be afiirmed. Such shyness as he displayed is 



^6 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

not only infectious, but saps that indispensable 
basis upon which military effectiveness reposes, 
namely, the certainty of co-operation and support, 
derived from mutual confidence, inspired by mili- 
tary discipline, obedience, and honor. It is well 
to note here that the remoteness of Lestock's 
division thus affected Burrish, who evidently 
could not understand either its distance or its 
failure to approach, and who, being what he 
was, saw himself threatened with want of that 
backing which he himself was refusing to the 
Marlborough, While he was blaming Lestock, 
hard things were being said about him in Les- 
tock's division ; but the lesson of Lestock's in- 
fluence upon Burrish is not less noteworthy 
because the latter forfeited both duty and 
honor by his hesitation. It is to be feared that 
the captain of the Essex, following the Dorset- 
shire, was a coward ; even so Burrish, an old 
captain, certainly did not cheer his heart by 
good example, but rather gave him the pretext 
for keeping still farther off. The rearmost two 
ships of the division but confirm the evidences 
of demoralization, and the more so that their 
captains seem from the evidence to have been 
well-disposed average men ; but the five Spanish 
vessels approaching, with the Dorsetshire and 
the Essex holding aloof, was too much for their 
resolution — and not unnaturally. The broad 
result, however, was lamentable; for four British 
ships feared to come to the aid of an heroic 



of the Eighteenth Century jy 

and desperately injured consort, in deadly peril, 
because five enemies were drawing nigh. 

Upon these four therefore fell, and not un- 
justly, the weight of national anger. Burrish 
was cashiered, and declared forever incapable 
of being an officer in the Navy. Norris, of the 
Essex, absconded to avoid trial. The two others 
were pronounced unfit to command, but, although 
never again employed, mitigating circumstances 
in their behavior caused them to be retained 
on the lists of the Navy. It is not too much 
to say that they were men just of the stamp 
to have escaped this shame and ruin of reputa- 
tion, under more favorable conditions of pro- 
fessional tone. 

Concerning the vice-admiral's action at this 
time, which had its share in the ruin of these 
captains, another curious instance of men's bond- 
age to the order of battle transpires. The three 
rear ships of his squadron were clean, that is, 
relatively fast ; and they were rearmost for this 
very reason of speed, because, when the division 
led on the other tack, they, as headmost ships of 
the fleet, would be ready to chase. Nevertheless, 
when the admiral sent to Lestock in the fore- 
noon to hurry him into line, no order was given 
to these ships to press ahead. Why .? Lestock 
answers that to send those ships ahead, out of 
the place in the line prescribed to them by the 
commander-in-chief, was breaking the line, which 
should expose him to condign punishment ; and 



3 8 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

this opinion the Court also adopts : " The [only] 
messages sent to the Vice-Admiral by the Ad- 
miral's two lieutenants were to make what sail 
he possibly could, and to close the line with his 
division ; no signal was made for him to chase 
with his division, or send ships of his division 
to chase ; without which, while the signal for the 
line of battle was flying, and more especially after 
the messages brought him, he could not, without 
breach of duty, either have chased or sent ships 
to chase out of the line." It is to be noted that 
the word " chase " is here used in the strictest 
technical sense, not merely to exclude Lestock 
from diverting a ship to some other purpose than 
that of the engagement, but even from shifting 
her place in the general order in the view of 
furthering the engagement; for the Court says 
again : " The Vice- Admiral could not send any 
ships of his division to the relief of the Namur 
and Marlborough without breaking the order of 
battle, there being four ships of the Admiral's 
division " (to wit, the Dorsetshire and that crowd) 
" stationed between the Vice-Admiral's division 
and the Maryborough, which four ships might 
have gone to the assistance of the Marlborough!' 
The second in command thus had no liberty 
to repair either the oversights of his superior, or 
the results of obvious bad conduct in juniors ; for 
Burrish's backwardness was observed throughout 
the rear. There was a long road yet to travel 
to Nelson's personal action at St. Vincent and 



of the Eighteenth Century 39 

Copenhagen, or to his judicious order at Trafal- 
gar, " The Second in command will, after my 
intentions are made known to him, have the 
entire direction of his line." Even that great 
officer Hood, off the Chesapeake in 1781, felt 
himself tied hand arid foot by the union flag at 
the mizzen peak, — the signal for the line. Only 
the commander-in-chief could loose the bonds ; 
either by his personal initiative alone, and vigi- 
lant supervision, as did Hawke and Rodney, or 
by adding to this the broad view of discretion in 
subordinates which Nelson took. Before leaving 
this subject, note may be taken of a pettifogging 
argument advanced by Lestock and adopted by 
the Court, that orders to these three ships to press 
ahead would have resulted in nothing, because of 
the lightness of the wind then and afterwards. 
True, doubtless, and known after the fact ; but 
who before the event could predict the uncertain 
Mediterranean breeze, or how much each foot 
gained might contribute to the five minutes 
which measure the interval between victory and 
defeat. It is not by such lagging hesitations 
that battles are won. 

It is a trivial coincidence, though it may be 
noted in passing, that as it was the second astern 
of the commander-in-chief on whom fell the 
weight of the disgrace, so it was the second 
astern of the commander of the van who alone 
scored a distinct success, and achieved substan- 
tial gain of professional reputation. Hawke, at 



40 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

first bearing down, had come to close action with 
the Spanish Neptuno, a vessel nominally of less 
force than his own ship, the Berwick, The Nep- 
tuno was at length driven out of her line, with a 
loss of some two hundred killed and wounded. 
Thus left without an immediate antagonist, 
Hawke's attention was attracted by another 
Spanish vessel, the Poder, of the same nominal 
force as the Neptuno, and following her in the 
order ; with which four or five of the seven British 
ships, that should have closed the interval between 
Mathews and Rowley, were carrying on a distant 
and circumspect engagement, resembling in cau- 
tion that of the Dorsetshire and her followers. 
He carried the Berwick close alongside the new 
enemy, dismasted her, and after two hours com- 
pelled her to strike her flag ; the only vessel in 
either fleet that day to surrender, and then only 
after a resistance as honorable to Spain as that 
of the Marldorouo-h had been to Great Britain. 
Her commander refused to yield his sword to 
any but Hawke, who also took possession of the 
prize with a party from his own ship ; thus estab- 
lishing beyond dispute, by all customary formali- 
ties, his claim to the one trophy of the day. The 
occurrences through which she was afterwards 
lost to the British, so that only the honor of the 
capture remained, and that to Hawke alone, 
must be briefly told ; for they, too, are a part of 
the mismanagement that has given to this battle 
its particular significance in naval history. 



of the Eighteenth Century 41 

As the unlucky fire-ship bore down, Mathews 
began wearing the Namur, — turning her round, 
that is, from the wind, and therefore towards the 
Marlborough and her opponents. In this he 
seems to have had first in view supporting the 
fire-ship and covering the Marlborough. Boats 
were ahead of the latter towing her from the 
enemy. As she was thus being dragged off, but 
after the fire-ship blew up, the Namur passed 
between her and the hostile line ; then, hauling 
to the wind on the starboard tack, she stood north 
towards Lestock's division. This movement to 
the rear was imitated by the British ships of 
the centre, — the Dorsetshire and others, — and, 
beyond a brush with the rear five Spanish vessels 
as they came up, the action in the centre here 
ceased. 

This retrograde movement of Mathews and his 
division drew the centre away from the van. At 
about the same time the allied van, composed 
wholly of French ships, seeing the straits of the 
Poder and the Real, tacked — turned round — to 
come down to their assistance. This imposed a 
like movement upon the British van, lest it should 
be engaged apart from the rest of the fleet, and 
perhaps doubled on, by a number of perfectly 
fresh ships. The Poder, having lost her chief 
spars, could not be carried off, nor was Hawke 
able even to remove the men he had thrown 
on board. She was therefore retaken by the 
French. Lieutenant Lloyd, the officer in charge, 



42 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

escaped with a part of the prize crew, taking with 
him also a number of Spanish prisoners ; but a 
junior lieutenant and some seamen were left 
behind and captured. The Berwick being com- 
pelled to follow her division, Lloyd could not 
rejoin her till the following day, and sought 
refuge for that night on board another ship. 

The next day, February 23d, Mathews had 
another chance. As he did not pursue during 
the night, while the allies continued to retire, he 
was a long way off at daylight ; but his fleet was 
now united, and the enemy retreating. He need 
therefore have no anxiety about the crippled 
Marlborough, but could follow freely; whereas, 
the enemy being pursued, their injured ships both 
retarded the movement and were endangered. In 
the course of the day, the Poder had lagged so far 
behind that Admiral Rowley, who had recognized 
Hawke's enterprise the day before, directed him 
to move down upon her. As he approached, the 
French ship in company abandoned her, but in 
taking possession Hawke was anticipated by the 
Essex, which Mathews himself had ordered to do 
so. The captain of the Essex got hold of the 
Spanish flag, with some other small trophies, 
which he afterwards refused to give up unless 
compelled ; and, as Mathews would not give an 
order, Hawke never got them. Thus curiously 
it came to pass that the one man who above 
several misdemeanants distinguished himself by 
bad conduct, amounting to cowardice, and who 



of the Eighteenth Century 43 

ran away to escape trial, kept the tokens of the 
single achievement of the day from him whose 
valor had won them. The Poder herself was set 
on fire, and destroyed. 

The British fleet continued to follow during 
the 23d, and at nightfall was within three or 
four miles of the enemy, when Mathews again 
stopped. The allies, continuing to withdraw, 
were next morning nearly out of sight, and 
further pursuit was abandoned. 

Thus ended this almost forgotten affair, which 
in its day occasioned to an unusual degree the 
popular excitement and discussion which always 
follow marked disaster, and but rarely attend 
success. Besides the particular missteps of Les- 
tock and the individual captains, which have been 
mentioned, Mathews's conduct was marked by 
serious failures in professional competency. The 
charge preferred against him which seems most 
to have attracted attention, and to have been 
considered most damaging, was taking his fleet 
into action in a confused and disorderly manner. 
It is significant of professional standards that 
this should have assumed such prominence ; for, 
however faulty may have been his previous man- 
agement, the most creditable part of his conduct 
was the manner of his attack. He did not wait 
for a pedantically accurate line, but by a straight- 
forward onslaught, at a favorable moment, upon 
a part of the enemy, — and that the rear, — set 
an example which, had it been followed by all 



44 



Naval Warfare at the Beginning 



who could do so, would probably have resulted 
in a distinct and brilliant success. He was justi- 
fied — if he reasoned at all — in expecting that 
Lestock could get into action as soon as the 
French van; or, at the least, before it could 
reverse the conditions which would have ensued 
from a vigorous encounter upon the lines of 
Mathews's attack. It is most doubtful, indeed, 
whether the French van would have ventured to 
engage, in the case supposed; for the French 
admiral, writing to the French ambassador in 
Spain, used these words: "It is clear, in the 
situation I was in, it could not be expected that 
a French admiral should go to the assistance of 
the Spaniards ; neither could the vanguard of the 
fleet do it without running the hazard of being 
surrounded by the vanguard of the English, 
which had the wind of them ; but as soon as the 
English left me I drew together all the ships of 
both squadrons, and sailed immediately to the 
assistance of the Real Felipe, in doing which I 
was exposed to the fire of the whole English 
line ; but happily the English did not punish my 
rashness as it deserved." Evidently De Court 
shared to the full the professional caution which 
marked the French naval oiiicers, with all their 
personal courage ; for if it was rash to pass the 
hostile line after it wore, it would be reckless to 
do so before. 

Considered simply as a tactical situation, or 
problem, quite independent of any tactical fore- 



of the Eighteenth Century 45 

thought or insight on the part of the commander- 
in-chief, — of which there is Httle indication, — 
the conditions resulting from his attack were well 
summed up in a contemporary publication, wholly 
adverse to Mathews in tone, and saturated with 
the professional prepossessions embodied in the 
Fighting Instructions. This writer, who claims 
to be a naval officer, says : 

''The whole amount of this fight is that the centre, 
consisting of eleven ships-of-the-line, together with two 
of-the-line and two fifty-gun ships of the Rear- Admiral's 
division [the van], were able to destroy the whole Span- 
ish squadron, much more so as three of those ships went 
on with the French [the alHed van], and four of the 
sternmost did not get up with their admiral before it 
was darkish, long after the fire-ship's misfortune, so that 
the whole afternoon there were only five, out of which 
the Constante was beat away in less than an hour ; what 
then fifteen ships could be doing from half an hour 
past one till past five, no less than four hours, and these 
ships not taken, burnt, and destroyed, is the question 
which behooves them to answer." 

In brief, then, Mathews's attack was so delivered 
that the weight of thirteen of-the-line fell upon 
five Spanish of the same class, the discomfiture of 
which, actually accomplished even under the mis- 
behavior of several British ships, separated the 
extreme rear, five other Spanish vessels, from the 
rest of the allies. Whatever the personal merit 
or lack of merit on the part of the commander- 
in-chief, such an opportunity, pushed home by a 



46 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

"band of brothers," would at the least have wiped 
out these rear ten ships of the allies ; nor could 
the remainder in the van have redeemed the situ- 
ation. As for the method of attack, it is worthy 
of note that, although adopted by Mathews 
accidentally, it anticipated, not only the best gen- 
eral practice of a later date, but specifically the 
purpose of Rodney in the action which he him- 
self considered the most meritorious of his whole 
career, — that of April 1 7, 1 780. The decisive 
signal given by him on that occasion, as explained 
by himself, meant that each ship should steer, 
not for the ship corresponding numerically to 
her in the enemy's order, but for the one imme- 
diately opposite at the time the signal was made. 
This is what Mathews and his seconds did, and 
others should have imitated. Singularly enough, 
not only was the opportunity thus created lost, 
but there is no trace of its existence, even, being 
appreciated in such wise as to affect professional 
opinion. As far as Mathews himself was con- 
cerned, the accounts show that his conduct, 
instead of indicating tactical sagacity, was a 
mere counsel of desperation. 

But after engaging he committed palpable and 
even discreditable mistakes. Hauling to wind- 
ward — away — when the Marlborough forced 
him ahead, abandoned that ship to overwhelming 
numbers, and countenanced the irresolution of 
the Dorsetshire and others. Continuing to stand 
north, after wearing on the evening of the battle, 



of the Eighteenth Century 47 

was virtually a retreat, unjustified by the condi- 
tions ; and it would seem that the same false step 
gravely imperilled the Berwick, Hawke holding 
on, most properly, to the very last moment of 
safety, in order to get back his prize-crew. 
Bringing-to on the night of the 23d was an error 
of the same character as standing north during 
that of the 22d. It was the act of a doubtful, 
irresolute man, — irresolute, not because a coward, 
but because wanting in the self-confidence that 
springs from conscious professional competency. 
In short, the commander-in-chief's unfitness was 
graphically portrayed in the conversation with 
Cornwall from the quarter gallery of the flag-ship. 
" If you approve and will go down with me, I will 
go down." Like so many men, he needed a 
backer, to settle his doubts and to stiffen his back- 
bone. The instance is far from unique. 

In the case of Byng, as of Mathews, we are not 
concerned with the general considerations of the 
campaign to which the battle was incidental. It 
is sufficient to note that in Minorca, then a Brit- 
ish possession, the French had landed an army of 
15,000 men, with siege artillery sufficient to 
reduce the principal port and fortress, Port 
Mahon ; upon which the whole island must fall. 
Their communications with France depended 
upon the French fleet cruising in the neighbor- 
hood. Serious injury inflicted upon it would 
therefore go far to relieve the invested garrison. 

Under these circumstances the British fleet 



48 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

sighted Minorca on the 19th of May, 1756, and 
was attempting to exchange information with the 
besieged, when the French fleet was seen in the 
southeast. Byng stood towards it, abandoning 
for the time the effort to communicate. That 
night both fleets manoeuvred for advantage of 
position with regard to the wind. The next day, 
between 9 and 10 a. m., they came again in view 
of each other, and at 1 1 were about six miles apart, 
the French still to the southeast, with a breeze 
at south-southwest to southwest. The British 
once more advanced towards them, close hauled 
on the starboard tack, heading southeasterly, the 
enemy standing on the opposite tack, heading 
westerly, both carrying sail to secure the weather 
gage (Bi, Fi). It appeared at first that the French 
would pass ahead of the British, retaining the 
windward position ; but towards noon the wind 
changed, enabling the latter to lie up a point or 
two higher (Bo). This also forced the bows of 
the several French vessels off their course, and put 
them out of a regular line of battle ; that is, they 
could no longer sail in each other's wake (Fo). 
Being thus disordered, they reformed on the 
same tack, heading northwest, with the wind very 
little forward of the beam. This not only took 
time, but lost ground to leeward, because the 
quickest way to re-establish the order was for the 
mass of the fleet to take their new positions from 
the leewardmost vessel. When formed (F3), as 
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of the Eighteenth Century 49 

passing ahead, they hove-to with their main- 
topsails aback, — stopped, — awaiting the attack, 
which was thenceforth inevitable and close at 
hand. 

In consequence of what has been stated, the 
British Hne (B2 — B3) — more properly, column — 
was passing ahead of the French (F2 — F3), steer- 
ing towards their rear, in a direction in a general 
sense opposite to theirs, but not parallel ; that is, 
the British course made an angle, of between 
thirty and forty-five degrees, with the line on 
which their enemy was ranged. Hence, barring 
orders to the contrary, — which were not given, — 
each British ship was at its nearest to the enemy 
as she passed their van, and became more and more 
distant as she drew to the rear. It would have 
been impossible to realize more exactly the post- 
ulate of the 17th Article of the Fighting 
Instructions, which in itself voiced the ideal con- 
ditions of an advantageous naval position for 
attack, as conceived by the average ofificer of 
the day; and, as though most effectually to 
demonstrate once for all how that sort of 
thing would work, the adjunct circumstances 
approached perfection. The admiral was thor- 
oughly wedded to the old system, without an 
idea of departing from it, and there was a fair 
working breeze with which to give it effect, 
for the ships under topsails and foresail would 
go about three knots ; with top-gallant sails, per- 
haps over four. A fifty-gun ship, about the 

4 



50 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

middle of the engagement, had to close her 
lower deck ports when she set her top-gallant 
sails on the wind, which had then freshened 
a little. 

The 1 7th Article read thus : " If the admiral 
see the enemy standing towards him, and he 
has the wind of them, the van of the fleet 
is to make sail till they come the length of 
the enemy's rear, and our rear abreast of the 
enemy's van ; then he that is in the rear of 
our fleet is to tack first, and every ship one 
after another as fast as they can throughout 
the whole line; and if the admiral will have 
the whole fleet to tack together, the sooner to 
put them in a posture of engaging the enemy, 
he will hoist " a prescribed signal, " and fire 
a gun; and whilst they are in fight with the 
enemy the ships will keep at half a cable's 
length — one hundred yards — one of the other." 
All this Byng aimed to do. The conditions ex- 
actly fitted, and he exactly followed the rules, with 
one or two slight exceptions, which will appear, 
and for which the Court duly censured him. 

When thus much had been done, the 19th 
Article in turn found its postulate realized, and 
laid down its corresponding instruction : " If the 
admiral and his fleet have the wind of the 
enemy, and they have stretched themselves in 
a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet 
is to steer with the van of the enemy's, and 
there to engage with them." The precise force 



of the Eighteenth Century 51 

of " steer with " is not immediately apparent to 
us to-day, nor does it seem to have been perfectly 
clear then ; for the question was put to the 
captain of the flag-ship, — the heroic Gardiner, 

" You have been asked if the admiral did not 

express some uneasiness at Captain Andrews " 
— of the van ship in the action — " not seeming 
to understand the 19th Article of the Fighting 
Instructions ; Do not you understand that article 
to relate to our van particularly when the two 
fleets are [already] in a parallel line of battle to 
each other ? " (As TT, F3). A7iswer : " I appre- 
hended it in the situation " [not parallel] " we were 
in^ if the word For were instead of the word 
With, he would, I apprehend, have steered directly 
for the van ship of the Enemy." Question. " As 
the 19th Article expresses to steer with the 
van of the enemy, if the leading ship had done 
so, in the oblique hne we were in with the 
enemy, and every ship had observed it the same, 
would it not have prevented our rear coming to 
action at all, at least within a proper distance ? " 
Answer: "Rear, and van too." "Steer with" 
therefore meant, to the Court and to Gardiner, 
to steer parallel to the enemy, — possibly like- 
wise abreast, — and if the fleets were already 
parallel the instruction would work ; but neither 
the articles themselves, nor Byng by his signals, 
did anything to effect parallelism before making 
the signal to engage. 

1 This wording and punctuation is exact from the text. 



52 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

The captain of the ship sternmost in passing, 
which became the van when the fleet tacked 
together according to the Instructions and 
signals, evidently shared Gardiner's impression ; 
when about, he steered parallel to — " with " — 
the French, who had the wind nearly abeam. 
The mischief was that the ships ahead of him 
in passing were successively more and more 
distant from the enemy, and if they too, after 
tacking, steered with the latter, they would never 
get any nearer. The impasse is clear. Other 
measures doubtless would enable an admiral 
to range his fleet parallel to the enemy at any 
chosen distance, by taking a position himself and 
forming the fleet on his ship ; or, in this particu- 
lar instance, Byng being with the van as it, on 
the starboard tack, was passing the enemy 
(B3 B3), could at any moment have brought his 
fleet parallel to the French by signalling the 
then van ship to keep away a certain amount, 
the rest following in her wake. Nothing to 
that effect being in the Instructions, it seems 
not to have occurred to him. His one idea was 
to conform to them, and he apprehended that 
after tacking, as they prescribed, the new van 
ship would bear down and engage without 
further orders, keeping parallel to the French 
when within point-blank, the others following 
her as they could ; a process which, from the 
varying distances, would expose each to a con- 
centrated fire as they successively approached. 



of the Eighteenth Century ^2 

Byng's action is only explicable to the writer 
by supposing that he thus by " steer with " 
understood " steer for ; " for when, after the fleet 
tacked together, the new van ship (formerly the 
rear) did not of her own motion head for the 
leading enemy, he signalled her to steer one 
point, and then two points, in that direction. 
This, he explained in his defence, was " to put 
the leading captain in mind of his Instructions, 
who I perceived did not steer away with the 
enemy's leading ship agreeable to the 19th Arti- 
cle of the Fighting Instructions." The results 
of these orders not answering his expectations, 
he then made the signal to engage, as the only 
remaining way perceptible to him for carrying 
out the Instructions. 

To summarize the foregoing, up to the moment 
the signal for battle was made : While the fleets 
were striving for the weather gage, the wind had 
shifted to the southwest. The French, momenta- 
rily disordered by the change, had formed in line 
ahead about noon, heading northwest, westerly, so 
as just to keep their main topsails aback and the 
ships with bare steerage way, but under command 
(F3). The British standing south-southeast, by the 
wind, were passing (B2— B3) across the head of the 
enemy's fleet at a distance of from three to two 
miles — the latter being the estimate by their 
ships then in the rear. The French having 
twelve vessels in line and the British thirteen, the 
gradual progress of the latter should bring their 



54 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

then van " the length of the enemy's rear," about 
the time the rear came abreast of his van. When 
this happened, the Instructions required that the 
fleet tack together, and then stand for the enemy, 
ship to ship, number one to number one, and so 
along: the line till the number twelves met/ 

This Byng purposed to do, but, unluckily for 
himself, ventured on a refinement. Considering 
that, if his vessels bore down when abreast their 
respective antagonists, they would go bows-on, 
perpendicularly, subject to a raking — enfilading 
— fire, he deferred the signal to tack till his van 
had passed some distance beyond the French rear, 
because thus they would have to approach in a 
slanting direction. He left out of his account here 
the fact that all long columns tend to straggle in 
the rear ; hence, although he waited till his three 
or four leading ships had passed the enemy 
before making signal to tack, the rear had got no 
farther than abreast the hostile van. Two of the 
clearest witnesses, Baird of the Portland, next to 
the then rear ship, and Cornwall of the Revenge, 
seventh from it, testified that, after tacking 
together, to the port tack, when they kept away 
for the enemy in obedience to the signal for 
battle, it was necessary, in order to reach their 
particular opponents, to bring the wind not only 
as far as astern, but on the starboard quarter, 

1 So far was literalism carried, that, before the signal for battle, Byng 
evened numbers with his opponent by directing his weakest ship to 
leave the line, with no other orders than to be ready to take the place of 
a disabled vessel. 



of the Eighteenth Century ^^ 

showing that they had been in rear of their sta- 
tion before tacking, and so too far ahead after it ; 
while Durell of the Trident, ninth from rear and 
therefore fifth from van, asserted that at the 
same moment the British van, which after tacking 
became the rear, had overpassed the enemy by 
five or six ships. This may be an exaggeration, 
but that three or four vessels had gone beyond 
is proved by evidence from the ships at that end 
of the line. 

The Court therefore distinctly censured the 
admiral for this novelty: "Unanimously, the 
Court are of opinion that when the British fleet 
on the starboard tack were stretched abreast, or 
about the beam of the enemy's line, the admiral 
should have tacked the fleet all together, and 
immediately have conducted it on a direct course 
for the enemy, the van steering for the enemy's 
van," etc. The instructive point, however, is not 
Byng's variation, nor the Court's censure, but the 
idea, common to both, that the one and only way 
to use your dozen ships under the conditions was 
to send each against a separate antagonist. The 
highest and authoritative conception of a fleet 
action was thus a dozen naval duels, occurring 
simultaneously, under initial conditions unfavor- 
able to the assailant. It is almost needless to 
remark that this is as contrary to universal mili- 
tary teaching as it was to the practice of Rodney, 
Howe, Jervis, and Nelson, a generation or two 
later. 



56 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

This is, in fact, the chief significance of this 
action, which ratified and in a measure closed the 
effete system to which the middle eighteenth 
century had degraded the erroneous, but com- 
paratively hearty, tradition received by it from 
the seventeenth. It is true, the same blunder- 
ing method was illustrated in the War of 1778. 
Arbuthnot and Graves, captains when Byng was 
tried, followed his plan in 1781, with like dem- 
onstration of practical disaster attending false 
theory; but, while the tactical inefficiency was 
little less, the evidence of faint-hearted profes- 
sional incompetency, of utter personal inade- 
quacy, was at least not so glaring. It is the 
combination of the two in the person of the 
same commander that has given to this action its 
pitiful pre-eminence in the naval annals of the 
century. 

It is, therefore, not so much to point out the 
lesson, as to reinforce its teaching by the exem- 
plification of the practical results, that there is 
advantage in tracing the sequel of events in this 
battle. The signal to tack was made when the 
British van had reached beyond the enemy's 
rear, at a very little after i p.m. (B3). This re- 
versed the line of battle, the rear becoming the 
van, on the port tack. When done, the new 
van was about two miles from that of the 
French (F4) ; the new rear, in which Byng was 
fourth from sternmost, was three and a half or 
four from their rear. Between this and 2 p. m. 



of the Eighteenth Century 57 

came the signals for the ship then leading to keep 
two points, twenty-five degrees, more to starboard, 
— towards the enemy; a measure which could 
only have the bad effect of increasing the angle 
which the British line already made with that 
of the French, and the consequent inequality of 
distance to be traversed by their vessels in reach- 
ing their opponents. At 2.20 the signal for battle 
was made, and was repeated by the second in 
command. Rear- Admiral Temple West, who was 
in the fourth ship from the van. His division of 
six bore up at once and ran straight down before 
the wind, under topsails only, for their several 
antagonists; the sole exception being the van- 
most vessel, which took the slanting direction 
desired by Byng, with the consequence that she 
got ahead of her position, had to back and to 
wear to regain it, and was worse punished than 
any of her comrades. The others engaged in 
line, within point-blank, the rear-admiral hoisting 
the flag for close action (B4). Fifteen minutes 
later, the sixth ship, and rearm.ost of the van, 
the Intrepid, lost her fore topmast, which crippled 
her. 

The seventh ship, which was the leader of the 
rear, Byng's own division, got out of his hands 
before he could hold her. Her captain, Frederick 
Cornwall, was nephew to the gallant fellow who 
fell backing Mathews so nobly off Toulon, and 
had then succeeded to the command of the Marl-- 
borough, fighting her till himself disabled. He 



58 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

had to bring the wind on the starboard quarter 
of his little sixty-four, in order to reach the sev- 
enth in the enemy's line, which was an eighty-gun 
ship, carrying the flag of the French admiral. 
This post, by professional etiquette, as by evident 
military considerations, Byng owed to his own 
flag-ship, of equal force. 

The rest of the rear division the commander- 
in-chief attempted to carry with himself, slanting 
down ; or, as the naval term then had it, " lask- 
ing " towards the enemy. The flag-ship kept 
away four points — forty-five degrees ; but hardly 
had she started, under the very moderate canvas 
of topsails and foresail, to cover the much greater 
distance to be travelled, in order to support the 
van by engaging the enemy's rear, when Byng 
observed that the two ships on his left — towards 
the van — were not keeping pace with him. He 
ordered the main and mizzen topsails to be backed 
to wait for them. Gardiner, the captain, " took 
the liberty of offering the opinion " that, if sail 
were increased instead of reduced, the ships con- 
cerned would take the hint, that they would all 
be sooner alongside the enemy, and probably 
receive less damage in going down. It was a 
question of example. The admiral replied, "You 
see that the signal for the line is out, and I am 
ahead of those two ships ; and you would not 
have me, as admiral of the fleet, run down as if 
I was going to engage a single ship. It was Mr. 
Mathews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not 



of the Eighteenth Century 59 

carrying his force down together, which I shall 
endeavor to avoid." Gardiner again " took the lib- 
erty " of saying he w^ould answer for one of the two 
captains doing his duty. The incident, up to the 
ship gathering way again, occupied less than ten 
minutes ; but with the van going down headlong 
— as it ought — one ceases to wonder at the 
impression on the public produced by one who 
preferred lagging for laggards to hastening to 
support the forward, and that the populace sus- 
pected something worse than pedantry in such 
reasoning at such a moment. When way was 
resumed, it was again under the very leisurely 
canvas of topsails and foresail. 

By this had occurred the incident of the In- 
trepid losing her foretopmast. It was an ordinary 
casualty of battle, and one to be expected ; but 
to such a temper as Byng's, and under the 
cast-iron regulations of the Instructions, it 
entailed consequences fatal to success in the 
action, — if success were ever attainable under 
such a method, — and was ultimately fatal to 
the admiral himself. The wreck of the fallen 
mast was cleared, and the foresail set to maintain 
speed, but, despite all, the Intrepid dropped 
astern in the line. Cornwall in the Revenue 
was taking his place at the moment, and fearing 
that the Intrepid would come back upon him, 
if in her wake, he brought up first a little 
to windward, on her quarter; then, thinking 
that she was holding her way, he bore up again. 



6o Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

At this particular instant he looked behind, and 
saw the admiral and other ships a considerable 
distance astern and to windward ; much Les- 
tock's position in Mathews's action. This was 
the stoppage already mentioned, to wait for the 
two other ships. Had Cornwall been Burrish, 
he might in this have seen occasion for waiting 
himself; but he saw rather the need of the 
crippled ship. The Revenge took position on 
the Intrepid' s lee quarter, to support her against 
the enemy's fire, concentrated on her when her 
mast was seen to fall. As her way slackened, 
the Revenge approached her, and about fifteen 
minutes later the ship following, the Princess 
Louisa, — one of those for which Byng had 
waited, — loomed up close behind Cornwall, who 
expected her to run him on board, her braces 
being shot away. She managed, however, with 
the helm to back her sails, and dropped clear; 
but in so doing got in the way of the vessel 
next after her, the Trident, which immediately 
preceded Byng. The captain of the Trident, 
slanting down with the rest of the division, 
saw the situation, put his helm up, ran under 
the stern of the Louisa, passed on her lee side, 
— nearest the enemy, — and ranged up behind 
the Revenge; but in doing this he not only 
crossed the stern of the Louisa, but the bow 
of the admiral's ship — the Ramillies. 

Under proper management the Ramillies 
doubtless could have done just what the Trident 



of the Eighteenth Century 6i 

did, — keep away with the helm, till the ships 
ahead of her were cleared ; she would be at 
least hasting towards the enemy. But the noise 
of battle was in the air, and the crew of the 
Ramillies began to fire without orders, at an 
improper distance. The admiral permitted them 
to continue, and the smoke enveloping the ship 
prevented fully noting the incidents just nar- 
rated. It was, however, seen before the firing 
that the Louisa was come up into the wind 
with her topsails shaking, and the Trident pass- 
ing her to leeward. There should, therefore, 
have been some preparation of mind for the 
fact suddenly reported to the admiral, by a 
military passenger on the quarter deck, that 
a British ship was close aboard, on the lee bow. 
It was the Trident that had crossed from wind- 
ward to leeward for the reasons given, and an 
instant later the Louisa was seen on the weather 
bow. Instead of keeping off, as the Trident 
had done, the admiral ordered the foresail hauled 
up, the helm down, lufied the ship to the wind, 
and braced the foretopsail sharp aback ; . the 
effect of which was first to stop her way, and 
then to pay her head off to leeward, clear of 
the two vessels. About quarter of an hour 
elapsed, by Captain Gardiner's evidence, from 
the time that the Ramillies s head pointed clear 
of the Trident and Louisa before sail was again 
made to go forward to aid the van. The battle 
was already lost, and in fact had passed out 



62 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

of Byng's control, owing to his previous action ; 
nevertheless this further delay, though probably 
due only to the importance attached by the 
admiral to regularity of movement, had a dis- 
creditable appearance. 

The Court held that the admiral was justified 
in not trying to go to leeward of the two ships, 
under the circumstances when they were seen; 
but blamed him for permitting the useless can- 
nonade which prevented seeing them sooner. 
The results at this moment in other parts of 
the field should be summarized, as they show 
both the cause and the character of the failures 
due to faulty management. 

The five ships of the British van had already 
seen their adversaries withdraw after a sharp 
engagement. This seems to have been due to 
the fact that two were individually overmatched 
and driven off; whereupon the other three 
retired because unable to contend with five. 
But no support reached the British van at 
this important moment ; on the contrary, the 
British rear was now two or three miles distant, 
astern and to windward. The lagging of the 
crippled Intrepid held back the Revenge, Corn- 
wall was detained some time by the old idea 
that he needed a signal to pass her, because 
to do so was breaking the order established by 
the admiral ; but concluding at last that Byng 
was unaware of the conditions, and seeing that 
his immediate opponent — the French admiral 



of the Eighteenth Century 63 

— was drawing ahead, he sent word to the 
Intrepid to hold her fire for a few moments 
till he could go by. He then made sail. 

The French rear with its commander-in-chief 
had been watching the incidents narrated : the 
crippling of the Intrepid, the consequent disorder 
in the British rear, and the increasing distance 
between it and the van. When the Revenge, 
however, passed ahead, and Byng disentangled 
his flag-ship, the moment for a decisive step 
arrived. The French rear vessels were nearer 
the British van than Byng's division was. They 
now filled their topsails, made more sail, stood 
for the British leading ships, already partially 
unrigged, passed by, and in so doing gave them 
the fire of a number of substantially fresh vessels, 
which had undergone only a distant and ineffec- 
tive cannonade. Byng saw what was about to 
happen, and also set more canvas ; but it was no 
longer possible to retrieve the preceding errors. 
The French admiral had it in his power very 
seriously to damage, if not to destroy the hostile 
van ; but in accordance with the tradition of his 
nation he played an over-prudent game, strictly 
defensive, and kept too far off. After exchang- 
ing distant broadsides, he steered northwest to- 
wards Mahon, satisfied that he had for the time 
disabled his opponent. The British that eve- 
ning tacked off-shore and stood to the southeast. 
Four days later they abandoned the field, return- 
ing to Gibraltar. The fall of Minorca followed. 



64 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

Nothing could have been much worse than the 
deplorable management of this action on the part 
of the commander-in-chief. It is a conspicuous 
instance of weak and halting execution, superim- 
posed upon a professional conception radically 
erroneous ; and it reflected throughout the timid 
hesitancy of spirit which dictated the return to 
Gibraltar, under the always doubtful sanction of 
a Council of War. But the historical value of 
the lesson is diminished if attention is confined 
to the shortcomings of the admiral, neglectful 
of the fact that his views as to the necessity 
to observe the routine of the Fighting Instruc- 
tions are reproduced in the evidence of the 
captains ; and that the finding of the Court 
censures, not the general idea, but certain details, 
important yet secondary. Durell, being asked 
whether the admiral could not have passed under 
the stern of the Trident, as the Trident had 
under that of the Louisa, replies, " Yes, but she 
would have been to leeward of those ships 
ahead ; " that is, to leeward of the line. Gar- 
diner "knows no other method than what the 
admiral took, for preserving the line regular." 
Cornwall cannot pass the Intrepid without a 
signal, because it would be breaking the order. 
These were all good men. 

The Court, composed of four admirals and 
nine captains, the junior of whom had over ten 
years seniority, give in their finding no shadow 
of disapproval to the broad outlines of the action. 



of the Eighteenth Century 6^ 

There can be, therefore, no doubt about service 
standards. The questions put to the witnesses 
reveal indeed a distinct preference for forming 
the line of battle parallel to that of the enemy 
before bearing down, so that all the ships may 
have the same distance to go, have a clear field 
ahead of each, and the comparatively simple 
mutual bearing of "abeam" to observe; but it 
refrains from censuring the admiral for forming 
on a line very oblique to that of the enemy, 
which entailed the burden of changing the rela- 
tive positions during standing down, so as to 
arrive all together, on a line parallel to his ; while 
the course itself being oblique alike to their own 
front and the enemy's, each preceding ship was 
liable to get in the way, " to prove an impedi- 
ment," to its follower, — as actually happened. 
It was indeed impossible to fault the commander- 
in-chief in this particular, because his action was 
conformable to the letter of the Instructions, 
with which he was evidently and subserviently 
eager to comply. 

The decision of the Court therefore was, in 
substance, that in bearing down upon the enemy 
Byng did not do wrong in starting upon a line 
oblique to them ; but that he should have steered 
such a course, and maintained such spread of 
sail, graduated to the speed of the slowest ship in 
the fleet, that all should reach point-blank range 
at the same time, and be then ranged on a 
line parallel to that of the enemy. " When on 

5 



66 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

the starboard tack, the admiral should have 
tacked the fleet all together and immediately con- 
ducted it on a direct course for the enemy; . . . 
each ship steering for her opposite ship in the 
enemy's line, and under such sail as might have 
enabled the worst sailing ship, under all her plain 
sail, to preserve her station." It is needless to 
insist with any naval man, or to any soldier, that 
such an advance, in orderly fashion, oblique to 
the front, is unattainable except by long drill, 
while this fleet had been but a few weeks assem- 
bled; and the diiflculty is enhanced when each 
ship has not only to keep its station in line, but 
to reach a particular enemy, who may not be just 
where he ought, having respect to the British 
order. The manoeuvre favored by the Court for 
the fleet as a whole was in fact just that which 
Byng attempted for his own division, with the 
results that have been narrated. These were 
aggravated by his mismanagement, but did not 
originate from it. 

The invariable result of an attack thus at- 
tempted, however vigorously made, was that the 
van of the assailant got into action first, receiving 
the brunt of the enemy's fire without proper sup- 
port. Not infrequently, it also underwent a 
second hammering from the enemy's rear, pre- 
cisely in the same way as occurred in Byng's 
action ; and whether this happened or not de- 
pended more upon the enemy than upon the 
British rear. In ignoring, therefore, the idea of 



of the Eighteenth Century 67 

combining an attack in superior numbers upon 
a part of the enemy, and adopting instead that of 
an onslaught upon his whole, all along the line, 
the British practice of the eighteenth century 
not only surrendered the advantage which the 
initiative has, of effecting a concentration, but 
subjected their own fleets to being beaten in 
detail, subject only to the skill of the opponent 
in using the opportunity extended to him. The 
results, at best, were indecisive, tactically con- 
sidered. The one apparent exception was in 
June, 1794, when Lord Howe, after long vainly 
endeavoring a better combination with a yet raw 
fleet, found himself forced to the old method ; 
but although then several ships were captured, 
this issue seems attributable chiefly to the con- 
dition of the French Navy, greatly fallen through 
circumstances foreign to the present subject. It 
was with this system that Rodney was about to 
break, the first of his century formally to do so. 
A false tactical standard, however, was not the 
only drawback under which the British Navy 
labored in 1739. The prolonged series of wars, 
which began when the establishment of civil 
order under Cromwell permitted the nation to 
turn from internal strife to external interests, had 
been for England chiefly maritime. They had 
recurred at brief intervals, and had been of such 
duration as to insure a continuity of experience 
and development. Usage received modification 
under the influence of constant warlike practice, 



68 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

and the consequent changes in methods, if not 
always thoroughly reasoned, at the least reflected 
a similar process of professional advance in the 
officers of the service. This was consecutively 
transmitted, and by the movement of actual war 
was prevented from stagnating and hardening 
into an accepted finality. Thus the service and 
its officers, in the full performance of their func- 
tions, were alive and growing. Nor was this all. 
The same surroundings that promoted this 
healthful evolution applied also a continual test 
of fitness to persons. As each war began, there 
were still to be found in the prime of vigor and 
usefulness men whose efficiency had been proved 
in its predecessor, and thus the line of sustained 
ability in leadership was carried on from one 
naval generation to another, through the sixty- 
odd years, 165 2-1 7 13, over which these condi- 
tions extended. 

The peace of Utrecht in 171 3 put an end to 
this period. A disputed succession after the 
death of Queen Anne, in 1714, renewed the condi- 
tion of internal disquietude which had paralyzed 
the external action of England under Charles I.; 
and this co-operated with the mere weariness of 
war, occasioned by prolonged strife, to give both 
the country and the navy a temporary distaste to 
further military activity. The man of the occa- 
sion, who became the exponent and maintainer 
of this national inclination, was Sir Robert Wal- 
pole ; to whom, during his ministry of over twenty 



of the Eighteenth Century 69 

years, can fairly be applied Jefferson's phrase 
concerning himself, that his "passion was peace." 
But, whatever the necessity to the country of 
such a policy, it too often results, as it did in both 
these cases, in neglect of the military services, 
allowing the equipment to decay, and tending to 
sap the professional interest and competency of 
the officers. 

From this last evil the United States Navy in 
Jefferson's day was saved by the simple fact that 
the officers were young men, or at the most in 
the early prime of life, — the Navy itself, in 181 2, 
being less than twenty years old as a corporate 
organization. The British Navy of 1739 was in 
very different case. For a quarter of a century 
the only important military occurrence had been 
the Battle of Cape Passaro, in 1718, where the 
British fleet in a running fight destroyed a much 
inferior Spanish force ; and the occasion then 
was not one of existent war, but of casual hostili- 
ties, which, precipitated by political conditions, 
began and ended with the particular incident, as 
far as the sea was concerned. Back of this lay 
only Malaga, in 1 704 ; for the remaining years of 
war, up to 1 713, had been unmarked by fleet 
battles. The tendency of this want of experience, 
followed by the long period — not of peace only, 
but — of professional depression resultant upon 
inactivity and national neglect, was to stagna- 
tion, to obviate which no provision existed or was 
attempted. Self-improvement was not a note of 



^n 



70 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

the service, nor of the times. The stimulus of 
occupation and the corrective of experience being 
removed, average men stuck where they were, 
and grew old in a routine of service, or, what was 
perhaps worse, out of the service in all but name. 
In naval warfare, the Battle of Malaga, the last 
point of performance, remained the example, and 
the Fighting Instructions the passively accepted 
authority. The men at the head of the Navy, to 
whom the country naturally looked, either had no 
record — no proof of fitness — because but youths 
in the last war, or else, in simple consequence of 
having then had a chance to show themselves, 
were now superannuated. This very fact, how- 
ever, had the singular and unfortunate result that, 
because the officers of reputation were old, men 
argued, by a curious perversion of thought, that 
none but the old should be trusted. 

Of this two significant cases will tell more 
than many words. Mathews, who commanded at 
Toulon in 1744, was then sixty-seven years old, 
and had not been at sea between 1724 and 1742. 
Hawke, in 1747, when he had already established 
an excellent reputation as a captain, and for enter- 
prise in recent battle, was thought young to be 
entrusted with a squadron of a dozen ships-of-the- 
line, although he was forty- two, — two years older 
than Nelson at the Nile, but four years younger 
than Napoleon and Wellington at Waterloo, and 
one year less in age than Grant at the close of 
the American Civil War. Such instances are not 



of the Eighteenth Century 71 

of merely curious interest ; they are symptoms of 
professional states of mind, of a perplexity and 
perversion of standards which work disastrously 
whenever war succeeds to a prolonged period of 
peace, until experience has done its work by 
sorting out the unsound from among the fair- 
seeming, and has shown also that men may be 
too old as well as too young for unaccustomed 
responsibility. The later prevalence of juster 
views was exemplified in the choice of Wolfe, 
who was but thirty-two when he fell before 
Quebec in 1759, charged with one of the most 
difficult enterprises that had then been entrusted 
to a British general. 

It is these two factors, therefore, an erroneous 
standard and a lethargic peace, which princi- 
pally caused the weakness of the British offi- 
cial staff for battle service at the period of 
lowest descent, which was reached in the first 
quarter of the eighteenth century, but was pro- 
longed and intensified by a protracted interval 
of professional apathy. Other . grievous evils 
doubtless existed, serious defects in administra- 
tion, involving indifferent equipment, bad and 
scanty provisions, inferior physique in the ships' 
companies, and wretched sanitary arrangements ; 
but while all these unquestionably gravely affected 
general efficiency for war, they belonged rather 
to the civil than the military side of the profes- 
sion. In the hour of battle it was not these, 
but the tone and efficiency of the officers, that 



72 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

chiefly told. A false pattern of action had been 
accepted at a moment favorable to its perpetu- 
ation, when naval warfare on the grand scale had 
ceased, owing to the decline of the principal 
enemy, the navy of France; while the average 
competency of naval officers had been much low- 
ered through want of professional incentive, and 
the absence of any sifting process by which the 
unfit could be surely eliminated. That plenty of 
good material existed, was sufficiently shown by 
the number of names, afterwards distinguished, 
which soon began to appear. Weeding went on 
apace ; but before its work was done, there had to 
be traversed a painful period, fruitful of evidences 
of unfitness, of personal weakness, of low or false 
professional ideas. 

It is with this period that we have first had to 
do as our point of departure, by which not only 
to estimate the nature and degree of the sub- 
sequent advance, but to illustrate also the part 
specifically contributed to it by Hawke and 
Rodney, through their personal and professional 
characteristics. While types, they are more than 
mere exponents of the change as a whole, and 
will be found to bear to it particular relations, 
— its leaders in fact, as well as in name. It is 
not merely fanciful to say that Hawke stands 
for and embodies the spirit of the new age, 
while Rodney rather exemplifies and develops 
the form in which that spirit needed ultimately 
to cloth itself in order to perfect its working. 



of the Eighteenth Century yj 

The one is a protest in act against the pro- 
fessional faintheartedness, exaggerated into the 
semblance of personal timidity, shown by the cap- 
tains off Toulon in 1774; the other, in the 
simple but skilful methods and combinations 
adopted by him, both represents and gives effect 
to a reaction against the extravagant pedantry, 
which it fell to Byng, in all the honesty of 
a thoroughly commonplace man, to exhibit in 
unintentional caricature. 

In thus ascribing to these great men com- 
plementary parts in leading and shaping the 
general movement, it is not meant that either 
is deficient on the side attributed to the other. 
Hawke showed by his actions that he was by 
no means indifferent to tactical combinations, 
which is another way of saying that he appre- 
ciated the advantage of form in warfare ; while 
Rodney, though a careful organizer and driller 
of fleets, and patient in effort to obtain advan- 
tage before attacking, exhibited on occasion 
headlong, though not inconsiderate, audacity, 
and also tenacious endurance in fight. Still, 
it will probably be admitted by the student of 
naval biography that to him Hawke suggests 
primarily the unhesitating sudden rush — the 
swoop — upon the prey, while Rodney resembles 
rather the patient astute watcher, carefully keep- 
ing his own powers in hand, and waiting for 
the unguarded moment when the adversary may 
be taken suddenly at unawares. Certain it is 



74 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 

that, with opportunities much more numerous 
than were permitted to Hawke, his successes 
would have been far greater but for an excess 
of methodical caution. There was a third, who 
combined in due proportion, and possessed to 
an extraordinary degree, the special qualities 
here assigned to each. It is one of the ironies 
of history that the first Sir Samuel Hood should 
have had just opportunity enough to show how 
great were his powers, and yet have been denied 
the chance to exhibit them under conditions 
to arrest the attention of the world ; nay, have 
been more than once compelled to stand by 
hopelessly, and see occasions lost which he 
would unquestionably have converted into signal 
triumphs. In him, as far as the record goes, 
was consummated the advance of the eighteenth 
century. He was the greatest of the sowers. 
It fell to Nelson, his pupil, — in part at least, — 
to reap the harvest. 

Before closing this part of our subject, the 
necessary preliminary to understanding the 
progress of naval warfare in the eighteenth cen- 
tury, it is pertinent to note the respect in which 
advance there differs from that of the nineteenth, 
and in some degree, though less, from that 
of the seventeenth centuries. The period was 
not one of marked material development. Im- 
provements there were, but they were slow, 
small in ultimate extent, and in no sense revolu- 
tionary. Ships and guns, masts and sails, grew 



of the Eighteenth Century 75 

better, as did also administrative processes; it 
may indeed be asserted, as an axiom of pro- 
fessional experience, that as the military tone 
of the sea-ofiEcers rises, the effect will be trans- 
mitted to those civil functions upon which effi- 
ciency for war antecedently depends. Still, 
substantially, the weapons of war were in princi- 
ple, and consequently in general methods of 
handling, the same at the end of the period 
as at the beginning. They were intrinsically 
more efficient ; but the great gain was not in 
them, but in the spirit and intellectual grasp 
of the men who wielded them. There was no 
change in the least analogous to that from 
oars to sails, or from sails to steam. 

Under such conditions of continued similarity in 
means, advance in the practice of any profession is 
effected rather in the realm of ideas, in intellectual 
processes ; and even their expert application in- 
volves mind rather than matter. In the nineteenth 
century such intellectual processes have been 
largely devoted to the purposes of material develop- 
ment, and have found their realization, in the navy 
as elsewhere, in revolutionizing instruments, in 
providing means never before attainable. The 
railroad, the steamer, the electric telegraph, find 
their counterpart in the heavily armored steam- 
ship of war. But in utilizing these new means the 
navy must still be governed by the ideas, which 
are, indeed, in many ways as old as military 
history, but which in the beginning of the eigh- 



76 Naval Warfare in the Eighteenth Century* 

teenth century had passed out of the minds of 
naval men. It was the task of the officers of 
that period to recall them, to formulate them 
anew, to give them a living hold upon the theory 
and practice of the profession. This they did, 
and they were undoubtedly helped in so doing 
by the fact that their attention was not diverted 
and absorbed, as that of our day very largely has 
been, by decisive changes in the instruments with 
which their ideas were to be given effect. Thus 
they were able to make a substantial and distinc- 
tive contribution to the art of naval warfare, and 
that on its highest side. For the artist is greater 
than his materials, the warrior than his arms ; 
and it was in the man rather than in his weapons 
that the navy of the eighteenth century wrought 
its final conspicuous triumph. 



H AWKE 

1705-1781 

THE first great name in British naval annals 
belonging distinctively to the eighteenth 
century rather than to the seventeenth, is that of 
Edward Hawke. He was born in 1705, of a 
family of no marked social distinction, his father 
being a barrister, and his grandfather a Lon- 
don merchant. His mothers maiden name was 
Bladen. One of her brothers held an important 
civil ofHce as Commissioner of Trade and Planta- 
tions, and was for many years a member of Par- 
liament. Under the conditions which prevailed 
then, and for some generations longer, the in- 
fluence attaching to such positions enabled the 
holder to advance substantially the professional 
interests of a naval ofificer. Promotion in rank, 
and occupation both in peace and war, were 
largely a matter of favor. Martin Bladen nat- 
urally helped his nephew in this way, a service 
especially valuable in the earlier part of a career, 
lifting a man out of a host of competitors and 
giving him a chance to show what was in him. 
It may readily be believed that Hawke's marked 



7 8 Types of Naval Officers 

professional capacity speedily justified the advan- 
tage thus obtained, and he seems to have owed 
his promotion to post-captain to a superior 
officer when serving abroad ; though it is never 
possible to affirm that even such apparent official 
recognition was not due either to an intimation 
from home, or to the give and take of those who 
recognized Bismarck's motto, " Do ut des." 

However this may have been, the service did 
not suffer by the favors extended to Hawke. 
Nor was his promotion unduly rapid, to the in- 
jury of professional character, as often happened 
when rank was prematurely reached.^ It was 
not till March 20, 1734, that he was "made 
post," as the expression went, by Sir Chaloner 
Ogle into the frigate Flamborough, on the West 
India Station. Being then twenty-nine years 
old, in the prime of life for naval efficiency, he 
had reached the position in which a fair oppor- 
tunity for all the honors of the profession lay 
open to him, provided he could secure occupation 
until he was proved to be indispensable. Here 
also his uncle's influence stood good. Although 
the party with which the experienced politician 
was identified had gone out of power with Sir 
Robert Walpole, in 1742, his position on the 
Board dealing with Colonial affairs left him not 
without friends. " My colleague, Mr. Cavendish," 
he writes, " has already laid in his claim for 
another ship for you. But after so long a voy- 
age " (he had been aw^ay over three years) " I 



Hawke 



79 



( 



think you should be allowed a little time to spend 
with your friends on shore. It is some consola- 
tion, however, that I have some friends on the 
new Board of Admiralty." " There has been a 
clean sweep," he says again, "but I hope I may have 
some friends amongst the new Lords that will 
upon my account afford you their protection." 

This was in the beginning of 1743, when 
Hawke had just returned from a protracted 
cruise on the West India and North American 
stations, where by far the greater part of his early 
service was passed. He never again returned 
there, and very shortly after his uncle's letter, 
just quoted, he was appointed to the Berwick, a 
ship-of-the-line of seventy gu^s. In command of 
her he sailed in September, 1 743, for the Mediter- 
ranean ; and a few months after, by his decided and 
seamanlike course in Mathews's action, he estab- 
lished his professional reputation and fortunes, 
the firm foundations of which had been laid dur- 
ing the previous years of arduous but inconspicu- 
ous service. Two years later, in 1746, Martin 
Bladen died, and with him political influence, in 
the ordinary acceptation, departed from Hawke. 
Thenceforth professional merit, forced upon men's 
recognition, stood him in stead. 

He was thirty-nine when he thus first made 
his mark, in 1744. Prior to this there is 
not found, in the very scanty records that 
remain of his career, as in that of all officers of 
his period while in subordinate positions, any 



8o Types of Naval Officers 

certain proof that he had ever been seriously 
engaged with an enemy. War against Spain 
had been declared, October 19, 1739. He had 
then recently commissioned a fifty-gun ship, the 
Portland, and in her sailed for the West Indies, 
where he remained until the autumn of 1742; 
but the inert manner in which Spain maintained 
the naval contest, notwithstanding that her trans- 
marine policy was the occasion of the quarrel, 
and her West Indian possessions obviously en- 
dangered, removed all chance of active service 
on the large scale, except in attacking her colo- 
nies; and in none of those enterprises had the 
Portland been called upon to share. 

Meantime, a general European war had begun 
in 1740, concerning the succession to the Aus- 
trian throne ; and, in the political combinations 
which followed, France and Great Britain had as 
usual ranged themselves on opposite sides, though 
without declaring war upon each other. Further, 
there had existed for some time a secret defen- 
sive alliance between France and Spain, binding 
each party to support the other, under certain 
conditions, with an effective armed force, to be 
used not for aggressive purposes, but in defence 
only. It was claimed, indeed, that by so doing 
the supporting country was not to be considered 
as going to war, or even as engaged in hostilities, 
except as regarded the contingent furnished. 
This view received some countenance from in- 
ternational law, in the stage of development it 



Hawke 8i 



had then reached ; yet it is evident that if a Brit- 
ish admiral met a Spanish fleet, of strength fairly 
matching his own, but found it accompanied by 
a French division, the commander of which noti- 
fied him that he had orders to fight if an attack 
were made, friendly relations between the two 
nations would be strained near to the breaking 
point. This had actually occurred to the British 
Admiral Haddock, in the Mediterranean, in 1741 ; 
and conditions essentially similar, but more ex- 
asperated, constituted the situation under which 
Hawke for the first time was brought into an 
action between two great fleets. 

On the nth of January, 1744, when the Ber- 
wick joined the British fleet, it had rendezvoused 
at the Hyeres Islands, a little east of Toulon, 
watching the movements of twelve Spanish ships- 
of-the-line, which had taken refuge in the port. 
As these were unwilling to put to sea trusting to 
their own strength, the French Admiral De 
Court was ordered to accompany and protect 
them when they sailed. This becoming known, 
Admiral Mathews had concentrated his fleet, 
which by successive reinforcements — the Ber- 
wick among others — numbered twenty-eight of- 
the-line when the allies, in about equal force, 
began to come out on the 20th of February. 

The action which ensued owes its historical 
significance wholly to the fact that it illustrated 
conspicuously, and in more than one detail, the 
degenerate condition of the official staff of the 



82 Types of Naval Officers 

British navy; the demoralization of ideals, and 
the low average of professional competency.^ 
That there was plenty of good metal was also 
shown, but the proportion of alloy was danger- 
ously great. That the machinery of the organi- 
zation was likewise bad, the administrative system 
culpably negligent as well as inefficient, had been 
painfully manifested in the equipment of the 
ships, in the quality of the food, and in the 
indifferent character of the ships' crews ; but in 
this respect Hawke had not less to complain of 
than others, having represented forcibly to the 
Admiralty the miserable unfitness of the men sent 
him. Nevertheless, despite all drawbacks, includ- 
ing therein a signalling system so rudimentary 
and imperfect as to furnish a ready excuse to the 
unwilling, as well as a recurrent perplexity to 
those honestly wishing to obey their orders, he 
showed that good will and high purpose could 
not only lead a man to do his full duty as 
directed, but guide him to independent initia- 
tive action when opportunity offered. Under all 
external conditions of difficulty and doubt, or even 
of cast-iron rule, the principle was as true then as 
when Nelson formulated it, that no captain when 
in doubt could do very wrong if he placed his ship 
alongside an enemy. That Hawke so realized it 
brought out into more glaring relief the failure 
of so many of his colleagues on this occasion. 

1 For the account of Mathews's action, including Hawke's personal 
share in it, see ante, pp. 21-47. 



Hawke 83 



I 



But the lesson would be in great part lost, if 
there were to be seen in this lapse only the per- 
sonal element of the delinquents, and not the 
widespread decline of professional tone. Un- 
doubtedly, of course, it is true that the personal 
equation, as always, made itself felt, but here as 
intensifying an evil which had its principal 
source elsewhere. 

Hawke carried Nelson's maxim into effect. 
Upon the signal for battle he took his own ship 
into close action with the antagonist allotted to 
him by the order of the fleet ; but after beating 
her out of the line he looked round for more 
work to do. Seeing then that several of the 
British vessels had not come within point-blank, 
but, through professional timidity, or over-cau- 
tious reverence for the line of battle, were 
engaging at long range a single Spaniard, he 
quitted his own position, brought her also to close 
quarters, and after an obstinate contest, creditable 
to both parties, forced her to surrender. She was 
the only ship to haul down her flag that day, and 
her captain refused to surrender his sword to 
any but Hawke, whom alone he accepted as his 
vanquisher. 

A generation or two later Hawke's conduct in 
this matter would have drawn little attention ; it 
would not have been exceptional in the days of 
St. Vincent and Nelson, nor even in that of 
Howe. At the time of its occurrence, it was 
not only in sharp contrast with much that hap- 



84 Types of Naval Officers 

pened on the same field of battle, but it was 
somewhat contrary to rule. It possessed so far 
the merit of originality ; and that on the right 
side, — the side of fighting. As in all active life, 
so in war a man is more readily pardoned for 
effecting too much than too little; and it was 
doubly so' here, because it was evident from the 
behavior of his peers that he must expect no 
backing in the extra work he took upon himself. 
Their aloofness emphasized his forwardness ; and 
the fact that through the withdrawal of his 
admiral for the night, the prize was ultimately 
retaken, together with an officer and seamen he 
had placed on board, fixed still further attention 
upon the incident, in which Hawke's action was 
the one wholly creditable feature. 

The effect of the battle upon his fortunes was 
summed up in a phrase. When his first lieuten- 
ant was sent to report the loss of the prize-crew 
to Rear-Admiral Rowley, the commander of the 
division, the latter replied, among other things, 
that "he had not been well acquainted with 
Captain Hawke before, but he should now be 
well acquainted with him from his behavior." 
Like Nelson at St. Vincent, Hawke was now 
revealed, not to the navy only but to the nation, 
— "through his behavior." Somewhat excep- 
tionally, the king personally took knowledge of 
him, and stood by him. George II. paid most 
interested attention to the particulars elicited by 
the Courts-Martial, — a fact which doubtless con- 



Hawke 85 



tributed to make him so sternly unyielding in 
the case of Byng, twelve years later. To the king 
Hawke became " my captain ; " and his influence 
was directly used when, in a flag promotion in 
1747, some in the Admiralty proposed to include 
Hawke in the retirement of senior captains, which 
was a common incident in such cases. " I will 
not have Hawke 'yellowed,' " was the royal fiat; 
a yellow admiral being the current phrase for one 
set aside from further active employment. 

Such were the circumstances under which 
Hawke first received experience of the fighting 
conditions of the navy. Whatever his previous 
attitude towards accepted traditions of profes- 
sional practice, this no doubt loosened the fet- 
ters ; for they certainly never constrained him 
in his subsequent career. He remained in the 
Mediterranean fleet, generally upon detached 
services in command of divisions of ships, until 
the end of 1745. Returning then to England, 
he saw no further active service until he became 
a Rear-Admiral — of the White — on July 15, 

1747- 

The promotions being numerous, Hawke's 

seniority as captain carried him well up the list 
of rear-admirals, and he was immediately em- 
ployed ; hoisting his flag July 22d. He then 
became second to Sir Peter Warren, commander- 
in-chief of the " Western Squadron." This 
cruised in the Bay of Biscay, from Ushant to 
Finisterre, to intercept the naval divisions, and 



86 Types of Naval Officers 

the accompanying convoys of merchant and 
transport ships, with which the French were then 
seeking to maintain their colonial empire in 
North America and in India : an empire already 
sorely shaken, and destined to fall finally in the 
next great war. 

Hawke was now in the road of good luck, pure 
and unadulterated. His happy action in captur- 
ing the Poder illustrates indeed opportunity im- 
proved ; but it was opportunity of the every day 
sort, and it is the merit that seized it, rather than 
the opportunity itself, that strikes the attention. 
The present case was different. A young rear- 
admiral had little reason to hope for independent 
command ; but Warren, a well-tried officer, pos- 
sessing the full confidence of the First Lord, 
Anson, himself a master in the profession, was in 
poor health, and for that reason had applied for 
Hawke to be "joined with him in the command," 
apparently because he was the one flag-officer 
immediately available. He proposed that Hawke 
should for the present occasion take his place, 
sail with a few ships named, and with them join 
the squadron, then at sea in charge of a captain. 
Anson demurred at first, on the ground of 
Hawke's juniority, — he was forty-two, — and 
Warren, while persisting in his request, shares 
the doubt; for he writes,"! observe what you 
say about the ships abroad being under so young 
an officer. I am, and have been uneasy about it, 
though I hope he will do well, and it could not 



Hawke 87 



then be avoided^ Anson, however, was not fixed 
in his opposition ; for Warren continued, " From 
your letter I have so little reason to doubt his 
being put under my command, that I have his 
instructions all ready ; and he is prepared to go 
at a moment's notice." The instructions were 
issued the following day, August 8th, and on the 
9th Hawke sailed. But while there was in this 
so much of luck, he was again to show that he 
was not one to let occasion slip. Admiral Farra- 
gut is reported to have said, " Every man has one 
chance." It depends upon himself whether he is 
by it made or marred. Burrish and Hawke toed 
the same line on the morning of February 2 2d, and 
they had had that day at least equal opportunity. 
Hawke's adequacy to his present fortune be- 
trayed itself again in a phrase to Warren, " I 
have nothing so much at heart as the faithful dis- 
charge of my duty, and in such manner as will 
give satisfaction both to the Lords of the Admi- 
ralty and yourself. This shall ever be my utmost 
ambition, and no lucre of profit, or other views, 
shall induce me to act otherwise." Not prize- 
money; but honor, through service. And this 
in fact not only ruled his thought but in the 
moment of decision inspired his act. Curiously 
enough, however, he was here at odds with the 
spirit of Anson and of Warren. The latter, in 
asking Hawke's employment, said the present 
cruise was less important than the one to succeed 
it, " for the galleons " — the Spanish treasure- 



88 Types of Naval Officers 

ships — " make it a general rule to come home 
late in the fall or winter." Warren by prize- 
money and an American marriage was the richest 
commoner in England, and Anson it was that 
had captured the great galleon five years before, 
to his own great increase; but it was Hawke who, 
acknowledging a letter from Warren, as this 
cruise was drawing to its triumphant close, wrote, 
" With respect to the galleons, as it is uncertain 
when they will come home and likewise impos- 
sible for me to divide my force in the present 
necessitous condition of the ships under my 
command, I must lay aside all thoughts of them 
during this cruise." In this unhesitating subor- 
dination of pecuniary to military considerations 
we see again the temper of Nelson, between whom 
and Hawke there was much community of spirit, 
especially in their independence of ordinary mo- 
tives and standards. " Not that I despise money," 
wrote Nelson near the end of a career in which 
he had never known ease of circumstances ; 
" quite the contrary, I wish I had a hundred 
thousand pounds this moment ; " but " I keep the 
frigates about me, for I know their value in the 
day of battle, and compared with that day, what 
signifies any prizes they might take ? " Yet he 
had his legal share in every such prize. 

The opening of October 14th, the eighth day 
after Hawke's letter to Warren just quoted, 
brought him the sight of his reward. At seven 
that morning, the fleet being then some four 



Hawke 89 



hundred miles west of La Rochelle in France, a 
number of sails were seen in the southeast. Chase 
was given at once, and within an hour it was evi- 
dent, from the great crowd of vessels, that it was a 
large convoy outward-bound which could only be 
enemies. It was in fact a fleet of three hundred 
French merchantmen, under the protection of 
eight ships-of-the-line and one of fifty guns, 
commanded by Commodore L'Etenduere. The 
force then with Hawke were twelve of-the-line 
and two of fifty guns. Frigates and lighter 
vessels of course accompanied both fleets. The 
average size and armament of the French vessels 
were considerably greater than those of the Brit- 
ish ; so that, although the latter had an un- 
doubted superiority, it vi^as far from as great as 
the relative numbers would indicate. Prominent 
British officers of that day claimed that a French 
sixty-gun ship was practically the equal of a 
British seventy-four. In this there may have 
been exaggeration ; but they had good oppor- 
tunity for judging, as many French ships were 
captured. 

When L'Etenduere saw that he was in the 
presence of a superior enemy, he very manfully 
drew out his ships of war from the mass, and 
formed them in order of battle, covering the con- 
voy, which he directed to make its escape ac- 
companied by one of the smaller ships-of-the-line 
with the light cruisers. He contrived also to 
keep to windward of the approaching British. 



go Types of Naval Officers 

With so strong a force interposed, Hawke saw 
that no prize-money was easily to be had, but 
for that fortune his mind was already prepared. 
He first ordered his fleet to form order of battle ; 
but finding time was thereby lost he changed the 
signal to that for a general chase, which freed the 
faster sailers to use their utmost speed and join 
action with the enemy, secure of support in due 
time by their consorts as they successively came 
up. 

Half an hour before noon the leading British 
reached the French rear, already under short 
canvas. The admiral then made signal to en- 
gage, and the battle began. As the ships under 
fire reduced sail, the others overtook them, passed 
by the unengaged side and successively attacked 
from rear to van. As Haw^ke himself drew near, 
Rodney's ship, the Eagle, having her wheel and 
much of her rigging shot away, was for the time 
unmanageable and fell twice on board the flag- 
ship, the Devonshire, driving her to leeward, and 
so preventing her from close action with the 
French flag-ship Tonnant, of eighty guns, a force 
far exceeding that of the Devonshire, which had 
but sixty-six. " This prevented our attacking Le 
Monarque, 74, and the Tonnant, within any dis- 
tance to do execution. However we attempted 
both, especially the latter. While we were en- 
gaged with her, the breechings of all our lower- 
deck guns broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, 
which obliged us to shoot ahead, for our upper 



Hawke 



91 



guns could not reach her." The breaking of 
the breechings — the heavy ropes which take the 
strain of the guns' recoil — was doubtless ac- 
celerated by the undue elevation necessitated by 
the extreme range. The collision with the Eagle 
was one of the incidents common to battle, but 
it doubtless marred the completeness of the vic- 
tory. Of the eight French ships engaged, six were 
taken ; two, the Tonnant and her next astern, 
escaped, though the former was badly mauled. 

Despite the hindrance mentioned, Hawke's 
personal share in the affair was considerable, 
through the conspicuous activity of the flag-ship. 
Besides the skirmish at random shot with the 
Tonnant, she engaged successively the Trident, 
64, and the Terrible, 74, both which were among 
the prizes. He was entirely satisfied also with 
the conduct of all his captains, — save one. The 
freedom of action permitted to them by the gen- 
eral chase, with the inspiring example of the 
admiral himself, was nobly used. " Captain Har- 
land of the Tilbury, 60, observing that the Ton- 
nant fired single guns at us in order to dismast 
us, stood on the other tack, between her and the 
Devonshire, and gave her a very smart fire." It 
was no small gallantry for a 60 thus to pass close 
under the undiverted broadside of an 80, — nearly 
double her force, — and that without orders ; and 
Hawke recognized the fact by this particular 
notice in the despatch. With similar initiative, as 
the Tonnant and Intrepide were seen to be escap- 



92 Types of Naval Officers 

ing, Captain Saunders of the Yarmouth, 64, pursued 
them on his own motion, and was accompanied, 
at his suggestion, by the sixty-gun ships of Rod- 
ney and of Saumarez. A detached action of an 
hour followed, in which Saumarez fell. The 
enemy escaped, it is true ; but that does not im- 
peach the judgment, nor lessen the merits, of the 
officers concerned, for their ships were both 
much smaller and more injured than those they 
attacked. Harland and Saunders became dis- 
tinguished admirals ; of Rodney it is needless 
to say the same. 

In his report of the business, Hawke used a 
quaint but very expressive phrase, " As the 
enemy's ships were large, they took a great deal 
of drubbing, and (consequently) lost all their 
masts, except two, who had their foremasts left. 
This has obliged me to lay-to for these two days 
past, in order to put them into condition to be 
brought into port, as well as our own, which have 
suffered greatly." Ships large in tonnage were 
necessarily also ships large in scantling, heavy 
ribbed, thick-planked, in order to bear their artil- 
lery ; hence also with sides not easy to be pierced 
by the weak ordnance of that time. They were 
in a degree armored ships, though from a cause 
differing from that of to-day; hence much "drub- 
bing " was needed, and the prolongation of the 
drubbing entailed increase of incidental injury 
to spars and rigging, both their own and those 
of the enemy. Nor was the armor idea, directly, 



Hawke 



93 



at all unrecognized even then ; for we are told 
of \\\% Real Felipe in Mathews's action, that, being 
so weakly built that she could carry only twenty- 
four-pounders on her lower deck, she had been 
" fortified in the most extraordinary surprising 
manner ; her sides being lined four or five foot 
thick everywhere with junk or old cables to 
hinder the shot from piercing." 

It has been said that the conduct of one cap- 
tain fell under Hawke's displeasure. At a Coun- 
cil of War called by him after the battle, to 
establish the fitness of the fleet to pursue the 
convoy, the other captains objected to sitting 
with Captain Fox of the Kent, until he had 
cleared himself from the imputation of misbe- 
havior in incidents they had noticed. Hawke 
was himself dissatisfied with Fox's failure to 
obey a signal, and concurred in the objection. 
On the subsequent trial, the Court expressly 
cleared the accused of cowardice, but found him 
guilty of certain errors of judgment, and specifically 
of leaving the Tonnant ^\vA(t the signal for close 
action was flying. As the Tonnant escaped, the 
implication of accountability for that result nat- 
urally follows. For so serious a consequence the 
sentence only was that he be dismissed his ship, 
and, although never again employed, he was re- 
tired two years after as a rear-admiral. It was 
becoming increasingly evident that error of judg- 
ment is an elastic phrase which can be made to 
cover all degrees of faulty action, from the mis- 



94 Types of Naval Officers 



takes to which every man is liable and the most 
faithful cannot always escape, to conduct wholly 
incompatible with professional efficiency or even 
manly honor. 

The case of Fox was one of many occurring at 
about this period, which, however differing in 
detail between themselves, showed that through- 
out the navy, both in active service before the 
enemy, and in the more deliberate criteria of 
opinion which influence Courts-Martial, there 
was a pronounced tendency to lowness of stand- 
ard in measuring officer-like conduct and official 
responsibility for personal action; a misplaced 
leniency, which regarded failure to do the utmost 
with indulgence, if without approval. In the strin- 
gent and awful emergencies of war too much is at 
stake for such easy tolerance. Error of judgment 
is one thing ; error of conduct is something very 
different, and with a difference usually recogniz- 
able. To style errors of conduct "errors of judg- 
ment " denies, practically, that there are standards 
of action external to the individual, and condones 
official misbehavior on the ground of personal 
incompetency. Military standards rest on dem- 
onstrable facts of experience, and should find 
their sanction in clear professional opinion. So 
known, and so upheld, the unfortunate man who 
falls below them, in a rank where failure may 
work serious harm, has only himself to blame ; 
for it is his business to reckon his own capacity 
before he accepts the dignity and honors of a 



Hawke 



9S 



position in which the interests of the nation are 
intrusted to his charge. 

An uneasy consciousness of these truths, forced 
upon the Navy and the Government by wide- 
spread short-comings in many quarters — of 
which Mathews's battle was only the most con- 
spicuous instance — resulted in a very serious 
modification of the Articles of War, after the 
peace. Up to 1748 the articles dealing with 
misconduct before the enemy, which had been in 
force since the first half of the reign of Charles 
II., assigned upon conviction the punishment of 
"death, or other punishment, as the circum- 
stances of the offence shall deserve and the 
Court-Martial shall judge fit." After the experi- 
ences of this war, the last clause was omitted. 
Discretion was taken away. Men w^ere dissatis- 
fied, whether justly or not, with the use of their 
discretion made by Courts-Martial, and deprived 
them of it. In the United States Navy, similarly, 
at the beginning of the Civil War, the Govern- 
ment was in constant struggle with Courts- 
Martial to impose sentences of severity adequate 
to the offence ; leaving the question of remission, 
or of indulgence, to the executive. These facts 
are worthy of notice, for there is a facile popular 
impression that Courts-Martial err on the side of 
stringency. The writer, from a large experience 
of naval Courts, upon offenders of many ranks, 
is able to affirm that it is not so. Marryat, in 
his day, midway between the two periods here 



9 6 Types of Naval Officers 

specified, makes the same statement, in " Peter 
Simple." "There is an evident inclination to- 
wards the prisoner; every allowance and every 
favor granted him, and no legal quibbles attended 
to." It may be added that the inconvenience and 
expense of assembling Courts make the executive 
chary of this resort, which is rarely used except 
when the case against an accused is pretty clear, — 
a fact that easily gives rise to a not uncommon 
assertion, that Courts-Martial are organized to 
convict. 

This is the antecedent history of Byng's trial 
and execution. There had been many examples 
of weak and inefficient action — of distinct errors 
of conduct — such as Byng was destined to illus- 
trate in the highest rank and upon a large scale, 
entailing an unusual and conspicuous national 
disaster; and the offenders had escaped, with 
consequences to themselves more or less serious, 
but without any assurance to the nation that the 
punishment inflicted was raising professional 
standards, and so giving reasonable certainty that 
the like derelictions would not recur. Hence 
it came to pass, in 1749, not amid the agita- 
tions of war and defeats, but in profound peace, 
that the article was framed under which Byng 
suffered : 

" Every person in the fleet, who through cowardice, 
negligence, or disaffection, shall in time of action, . . . 
not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it 
shall be his duty to engage ; and to assist all and every 



Hawke 97 



of His Majesty's ships, or those of His aUies, which it 
shall be his duty to assist and relieve, . . . being con- 
victed thereof by sentence of a Court- Martial, shall suffer 
death." 

Let it therefore be observed, as historically 
certain, that the execution of Byng in 1757 is 
directly traceable to the war of 1 739-1 747. It 
was not determined, as is perhaps generally 
imagined, by an obsolete statute revived for the 
purpose of a judicial murder; but by a recent Act, 
occasioned, if not justified, by circumstances of 
marked national humiliation and injury. The 
offences specified are those of which repeated 
instances had been recently given; and negli- 
gence is ranked with more positive faults, because 
in practice equally harmful and equally culpable. 
Every man in active life, whatever his business, 
knows this to be so. 

At the time his battle with L'Etenduere was 
fought, Hawke was actually a commander-in-chief; 
for Warren, through his disorder increasing upon 
him, had resigned the command, and Hawke had 
been notified of the fact. Hence there did not 
obtain in his case the consideration, so absurdly 
advanced for limiting Nelson's reward after the 
Nile, that he was acting under the orders of a 
superior several hundred miles away. Neverthe- 
less, Hawke, like Nelson later, was then a new 
man, — "a young officer;" and the honor he 
received, though certainly adequate for a victory 
over a force somewhat inferior, was not adequate 

7 



98 Types of Naval Officers 

when measured by that given to Anson, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, for a much less nota- 
ble achievement six months before. Anson 
was raised to the peerage ; Hawke was only 
given the Order of the Bath, the ribbon which 
Nelson coveted, because a public token, visible 
to all, that the wearer had done distinguished 
service. It was at that period a much greater dis- 
tinction than it afterwards became, through the 
great extension in numbers and the division into 
classes. He was henceforth Sir Edward Hawke ; 
and shortly after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
signed April 30, 1748, another flag-promotion 
raised him to the rank of Vice-Admiral, of the 
Blue Squadron. 

Such rank, accompanied by such recognized 
merit, insured that he should thenceforth always 
command in chief; and so it was, with a single 
brief interval due to a very special and exceptional 
cause to be hereafter related. During the years 
of peace, from 1748 to 1755, his employment was 
mainly on shore, in dock-yard command, which 
carried with it incidentally a good deal of pre- 
siding over Courts- Martial. This duty, in his 
hands, could hardly fail to raise professional 
standards, with all the effect that precedents, 
established by the rulings and decisions of Courts, 
civil and military, exert upon practice. Such a 
period, however, affords but little for narration, 
either professional or personal, except when the 
particular occupations mentioned are the subject 



Hawke 99 



of special study. General interest they cannot 
be said to possess. 

But while thus unmarked on the biographical 
side, historically these years were pregnant with 
momentous events, which not only affected the 
future of great nations then existing, but were 
to determine for all time the extension or restric- 
tion of their social systems and political ten- 
dencies in vast distant regions yet unoccupied 
by civilized man, or still in unstable political 
tenure. The balance of world power, in short, 
was in question, and that not merely as every 
occurrence, large or small, contributes its some- 
thing to a general result, but on a grand and 
decisive scale. The phrase "world politics," if 
not yet invented, characterizes the issues then 
eminently at stake, though they probably were 
not recognized by contemporaries, still blinded 
by the traditions which saw in Europe alone the 
centre of political interests. 

To realize the conditions, and their bearing 
upon a future which has become our present, we 
should recall that in 1748 the British Empire, as 
we understand the term, did not exist; that 
Canada and Louisiana — meaning by the latter 
the whole undefined region west of the Missis- 
sippi — were politically and socially French ; 
that between them the wide territory from the 
Alleghanies to the Mississippi was claimed by 
France, and the claim vigorously contested not 
only by Great Britain herself, but by the thirteen 

LofG. 



loo Types of Naval Officers 

British colonies which became the United States 
of America ; that in India the representatives of 
both mother countries were striving for mastery, 
not merely through influence in the councils of 
native rulers, but by actual territorial sway, and that 
the chances seemed on the whole to favor France. 

In the great struggle for Anglo-Saxon pre- 
dominance, which had begun under William III., 
but was now approaching its crisis and final de- 
cision in the Seven Years War, the determining 
factor was to be the maritime strength of Great 
Britain. It is, therefore, the distinctive and dis- 
tinguished significance of Hawke's career that 
during so critical a period he not only was the 
most illustrious and able ofiicer of her navy — 
the exponent of her sea-power — but that by 
the force of his personality he chiefly shaped the 
naval outcome. He carried on the development 
of naval warfare, revolutionized ideas, raised pro- 
fessional standards, and thereby both affected 
the result in his own time, and perpetuated an 
influence, the effect of which was to be felt in the 
gigantic contests of later days. In this eminent 
particular, which involves real originality, no sea 
officer of the eighteenth century stands with him ; 
in this respect only he and Nelson, who be- 
longs rather to the nineteenth, are to be named 
together. 

In the years of nominal peace, 1 748-1 755, the 
Navy of Great Britain was permitted by a politi- 
cally cautious Government to decline much in 



Hawke loi 



power ; but there was compensation in the fact 
that that of PVance drooped equally. In both 
countries there was then, as there has been ever 
since, a party opposed to over-sea enterprise. 
" The partisans of the Ministry," wrote Walpole 
in 1755, "d — n the Plantations [Colonies], and 
ask if we are to involve ourselves in a war for 
them." The French government underwent a 
like revulsion of feeling as regarded India, and in 
1754 recalled Dupleix in mid-career, in order to 
quiet the remonstrances of Great Britain. It 
would be irrelevant, were it not signally instruc- 
tive, to remark that both nations passed under 
the influence of the same ideas a hundred years 
later. In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the preponderant expression in England was that 
the colonies were unprofitable incumbrances, and, 
if occasion arose, should be encouraged to sepa- 
rate rather than urged to remain ; while France, 
through whatever motive, at a critical moment 
abandoned the field in Egypt, by refusing joint 
action. It is, therefore, probably the result of 
a true national genius, asserting itself above 
temporary aberrations, that the close of the 
nineteenth century saw France wholly excluded, 
politically, from Egypt, as she had before been 
from India, and Great Britain involved in an 
expensive war, the aim of which was the preser- 
vation of the imperial system, in the interest 
not only of the mother country, but of the colo- 
nies as well. 



I02 Types of Naval Officers 

And that it was in the interest of her colonies 
was precisely the all important part which differ- 
entiated the Seven Years War in its day, and the 
South African War in our day, from the struggle, 
so disastrous to the Empire, that is known as the 
American Revolution. " There is no repose for 
our thirteen colonies," wrote Franklin a hundred 
and fifty years ago, " so long as the French are 
masters of Canada." "There is no repose for 
British colonists in South Africa," was the virtual 
assertion of Natal and the Cape Colony, " so long 
as the Boer political methods are maintained in 
the Transvaal with the pledged support of the 
Orange Free State." Irreconcilable differences 
of political and social systems, when brought into 
close contact, involve irrepressible conflict, and 
admit of no lasting solution except the subjuga- 
tion and consequent submersion of one or the 
other. 

Such a final settlement was attained in North 
America and in India by the Seven Years War. 
The full results thereof even we of this day have 
not yet seen ; for who can yet predict the effect 
upon the question of the Pacific and of China, 
that by this war was assured the dominance of 
the Anglo-Saxon political and legal tradition over 
the whole American continent north of the 
tropics, and that the same tradition shall, for a 
future yet indeterminate, decisively shape the 
course of India and the Philippines? The pre- 
ceding war, 1 739-1 748, had been substantially 



Hawke 103 



inconclusive on the chief points at issue, because 
European questions intervening had diverted the 
attention of both France and Great Britain from 
America and from India ; and the exhaustion 
of both had led to a perfunctory compact, in 
which the underlying contention was substantially 
ignored in order to reach formal agreement. 
That the French conquest of Madras, in India, 
was yielded in exchange for Louisburg and Cape 
Breton Island, which the American colonists had 
won for England, typifies concisely the status q^io 
to which both parties were willing momentarily 
to revert, while they took breath before the inevi- 
table renewal of the strife, with added fury, a few 
years later; but then upon its proper scene, the 
sea and the over-sea regions in dispute. 

In this great arbitrament Hawke was at once 
called forth to play his part. In 1754 diplomatic 
contention had become acrimonious, and various 
events showed that the moment of open conflict 
was approaching. The squadron in India was 
then considerably increased. In the beginning 
of 1755 Hawke was again afloat to command the 
Channel Fleet, the operations of which extended 
ordinarily from the Channel, over the Bay of 
Biscay, to Cape Finisterre. A naval force was 
collecting at the same time at Portsmouth, under 
Boscawen, to counteract the preparations the 
French were known to be making in North 
America. It sailed soon afterwards, with orders 
to intercept a squadron convoying reinforcements 



I04 Types of Naval Officers 

for Canada ; and on the 8th of June two of these 
ships were captured off the mouth of the St. 
Lawrence, the remainder escaping under cover of 
a fog. In July Hawke went out, with instructions 
to take any French ships-of-the-line that he might 
meet; and in August he was further directed to 
send into port French ships of every kind, mer- 
chant and other, that he might encounter. Before 
the end of the year three hundred trading vessels, 
valued at $6,000,000, had been thus seized. War 
had not yet been declared, but the captured 
vessels were held, as on other occasions before 
and after, as hostages to await the settlement of 
existing difficulties. 

The French government protested of course, 
and recalled its ambassador, but it did not pro- 
ceed to formal hostilities. A great stroke was in 
preparation at Toulon, which could be covered 
for a while by diplomatic correspondence, coupled 
with angry demonstrations on the Atlantic and 
Channel coasts. On the loth of April, 1756, 
twelve French ships-of-the-line and fifteen thou- 
sand troops sailed for Minorca, then a British 
possession, and in the absence of a hostile fleet 
effected a landing without opposition. The Brit- 
ish cabinet having taken alarm too late. Admiral 
Bynghad sailed from Portsmouth, with ten ships, 
only three days before the French left Toulon ; 
when he arrived off Port Mahon, six weeks later, 
a practicable breach in the works had already 
been made. The French fleet was cruising out- 



Hawke 105 



side in support of the siege, and Byng, whose 
force had been increased to thirteen ships, engaged 
it on May 20. The action was in itself indeci- 
sive ; but, upon the opinion of a council of war 
that nothing more could be done, Byng retired to 
Gibraltar. The result to him personally is well 
known. Port Mahon surrendered on June 28. 
War had by this been declared ; by Great Britain 
on the 17th of May, and by France June 20, 1756. 
When the news of Byng's retreat was received 
in England, Hawke was sent out to supersede 
him. He went only personally, accompanied by 
a second in command, but with no fleet, and with 
sealed instructions. Opening these when he 
reached Gibraltar, he found orders to send home 
Byng and his second in command, and to institute 
an inquiry into the conduct of the captains, sus- 
pending any one found " not to have acted with 
due spirit and vigor." An investigation of this 
kind would enable him to form an opinion of 
Byng's own conduct even more exact and authentic 
than his other official opportunities for personal 
intercourse with the chief actors, but he must 
have refrained with much discretion from express- 
ing his judgment on the affair in such way as to 
reach the public ear. It was stated in the *' Gentle- 
man's Magazine," in 1766, that an inquiry was 
provoked in the House of Commons, shortly after 
these events, by Pitt, who took Byng's side ; but 
that Hawke, being a member of the House, denied 
some of Pitt's allegations as to the inadequacy of 



io6 Types of Naval Officers 

Byng's fleet, on the strength of his own personal 
observation after taking over the command. 
Thereupon, so the account says, the categorical 
test question, the argumentum ad hommem, was 
put to him whether with Byng's means he could 
have beat the enemy ; and the manner of the first 
Pitt, in thus dealing with an opponent in debate, 
can be imagined from what we know of him other- 
wise. Whether the story be true or not, Hawke 
was not a man to be so overborne, and the reply 
related is eminently characteristic, " By the grace 
of God, he would have given a good account of 
them." Whatever the reason, there seems little 
doubt that Pitt did not like Hawke ; but the latter 
was at once too independent to care, and too 
necessary to be discarded. 

He remained in the Mediterranean only six 
months, returning to England in January, 1757. 
His tenure of this command was marked by an 
incident which exemplifies the vigorous exercise 
of power frequent in naval commanders, in the 
days when neither steam nor telegraph existed to 
facilitate reference home for instructions ; when 
men with their strong right arms redressed on 
the spot what they thought a wrong. A British 
ship carrying supplies to Gibraltar, where Haw^ke 
was then lying, was captured by a French privateer 
and taken into the Spanish port of Algeciras, on 
the opposite side of the bay. Her surrender was 
demanded from the governor of the port, Spain 
being then neutral ; but, being refused, the admiral 



Hawke io7 



sent the boats of the squadron and cut her out. 
This being resisted by the Spanish forts, a hun- 
dred British seamen were killed or wounded. On 
the admiral's return home, Pitt is reported to 
have told him that he thought he would himself 
have acted in the same way, but would have made 
some concession afterwards. Hawke replied that 
his duty, having the country's force in his hands, 
was to act as he had, — not to make concessions; 
but that the Ministry could deal with the case 
subsequently as it thought fit. In other words, as 
in joint operations with the army, later in the year, 
he took the ground that the land officers were the 
judges of their own business, but that he would 
see them put safe on shore, as a first step ; so 
in a matter affecting national honor, as he con- 
ceived it, he would do the seaman's part and 
redress the injury, after which the civil authority 
could arrange with the other party. The known 
details of this transaction are not full enouo-h to 
permit a decided opinion as to how far the admiral 
was justified in his action, judged even by the in- 
ternational law of the day. It was not necessarily 
a breach of neutrality to admit a belligerent with 
her prize; but it would have been, had the French 
ship gone out from Algeciras, seized her prey, 
and returned with it. Whatever the facts, how- 
ever, the episode illustrates interestingly the spirit 
of Hawke himself, and of the service of that day, 
as well as his characteristic independence towards 
superiors when he felt himself right. 



io8 Types of Naval Officers 

From this time forward Hawke's service was 
confined to the Channel Fleet. This was, during 
that war, the post for the most capable of British 
officers ; for, while the matter at stake was over- 
sea predominance and conquest, yet both these 
depended upon the communications of the French 
colonies and distant possessions with the mother 
country. The source of all their strength, the 
one base indispensable to their operations, was 
the coast of France ; to close exit from this was 
therefore to strike at the root. This was much 
less true for the colonies of Great Britain, at 
least in America ; their numbers, and resources 
in every way, were so far superior to those of 
Canada that they needed only to be preserved 
from interference by the navy of France, — an 
end also furthered by the close watch of the 
French ports. This blockade, as it is often, but 
erroneously, styled, Hawke was the first to main- 
tain thoroughly and into the winter months ; 
and in so doing he gave an extension to the 
practice of naval warfare, which amounted to a 
veritable revolution in naval strategy. The con- 
ception was one possible only to a thorough sea- 
man, who knew exactly and practically what ships 
could do ; one also in whom professional knowl- 
edge received the moral support of strong natural 
self-confidence, — power to initiate changes, to 
assume novel responsibility, through the inner 
assurance of full adequacy to bear it. 

All this Hawke had. The method, therefore, 



Hawke 



09 



the holding the sea, and the exposure of heavy 
ships to weather before thought impossible, was 
well within the range of his ability, — of his 
native and acquired faculties ; but it is due to him 
to recognize the intellectual force, the originality, 
which lifted him above the accepted tradition of 
his predecessors, and by example transmitted to 
the future a system of warfare that then, as well 
as in his own hands, was to exercise a decisive 
effect upon the course of history. It is also to 
be remembered that he took this weighty step 
with instruments relatively imperfect, and greatly 
so. The bottoms of ships were not yet coppered ; 
in consequence they fouled very rapidly, the 
result of which was loss of speed. This meant 
that much greater power, press of canvas, w^as 
needed to force them through the water, and that 
they had to be sent frequently into port to be 
cleaned. Thus they were less able than ships of 
later days to overtake an enemy, or to keep off 
a lee shore, while more intricate administration 
and more ships were required to maintain the 
efficiency of the squadron by a system of reliefs. 
Hawke noted also another difficulty, — the fatigue 
of the crews in cleaning their ships' bottoms. It 
was even more important to success, he said, to 
restore the seaman, worn by cruising, by a few 
days quiet and sleep in port, than to clean thor- 
oughly at the expense of exhausting them. " If 
the enemy should slip out and run," he writes, 
"we must follow as fast as we can." Details 



no Types of Naval Officers 

such as these, as well as the main idea, must be 
borne in mind, if due credit is to be given to 
Hawke for one of the most decisive advances 
ever made in the practice of naval campaigning. 

Some time, however, was to elapse before the 
close watch of the French ports became a leading 
feature in the naval policy of the government. 
The early disasters of the war had forced the 
king, after much resistance, finally to accept the 
first Pitt as the leading minister of the Crown, 
in June, 1757. Pitt's military purpose embraced 
two principal objects: i, the establishment of the 
British colonial system by the destruction of that 
of France, which involved as a necessary prece- 
dent the control of the sea by a preponderant 
navy ; and, 2, the support of Frederic of Prussia, 
then engaged in his deadly contest with the 
combined armies of France, Austria, and Russia. 
Frederic's activity made a heavy drain upon the 
troops and the treasure of France, preventing her 
by just so much from supporting her colonies 
and maintaining her fleet; but, heavily outnum- 
bered as he was, it was desirable to work all 
possible diversion in his favor by attacks else- 
where. This Pitt proposed to do by a series of 
descents upon the French coast, compelling the 
enemy to detach a large force from before the 
Prussian king to protect their own shores. 

As far as the home naval force was concerned, 
the years 1757 and 1758 were dominated by this 
idea of diversion in favor of Frederic the Great 



Hawke 1 1 1 



From the general object of these enterprises, the 
army was necessarily the principal agent ; but the 
navy was the indispensable auxiliary. Hawke's 
association with them is interesting chiefly as 
illustrative of professional character; for there 
was little or no room for achievement of naval 
results. The first expedition in which he was 
concerned was that against Rochefort in 1757. 
This, though now long forgotten, occasioned by 
its failure a storm of contemporary controversy. 
Whatever chances of success it may under any 
circumstances have had were lost beforehand, 
owing to the lateness of the season — June — in 
which Pitt took office. Preparation began at the 
moment when execution was due. The troops 
which should have sailed in early summer could 
not, from delays apparently unavoidable under 
the conditions, get away before September jo. 
Hawke himself hoisted his flag — assumed active 
command — only on August 15. The previous 
administration was responsible for whatever de- 
fect in general readiness increased this delay; as 
regards the particular purpose, Pitt's government 
was at fault in attempting at all an undertaking 
which, begun so late in the year, could not expect 
success under the notorious inadequacy of organi- 
zation bequeathed to him by his predecessors. 
But there will always be found at the beginning 
of a war, or upon a change of commanders, a 
restless impatience to do something, to make a 
showing of results, which misleads the judgment 



112 Types of Naval Officers 

of those in authority, and commonly ends, if not 
in failure, at least in barren waste of powder 
and shot. 

Not the least of the drawbacks under which the 
enterprise labored was extremely defective infor- 
mation — especially hydrographic. The char- 
acter of the coast, the places suited for landing, 
the depths of water, and the channels, were prac- 
tically unknown. Hence a necessity for recon- 
noissances, pregnant of indefinite delay, as might 
have been foreseen. Among Hawke's memo- 
randa occur the words, " Not to undertake any- 
thing without good pilots." The phrase is doubly 
significant, for he was not a man to worry need- 
lessly about pilots, knowing that pilots look not 
to military results, but merely to their own 
responsibility not to take the ground ; and it 
shows the total ignorance under which labored 
all who were charged with an undertaking that 
could only succeed as a surprise, executed with 
unhesitating rapidity. Hawke himself was 
astounded at finding in Basque Roads, before 
Rochefort, " a safe spacious road in which all the 
navy of England, merchant ships included, may 
ride without the least annoyance. Before I came 
here, the place was represented as very difficult 
of access, and so narrow that ships could not lie 
in safety from the forts — nay, the pilots made 
ma7ty baulks before we came m." In fact, want 
of good pilotage summed up the fault of the ex- 
pedition, from its inception in the Cabinet through- 



Hawke 113 



out all the antecedent steps of consultation and 
preparation. Pitt's impetuosity doubtless acted 
as a spur to laggards, but it was accompanied by 
a tendency to overbearing insolence that not in- 
frequently browbeats cautious wisdom. When 
applied to a man like Hawke, strong in natural 
temper and in conscious mastery of his profession, 
the tone characteristic of Pitt provokes an equally 
resolute self-assertion, as far removed from sub- 
jection as it is from insubordination ; but friend- 
ship becomes impossible, and even co-operation 
difficult. 

Throughout all Hawke kept his head, and made 
no serious mistake ; but he accepts no unmerited 
censures. Seeing that the transports are not 
enough for the healthful carriage of the troops, 
he so represents it. The government, already 
impatient at any report of defects, hopes that 
things are now arranged to his satisfaction. " I 
am astonished at this expression," he says, " it is 
my duty to represent defects, but I am satisfied 
with any decision you make." Again, " I have 
received your letter signifying His Majesty's direc- 
tions to use the utmost diligence in embarking 
the troops and getting to sea. As I cannot doubt 
my letter of Sunday being immediately communi- 
cated to you, I should have expected that before 
yours was sent His Majesty would have been fully 
satisfied that I needed no spur in executing his 
orders." As Hawke and Anson — the First Lord 
— were friends, there can be Httle doubt that we 



114 Types of Naval Officers 

see here a firm protest against the much laudecl 
tone to which the efficiency of the British army 
and navy under Pitt has been too exclusively 
attributed. It was in the civil administration, the 
preparation that underlies military success, which 
being at home was under his own eye, that Pitt's 
energy was beneficially felt, and also in his prompt 
recognition of fit instruments; but he had no 
need to discover Hawke or Boscawen. He might 
as well be thought to have discovered the sun. 

In discharginghis part of the expedition Hawke's 
course is consistent and clear. It must in the 
first place be recognized that such enterprises are 
of secondary importance, and do not warrant the 
risks which are not only justifiable but imperative 
when a decisive issue is at stake. Hawke's heroic 
disregard of pilotage difficulties at Quiberon, in 
1759, would have been culpable temerity at Basque 
Roads, in 1757. But, save delays on this account, 
no time is lost by him. When the decision to 
land is reached, he is clear as to the possibility of 
landing ; but when the generals think it impos- 
sible to effect certain results, he replies that is 
their business, on which he does not pretend to 
judge. In his evidence before the Court after- 
wards, he said, " Whether they should land or 
not, he constantly thought it the part of the 
generals to determine. He could not but suppose 
they were infinitely better judges of their own 
business than he could be." Their conduct was 
marked by vacillations strange to him, and which 



Hawke 115 



apparently displeased him ; the troops being, on 
one occasion, embarked in the boats for some 
hours, and yet returning to the ships without pro- 
ceeding. He then addressed a formal letter to 
the commanding general, saying that if he had no 
further operation to propose the fleet would return 
at once to England, and he declined to attend a 
Council of War to decide either of these points. 
The Army should decide, alone, whether it could 
effect anything by landing ; if not, he, without 
asking counsel, w^ould stay no longer. On Octo- 
ber 7th he reached Spithead. 

Pitt, who had espoused Byng's cause against 
the previous administration, followed its precedent 
in throwing the blame on the military and naval 
leaders. In Parliament, he "declared solemnly 
his belief that there was a determined resolution, 
both in the naval and military commanders, against 
any vigorous exertion of the national power." 
For far less than this accusation Byng had been 
condemned ; but in fact the fault at Rochefort lay 
clearly on those who issued the orders, — upon 
the Cabinet ; upon the character of the expedition 
itself, — a great risk for a secondary and doubtful 
object ; upon the inconsiderate haste which disre- 
garded alike the season and the inadequate know- 
ledge ; upon defective preparation in the broadest 
sense of the words. Diversions, in truth, are 
feints, in which the utmost smoke with the least 
fire is the object. Carried farther, they entail 
disaster ; for they rest on no solid basis of adequate 



ii6 Types of Naval Officers 

force, but upon successful deception. Pitt's angry 
injustice met with its due rebuke the next year at 
St. Cas. It can scarcely be doubted that words 
such as those quoted were responsible, in part at 
least, for the disastrous issue of that diversion, the 
story of which belongs, if to the navy at all, to the 
life of Howe. 

That Hawke resented this language can 
scarcely be doubted, and none the less that he 
evidently himself felt that something might have 
been attempted by the troops. He was clear of 
fault in his own consciousness ; but in the general 
censure he was involved with his associates — 
known, so to say, by his friends, implicated in the 
meshes of a half-truth, where effort to clear one's 
self results in worse entanglement. He had the 
manly cast of character which will not struggle 
for self-vindication ; but his suppressed wrath 
gathered force, until a year later it resulted, upon 
occasion of official provocation, in an explosion 
that has not a close parallel in naval history. 

He had hoisted his flag again on February 
28, 1758. His first service was directed against 
a French squadron of five ships-of-the-line, fitting 
at Rochefort to convoy troops for the relief of 
Louisburg, in Cape Breton Island, then about 
to be besieged by British and colonial forces. 
Hawke's observations of the previous year had 
ascertained the hitherto unknown facilities of 
Basque Roads for occupation by a fleet and con- 
sequent effectual interception of such an expedi- 



Hawke 117 



tion. Upon making the land the French vessels 
were found already in the Roads, therefore soon 
to sail ; but before this superior force of seven 
ships they cut their cables, and fled across the 
shoals up the river Charente, on which Rochefort 
lies. Hawke, instructed by his previous expe- 
rience, had earnestly but fruitlessly demanded fire- 
ships and bomb-vessels to destroy the enemy in 
case they grounded on the flats ; which they did, 
and for some hours lay exposed to such an attack. 
Not having these means, he had to watch help- 
lessly the process of lightening and towing by 
which they at last made their escape. He then 
returned to England, having frustrated the relief 
expedition but, through defective equipment, not 
destroyed the vessels. The Admiralty, upon re- 
ceiving his report of the transaction, made no 
acknowledgments to him. 

Pitt had profited by Hawke's ineffectual re- 
quest for small vessels and his suffering from the 
want of them ; but he utilized the suggestions in a 
manner that robbed their author of any share in 
the results. A squadron of that sort was to be 
constituted, to operate on the French coast in 
diversions like that of 1757; but it was to be an 
independent command, under an officer chosen 
by the Government without consulting the ad- 
miral. To the main fleet was assigned the nec- 
essary, but in credit very secondary, office of 
cruising off Brest, to prevent interruption by the 
French ships there ; to play, in short, the incon- 



ii8 Types of Naval Officers 

spicuous role of a covering force, while the light 
squadron had the brilliant part of fighting. The 
officer selected for the latter was Howe, deservedly 
a favorite of Hawke's, but not therefore acceptable 
to him as a supplanter in his honors. 

The admiral had been for some time superin- 
tending the equipment of the vessels for the light 
division, when, on May lo, 1758, Howe reported 
to him, bringing his orders. Hawke boiled over 
at once ; and, in a heat evidently beyond his 
will to control, despatched the following letter, 
three hours after Howe's arrival. 

Portsmouth, 7 o'clock p. m. loth May, 1758. 

Sir, — About 4 o'clock arrived here Captain Howe, 
and delivered me their Lordships' order of the 9th. In 
last September I was sent out to command an expedi- 
tion under all the disadvantages one could possibly 
labor under, arising chiefly from my being under the 
influence of land-officers in Councils of War at sea.^ 
Last cruise (March-April, 1758) I went out on a partic- 
ular service, almost without the least means of perform- 
ing it. Now every means to ensure success is provided ; 
another is to reap the credit ; while it is probable that 
I, with the capital ships, might be ordered to cruise in 
such a manner as to prevent his failing in this attempt. 
To fit out his ships for this service I have been kept 
here,^ and even now have their Lordships' directions, at 
least in terms, to obey him. He is to judge of what he 
wants for his expedition ; he is to make his demands, 

1 By express orders from the Ministry Councils of War had to be 
held. 

^ An application for four days' leave for private business had been 
refused. 



Hawke 119 



and I am to comply with them. I have therefore 
directed my flag immediately to be struck, and left their- 
Lordships' orders with Vice-Admiral Holburne. For 
no consequence that can attend my striking it without 
orders shall ever outbalance with me the wearing it one 
moment with discredit. 

I am, etc. 

E. Hawke. 

It is impossible to justify so extreme a step as 
abandoning one's command without permission, 
and especially under circumstances that permitted 
the orderly course of asking for detachment. 
Nevertheless, Hawke did well to be angry ; and, 
as is sometimes the case, an injudicious and, in 
point of occasion, unseemly loss of temper, doubt- 
less contributed to insure for him in the future, to 
a degree which forbearance or mere remonstrance 
would not have assured, the consideration essen- 
tial to his duties. Many will remember the effect 
produced by Plimsolls unparliamentary outbreak. 
The erroneous impression, that admirals and gen- 
erals fit to be employed at all were to be ridden 
booted and spurred, needed correction. Hawke 
had misapprehended the intention of the Govern- 
ment, in so far as believing that the light squadron 
was to be employed in Basque Roads, the scene 
of last years failure ; but he was right in thinking 
that intrusting the enterprise to another, on that 
occasion his junior, would be a reflection upon 
himself, intensified by making the command 
practically independent, while he was limited to 



I20 Types of Naval Officers 

the covering duty. Under these circumstances, 
erroneously imagined by him, the squadron should 
have been attached to his command, and the 
particular direction left to him ; the Government 
giving to him, instead of to Howe, the general 
orders which it issued, and arranging with him 
beforehand as to the command of the detached 
squadron. 

But even under the actual conditions, of an 
intention to operate on the western Channel coast 
of France, it would have been graceful and ap- 
propriate to recognize Hawke's eminent past, and 
recent experience, by keeping under his command 
the ships he had himself fitted for the service, and 
directing him to despatch Howe with the necessary- 
instructions. It was as in the Nile campaign, 
where the general directions were sent to St. 
Vincent, with a clear expression of the Govern- 
ment's preference for Nelson as the officer to take 
charge. The intended scene of Howe's opera- 
tions, if not formally within Hawke's district, was 
far less distant from Brest than Toulon and Italy 
were from Cadiz, where St. Vincent covered Nel- 
son's detachment. In the wish for secrecy, per- 
haps, or perhaps through mere indifference to the 
effect produced upon Hawke, as a man assumed 
to need curb and spur, he was left in ignorance, 
to imagine what he pleased ; and this action, suc- 
ceeding previous neglects and Pitt's imputations 
of the previous year, elicited an outburst which, 
while it cannot be justified in its particular mani- 



Hawke 121 



festation, was in spirit inevitable. A man sub- 
missive to such treatment as he had good cause 
to suspect, would be deficient in the independence 
of character, and sensitive regard to official repu- 
tation, without which he was unfit to command 
the Channel Fleet. 

Hawke was summoned at once to the Admir- 
alty, and in the interview which ensued, as shown 
by the minutes endorsed on his own letter, his 
misconception as to the quarter in which Howe 
was to act afforded standing ground for a com- 
promise. Hawke having committed himself 
officially, and upon a mistaken premise, the 
Admiralty had him technically at their mercy ; 
but such a triumph as they could win by dis- 
ciplining him would be more disastrous than a 
defeat. He disclaimed resentment towards any 
person, and reiterated that his action was in- 
tended merely to defend his character and honor, 
which he said — to quote the minute exactly — 
" were not so much touched as he apprehended 
when the suspicion he had of Mr. Howe's going 
to Basque Roads arose — from the Lords asking 
him some days since for a draft of the Roads." 
The italics are the present writer's ; but the words 
as they stand would indicate that he did not yield 
his view of the matter in general, nor leave 
hearers under any doubt as to how far he could 
safely be treated with contumely or slight. There 
can be little doubt that the substantial result 
was to strengthen his position in the exact- 



122 Types of Naval OfBcers 

ing duty that lay before him in the following 
year. 

The whole business was then salved over 
by the First Lord, Anson, taking command of 
tlie Channel Fleet for the particular occasion. 
Hawke accompanied him as second in command, 
while How^e went his way with the light squadron 
and the troops. Both divisions sailed on the ist 
of June. On the i8th our admiral was so unwell 
with a severe fever and cold — a complaint to 
which he was much subject — that he had to ask 
to be sent into port. He went ashore before the 
end of the month, and remained unemployed till 
the following May. 

The year 1759 is the culminating epoch of 
Hawke's career. In it occurred the signal tri- 
umph of Quiberon Bay, the seal of his genius, 
significant above all as demonstrating that the 
ardor of the leader had found fulfilment in his 
followers, that the spirit of Hawke had become 
the spirit of the Navy. This year also yielded 
proof of his great capacity as a seaman and ad- 
ministrator, in the efficient blocking of Brest, 
prolonged through six months of closest watching 
into the period of the winter gales, in face of 
which it had hitherto been thought impossible to 
keep the sea with heavy ships massed in fleets ; 
for, as he most justly said, in explaining the 
necessity of maintaining the rendezvous fixed by 
him, " A single ship may struggle with a hard 
gale of wind when a squadron cannot. In work- 



Hawke 123 



ing against a strong westerly gale in the Channel, 
where it cannot make very long stretches," — 
because it finds shores and shoals on either side, 
— "it must always by wearing lose ground, but 
more especially if it should so blow as to put it 
past carrying sail." The method used by Hawke 
was not only an innovation on all past practice, 
but, as has before been said, constituted the pat- 
tern whereon were framed the great blockades of 
the Napoleonic period, which strangled both the 
naval efficiency and the commercial and financial 
resources of the Empire. These were but devel- 
opments of Hawke's fine achievement of 1759; 
the prestige of originality belongs to him. Even 
their success, with better ships and the improve- 
ment of detail always accompanying habit, is fore- 
shadowed by his. " I may safely affirm that, 
except the few ships that took refuge in Conquet, 
hardly a vessel of any kind has been able to enter 
or come out of Brest for four months," — ending 
October loth. "They have been obliged to un- 
load near forty victuallers at Quimperley and 
carry their cargoes by land to Brest. It must 
be the fault of the weather, not ours, if any of 
them escape." ' 

It was suitable indeed that so strenuous and 
admirable an exhibition of professional ability, — 
of naval generalship, — alike in strategic combi- 
nation, tactical disposition, and administrative 
superintendence, should terminate in a brilliant 
triumph, at once its fruit and its crown ; wherein 



124 Types of Naval Officers 

sedulous and unremittent readiness for instant 
action, comprehended by few, received a startling 
demonstration which none could fail to understand. 
As Nelson was pursued by ignorant sneers before 
the Nile, so Hawke was burned in effigy by the 
populace, at the very moment when laborious 
effort was about to issue in supreme achievement. 
The victory in either case is less than the ante- 
cedent labor, as the crown, after all, is less than 
the work, the symbol than the fact symbolized. 

A brief account of preceding conditions, and 
of the dispositions maintained to meet them, is 
therefore necessary to due appreciation of the 
victory of Quiberon Bay. Although the diver- 
sions of 1758 had not very materially aided 
FredQric of Prussia, they had inflicted distinct 
humiliation and harassment upon France. This, 
added to defeat upon the Continent and in North 
America, had convinced the French Government, 
as it convinced Napoleon a half-century later, that 
a determined blow must be struck at England 
herself as the operative centre upon which rested, 
and from which proceeded, the most serious 
detriment to their cause and that of their allies. 
It was resolved, therefore, to attempt an invasion 
of England ; to the threat of which the English 
people were always extremely sensitive. 

From local conditions the French preparations 
had to be made in several separate places ; it was 
the task of the British Navy to prevent the con- 
centration of these different detachments in a 



Hawke 125 



joint effort. The troops must embark, of course, 
from some place near to England ; their principal 
points of assembly were on the Channel, whence 
they were to cross in flat-boats, and in the Biscay 
ports, from Brest to the mouth of the Loire. 
The Bay of Quiberon, from which Hawke's ac- 
tion takes its name, lies between the two latter 
points. It is sheltered from the full force of the 
Atlantic gales by a peninsula of the same name, 
and by some shoals which prolong the barrier 
to the southward of the promontory. 

To cross safely, it was necessary to provide 
naval protection. To this end squadrons were 
equipped in Toulon and in Brest. Combined at 
the latter point, and further strengthened by 
divisions expected to return from North America, 
they would constitute a force of very serious con- 
sideration in point of numbers. Rochefort also 
was an element in the problem, though a minor 
one ; for either the small force already there 
might join the concentration, or, if the port were 
unwatched, the American or other divisions 
might get in there, and be at least so much 
nearer to Brest, or to a neighboring point of 
assembly, as Quiberon Bay. 

As the French Navy was essential to the 
French crossing, as its junction was essential to 
action, as the point of junction was at or near 
Brest — for there was the district near which the 
troops were assembling — and as by far the 
largest detachment was already in Brest, that port 



126 Types of Naval Officers 

became the important centre upon blocking which 
depended primarily the thwarting of the invasion. 
If the French Navy succeeded in concentrating 
at Brest, the first move in the game would be lost. 
Hawke therefore had the double duty of not allow- 
ing the squadron there to get out without fight- 
ing, and of closing the entrance to reinforcements. 
The latter was far the m.ore difficult, and could 
not be assured beyond the chance of failure, 
because an on-shore gale, which would carry his 
fleet into the Channel to avoid being driven on 
the French coast, would be fair for an outside 
enemy to run into the port, friendly to him. 
This actually occurred at a most critical moment, 
but it could only happen by a combination of 
circumstances ; that is, by the hostile squadron 
chancing to arrive at a moment when the British 
had been blown off. If it approached under ordi- 
nary conditions of weather it would run into the 
midst of foes. 

The great names of the British Navy were 
then all afloat in active command. Rodney was 
before Havre, which he bombarded in the course 
of the summer, doing a certain amount of dam- 
age, harassing the local preparations for invasion, 
and intercepting vessels carrying supplies to the 
Brest fleet and coastwise. Boscawen, second only 
to Hawke, was before Toulon, to hold there 
the dozen ships-of-the-line under De la Clue, as 
Hawke was charged to stop the score under 
Conflans. 



Hawke 



127 



In broad conception, Hawke's method was 
simple and can be easily stated ; the difficulty 
lay in carrying it out. The main body of his 
force had a rendezvous, so chosen that in violent 
weather from the westward it could at worst 
drift up Channel, but usually would have a fair 
wind for Torbay, a roadstead on the British 
coast about a hundred miles distant. To the 
rendezvous the fleet was not tied under ordi- 
nary circumstances ; it was merely a headquarters 
which admitted of cruising, but where despatches 
from home would always find the admiral in per- 
son, or news of his whereabouts. Near Brest 
itself was kept an inshore squadron of three or 
four ships, which under ordinary circumstances 
could see the enemy inside, noting his forward- 
ness ; for the cannon of the day could not molest 
a vessel more than a mile from the entrance, 
while the conditions within of spars and sails 
indicated to a seaman the readiness or intention 
to move, to a degree not ascertainable with ships 
dependent on steam only. 

With these dispositions, if a westerly gale 
came on, the fleet held its ground while it could, 
but when expedient to go put into Torbay. Ow- 
ing to the nearness of the two places, the weather, 
when of a pronounced character, was the same 
at both. While the wind held to the westward 
of south, or even at south-southeast, a ship-of-the- 
line could not beat out from Brest; much less a 
fleet. The instant the wind went east, fair for 



128 Types of Naval Officers 

exit, the British left Torbay, with certainty of 
not being too late ; for, though the enemy might 
get out before their return, the east wind would 
not suffer them to close with the French coast 
at another point soon enough to avoid a meet- 
ing. While in Torbay the time was improved by 
taking on board stores and provisions ; nor was 
the night's rest at anchor a small consideration 
for seamen w^orn with continual cruising. 

The practical merits displayed by Hawke in 
maintaining this simple but arduous service were, 
first and supremely, the recognition of its pos- 
sibility, contrary to a tradition heretofore as com- 
monly and as blindly accepted as those of the 
line-of-battle, and of the proper methods for fleet 
attack before described. It must be remembered 
also that in these wars, 1 739-1 763, for the first 
time the British Navy found the scene of action, 
in European waters, to be the Biscay coast of 
France. In the former great wars of the seven- 
teenth century, French fleets entered the Channel, 
and pitched battles were fought there and in 
the North Sea. Thence the contest shifted 
to the Mediterranean, where the great fleets 
operated in the later days of William III., and the 
reign of Anne. Then, too, the heavy ships, like 
land armies, went into winter quarters. It was 
by distinguished admirals considered profes- 
sionally criminal to expose those huge yet cum- 
brous engines of the nation's power to the buffet- 
ings of winter gales, which might unfit them next 



Hawke 129 



year to meet the enemy, snugly nursed and 
restored to vigor in home ports during the same 
time. The need of periodical refitting and clean- 
ing the bottoms clinched the argument in favor 
of this seasonable withdrawal from the sea. 

With this presumed necessity, attention had 
not been paid to developing a system of mainte- 
nance and refit adapted to the need of a fleet per- 
forming what Hawke undertook. In this, of 
course, there cannot be assigned to him the in- 
dividuality of merit that may belong to a concep- 
tion, and does belong to the man who initiates 
and assumes, as he did, the responsibility for a 
novel and hazardous course of action. Many 
agents had to contribute to the forwarding of 
supplies and repairs; but, while singleness of 
credit cannot be assumed, priority is justly due to 
him upon whose shoulders fell not only all blame, 
in case his enterprise failed, but the fundamental 
difficulty of so timing the reliefs of the vessels 
under his command, so arranging the order of 
rotation in their going and coming as to keep 
each, as well as the whole body, in a constant con- 
dition of highest attainable efficiency — in num- 
bers, in speed, and in health — for meeting the 
enemy, whose time of exit could not be foreknown. 
Naturally, too, the man on whom all this fell, and 
who to the nation would personify success or 
failure, as the event might be, — terms which to 
him would mean honor or ruin, — that man, when 
professionally so competent as Hawke, would be 

9 



I JO Types of Naval Officers 

most fruitful in orders and in suggestions to attain 
the desired end. In this sense there can be no 
doubt that he was foremost, and his correspon- 
dence bears evidence of his preoccupation with 
the subject. 

Into particulars it is scarcely necessary to go. 
Administrative details are interesting only to 
specialists. But one quality absolutely essential, 
and in which most men fail, he manifested in high 
degree. He feared no responsibility, either 
towards the enemy, or towards the home authori- 
ties. Superior and inferior alike heard plainly 
from him in case of defects ; still more plainly in 
case of neglect. " It is a matter of indifference 
to me whether I fight the enemy, should they 
come out, with an equal number, one ship more, 
or one ship less." " I depend not on intelligence 
from the French ports; what I see I believe, and 
regulate my conduct accordingly ; " a saying which 
recalls one of Farragut's, —r " The officers say I 
don't believe anything. I certainly beheve very 
little that comes in the shape of reports. They 
keep everybody stirred up. I mean to be whipped 
or to whip my enemy, and not to be scared 
to death." Agitation, to a very considerable 
degree, was the condition of Hawke's superiors ; 
to say the least, anxiety strained to the point of 
approaching panic. But Hawke could have 
adopted truly as his own Farragut's other words, 
" I have full confidence in myself and in my judg- 
ment," — that is, of course, in professional mat- 



Hawke 131 



ters ; and he spoke reassuringly out of the firmness 
of his self-reliance. " Their Lordships will pardon 
me for observing that from the present disposition 
of the squadron I think there is little room for 
alarm while the weather continues tolerable." 
Again, a few days later, " Their Lordships may 
rest assured there is little foundation for the pre- 
sent alarms. While the wind is fair for the 
enemy's coming out, it is also favorable for our 
keeping them in ; and while we are obliged to 
keep off they cannot stir." This was in October, 
when the weather was already wild and the days 
shortening. 

With equally little hesitancy, though without 
breach of subordination, he overbears the Admir- 
alty when they wish to pay what he considers 
exaggerated care to cleaning the bottoms, trace- 
able, no doubt, to the prejudices of the Sea Lords. 
" If the ships take up a month by cleaning, from 
the time they leave me to their return, it will be 
impossible for me to keep up the squadron. The 
only practicable way is to heel, etc., and confine 
them to ten days in port for the refreshment of 
their companies in case they should miss the 
spring tide." " Their Lordships wdll give me leave 
to observe that the relief of the squadron depends 
more on the refreshment of the ships' companies 
than on cleaning the ships. By the hurry the 
latter must be performed in, unless the ship con- 
tinues a month or five weeks in port, which the 
present exigency will by no means admit of, the 



132 Types of Naval Officers 

men would be so harassed and fatigued that they 
would return to me in a worse condition than 
when they left me. . . . However, I shall endeavor 
to comply with all their Lordships' directions in 
such manner as, to the best of my judgme^it, will 
answer their intentions in employing m.e here''' 
The words italicized strike the true note of subor- 
dination duly tempered with discretion. 

To the Navy Board, a civil adjunct to the 
Admiralty, but possessed of considerable indepen- 
dent power to annoy officers in active military 
service, he took a more peremptory tone. He 
had discharged on his own authority, and for rea- 
sons of emergency, a mutinous surgical officer. 
For this he was taken to task, as Nelson a gen- 
eration later was rebuked by the same body. " I 
have to acquaint you," he replied, " that there was 
no mistake in his being ordered by me to be dis- 
charged." He then gives his reasons, and con- 
tinues, " For the real good of the service I ordered 
him to be discharged, and his crime noted on his 
list of pay, for your information. I shall not enter 
into any dispute with you about my authority as 
a Commanding Officer, neither do I ever think of 
inconveniences or prejudices to myself, as a party, 
according to your insinuations, where the good of 
the service is concerned." It must be added that 
to subordinates he was as liberal with praise as he 
was with censure, where either was merited ; nor 
did he fail in kindly personal intervention upon 
due occasion for deserving or unfortunate men. 



Hawke 



^33 



More reserved, apparently, than Nelson, he seems 
to have been like him sympathetic ; and hence it 
was that, as before observed, it was his spirit that 
he communicated to the navy rather than a system, 
admirable as was the strategic system embodied 
in his methods of blockade. It was by personal 
influence rather than by formulated precept that 
Hawke inspired his service, and earned a just claim 
to be reckoned the greatest force of his century 
in naval development. 

The general conditions being as described, the 
fighting in the naval campaign of 1759 began in 
the Mediterranean. On June 8th Boscawen, hav- 
ing driven two French frigates into a fortified bay 
near Toulon, attacked them with three ships-of- 
the-line. The attack failed, and the British ships 
were badly injured ; a timely lesson on the gen- 
eral inexpediency of attacking shore batteries with 
vessels, unless for special and adequate reasons 
of probable advantage. In July he returned to 
Gibraltar, to refit and for provisions. In the 
absence of details, positive criticism is unwar- 
ranted ; but it is impossible not to note the differ- 
ence between this step, during summer weather, 
and the Toulon blockades of Lord St. Vincent, 
who, when before Brest, modelled his course upon 
that of Hawke. The port being thus left open, 
De la Clue sailed on the 5th of August for Brest. 
On the 17th he was near the straits of Gibraltar, 
hugging the African coast, and falling night gave 
promise of passing unseen, when a British look- 



134 Types of Naval Officers 

out frigate caught sight of his squadron. She 
hauled in for Gibraltar at once, firing signal guns. 
Boscawen'sships were in the midst of repairs, mostly 
dismantled ; but, the emergency not being unfore- 
seen, spars and sails were sent rapidly aloft, and 
within three hours they were underway in pursuit. 
The French division separated during the night. 
Five ships put into Cadiz. The British next 
morning caught sight of the remaining seven, 
among which was the admiral, and a sharp chase 
resulted in the destruction of five. From August 
1 8th the Toulon fleet was eliminated from the cam- 
paign ; though the vessels in Cadiz remained to 
the end a charge upon Hawke's watchfulness, 
similar to that caused by the enemy's divisions 
expected from America. 

That one of the latter was already on its way 
home, under the command of Commodore Bom- 
part, was notified to our admiral on September 
2ist by a despatch from England. He immedi- 
ately sent a division of heavy ships to reinforce 
the light squadron to the southward. " If the 
alarm is great now," he said, ''it will be much 
greater if he get into Rochefort." Further infor- 
mation from the West Indies contradicted the 
first report, and on October loth Hawke recalled 
the ships-of-the-line, apparently at the wish of the 
Admiralty ; for he expresses his regret at doing 
so, and asks for more of the " many ships " then 
in England, that Rochefort may be blocked as 
well as Brest. The incident has now little impor- 



Hawke 135 



tance, except as indicating the general national 
nervousness, and the difficulty under which he 
labored through force inadequate to the numerous 
and exacting duties entailed by constant holding 
the sea in war. From this point of view it bears 
upon his conduct. 

That Bompart was coming proved to be true. 
On November loth Hawke anchored with the fleet 
in Torbay, after three days of struggle against a 
very heavy westerly storm. " Bompart, if near, 
may get in," he wrote the Admiralty, " but no 
ship can get out from any port in the Bay." The 
weather had then moderated, but was still too 
rough for boating, even in the sheltered roadstead ; 
hence he could get no reports of the state of the 
ships, which shows incidentally the then defective 
system of signalling. On the 12th he sailed, on 
the 1 3th was again forced into Torbay by a south- 
wester, but on the 14th got away finally. On the 
afternoon of the i6th the fleet was twenty-five 
miles from the Island of Ushant, near Brest, and 
there learned from transports, returning from the 
the light division off Quiberon, that the French 
fleet had been seen the day before, seventy-five 
miles northwest of Belleisle ; therefore some fifty 
or sixty miles southeast of the point where this 
news was received. Conflans had sailed the same 
day that the British last left Torbay, but before 
his departure Bompart had opportunely arrived, 
as Hawke had feared. His ships were not able 
to go at once to sea on so important a mission, 



136 Types of Naval Officers 

but their seasoned crews were a welcome reinforce- 
ment and were distributed through the main fleet, 
which numbered twenty-one ships-of-the-line. 
Hawke had twenty-three. 

Concluding that the enemy were bound for 
Quiberon, Hawke carried a press of sail for that 
place. He knew they must be within a hundred 
miles of him and aimed to cut them off from their 
port. During the 17th the wind, hanging to the 
south and east, was adverse to both fleets, but on 
the 1 8th and 19th it became more favorable. At 
half-past eight on the morning of the 20th, one of 
the look-out frigates ahead of the British made 
the signal for sighting a fleet. It was then blow- 
ing strong from the west-northwest, and Belleisle, 
which is ten miles w^est of Quiberon Bay, and 
south of which the fleets must pass, was by the 
English reckoning forty miles distant. A course 
of some fifty or sixty miles was therefore to be 
run before the enemy could close the land, and 
there remained about eight hours of sun. 

Hawke 's day had come. Towards ten o'clock 
he had the enemy sufficiently in view to see that 
they were intent upon securing their arrival, 
rather than fighting. He therefore made signal 
for the seven ships nearest them " to chase and 
draw into a line-of-battle ahead of me, and en- 
deavour to stop them till the rest of the squadron 
should come up, who also were to form as they 
chased that no time might be lost in the pursuit." 
The French " kept going off under such sail as 



Hawke 137 



all their squadron could carry and yet keep to- 
gether^ while we crowded after him with every sail 
our ships could bear'' The words italicized sum 
up the whole philosophy of a general chase. 
The pursued are limited to the speed of the 
slowest, otherwise he who cannot but lag is 
separated and lost ; the pursuer need slacken 
no whit, for his friends are ever coming up to 
his aid. Overtaking is inevitable, unless the dis- 
tance is too short. 

At half-past two firing began between the 
French rear and the leading British. Of the two 
foremost in the chase, who thus opened the fight, 
one was the same Dorsetshire which in Mathews's 
battle had played the laggard. Her captain, who 
thus rose to his opportunity, was one of the two 
to whom Hawke addressed the enthusiastic com- 
pliment that they had " behaved like angels." 
Hawke himself was at this moment south of 
Belleisle, with several ships ahead of him ; while 
the French admiral was leading his fleet, in order 
better to pilot them over dangerous ground, and 
by his own action show more surely than was 
possible by signal what he wished done from 
moment to moment. At the southern extreme of 
the shoals which act as a breakwater to Quiberon 
Bay are some formidable rocks, known as the 
Cardinals. Around these M. de Conflans passed 
soon after the firing began, his rear being then in 
hot action. 

Hawke himself was without a pilot, as were 



138 Types of Naval Officers 

most of his captains. The sailing master of the 
flag-ship was charged with that duty for the fleet, 
but had of the ground before him no exact per- 
sonal knowledge ; nor could reliance be placed 
upon the imperfect surveys of a locality, which 
it was not the interest of an almost constant 
enemy to disclose. Enough, however, was known 
to leave no doubt of the greatness of the risks, 
and it was the master's part to represent them. 
The occasion, however, was not one of a mere 
diversion, of a secondary operation, but of one 
vital to the nation's cause ; and Hawke's reply, 
stamped with the firmness of a great officer, 
showed how little professional timidity had to 
do with his laudable care of his fleet in Basque 
Roads two years before. " You have done your 
duty in warning me," he replied ; " now lay us 
alono^side the French Commander-in-chief." So 
amid the falling hours of the day the British fleet, 
under the unswerving impulse of its leader, moved 
steadfastly forward, to meet a combination of 
perils that embraced all most justly dreaded by 
seamen, — darkness, an intricate navigation, a 
lee shore fringed with outlying and imperfectly 
known reefs and shoals, towards which they were 
hurried by a fast-rising wind and sea, that for- 
bade all hope of retracing their steps during the 
long hours of the night. 

" Had we but two hours more daylight," wrote 
Hawke in his official report, " the whole had been 
totally destroyed or taken ; for we were almost 



Hawke 139 



up with their van when night overtook us." His 
success would have been greater, though not 
more decisive of issues than the event proved it ; 
but nothing could have added to the merit or 
brilliancy of his action, to which no element of 
grandeur was wanting. This was one of the 
most dramatic of sea fights. Forty-odd tall 
ships, pursuers and pursued, under reefed canvas, 
in fierce career drove furiously on ; now rushing 
headlong down the forward slope of a great sea, 
now rising on its crest as it swept beyond them ; 
now seen, now hidden ; the helmsmen straining 
at the wheels, upon which the huge hulls, tossing 
their prows from side to side, tugged like a mad- 
dened horse, as though themselves feeling the 
wild " rapture of the strife " that animated their 
masters, rejoicing in their strength and defying 
the accustomed rein. 

The French admiral had flattered himself that 
the enemy, ignorant of the ground, would not 
dare to follow him round the Cardinals. He was 
soon undeceived. Hawke's comment on the 
situation was that he was ''for the old way of 
fighting, to make downright work with them." 
It was an old way, true ; but he had more than 
once seen it lost to mind, and had himself 
done most to restore it to its place, — a new way 
as well as an old. The signals for the general 
chase and for battle were kept aloft, and no 
British ship slacked her way. Without ranged 
order, save that of speed, the leaders mingled 



140 Types of Naval Officers 

with the French rear; the roar and flashes of 
the guns, the falUng spars and drifting clouds of 
smoke, now adding their part to the wild mag- 
nificence of the scene. Though tactically perfect 
in the sole true sense of tactics, that the means 
adopted exactly suited the situation, this was a 
battle of incidents, often untold, — not one of 
manoeuvres. As the ships, rolling heavily, buried 
their flanks deeply in the following seas, no cap- 
tain dared to open his lower tier of ports, where 
the most powerful artillery was arrayed — none 
save one, the French Thesee, whose rashness was 
rebuked by the inpouring waters, which quickly 
engulfed both ship and crew. The Superbe met 
a like fate, though not certainly froni the same 
cause. She sank under the broadside of the 
Royal George, Hawke's flag-ship. " The Royal 
Georges people gave a cheer," wrote an eye wit- 
ness, " but it was a faint one ; the honest sailors 
were touched at the miserable state of so many 
hundreds of poor creatures." Americans and 
English can couple this story of long ago with 
Philip's ejaculation off Santiago de Cuba, but 
three years since: "Don't cheer, boys, those 
poor devils are dying." 

By five o'clock two French ships had struck, 
and two had been sunk. " Night was now come," 
wrote Hawke, "and being on a part of the coast, 
among islands and shoals of which we were 
totally ignorant, without a pilot, as was the 
greatest part of the squadron, and blowing hard 



Hawke 141 



on a lee shore, I made the signal to anchor." 
The day's work was over, and doubtless looked to 
him incomplete, but it was effectually and finally 
done. The French Navy did not again lift up 
its head during the three years of war that 
remained. Balked in their expectation that the 
foe's fear of the beach would give them refuge, 
harried and worried by the chase, harnessed to no 
fixed plan of action, Conflans's fleet broke apart 
and fled. Seven went north, and ran ashore at 
the mouth of the little river Vilaine which emp- 
ties into Quiberon Bay. Eight stood south, and 
succeeded in reaching Rochefort. The fate of 
four has been told. Conflans's flag-ship anchored 
after night among the British, but at daybreak 
next morning cut her cables, ran ashore, and was 
burned by the French. One other, wrecked on a 
shoal in the bay, makes up the tale of twenty-one. 
Six were wholly lost to their navy ; the seven 
that got into Vilaine only escaped to Brest by 
twos, two years later, while the Rochefort division 
was effectually blocked by occupying Basque 
Roads, the islands of which and of Quiberon 
were cultivated as kitchen gardens for the re- 
freshment of British crews. 

Of the British, one ship went on a shoal during 
the action, and on the following day another 
coming to her assistance also grounded. Both 
were lost, but most of their people were saved. 
Beyond this Hawke's fleet suffered little. "As 
to the loss we have sustained," wrote he, " let it 



142 Types of Naval Officers 

be placed to the account of the necessity I was 
under of running all risks to break this strong 
force of the enemy." 

A contemporary witness assigns to Hawke's 
own ship a arge individual share in the fighting. 
Of this he does not himself speak, nor is it 
of much matter. That all was done with her 
that could be done, to aid in achieving success, 
is sufficiently assured by his previous record. 
Hawke's transcendent merit in this affair was 
that of the general officer, not of the private 
captain. The utmost courage shown by the 
commander of a single ship before the enemy's 
fire cannot equal the heroism which assumes the 
immense responsibility of a doubtful issue, on 
which may hang a nation's fate ; nor would the 
admiral's glory be shorn of a ray, if neither then 
nor at any other time had a hostile shot traversed 
his decks. 

The night of the 20th passed in anxieties 
inseparable from a situation dangerous at best,, 
but still more trying to an admiral upon whom, 
after such a day, night had closed without ena- 
bling him to see in what case most of his ships- 
were. "In the night," he reports, "we heard 
many guns of distress fired, but, blowing hard, 
want of knowledge of the coast, and whether they 
were fired by a friend or an enemy, prevented all 
means of relief." In the morning he resumed 
his activity. Little, however, could be done. 
The continuing violence of the wind, and igno- 



Hawke 143 



ranee of the ground, prevented approach within 
gun-shot to the ships at the mouth of the Vilaine, 
while they, by lightening and favor of the next 
flood tide, warped their way inside through the 
mud flats. 

Hawke remained nearly two months longer, re- 
turning to England January 17, 1760. He had 
then been thirty-five weeks on board, without set- 
ting foot on shore. At the age of fifty-four, and 
amid such manifold cares, it is not to be wondered 
at that he should need relief. Rather must he be 
considered fortunate that his health, never robust 
in middle life, held firm till his great triumph was 
achieved. Boscawen succeeded him temporarily 
in the command. 

He was received in England with acclamations 
and with honors ; yet the most conspicuous mark 
of approval conferred on admirals before and after, 
the grant of the peerage, was not given to him, 
who had wrought one of the very greatest services 
ever done for the country. Recent precedent — 
that of Anson — demanded such recognition ; and 
popular enthusiasm would have applauded, 
although the full military merit of the man could 
scarcely be appreciated by the standards of his 
generation. That no such reward was bestowed is 
most probably attributable to Hawke's own indif- 
ference to self-advancement. If demanded by him, 
it could scarcely have been refused ; but he never 
pushed his own interests. His masculine inde- 
pendence in professional conduct, towards supe- 



144 Types of Naval Officers 

riors and inferiors, found its root and its reflection 
in personal unconcern — as well antecedent as 
subsequent — about the results from his actions 
to his fortunes. To do his own part to the 
utmost, within the lines of the profession he knew, 
was his conception of duty. As he would not 
meddle with the land officers' decision as to what 
they should or should not do, so he left to the 
politicians, in whose hands the gifts lay, to decide 
what they would, or should, accord to a success- 
ful admiral. Pitt, the Great Commoner, left 
Hawke a commoner. Possibly he recognized 
that only by stretch of imagination could Hawke 
be reckoned one of the creations of a great Mini- 
ster's genius. 

Little remains to tell. On September 3, 
1762, the admiral's flag was hauled down for the 
last time. He never went to sea again. In 1 766, 
when Pitt came back to power as Lord Chatham, 
Hawke became First Lord of the Admiralty, and 
so remained till 1771. It was a time of unbroken 
peace, succeeding a period of continuous wars 
extending over a quarter of a century; conse- 
quently there was in naval and military matters 
the lassitude usual to such a period. Hawke is 
credited with formulating the principle that " the 
British fleet could only be termed considerable in 
the proportion it bore to that of the House of 
Bourbon ; " that is, to the combined navies of 
France and Spain, over which that House then 
reigned. The maxim proves that he had some 



Hawke 



45 



claim to statesmanship in his view of affairs out- 
side his service ; and his manifested freedom from 
self-seeking is the warrant that no secondary politi- 
cal motives would divert his efforts from this aim. 
That he succeeded in the main, that he was not re- 
sponsible for the fallen condition of the fleet when 
war again arose in 1778, is evidenced by a state- 
ment, uncontradicted, in the House of Lords in 
1779, that when he left office the navy had 139 
ships-of-the-line, of which 81 were ready for 
sea. 

In 1 765 Hawke, who was then already a full 
admiral, wearing his flag at the mainmast head, 
was made Vice-Admiral of Great Britain ; an 
honorary position, but the highest in point of 
naval distinction that the nation had to give. As 
one who held it three-quarters of a century later 
wrote, " It has ever been regarded as the most 
distinguished compliment belonging to our pro- 
fession." The coincidence is significant that 
upon Hawke's death Rodney succeeded him in 
it; affirming, as it were, the consecutiveness of 
paramount influence exercised by the two on the 
development of the Navy. In 1776 the peerage 
was at last conferred ; seventeen years after his 
great victory, and when, having passed three score 
and ten, a man who had ever disdained to ask must 
have felt the honor barren to himself, though 
acceptable for his son. 

His last recorded professional utterances are in 
private letters addressed in the summer of 1 780 



146 Types of Naval Officers 

to the commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet 
— Francis Geary — who had served with him in 
the Bay of Biscay, though he missed Ouiberon. 
He recommends the maintenance of his old 
station off Brest, and says, '' For God's sake, if 
you should be so lucky as to get sight of the 
enemy, get as close to them as possible. Do not 
let them shufHe with you by engaging at a dis- 
tance, but get within musket shot if you can. 
This will be the means to make the action deci- 
sive." In these words we find an unbroken chain 
of tradition between Hawke and Nelson. One of 
Hawke's pupils was William Locker ; and Locker 
in turn, just before Hawke's death, had Nelson for 
a lieutenant. To him Nelson in after years, in 
the height of his glory, wrote, " To you, my dear 
friend, I owe much of my success. It was you 
who taught me, — ' Lay a Frenchman close and 
you will beat him.' " 

Hawke died October 16, 1781. On his tomb 
appear these words, " Wherever he sailed, victory 
attended him." It is much to say, but it is not 
all. Victory does not always follow desert. " It 
is not in mortals to command success," — a favor- 
ite quotation with the successful admirals St. Vin- 
cent and Nelson. Hawke's great and distinctive 
glory is this, — that he, more than any one man, 
was the source and origin of the new life, the new 
spirit, of his service. There were many brave 
men before him, as there were after; but it fell to 
him in a time of great professional prostration 



Hawke i_^^ 



not only to lift up and hand on a fallen torch, but 
in himself to embody an ideal and an inspiration 
from which others drew, thus rekindling a li<rht 
which It IS scarcely an exaggeration to say had 
been momentarily extinguished. 



RODNEY 

I719-I792 

UNLIKE Hawke, Rodney drew his descent 
from the landed gentry of England, and 
had relatives among the aristocracy. The name 
was originally Rodeney. We are told by his son- 
in-law and biographer that the Duke of Chandos, 
a connection by marriage, obtained the command 
of the Royal yacht for the admiral's father, Henry 
Rodney. In one of the trips which George I. 
frequently made between England and Hanover, 
he asked his captain if there were anything he 
could do for him. The reply was a request that 
he would stand sponsor for his son, who accord- 
ingly received the name of George ; his second 
name Brydges coming from the family through 
which Chandos and the Rodneys were brought 
into relationship. The social position and sur- 
roundings resulting from such antecedents con- 
tributed of course to hasten the young officer's 
advancement, irrespective of the unquestionable 
professional merit shown by him, even in early 
years ; but to them also, combined with narrow 
personal fortune, inadequate to the tastes thus 



George Brydges fiodney, Lord Rodney. 



i 



Rodney 149 

engendered, was probably due the pecuniary em- 
barrassment which dogged him through life, and 
was perhaps the moving incentive to doubtful 
procedures that cast a cloud upon his personal 
and official reputation. 

Rodney was born in February, 1719, and went 
to sea at the age of thirteen ; serving for seven 
years in the Channel Fleet. Thence he was 
transferred to the Mediterranean, where he was 
made lieutenant in 1739. In 1742 he went again 
to the Mediterranean with Admiral Mathews, 
who there gave him command of a "post" ship, 
with which he brought home the trade, — three 
hundred merchant vessels, — from Lisbon. Upon 
arriving in England his appointment by Mathews 
was "confirmed" by the Admiralty. Being then 
only twenty-four, he anticipated by five years the 
age at which Hawke reached the same rank of 
post-captain, the attainment of which fixed a man's 
standing in the navy. Beyond that, advancement 
went by seniority; a post-captain might be 
"yellowed," — retired as a rear admiral, — but 
while in active service he kept the advantage of 
his early promotion. 

When Rodney was in later years commander- 
in-chief in the West Indies, he made his son a 
post-captain at fifteen ; an exercise of ofiicial 
powers which, though not singular to him, is 
too characteristic of the man and the times to 
be wholly unmentioned. His own promotion, 
though rapid, was not too much so for his pro- 



i^o Types of Naval Officers 

fessional good ; but it is likely that neither thaf 
consideration, nor the good of the service, counted 
for much alongside of the influence he possessed. 
He appears, however, to have justified from the 
first the favor of his superiors. His employment 
was continuous, and in a military point of view 
he was more fortunate than Hawke was at the 
same period of his career. Within two years, 
when in command of a forty-gun ship, he fought 
and took a French privateer of the same nominal 
force, and with a crew larger by one hundred 
than his own. Thence he was advanced into the 
Eagle, sixty, in which, after some commerce- 
destroying more lucrative than glorious, he bore 
an extremely honorable part in Hawke's battle 
with L'Etenduere, already related. The Eagle 
was heavily engaged, and was one of the three 
small ships that on their own initiative pursued 
and fought, though unsuccessfully, the two es- 
caping French vessels. Rodney shared Hawke's 
general encomium, that *' as far as fell within my 
notice, the commanders, their officers, and ships' 
companies, behaved with the greatest spirit and 
resolution." Rodney came under his close obser- 
vation, for, the Eagles " wheel being shot to 
pieces and all the men at it killed, and all her 
braces and bowlines gone," she drove twice on 
board the flag-ship. This was before her pursuit 
of the two fliers. 

In the subsequent trial of Captain Fox, — the 
m.inutes of which the present writer has not seen, 



Rodney 151 

— it appears, according to the biographer of 
Lord Hawke/ that it was Captain Saunders's 
and Captain Rodney's " sense of being deserted 
by Fox, and of the two French ships having 
escaped through his failure of duty, which forms 
the chief feature of the Court- Martial. Rodney 
especially describes his being exposed to the fire 
of four of the enemy's ships, when, as he asserted, 
Fox's ship might well have taken off some of it." 
The incident is very noteworthy, for it bears the 
impress of personal character. Intolerance of 
dereliction of duty, and uncompromising con- 
demnation of the delinquent, were ever leading 
traits in Rodney's course as a commander-in- 
chief. He stood over his ofBcers with a rod, 
dealt out criticism unsparingly, and avowed it as 
his purpose and principle of action so to rule. 
It is not meant that his censures were unde- 
served, or even excessive ; but there entered into 
them no ingredient of pity. His despatches are 
full of complaints, both general and specific. 
When he spared, it was from a sense of expe- 
diency, — or of justice, a trait in which he was by 
no means deficient ; but for human weakness he 
had no bowels. Hawke complains of but this 
one captain. Fox, and towards him he seems not 
to have evinced the strong feeling that animated 
his juniors. Each man has his special gift, and 
to succeed must needs act in accordance with it. 

1 Life of Lord Hawke, by Captain Montagu Burrows, Royal Navy, 
p. 194. 



152 Types of Naval Officers 

There are those who lead and those who drive; 
Hawke belonged to the one class, Rodney to the 
other. 

In direct consequence of this difference of 
temperament, it will be found, in contrasting the 
schools of which Hawke and Rodney are the 
conspicuous illustrations, that the first represents 
the spirit, and the second the form, which were 
the two efficient elements of the progress made 
during the eighteenth century. The one intro- 
duces into a service arrested in development, 
petrified almost, by blindly accepted rules and 
unintelligent traditions, a new impulse, which 
transforms men from within, breaking through 
the letter of the law in order to realize its for- 
gotten intent ; the other gives to the spirit, thus 
freed from old limitations, a fresh and sagacious 
direction, but needs nevertheless to impose its 
own methods by constraint from without. It is 
the old struggle, ever renewed, between liberty 
and law; in the due, but difficult, combination of 
which consist both conservation and progress. 

And so in the personality of the two great 
admirals who respectively represent these con- 
trasting schools of practice; while we find in 
both these two elements, as they must exist in 
every efficient officer, yet it is to be said that the 
one inspires and leads, the other moulds and com- 
pels. The one, though seemingly reserved, is in 
character sympathetic, and influences by example 
chiefly ; the other, austerely courteous, is towards 



Rodney i S3 

associates distant and ungenial, working by fear 
rather than by love. For these broad reasons of 
distinction it is Mathews's battle that best meas- 
ures the reaction of which Hawke is the type, 
for there was especially illustrated defect of spirit, 
to cover which the letter of the law was invoked ; 
whereas in Byng's action, extremely bad form, in 
the attempt to conform to the letter of the Instruc- 
tions, emphasizes the contrast with Rodney's 
methods, precise and formal unquestionably, but 
in which form ceases to be an end in itself and 
is reduced to its proper function as the means 
to carry into effect a sound military conception. 
Of these two factors in the century's progress, it 
needs hardly to be said that the one contributed 
by Hawke is the greater. In spirit and in achieve- 
ment he, rather than Rodney, is the harbinger of 
Nelson. 

A short time after the action with L'Etenduere 
the cruise of the JSa£-le came to an end. When 
she was paid off Rodney was presented at Court 
by Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty ; a 
merited and not unusual honor after distinguished 
service in battle. The King was struck by his 
youthful appearance, and said he had not known 
there was so young a captain in the Navy. As 
he was then nearly thirty, and had seen much 
and continuous service, it is singular that his 
face should not have borne clear traces of the 
facts. Anson replied that he had been a captain 
for six years, and it was to be wished that His 



154 Types of Naval Officers 

Majesty had a hundred more as good as he. 
Making allowance for courtly manners and fair- 
speaking, the incident may be accepted as show- 
ing, not only that aptitude for the service which 
takes its hardships without undue wear and 
tear, but also an official reputation already well 
established and recognized. 

Professional standing, therefore, as well as 
family influence, probably contributed to obtain 
for him in 1749 the appointment of Commodore 
and Commander-in-chief on the Newfoundland 
station ; for he was still junior on the list of 
captains, and had ten years more to run before 
obtaining his admiral's flag. He remained in 
this post from 1749 to 1752. They were years 
of peace, but of peace charged full with the ele- 
ments of discord which led to the following war. 
Canada was still French, and the territorial limits 
between the North American possessions of the 
two nations remained a subject of dispute and 
intrigue. The uncertain state of political rela- 
tions around the Gulf of St. Lawrence added to 
the responsibility of Rodney's duty, and empha- 
sized the confidence shown in assigning him a 
position involving cautious political action. 

Explicit confirmation of this indirect testimony 
is found in a private letter to him from the Earl 
of Sandwich, who had succeeded Anson as First 
Lord in 1748. "I think it necessary to inform 
you that, if the Governor of Nova Scotia should 
have occasion to apply to you for succor, and 



Rodney 155 

send to you for that purpose to Newfoundland, it 
would be approved by Government if you should 
comply with his request. It is judged improper, 
as yet, to send any public order upon a business 
of so delicate a nature, which is the reason of my 
writing to you in this manner; and I am satisfied 
that your prudence is such as wuU not suffer you 
to make any injudicious use of the information 
you now receive. There are some people that 
cannot be trusted with any but public orders, but 
I shall think this important affair entirely safe 
under your management and secrecy." Lan- 
guage such as this undoubtedly often covers a 
hint, as well as expresses a compliment, and may 
have done so in this instance ; nevertheless, in 
after life it is certain that Rodney gave proof of a 
very high order of professional discretion and of 
independent initiative. It is therefore perfectly 
reasonable to suppose that he had thus early 
convinced the Government that he was a man 
competent and trustworthy under critical condi- 
tions, such as then characterized the intercolonial 
relations of the two states. The particular inci- 
dent is farther noteworthy in connection with the 
backwardness, and even reluctance, of the Gov- 
ernment to employ him in the War of the Amer- 
ican Revolution, though Sandwich was again First 
Lord, and Rodney a strong political supporter of 
the party in power. The precise cause for this 
is probably not ascertainable ; but it is a matter 
of perfectly reasonable inference that the early 



156 Types of Naval Officers 

promise of the young officer had meanwhile 
become overclouded, that distrust had succeeded 
to confidence, for reasons professional, but not 
strictly military. Rodney's war record continued 
excellent from first to last; one not good only, 
but of exceptional and singular efficiency. 

In October, 1752, Rodney returned to England, 
having been elected to Parliament. The Seven 
Years War, which, after two years of irregular 
hostilities, began formally in 1756, found him still 
a captain. With its most conspicuous opening 
incident, the attempted relief of Minorca, and 
the subsequent trial and execution of the 
unsuccessful commander. Admiral Byng, he had 
no connection, personal or official ; nor was he a 
member of the Court- Martial, although he seems 
to have been in England at the time, and was 
senior to at least one of the sitting captains. 
The abortive naval engagement off Port Mahon, 
however, stands in a directly significant relation 
to his career, for it exemplifies to the most exag- 
gerated degree, alike in the purpose of the admiral 
and the finding of the Court, the formal and 
pedantic conception of a correctly fought fleet 
action, according to the rules and regulations "in 
such cases prescribed " by the Fighting Instruc- 
tions.^ It was Rodney's lot to break with this 
tradition, and to be the first to illustrate juster 
ideas in a fairly ranged battle, where the enemy 
awaited attack, as he had done at Malaga in 1704, 

1 For account and analysis of Byng's action, see ante, pp. 47-67. 



Rodney 157 

and at Minorca in 1756. Precisely such an op- 
portunity never came to Hawke; for, although 
L'Etenduere waited, he did so under conditions 
and dispositions which gave the ensuing affair 
a nearer analogy to a general chase than to a 
pitched battle. Though the British approach 
then was in a general sense parallel to the 
enemy's line, it was from the rear, not from the 
beam; and through this circumstance of overtak- 
ing, and from the method adopted, their vessels 
came under fire in succession, not together. 
This was perfectly correct, the course pre-emi- 
nently suited to the emergency, and therefore 
tactically most sound ; but the conditions were 
not those contemplated by the Fighting Instruc- 
tions, as they were in the case of Byng, and also 
in the battle most thoroughly characteristic of 
Rodney — that of April 17, 1780. The contrast 
in conduct between the two commanders is strik- 
ingly significant of progress, because of the close 
approach to identity in circumstances. 

Rodney accompanied the Rochefort expedition 
of 1757, under Hawke, some account of which is 
given in the life of that admiral ; and he com- 
manded also a ship-of-t he-line in Boscawen's fleet 
in 1758, when the reduction of Louisburg and 
Cape Breton Island was effected by the combined 
British and colonial forces. After this important 
service, the necessary and effectual antecedent of 
the capture of Quebec and the fall of Canada in 
the following year, he returned to England, where 



1^8 Types of Naval Officers 

on the 19th of May, 1759, he was promoted to 
Rear Admiral ; being then forty. He was next, 
and without interval of rest, given command of a 
squadron to operate against Havre, where were 
gathering boats and munitions of war for the 
threatened invasion of England ; with the charge 
also of suppressing the French coastwise sailings, 
upon which depended the assembling of the vari- 
ous bodies of transports, and the carriage of sup- 
plies to the fleet in Brest, that Hawke at the 
same time was holding in check. The service 
was important, but of secondary interest, and 
calls for no particular mention beyond that of its 
general eflficiency as maintained by him. 

In 1 76 1, Rodney was again elected to Parlia- 
ment, and, with a certain political inconsequence, 
was immediately afterwards sent out of the coun- 
try, being appointed to the Leeward Islands 
Station, which embraced the smaller Antilles, on 
the eastern side of the Caribbean Sea, with head- 
quarters at Barbados ; Jamaica, to the westward, 
forming a distinct command under an admiral of 
its own. He sailed for his new post October 21, 
1 761, taking with him instructions to begin opera- 
tions against Martinique upon the arrival of troops 
ordered from New York. These reached Bar- 
bados December 24th, a month after himself, and 
on the 7th of January, 1762, the combined forces 
were before Martinique, which after a month of 
regular operations passed into the possession of 
the British on the i6th of February. Its fall was 



Rodney 159 

followed shortly by that of the other French Les- 
ser Antilles, — Grenada, Santa Lucia, and St. 
Vincent. Guadaioupe had been taken in 1759, 
and Dominica in June, 1761. 

Up to this time the contest on the seas had 
been between Great Britain and France only; 
but on March 5th a frigate reached Rodney 
with instructions, then already nine weeks old, 
to begin hostilities against Spain, whose clearly 
inimical purpose had induced the British Gov- 
ernment to anticipate her action, by declaring 
war. The same day another vessel came in with 
like orders from the admiral at Gibraltar, while 
a third from before Brest brought word that a 
French squadron of seven ships-of-the-line, with 
frigates and two thousand troops, had escaped 
from that port at the end of the year. With 
these circumstances before him Rodney's con- 
duct was like himself ; prompt and officerlike. 
Lookout ships were stationed along the length 
of the Caribbees, to windward, to bring timely 
intelligence of the approach of the enemy's 
squadron ; and as its first destination was prob- 
ably Martinique, the fall of which was not yet 
known in Europe, he concentrated his fleet 
there, calling in outlying detachments. 

So far there was nothing in his course mark- 
edly difTerent from that of any capable officer, 
dealing with well ascertained conditions within 
the limits of his own command. Occasion soon 
arose, however, to require more exceptional ac- 



i6o Types of Naval Officers 

tion, and thus to illustrate at once the breadth of 
view, and the readiness to assume responsibility, 
which already raised Rodney conspicuously above 
the average level. On the 9th of March two 
lookout vessels came in with news that they had 
sighted a fleet, corresponding in numbers to the 
Brest division, fifteen miles to windward of Mar- 
tinique and standing to the southward ; the trade 
wind making it generally expedient to round the 
south point of the island in order to reach the 
principal port on the west side, — Fort Royal. 
The British squadron at once weighed anchor in 
pursuit ; but the enemy, having ascertained that 
the surrender was accomplished, had turned back 
north, and were soon after reported from Guada- 
loupe as having passed there, standing to the 
v^estward. 

Rodney at once inferred that they must be 
gone to Santo Domingo. To follow with the 
object of intercepting them was hopeless, in view 
of the start they had ; but the direction taken 
threatened Jamaica, the exposed condition of 
which, owing to inadequate force, had been com- 
municated to him by the military and naval 
authorities there. His measures to meet the 
case were thorough and deliberate, as well as 
rapid ; no time was lost either by hesitancy or 
delay, nor by the yet more facile error of too 
precipitate movement. Orders for concentration 
were already out, but the point on which to ef- 
fect it was shifted to Antigua, where, although 



Rodney i 6 i 

inferior in natural resources to Martinique, the 
established British naval station with its accu- 
mulated equipment was fixed ; and the work of 
provisioning and watering, so as to permit long 
continuance at sea unhampered by necessity of 
replenishing, there went on apace. It was the 
admiral's intention to leave his own command to 
look out for itself, while he took away the mass 
of his fleet to protect national interests elsewhere 
threatened. 

Such a decision may seem superficially a com- 
monplace matter of course; that it was much 
more is a commonplace historical certainty. The 
merit of Rodney's action appears not only in the 
details of execution, but in its being undertaken 
at all ; and in this case, as in a later instance in 
his career, his resolution received the concrete 
emphasis that a sharp and immediate contrast 
best affords. Prior to the enemy's arrival he had 
laid the conditions before his colleague in service, 
General Moncton, commanding the forces on 
shore, and asked a reinforcement of troops for 
destitute Jamaica, if necessity arose. The result 
is best told in his own words ; for they convey, 
simply and without egotistic enlargement, that 
settled personal characteristic, the want of which 
Jervis and Nelson in their day noted in many, 
and which Rodney markedly possessed. This 
was the capacity, which Sandwich eighteen years 
later styled " taking the great line of considering 
the King's whole dominions under your care ; " 



1 62 Types of Naval Officers 

an attribute far from common, as Moncton's 
reply showed. " I acquainted him that I should 
certainly assist them with all the naval force that 
could possibly be spared from the immediate pro- 
tection of His Majesty's Caribbee islands. I have 
again solicited the General for a body of troops, 
since the enemy left these seas, and must do him 
the justice to say, that he seems much concerned 
at the present distress of Jamaica, but does not 
think himself sufficiently authorized to detach a 
body of troops without orders from England. I 
flatter myself their Lordships will not be dis- 
pleased with me if I take the liberty to construe 
my instructions in such a manner as to think 
myself authorized and obliged to succor any of 
His Majesty's colonies that may be in danger; 
and shall, therefore, without a moment's loss of 
time, hasten to the succor of Jamaica, with ten 
sail-of-the-line, three frigates and three bombs. " ^ 

It was not because, in so doing this, the obliga- 
tion was absolute, and the authority indisputable, 
that Rodney's course was professionally merito- 
rious. In such case his action would have risen 
little above that obedience to orders, in which, as 
Nelson said, the generality find " all perfection." 
The risk was real, not only to his station, but 
to the possible plans of his superiors at home ; 
the authority was his own only, read by him^self 
into his orders — at most their spirit, not their 
letter. Consequently, he took grave chance of 

1 The italics are the author's. 



Rodney 163 

the penalty — loss of reputation, if not positive 
punishment, — which, as military experience 
shows, almost invariably follows independent 
action, unless results are kind enough to justify 
it. It is, however, only the positive characters 
capable of rising to such measures that achieve 
reputations enduring beyond their own day. The 
incident needs to be coupled with Sandwich's 
compHment just quoted, as well as with the one 
paid him when on the Newfoundland command. 
Taken together, they avouch a personality that 
needs only opportunity to insure itself lasting 
fame. 

As it happened, Rodney not only took the re- 
sponsibility of stripping his own station to the 
verge of bareness in favor of the general interest, 
but in so doing he came very near traversing, 
unwittingly, the plans of the general government 
by his local action, laudable and proper as that 
certainly was. He was, however, professionally- 
lucky to a proverb, and escaped this mischance 
by a hair's breadth. The purposed detachment 
had already started for Jamaica, and he was ac- 
companying it in person, when there joined him 
on March 25th, off the island of St. Kitt's, not 
far from Antigua, a frigate bearing Admiralty 
despatches of February 5th. These required him 
to desist from any enterprises he might have in 
hand, in order to give his undivided attention to 
the local preparations for an expedition, as yet 
secret, which was shortly to arrive on his station, 



164 Types of Naval Officers 

under the command of Admiral Pocock, with 
ultimate destination against Havana. 

To be thus arrested at the very outset of a 
movement from which he naturally expected dis- 
tinction was a bitter disappointment to Rodney. 
Several years later, in 1771, he wrote to Sand- 
wich, who was not the First Lord when Pocock 
was sent out, " I had the misfortune of being su- 
perseded in the command of a successful fleet, 
entrusted to my care in the West Indies, at the 
very time I had sailed on another expedition 
against the enemy's squadron at Santo Domingo, 
and was thereby deprived of pursuing those con- 
quests which so honorably attended upon another, 
and which secured him such great emoluments," 
— for Havana proved a wealthy prize. His 
steps, however, upon this unexpected reversal of 
his plans, were again characterized by an immedi- 
ateness, most honorable to his professional char- 
acter, which showed how thoroughly familiar he 
was with the whole subject and its possible con- 
tingencies, and the consequent readiness of his 
mind to meet each occasion as it arose ; marks, 
all, of the thoroughly equipped general officer. 
The order as to his personal movements being 
not discretional, was of course absolutely ac- 
cepted ; but his other measures were apparently 
his own, and were instantaneous. A vessel was 
at once sent off to Barbados to notify Admiral 
Pocock that the best place in the West Indies for 
his rendezvous was Fort Royal Bay, in the newly 



Rodney 165 

acquired Martinique. The ten sail-of-the-line, ac- 
companied by two large transports from St. Kitt's, 
were then sent on to Jamaica to move troops 
from there to join Pocock ; the command of the 
detachment being now entrusted to Sir James 
Douglas, who received the further instruction 
to send back his fastest frigate, with all the 
intelligence he could gather, directing her to 
keep in the track Pocock would follow, in order 
to meet him betimes. The frigate thus sent, 
having first made a running survey of the unfre- 
quented passage north of Cuba, by which the 
expedition was to proceed, joined Pocock, and, by 
the latter's report, acted as pilot for the fleet. 
" Having taken sketches of the land and cayos 
on both sides, Captain Elphinstone kept ahead 
of the fleet, and led us through very well." This 
service is claimed to the credit of Rodney's fore- 
sight by his biographer. This may very well be, 
though more particular inquiry and demonstration 
by his letters would be necessary to establish 
specific orders beyond the general instructions 
given by him. It is, however, safe to say that 
such particularity and minuteness of detail would 
be entirely in keeping with the tenor of his course 
at this period. His correspondence bears the 
stamp of a mind comprehensive as well as exact ; 
grasping all matters with breadth of view in their 
mutual relations, yet with the details at his fingers' 
ends. The certainty of his touch is as obvious as 
the activity of his thought. 



1 66 Types of Naval Officers 

In accordance with the spirit of his instructions, 
Rodney went in person to Martinique, the spot 
named by him as best for the rendezvous, there 
to superintend the preparations ; to sow the seed 
for a harvest in which he was to have no share. 
Incidental mention reveals that the sending of 
the ships-of-the-line with Douglas had reduced 
him to three for his own command ; and also that 
Moncton, having now superior authority to do so, 
found himself able to spare troops for Jamaica, 
which were afloat in transports by the time 
Pocock came. In the same letter the admiral 
frankly admits his anxiety for his station, under 
the circumstances of the big detachment he had 
made ; a significant avowal, which enhances the 
merit of his spontaneous action by all the credit 
due to one who endures a well-weighed danger 
for an adequate end. 

The despatch of Pocock's expedition, which re- 
sulted in the fall of Havana, August 13, 1762, 
practically terminated Rodney's active service in 
the Seven Years War. In a career marked by 
unusual professional good fortune in many ways, 
the one singular mischance was that he reached 
a foremost position too late in life. When he 
returned to England in August, 1763, he was in 
his full prime, and his conduct of affairs entrusted 
to him had given clear assurance of capacity for 
great things. The same evidence is to be found 
in his letters, which, as studies of official character 
and competency, repay a close perusal. But now 



Rodney 167 

fifteen years of peace were to elapse before a 
maritime war again broke out, and the fifteen 
years between forty-five and sixty tell sorely 
upon the physical stamina which need to under- 
lie the mental and moral forces of a great com- 
mander. St. Vincent himself staggered under 
the load, and Rodney was not a St. Vincent in 
in the stern self-discipline that had braced the 
latter for old age. He had not borne the yoke in 
his youth, and from this time forward he fought 
a losing fight with money troubles, which his 
self-controlled contemporary, after one bitter ex- 
perience, had shaken off his shoulders forever. 

The externals of Rodney's career during the 
period now in question are sufficiently known ; 
of his strictly private life we are left largely to 
infer from indications, not wholly happy. He 
returned to England a Vice-Admiral of the Blue, 
and had advanced by the successive grades of 
that rank to Vice-Admiral of the Red, when, in 
January, 1771, he was appointed Commander-in- 
chief at Jamaica. At this time he had been for 
five years Governor of Greenwich Hospital, and 
he took it hard that he was not allowed to retain 
the appointment in connection with his new com- 
mand, alleging precedents for such a favor; the 
latest of which, however, was then twenty-five 
years old. The application was denied by Sand- 
wich. From the earnest tone in which it was 
couched, as well as the comparatively weak 
grounds upon which Rodney bases his claims 



1 68 Types of Naval Officers 

to such a recognition, it can scarcely be doubted 
that pecuniary embarrassment as well as mortifica- 
tion entered into his sense of disappointment. It 
is the first recorded of a series of jars between 
the two, in which, although the external forms of 
courtesy were diligently observed, an underlying 
estrangement is evident. 

The Jamaica Station at that day required, in 
an even greater degree than Newfoundland be- 
fore the conquest of Canada, a high order of 
political tact and circumspection on the part of 
the naval commander-in-chief. The island lies in 
the centre of what was then a vast semi-circular 
sweep of Spanish colonies — Porto Rico, Santo 
Domingo, Cuba, Mexico, Central America, and the 
mainland of South America from the Isthmus to 
the Orinoco. Over this subject empire the mother 
country maintained commercial regulations of 
the most mediaeval and exclusive type ; outrag- 
ing impartially the British spirit of commercial 
enterprise, and the daily needs of her own colo- 
nists, by the restrictions placed upon intercourse 
between these and foreigners. Smuggling on a 
large scale, consecrated in the practice of both 
parties by a century of tradition, was met by a 
coast-guard system, employing numerous small 
vessels called guarda-costas, which girt the Span- 
ish coasts, but, being powerless to repress effect- 
ually over so extensive a* shore line, served rather 
to increase causes of vexation. The British gov- 
ernment, on the other hand, not satisfied to leave 



Rodney 169 

the illicit trade on which Jamaica throve to take 
care of itself, sought to increase the scope of 
transactions by the institution of three free ports 
on the island, — free in the sense of being open as 
depots, not for the entrance of goods, but where 
they could be freely brought, and transshipped 
to other parts of the world by vessels of all na- 
tions ; broker ports, in short, for the facilitation 
of general external trade. 

To this open and ingenuous bid for fuller ad- 
vantage by Spanish resort, Spain replied by 
doubling her custom-house forces and introduc- 
ing renewed stringency into her commercial 
orders. The two nations, with France in Hayti 
for a third, stood on ceaseless guard one against 
the other ; all imbued with the spirit of exclusive 
trade, and differing only in the method of appli- 
cation, according to their respective day-to-day 
views of policy. The British by the free-port 
system, instituted in their central geographical 
position, hoped to make the profits of the middle- 
man. Rodney reported that the effect had been 
notably to discourage the direct Spanish inter- 
course, and to destroy carriage by British colonial 
vessels in favor of those of France, which now 
flocked to Jamaica, smuggled goods into the 
island, and apparently cut under their rivals by 
the greater benevolence shown them in Spanish 
ports. " Commerce by British bottoms has to- 
tally ceased." Herewith, he added, disappeared 
the opportunities of British seamen to become 



lyo Types of Naval Officers 

familiar with the Spanish and French waters, 
while their rivals were invited to frequent those 
of Jamaica; so that in case of war — which in 
those days was periodical — the advantage of 
pilotage would be heavily on the side of Great 
Britain's enemies. He also stated that the dim- 
inution of employment to British merchant 
vessels had greatly impaired his means of obtain- 
ing information from within Spanish ports; for 
British ships of war were never allowed inside 
them, even when sent with a message from him. 
The French permitted them indeed to enter, but 
surrounded them throughout their visits with 
flattering attentions which wholly prevented the 
making of observations. 

Under these conditions of mutual jealousy be- 
tween the governments and officials, with the 
subjects on either side straining continually at 
the leashes which withheld them from traffic mu- 
tually beneficial, causes of offence were quick to 
arise. Rodney, like Sandwich, was a pronounced 
Tory, in full sympathy with traditional British 
policy, as well as an officer naturally of haughty 
temper and sharing all the prepossessions of his 
service ; but he found himself almost at once in- 
volved in a difference with his superiors in his 
political party, which throws a good deal of side 
light on personal as well as political relations. 
The British man-of-war schooner Hawke was 
overhauled off the Venezuelan coast by two 
Spanish guarda-costas and compelled to enter the 



Rodney 171 

harbor of Cartagena, under alleged orders from 
the Governor of the colony. After a brief deten- 
tion, she was let go with the admonition that, if 
any British ships of war were found again within 
twelve leagues of the coast, they would be taken 
and their crews imprisoned. 

Rodney's course w^as unimpeachable, as far as 
appears. He wrote a civil letter to the Governor, 
and sent it by a ship of war, the captain of which 
was directed to deliver it in person. He was 
confident, he wrote, that the Governor would dis- 
avow the action by calling to strict account the 
officers concerned, and would also confirm his 
own belief that it was impossible such a menace 
could have proceeded from any adecfuate author- 
ity. A sufficient intimation of what would follow 
an attempt to carry out the threat was conveyed 
by the words : " The British officer who has dis- 
honoured his King's colours by a tame submis- 
sion to this insult has been already dismissed the 
service." 

It is difficult to see what less could have been 
done ; but the British government was at the 
moment extremely reluctant to war, and sensitive 
to any step that seemed to make towards it. 
Spain was thought to be seeking a quarrel. She 
had entered the Seven Years War so near its 
termination as not to feel exhaustive effects ; and 
the capture of Havana and Manila, with the pe- 
cuniary losses involved, had left her merely em- 
bittered by humiliation, prone rather to renew 



172 Types of Naval Officers 

hostilities than to profit by experience. At the 
same time the foreign policy of Great Britain was 
enfeebled by a succession of short ministries, and 
by internal commotions ; while the discontent of 
the American continental colonies over the 
Stamp Act emphasized the weakness of her gen- 
eral position. Barely a year before the Hawke 
incident the insult by Spain at the Falkland 
Islands had brought the two nations to the verge 
of rupture, which was believed to have been 
averted only by the refusal of Louis XV., then 
advanced in years, to support the Spanish Bour- 
bons at the cost of another war. 

Under these circumstances Rodney's report of 
the occurrences at Cartagena filled the ministry 
with apprehensions, and brought him from Sand- 
wich an expression of dissatisfaction little removed 
from a reprimand. The communication is remark- 
able rather for what it intimates, and from the in- 
ferences naturally deducible, than for its direct 
utterances. " I cannot help cautioning you, as a 
friend, to be upon your guard, to avoid by every 
justifiable means the drawing this country into a 
war, which, if it comes on too speedily, I fear we 
shall have cause to lament." The warning is re- 
newed in a later part of the letter, but in itself 
has little significance compared with other hints, 
rather personal than official. " I cannot conceal 
from you, that many people have industriously 
spread stories here, that, among the foreign min- 
isters and others, you have expressed your wishes 



Rodney 173 

for a Spanish war." Such expressions — if used 
— were asserted of the time succeeding his ap- 
pointment to Jamaica, and near his departure for 
it ; for Sandwich adds, " This sort of declaration 
is too little founded on your instructions, and too 
indiscreet, to allow me to give them the least 
credit." It is clear, however, that he thought 
them not improbable, — a Spanish war was pop- 
ular with seamen for the prize-money it brought, 
and Rodney was poor, — for he adds, " I shall dis- 
credit the idea till I have received your answer 
to this letter." He concludes with a warning, not 
to be misunderstood, that a war, so far from help- 
ing Rodney, would probably cause his superses- 
sion. "I will add one word more: Upon a dec- 
laration of war larger squadrons must be sent out, 
and, very probably, senior officers to most of our 
stations in foreign parts." In face of an intima- 
tion thus thinly veiled, one scarcely needs to be 
told what was being said round the table of the 
Cabinet. 

That Rodney would have welcomed war for 
reasons personal as well as professional, for 
money and for glory, can readily be believed ; but 
his measures in this case give no ground for such 
an innuendo as Sandwich conveyed. Therefore, 
after making full allowance for the panic of minis- 
ters ready to fear the worst, and to throw blame on 
anybody, it is the more significant that he should 
have been suspected of an unworthy personal 
motive underlying a worthy official act. It is an 



iy4 Types of Naval Officers 

indication of reputation already compromised by 
damaging association with pecuniary embarrass- 
ments ; an evidence of latent distrust easily 
quickened into active suspicion. An officer of 
his rank and service, so far from home, and with 
the precedents of his day, could scarcely be faulted 
for what he had done to uphold the honor of the 
country; and his manner of doing it was digni- 
fied and self-restrained, as well as forcible. There 
was no violence like that of Hawke at Gibraltar, 
less than twenty years before, which that admiral 
had boldly vindicated to Pitt himself ; but there 
were no weak joints in Hawke's armor. In the 
particular instance, time and cooler judgment set 
Rodney right in men's opinion; but subsequent 
events showed that his general reputation did 
not recover, either then, or through his Jamaica 
career. 

After immediate apprehension had subsided, 
Rodney's action was justified by the government. 
Sandwich wrote him, a little later, that no com- 
mander-in-chief stood upon a better footing, and 
assured him that his private interests were safe 
in his hands. Sandwich, however, was an ex- 
tremely practical politician, who had much per- 
sonal use for his own patronage ; and Rodney's 
necessities were great. Fulfilment therefore fell 
far short of promise. Employment was neces- 
sary to the admiral, and his hopes fixed upon a 
colonial governorship when his present appoint- 
ment should expire ; Jamaica being his first choice. 



Rodney 175 

Sandwich renewed assurances, but advised a 
personal application also to the Prime Minister 
and other Cabinet officers. New York was men- 
tioned, but nothing came of it all. After three 
years Rodney was superseded, with permission 
to remain in the island instead of returning to 
England. This he declined. " I cannot bear to 
think of remaining here in a private station, after 
commanding in chief with the approbation of the 
whole island." How far this approbation was 
universal, or unqualified, is perhaps doubtful ; but 
the letters quoted by his biographer from his cor- 
respondence bear continuous evidence, in this 
peace employment, of the activity and perspi- 
cacity of mind characteristic of his more strictly 
military proceedings. 

In September, 1774, Rodney landed again in 
England, a disappointed man and in embar- 
rassed circumstances. Professional occupation 
was almost hopeless, for in peace times there 
were few positions for an officer of his rank ; 
and, although recognized for able, he had not 
then the distinction by which he is known to us. 
It is also evident, from subsequent events, that he 
just now lacked the influence necessary to obtain 
a preference over rivals in quest of employment. 
Under the circumstances, his debts determined 
his action, and to escape harassments he before 
long passed over into France and settled in 
Paris. In that capital, as in London, he mixed 
with the best society ; and there, as before, the 



1-76 Types of Naval Officers 

mode of life among his associates led him beyond 
his means and involved him in further distresses. 
Consequently, when war between France and 
Great Britain became imminent, in 1778, the 
vigilance of his creditors prevented his going 
home in person to offer his services. In Feb- 
ruary of that year, however, he made formal 
application to the Admiralty to be sent at a 
moment's warning on any enterprise. To this 
Sandwich, who was still First Lord, despite his 
previous assurances of friendship, paid no atten- 
tion beyond the formal customary acknowledg- 
ment given to all such letters when they came 
from officers of Rodney's standing. No indica- 
tion was shown of intention, or even of wish, 
to employ him. 

Rodney was therefore compelled to look on 
idly while others, of well-earned reputation indeed 
but as yet of less experience than himself 
in high command, were preferred before him. 
Howe had already been sent to North America 
in 1776, on a mission at once diplomatic and mil- 
itary ; and there he still was when war began. 
As it became imminent, Keppel was appointed 
to the Channel Fleet, and Byron to the North 
American command, from which Howe had 
asked to be relieved. All these were junior to 
Rodney ; and, as though to emphasize the neglect 
of him, rear-admirals were sent to the two West 
India stations, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, 
which he had formerly commanded, and to which 



Rodney lyy 

it would seem, from one of his letters, that he 
desired to return. He had, too, now reached the 
rank, the want of which had formed the burden 
of Sandwich's warning that he was in danger of 
supersession at Jamaica ; for in a general flag 
promotion in January, 1778, he had become 
Admiral of the White Squadron, than which no 
higher then obtained, commissions as Admirals 
of the Red not being issued. For this persistent 
ignoring of an oi^ficer of his unquestionable ability 
there were necessarily reasons more controlling 
than appears on the surface ; for the naval con- 
ditions and the national emergency called for 
men of demonstrated high capacity. Such Rod- 
ney was professionally ; and although his age 
— he was now in his sixtieth year — was against 
him, this consideration did not in those days 
weigh; nor should it, unless accompanied by 
probable indication of powers sapped. 

The conclusion is inevitable that the objection 
lay in personal record as bearing upon military 
efficiency. The Administration, responsible for 
results, knew Rodney's capacity, though its full 
extent was yet to be revealed ; the question in 
their minds clearly must have been, " Can we de- 
pend upon its exertion, full, sustained, and disin- 
terested?" Sandwich, despite the coldness with 
which he had received Rodney's application, — 
going so far as to refuse to support it actively, — 
was apparently in a minority among his colleagues 
in believing that they could. He declared in the 



lyS Types of Naval Officers 

House of Lords that, "When it was first pro- 
posed in the Council to employ Sir George, I, 
who knew him from a very young man, declared 
that Rodney once afloat would do his duty." 
Naval officers will recognize a familiar rins: in 
these words, and will recall instances where high 
professional ability has been betrayed by personal 
foible. Nor does Sandwich stand alone in offer- 
ing a clue to the hesitation of the Government. 
Rodney's biographer and son-in-law quotes with- 
out reprobation the account of Mr. Richard Cum- 
berland, who professed to have interested himself 
warmly for Rodney's employment and to have 
secured the support of the Secretary for War, 
Lord George Germaine. " The West India mer- 
chants had been alarmed, and clamoured against 
the appointment so generally and so decidedly as 
to occasion no small uneasiness in my friend and 
patron, Lord George, and drew from him some- 
thino^ that resembled a remonstrance for the risk 
I had exposed him to. But in the brilliancy of 
the capture of Langara's squadron all was done 
away, and past alarms were only recollected to 
contrast the joy which this success diffused." 
The opposition of the commercial class in the 
West Indies might arise from an officer's over- 
faithfulness to duty, as Nelson found to his cost ; 
but it seems clear that in this case distrust rested 
upon personal observation, which raised doubts as 
to the singlemindedness of Rodney's administra- 
tion of a command. Of the particulars of obser- 



Rodney lyp 

vation or experience from which the feeling 
sprang, we have no information; but St. Eus- 
tatius was destined to show that apprehension 
was not wholly unfounded. 

A summons to active employment would at 
once have silenced Rodney's creditors by the as- 
surance of increase of means, both through regu- 
lar income and probable prize-money; Admiralty 
neglect left him in fetters. Lady Rodney re- 
turned to England to negotiate the means for 
his liberation; but the matter dragged, and in 
the end he owed his release to the friendly inter- 
vention of a French nobleman, the Marechal 
Biron, who volunteered in warm terms to make 
him an advance to the amount of ^2,000. This 
chivalrous offer was for some time declined ; but 
finally conditions became so threatening, and 
his position so intolerable, that he accepted a 
loan of about a thousand louis. "Nothing but 
a total inattention to the distressed state I was 
in," he wrote to his wife, " could have prevailed 
upon me to have availed myself of his voluntary 
proposal ; but not having had, for a month past, 
a letter from any person but Mr. Hotham and 
yourself, and my passport being expired, it was 
impossible for me to remain in this city at the 
risk of being sued by my creditors, who grew so 
clamorous it was impossible to bear it ; and had 
they not been overawed by the Lieutenant of po- 
lice, would have carried their prosecutions to the 
greatest length. Their demands were all satis- 



i8o Types of Naval Officers 

fied this day," — May 6th, 1778. Friends in 
England enabled him to repay Biron immediately 
after his return. 

This benevolent interference on behalf of a na- 
tional enemy, although in its spirit quite charac- 
teristic, at once of the country and of the class to 
which the individual extending it belonged, has 
retained a certain unique flavor of its own among 
military anecdotes ; due undoubtedly to the dis- 
tinction subsequently acquired by Rodney at the 
expense of the people to which his liberator be- 
longed, rather than to anything exceptional in 
its nature. As it is, it has acquired a clear pre- 
eminence among the recorded courtesies of war- 
fare. It is pleasant to add that Great Britain had 
the opportunity in after times to requite Biron's 
daughters an act from which she had so greatly 
benefited. They having sought refuge, though 
with loss of fortune, from the early excesses of 
the French Revolution, received for some time 
pensions from the British Government. 

Rodney came back to England feeling any- 
thing but cordial towards Sandwich, whose de- 
cided support he had found wanting throughout 
a very critical period of his career. More than 
any one else the First Lord had had both the op- 
portunity and the insight to see his professional 
value. Tory though Rodney was, he hoped that 
" Lord Chatham (Pitt) would be minister, and 
another First Lord of the Admiralty be ap- 
pointed." " We hear of a change of Administra- 



Rodney 1 8 1 

tion. I hope it is true, and that I may have a 
chance of being employed, should another be at 
the Admiralty." " The refusal of Lord Sandwich 
does not surprise me. He cannot say but I have 
offered my services, and some friend will let the 
King know I have so done." Apparently he 
was to be ignored as well as overlooked. 

Circumstances, however, soon compelled his 
employment. Sandwich was an able man, but 
his personal character inspired mistrust. Not 
only was he controlled by political considerations 
in administration ; he was suspected of corrupdy 
using the Navy for party advantage. Whatever 
might be thought of Byng's conduct, his execu- 
tion, but twenty years before, was commonly 
ascribed to political exigency, making him a vica- 
rious sacrifice to cover the neglects of a Govern- 
ment. As in Byng's case, the material of the 
service was believed to be now inadequate to 
the emergency come upon it ; and it was known 
to have deteriorated gravely during the seven 
years of Sandwich's tenure of office. He was a 
Tory, as were his colleagues of the Cabinet ; the 
leaders of the Navy in professional estimation, 
Hawke and Keppel, with other distinguished of- 
ficers, were pronounced Whigs, whom it was 
thought the Administration would be willing to 
destroy. Keppel evidently feared an intention to 
ruin him by the command of the Channel Fleet, 
and the public discussion of the Courts-Martial 
which followed his indecisive action with D'Or- 



1 82 Types of Naval Officers 

villiers, in July, 1778, assumed a decided and 
rancorous party tone. His accuser then was his 
third-in-command, Vice-Admiral Palliser, who 
had left his place on the Admiralty Board to 
take this position in the fleet ; and popular out- 
cry charged him with having betrayed his chief 
in the battle. So far was professional feeling 
moved that twelve prominent admirals, — not all 
of whom were Whigs, — with Hawke at their 
head, presented to the King a memorial, deprecat- 
ing " particularly the mischief and scandal of per- 
mitting men, who are at once in high office and 
subordinate military command, previous to their 
making recriminating accusations against their 
commander-in-chief, to attempt to corrupt the pub- 
lic judgment by the publication of libels on their 
officers in a common newspaper, thereby exciting 
mutiny in your Majesty's Navy," etc. The words 
itahcized show that this was aimed at Palliser; 
and at Sandwich, who inferentially had "per- 
mitted" his action, and ultimately rewarded him 
with the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital. 

In this demoralized condition of professional 
sentiment the Admiralty could no longer com- 
mand the services of the best men. Howe came 
home in disgust from America. Keppel threw 
up the command of the Channel Fleet, and Bar- 
rington subsequently refused it on the expressed 
ground of self-distrust, underlying which was 
real distrust of the ministry. He would serve 
as second, but not as first. Byron, after reliev- 



Rodney 183 



ing Howe in New York, went to the West 
Indies, there made a failure, and so came home 
in the summer of 1779. The Channel squadron 
fell into the hands of men respectable, indeed, 
but in no way eminent, and advanced in years, 
whose tenures of office were comparatively short. 
Hardy was sixty-three, Geary seventy ; and on 
both Hawke, who was friendly to them, passed 
the comment that they were " too easy." The 
first had allowed " the discipline of the fleet to 
come to nothing," and he feared the same for 
the other. Not until the fall of the ministry, 
consequent upon Cornwallis's surrender, was the 
post filled by a distinguished name, when Howe 
took the command in 1782. 

The Administration was thus forced back upon 
Rodney ; fortunately for itself, for, as far as his- 
tory has since revealed, there was no other man 
then in the service, and of suitable rank, exactly 
fitted to do the work he did. Samuel Hood 
alone, then an unproved captain, and practically 
in voluntary retirement, could have equalled and 
surpassed him. Howe, like Rodney, was an ac- 
complished tactician, and in conception far in 
advance of the standards of the day. In his 
place he did admirable service, which has been 
too little appreciated, and he was fortunate in 
that the work which fell to him, at the first, and 
again at the last of this war, was peculiarly suited 
to his professional characteristics ; but he was 
not interchangeable with Rodney. In the latter 



184 TyP^^ °^ Naval Officers 

there was a briskness of temper, a vivacity, very 
distinguishable from Howe's solidity of persist- 
ence; and he was in no sense one to permit "dis- 
cipline to come to nought," the direction in which 
Howe's easy though reserved disposition tended. 
The West Indies were to be the great scene of 
battles, and, while the tactical ideas of the two 
appear to have been essentially alike, in the com- 
mon recognition of combination as imperative to 
success, the severity of Rodney was needed to jerk 
the West India fleet sharply out of sleepy tradi- 
tion ; to compel promptness of manoeuvre and in- 
telligent attention to the underlying ideas which 
signals communicate. Flexibility of movement, 
earnestness and rapidity of attack, mutual sup- 
port by the essential coherence of the battle order 
without too formal precision, — these were the 
qualities which Rodney was to illustrate in prac- 
tice, and to enforce by personal impression upon 
his officers. The official staff of the fleet had to 
pass under the rod ot the schoolmaster, to receive 
new ideas, and to learn novel principles of obedi- 
ence, — to a living chief, not to a dead letter 
crusted over by an unintelligent tradition. Not 
till this step had been made, till discipline had 
full hold of men's affections and understanding, 
was there room for the glorious liberty of action 
which Nelson extended to his officers ; preaching 
it in word, and practising it in act. Hawke re- 
begat the British Navy in the spirit he imparted 
to it; Rodney, first of several, trained its ap- 



Rodney 185 

preaching maturity in habits which, once ac- 
quired, stand by men as principles ; Nelson 
reaped the fulness of the harvest. 

On October i, 1779, Rodney was again ap- 
pointed to the command of the Leeward Islands 
Station. The year had been one of maritime mis- 
fortune and discouragement. The French decla- 
ration of war in 1778 had been followed by that 
of Spain in June, 1779; and a huge allied fleet — 
sixty-six ships-of-the-line, to which the British 
could oppose only thirty-five — had that summer 
entered and dominated the English Channel. 
Nothing was effected by it, true ; but the im- 
pression produced was profound. In the West 
Indies Grenada had been lost, and Byron badly 
worsted in an attempt to relieve it. On assum- 
ing his command, Rodney could not but feel that 
he had more to do than to establish a reputation ; 
he had a reputation to redeem, and that under a 
burden of national depression which doubly en- 
dangered the reputation of every officer in re- 
sponsible position. He must have known that, 
however undeservedly, he had not the full confi- 
dence of the government, although party and 
personal ties would naturally have predisposed 
it in his favor. He therefore entered upon his 
career under the necessity to do and to dare 
greatly ; he had not a strong hand, and needed 
the more to play a game not only strong, but to 
some extent adventurous. 

To the radical difference between his personal 



1 86 Types of Naval Officers 

standing at this opening of his command, and 
that which he had at its close, in 1782, may rea- 
sonably be attributed the clear difference in his 
action at the two periods. The first was auda- 
cious and brilliant, exhibiting qualities of which 
he was capable on occasion, but which did not 
form the groundwork of his professional character. 
The display was therefore exceptional, elicited by 
exceptional personal emergency. It was vitally 
necessary at the outset, if opportunity offered, to 
vindicate his selection by the government; to 
strike the imagination of the country, and obtain 
a hold upon its confidence which could not 
easily be shaken. This prestige once established, 
he could safely rest upon it to bear him through 
doubtful periods of suspense and protracted issues. 
It would have been well had he felt the same 
spur after his great battle in 1782. A necessity 
like this doubtless lies upon every opening career, 
and comparatively few there be that rise to it ; 
but there is an evident distinction to be drawn 
between one in the early prime of life, who may 
afford to wait, who has at least no errors to atone, 
and him who is about to make his last cast, 
when upon the turning of a die depends a fair 
opportunity to show what is in him. Rodney 
was near sixty-one, when he took up the com- 
mand which has given him his well earned place 
in history. 

He experienced at once indications of the atti- 
tude towards him ; and in two directions, from 



Rodney 187 

the Admiralty and from his subordinates. A 
month before he was ready, Sandwich urges him, 
with evident impatience, to get off. " For God's 
sake, go to sea without delay. You cannot con- 
ceive of what importance it is to yourself, to me, 
and to the public " (this very order of importance ' 
is suggestive), " that you should not lose this fair 
wind ; if you do, I shall not only hear of it in 
Parliament, but in places to which I pay more 
attention. ... I must once more repeat to you 
that any delay in your sailing will have the most 
disagreeable consequences." On the other hand, 
he had to complain not only of inattention on 
the part of the dockyard officials, but of want of 
zeal and activity in the officers of the fleet, many 
of whom behaved with a disrespect and want of 
cordiality which are too often the precursor of 
worse faults. Rodney was not the man to put up 
with such treatment. That it was offered, and 
that he for the moment bore with it, are both 
significant; and are to be remembered in con- 
nection with the fast approaching future. 

Gibraltar was then at the beginning of the 
three years siege, and his intended departure was 
utilized to give him command of the first of the 
three great expeditions for its relief, which were 
among the characteristic operations of this war. 
He sailed from Plymouth on the 29th of Decem- 
ber, 1779, having under him twenty-two sail-of- 
the-line, of which only four were to continue with 
him to the West Indies. With this great fleet. 



1 88 Types of Naval Officers 

and its attendant frigates, went also a huge col- 
lection of storeships, victuallers, ordnance vessels, 
troop ships, and merchantmen ; the last compris- 
ing the "trade "for Portugal and the West Indies, 
as the other classes carried the reinforcements for 
the Rock. 

On January 7th, the West India trade parted 
company off Cape Finisterre, and the next day 
began the wonderful good fortune for which 
Rodney's last command was distinguished. It 
is no disparagement to his merit to say that in 
this he was, to use Ball's phrase about Nelson, 
" a heaven-born admiral." A Spanish convoy of 
twenty-two sail, seven of which were ships of 
war, the rest laden with supplies for Cadiz, were 
sighted at daylight of the 8th, and all taken ; not 
one escaped. Twelve loaded with provisions 
were turned into the British convoy, and went on 
with it to feed the Gibraltar garrison. A prince 
of the blood-royal, afterwards King William IV., 
was with the fleet as a midshipman. One of the 
prizes being a line-of-battle ship, Rodney had an 
opportunity to show appositely his courtliness of 
breeding. " I have named her the Prince Wil- 
liam, in respect to His Royal Highness, in whose 
presence she had the honor to be taken^- 

Repeated intelligence had reached the admiral 
that a Spanish division was cruising off Cape St. 
Vincent. Therefore, when it was sighted at i 
P.M. of January i6th, a week after the capture of 
the convoy, he was prepared for the event. A 



Rodney 189 

brief attempt to form line was quickly succeeded 
by the signal for a general chase, the ships to en- 
gage to leeward as they came up with the enemy, 
who, by taking flight to the southeast, showed 
the intention to escape into Cadiz. The wind 
was blowing strong from the westward, giving a 
lee shore and shoals to the British fleet in the 
approaching long hours of a wintry night; but 
opportunity was winging by, with which neither 
Rodney nor the Navy could afford to trifle. He 
was already laid up with an attack of the gout 
that continued to harass him throughout this 
command, and the decision to continue the chase 
was only reached after a discussion between him 
and his captain, the mention of which is trans- 
mitted by Sir Gilbert Blane, the surgeon of the 
ship, who was present professionally. The merit 
of the resolution must remain with the man who 
bore the responsibility of the event ; but that he 
reached it at such a moment only after consul- 
tation with another, to whom current gossip at- 
tributed the chief desert, must be coupled with 
the plausible claim afterwards advanced for Sir 
Charles Douglas, that he suggested the breaking 
of the enemy's line on April 12th. Taken to- 
gether, they indicate at least a common contem- 
porary professional estimate of Rodney's tem- 
perament. No such anecdote is transmitted of 
Hawke. The battle of Cape St. Vincent, there- 
fore, is not that most characteristic of Rodney's 
genius. Judged by his career at large, it is ex- 



190 Types of Naval Officers 

ceptional ; yet of all his actions it is the one in 
which merit and success most conspicuously met. 
Nor does it at all detract from his credit that the 
enemy was much inferior in numbers ; eleven to 
twenty-one. As in Hawke's pursuit of Conflans, 
with which this engagement is worthy to be 
classed, what was that night dared, rightly and 
brilliantly dared, was the dangers of the deep, 
not of the foe. The prey was seized out of the 
jaws of disaster. 

The results were commensurate to the risk. 
The action, which began at 4 p. m., lasted till two 
the following morning, the weather becoming 
tempestuous with a great sea, so that it was 
difficult to take possession of the captured ves- 
sels. Many of the heavy British ships continued 
also in danger during the 17th, and had to 
carry a press of sail to clear the shoals, on which 
two of their prizes were actually wrecked. One 
Spanish ship-of-the-line was blown up and six 
struck, among them the flag-ship of Admiral Lan- 
gara, who was taken into Gibraltar. Only four 
escaped. 

Two such strokes of mingled good fortune and 
good management, within ten days, formed a rare 
concurrence, and the aggregate results were as 
exceptional as the combination of events. Sand- 
wich congratulated Rodney that he had already 
" taken more line-of -battle ships than had been 
captured in any one action in either of the two 
last preceding wars." Militarily regarded, it had 



Rodney 191 

a further high element of praise, for the enemy's 
detachment, though in itself inferior, was part of 
a much superior force ; twenty-four allied ships- 
of-the-line besides it being at the moment in 
Cadiz Bay. It is the essence of military art 
thus to overwhelm in detail. A technical cir- 
cumstance like this was doubtless overlooked in 
the general satisfaction with the event, the most 
evident feature in which was the relief of the 
Government, who just then stood badly in need 
of credit. " The ministerial people feel it very 
sensibly," Lady Rodney wrote him. " It is a 
lucky stroke for them at this juncture." Salutes 
were fired, and the city illuminated ; the press 
teemed with poetical effusion. Sandwich, some- 
what impudently when the past is considered, but 
not uncharacteristically regarded as an office- 
holder, took to himself a large slice of the credit. 
" The worst of my enemies now allow that I 
have pitched upon a man who knows his duty, 
and is a brave, honest, and able officer. ... I 
have obtained you the thanks of both houses 
of Parliament." The letter does not end with- 
out a further caution against indiscreet talking 
about the condition of his ships. It all comes 
back on the Government, he laments. What 
Rodney may have said to others may be uncer- 
tain ; to his wife, soon after reaching his station, 
he wrote, " What are the ministers about ? Are 
they determined to undo their country ? Is it 
fair that the British fleet should be so inferior to 



192 Types of Naval Officers 

the French, and that the British officers and men 
are always to be exposed to superior numbers ? 
What right had the administration to expect any- 
thing but defeat ? " Then he passes on to remark 
himself, what has been alluded to above, the 
change in his personal position effected by his 
successes. " Thank God, I now fear no frowns 
of ministers, and hope never again to stand in 
need of their assistance. I know them well. All 
are alike, and no dependence is to be placed on 
their promises." It is to be feared his sense of 
obligation to Sandwich did not coincide with 
the latter's estimate. 

In his official report Rodney gave much credit 
to his officers for the St. Vincent affair. " The 
gallant behaviour of the admirals, captains, of- 
ficers and men, I had the honour to command, 
was conspicuous ; they seemed animated with the 
same spirit, and were eager to exert themselves 
with the utmost zeal." Here also, however, he 
was biding his time for obvious reasons ; for to 
his wife he writes, " I have done them all like 
honour, but it is because I would not have the 
world believe that there were officers slack in their 
duty. Without a thorough change in naval affairs, 
the discipline of our navy will be lost. I could 
say much, but will not. You will hear of it from 
themselves ; " that is, probably, by their mutual 
recriminations. Such indulgent envelopment of 
good and bad alike in a common mantle of com- 
mendation is far from unexampled ; but it rarely 



Rodney 193 

fails to return to plague its authors, as has been 
seen in instances more recent than that of Rod- 
ney. He clearly had told Sandwich the same in 
private letters, for the First Lord writes him, " I 
fear the picture you give of the faction in your 
fleet is too well drawn. Time and moderation 
will by degrees get the better of this bane of dis- 
cipline. I exceedingly applaud your resolution 
to shut your ears against the illiberal language of 
your officers, who are inclined to arraign each 
other's conduct." In this two things are to be 
remarked: first, the evident and undeniable ex- 
istence of serious cause of complaint, which was 
preparing Rodney for the stern self-assertion soon 
to be shown ; and, second, that such imputations 
are frequent with him, while he seems in turn to 
have had a capacity for eliciting insubordination 
of feeling, though he can repress the act. It 
is a question of personal temperament, which 
explains more than his relations with other men. 
Haw^ke and Nelson find rare fault with those be- 
neath them ; for their own spirit takes possession 
of their subordinates. Such difference of spirit 
reveals itself in more ways than one in the active 
life of a military community. 

If there was joy in England over Rodney's 
achievement, still more and more sympathetic 
was the exultation of those who in the isolation 
of Gibraltar's Rock, rarely seeing their country's 
flag save on their own flagstaff, witnessed and 
shared the triumph of his entrance there with his 



194 Types of Naval Officers 

train of prizes. The ships of war and transports 
forming the convoy did not indeed appear in one 
body, but in groups, being dispersed by the light 
airs, and swept eastward by the in-drag of the 
current from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean ; 
but the presence of the great fleet, and the pres- 
tige of its recent victory, secured the practical 
immunity of merchant vessels during its stay. 
Of the first to come in, on January 15th, an eye- 
witness wrote, " A ship with the British flag 
entering the Bay was so uncommon a sight that 
almost the whole garrison were assembled at the 
southward to welcome her in ; but words are in- 
sufficient to describe their transports on being 
informed that she was one of a large convoy 
which had sailed the latter end of the preceding 
month for our relief." The admiral himself had 
been carried beyond and gone into Tetuan, in 
Morocco, whence he finally arrived on January 
26th, having sent on a supply fleet to Minorca, 
the garrison of which was undergoing a sever- 
ance from the outer world more extreme even 
than that of Gibraltar. Upon the return thence 
of the convoying ships he again put to sea, Feb- 
ruary 13th, with the entire fleet, which accom- 
panied him three days sail to the westward, when 
it parted company for England ; he with only 
four ships-of-the-line pursuing his way to his sta- 
tion. On March 27th he reached Santa Lucia, 
where he found seventeen of-the-line, composing 
his command. Three weeks later he met the 



Rodney 195 

enemy; barely three months, almost to a day, 
after the affair at St. Vincent. 

The antecedent circumstances of the war, and 
the recent history of the French navy, gave a 
singular opportuneness of occasion, and of per- 
sonal fitness, to Rodney's arrival at this moment. 
The humiliations of the Seven Years War, with 
the loss of so much of the French colonial em- 
pire, traceable in chief measure to naval deca- 
dence, had impressed the French government with 
the need of reviving their navy, which had conse- 
quently received a material development in qual- 
ity, as well as in quantity, unparalleled since the 
days of Colbert and Seignelay, near a century 
before. Concomitant with this had been a sin- 
gular progress in the theory of naval evolu- 
tions, and of their handmaid, naval signalling, 
among French officers ; an advance to which 
the lucid, speculative, character of the national 
genius greatly contributed. Although they as 
yet lacked practice, and were numerically too 
few, the French officers were well equipped by 
mental resources, by instruction and reflection, 
to handle large fleets ; and they now had large 
fleets to handle. No such conjunction had 
occurred since Tourville; none such recurred 
during the Revolution. 

The condition was unique in naval history 
of the sail period. To meet it, assuming an 
approach to equality in contending fleets, was 
required, first, a commander-in-chief, and then a 



196 Types of Naval Officers 

competent body of officers. The latter the Brit- 
ish had only in the sense of fine seamen and gal- 
lant men. In courage there is no occasion to 
institute comparisons between the two nations; 
in kind there may have been a difference, but 
certainly not in degree. The practical superiority 
of seamanship in the British may be taken as a 
set-off to the more highly trained understanding 
of military principles and methods on the part of 
their enemy. For commander-in-chief, there were 
at this time but two, Howe and Rodney, whose 
professional equipment, as shown in practice, 
fitted them to oppose the French methods. Of 
these Rodney was the better, because possessed 
of a quicker power of initiative, and also of 
that personal severity required to enforce strict 
conformity of action among indifferent or sullen 
subordinates. 

Rodney has therefore a singularly well defined 
place among British naval chiefs. He was to 
oppose form to form, theory to theory, evolution 
to evolution, upon the battle ground of the sea ; 
with purpose throughout tactically offensive, not 
defensive, and facing an adversary his equal in 
professional equipment. Had he arrived a year 
before he would have met no fair match in 
D'Estaing, a soldier, not a sailor, whose defi- 
ciencies as a seaman would have caused a very 
different result from that which actually followed 
his encounter with Byron, who in conduct 
showed an utter absence of ideas and of method 



Rodney 197 

inconceivable in Rodney. The French were 
now commanded by De Guichen, considered the 
most capable of their officers by Rodney, whose 
recent abode in Paris had probably familiarized 
him with professional reputations among the 
enemy. Everything therefore conspired to make 
the occasion one eminently fitted to his capaci- 
ties. Such are the conditions — the man and the 
hour — that make reputations ; though they 
do not form characters, which are growths of 
radically different origin. 

De Guichen put to sea from Martinique on 
April 15th, with a convoy for Santo Domingo 
which he intended to see clear of British inter- 
ference. Rodney, whose anchorage was but 
thirty miles away, learned instantly the French 
sailing and followed without delay. On the even- 
ing of April 1 6th, the two fleets were in sight of 
each other to leeward of Martinique, the British 
to windward ; an advantage that was diligently 
maintained during the night. At daylight of the 
17th the two enemies were twelve to fifteen miles 
apart, ranged on nearly parallel lines, the British 
twenty heading northwest, the French twenty- 
three southeast. The numerical difference repre- 
sents sufficiently nearly the actual difference of 
force, although French vessels averaged more 
powerful than British of the same rates. 

At 6.45 A. M. Rodney signalled that it was 
his intention to attack the enemy's rear with his 
whole force. This was never annulled, and the 



198 Types of Naval Officers 

purpose governed his action throughout the day. 
This combination — on the rear — is the one 
generally preferable to be attempted when under- 
way, and the relative situations of the fleets at 
this moment made it particularly opportune ; for 
the British, in good order, two cables interval 
between the ships, were abreast the rear centre 
and rear of the enemy, whose line was in com- 
parison greatly extended, — the result probably of 
inferior practical seamanship. To increase his 
advantage, Rodney at 7 ordered his vessels to close 
to one cable, and at 8.30, when the antagonists 
were still heading as at daybreak, undertook to 
lead the fleet down by a series of signals direc- 
tive of its successive movements. In this he was 
foiled by De Guichen, who by wearing brought 
what was previously his van into position to 
support the extreme threatened. " The differ- 
ent movements of the enemy, " wrote Rodney, 
" obliged me to be very attentive and watch every 
opportunity of attacking them at advantage;" 
a sentence that concisely sums up his special 
excellencies, of which the present occasion 
offers the most complete illustration. It may be 
fully conceded also that it would have vindicated 
his high title to fame by conspicuous results, had 
the intelligence of his officers seconded his 
dispositions. 

The forenoon passed in manoeuvres, skilfully 
timed, to insure a definite issue. At 11.50 
Rodney considered that his opportunity had 



Rodney 199 

arrived. Both fleets were then heading in the 
same direction, on the starboard tack, and he had 
again succeeded in so placing his own that, by 
the words of his report, he expected to bring 
"the whole force of His Majesty's fleet against 
the enemy's rear, and of course part of their 
centre, by which means the twenty sail of British 
ships would have been opposed to only fifteen 
sail of the enemy's, and must in all probability 
have totally disabled them before their van could 
have given them any assistance." It would be 
difficult to cite a clearer renouncement of the 
outworn " van to van," ship to ship, dogma ; but 
Rodney is said to have expressed himself in more 
emphatic terms subsequently, as follows : " Dur- 
ing all the commands Lord Rodney has been 
entrusted with, he made it a rule to bring his 
whole force against a part of the enemy's, and 
never was so absurd as to bring ship against ship, 
when the enemy gave him an opportunity of act- 
ing'otherwise." Though not distinctly so stated, 
it would seem that his first movement on the 
present occasion had failed because of the long 
distance between the fleets permitting the enemy 
to succor the part threatened, before he could 
close. He was now nearer, for at this second 
attempt only an hour proved to be needed for 
the first British ship to open fire at long range. 
It may be for this reason, also, that he at this 
stage threw himself upon his captains, no longer 
prescribing the successive movements, but issuing 



200 Types of Naval Officers 

the general signal to bear down, each vessel to 
"steer," according to the 21st Article of the 
Additional Fighting Instructions, "for the ship 
of the enemy which from the disposition of the 
two squadrons it must be her lot to engage, not- 
withstanding the signal for the line ahead will be 
kept flying: making or shortening sail in such 
proportion as to preserve the distance assigned by 
the signal for the line, in order that the whole 
squadron may, as near as possible, come into 
action at the same time.'* 

Unfortunately for his manoeuvre, the Admiral 
here ran up against the stolid idea of the old — 
and still existing — Fighting Instructions con- 
cerning the line-of-battle in action, embodied in 
a typical representative in the senior captain of 
his fleet. This gentleman, Robert Carkett, had 
risen from before the mast, and after a lieuten- 
ancy of thirteen years had become post in 1758, 
by succeeding to the command when his captain 
was killed, in one of the most heroic single-ship 
fights of the British navy. Unluckily, his sen- 
iority gave him the lead of the fleet as it was now 
formed on the starboard tack, and he considered 
that the signal for attacking the enemy's rear was 
annulled by the present situation. " Both fleets," 
he stated in a letter to the Admiralty, ''were at 
1 1. 1 5 parallel to and abreast of each other. As 
I was then the leading ship, it became my duty 
to engage the leading ship of the French fleet, 
as this signal disannulled all former ones rela- 



Rodney 201 



tive to the mode of attack." The word " abreast," 
critically used, would imply that the fleets were 
abreast, ship to ship, van to van ; but there 
appears no reason to question Rodney's state- 
ment of the facts made to Carkett himself : " For- 
getting that the signal for the line was only at 
two cables length distance from each other, the 
van division was by you led to more than two 
leagues distance from the centre division, which 
was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of 
the enemy, and not properly supported." Rodney, 
in short, meant by opposite the enemy's ship 
opposite at the moment the signal was made; 
and he also expected that the movements of his 
ships would be further controlled by the words of 
the 2ist Article, "preserve the distance assigned 
by the signal for the line," which distance was 
to be taken from the centre ; or, as sometimes 
worded in the Instructions, " the distance shall 
be that between the admiral and the ships next 
ahead and astern of him." Carkett conceived 
that he was to attack the ship opposite him in 
numerical order, that is, the leader of the enemy, 
and that the remaining British would take dis- 
tance from him. 

Why the rest of the van should also have been 
led thus astray can be explained only on the 
ground that Carkett's general views were shared 
by the divisional commander, a rear-admiral, who, 
as was proved a year later, possessed high cour- 
age of the pure game-cock order, but was wholly 



202 Types of Naval Officers 

thoughtless of gaining an unfair advantage, two 
against one, by tactical ingenuity. The result 
was that the van as a body left the centre to itself, 
and thereby not only wrecked the concentration 
at which Rodney aimed, but was out of hand to 
support his flag and his division, when badly 
battered by the enemy's fire. This was the 
great tactical blunder which brought to nought 
Rodney's patient, wary manoeuvres of the past 
six hours. To it especially, but not to it alone, 
he referred in the stinging words of his despatch: 
" 'T is with concern inexpressible, mixt with in- 
dignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign and 
country obliges me to acquaint their Lordships 
that, during the action with the French fleet on 
the 17th instant [and] His Majesty's, the British 
flag was not properly supported." To the specific 
error of the van was added a wide-spread dis- 
regard of the order for close action, despite the 
example of the commander-in-chief, who pressed 
the enemy so hard that towards the end his 
flag-ship was to leeward of De Guichen's wake. 
" Perceiving several of our ships engaging at a 
distance, I repeated the signal for close action. 
With truth, but sorrow, I must say it was little 
attended to." It is noticeable that one of the 
ships thus censured, the Cornwall, next ahead of 
Rodney, lost as heavily in killed and wounded as 
did the flag-ship herself; one of many instances 
showing that distance lessened efliciency without 
increasing safety. The forwardness of Rodney's 



Rodney 203 

flag on this occasion proves clearly enough his 
consciousness that tactics, to succeed, must be 
more than a veil for timidity; that hard hitting 
is as essential as skilful leading. 

This combination of steady, patient, wary, skil- 
ful guidance, with resolute and tenacious personal 
leadership, constituted the firm tissue of Rodney's 
professional character, and at no time received 
such clear illustration as in the case before us; 
for no like opportunity recurred. One experience 
was enough for De Guichen ; he did not choose 
again to yield the advantage of the weather gage, 
and he had the tactical skill necessary to retain 
it in his future contacts with this adversary. 
The battle of April 12, 1782, upon which Rod- 
ney's fame has rested, was rather an accident 
than an achievement, and as a revelation of char- 
acter its most conspicuous feature is wariness 
exaggerated into professional timidity. He him- 
self has weighed the relative professional value 
of the two affairs. A letter published in 1809, 
anonymous, but bearing strong internal evidence 
of being written by Sir Gilbert Blane, long on 
a trusted physician's terms of intimacy with Rod- 
ney, states that he " thought little of his victory 
on the 12th of April." He would have preferred 
to rest his reputation upon this action with De 
Guichen, and "looked upon that opportunity of 
beating, with an inferior fleet, such an officer, 
whom he considered the best in the French ser- 
vice, as one by which, but for the disobedience of 



204 Types of Naval Officers 

his captains, he might have gained an immortal 
renown." 

The misconduct of his officers brought out in 
full vigor the severity which was a salient feature 
of Rodney's professional character. In the St. 
Vincent business he may have been partly actu- 
ated to spare, by the reflection that the offenders 
were not his own captains ; that they were about 
to quit him finally. Moreover, there had been 
then a very considerable tangible success ; results 
cover a multitude of sins. No such extenua- 
tions applied here. The wreck of his reasonable 
hopes of personal distinction coincided with failure 
towards the nation itself. Rodney's hand came 
down heavy upon the offenders ; but so far as 
seen it was the hand always of a gentleman. In 
private letters his full feelings betrayed them- 
selves in vehemence ; but in public they were 
measured to austerity. To Carkett, when ques- 
tioned concerning the rumored expressions in his 
despatch, he is withering in the pointed enumera- 
tion of varied shortcomings ; but he never lapses 
into a breach of professional decorum of utter- 
ance. The unfortunate man represented to the 
Admiralty his view of the matter, — already cited; 
but it bears no indorsement to show that it had 
passed under Rodney's eye. Captain, ship, and 
ship's company, were swept away a few months 
later in the memorable hurricane of October, 
1780. 

The despatch specified no other delinquent by 



Rodney 205 

name ; but the selection of five captains to receive 
personal commendation, and the persistent refusal 
of the same to all other subordinates, including 
the junior flag-ofificers, made censure sufficiently 
individual; and the admiral's subsequent Hne of 
conduct emphasized rebuke bitterly. The cruise 
was not yet finished ; for the French having taken 
refuge at Guadaloupe, it was important to prevent 
them from regaining Martinique, their chief depot 
and place of repairs. To intercept them there, 
Rodney at first took station off Fort Royal, and 
when compelled for a moment to return to Santa 
Lucia, kept lookouts to warn him betimes of the 
enemy's appearance. So, when De Guichen ap- 
proached from the windward side of the islands, 
on May 9th, he found the British getting under- 
way to meet him. From that time until the 20th 
— eleven days — the fleets were manoeuvring in 
sight of one another, beating to windward ; the 
British endeavoring to force action, the French 
to avoid it. De Guichen's orders from home 
were *'to keep the sea, so far as the force main- 
tained by England in the Windward Islands would 
permit, without too far compromising the fleet en- 
trusted to him." Such instructions compelled him 
to defensive tactics ; as Rodney's views, and those 
traditional in his service, impelled him to attack. 
Hence ensued a struggle of sustained vigilance, 
activity, and skill, profoundly interesting profes- 
sionally, but which does not lend itself to other 
than technical narrative. "For fourteen days 



2o6 Types of Naval Officers 

and nights," wrote Rodney, "the fleets were so 
near each other that neither officers nor men 
could be said to sleep. Nothing but the good- 
ness of the weather and climate could have en- 
abled us to endure so continual a fatigue. Had 
it been in Europe, half the people must have 
sunk under it. For my part, it did me good." 
No evidence of professional aptness could be 
given clearer than the last words. A man is 
easy under such circumstances only when they fit 
him. De Guichen asked to be superseded; "my 
health cannot endure such continual fatigue and 
anxiety." Twice the wary Frenchman was nearly 
caught, but the wind did not favor Rodney long 
enough to give him the weather position, the 
only sure one for offence. But, while thus un- 
able to compass results, he gave conclusive evi- 
dence of the quickness of his eye, the alertness 
of his action, and the flexibility which he was 
enabled to impress upon his fleet by sheer force 
of personal character. The contest resembled 
that of two expert swordsmen ; more intermit- 
tent doubtless, but also much more prolonged. 
There can be no trifling with such conditions. 
A moment's relaxation, or inaptness, may forfeit 
opportunity, offered only by chance and not to be 
regained by effort. Rodney was fixed that no 
such slip should occur through the neglect of 
others, and his stern supervision, as represented 
by himself to his wife, was that of a slave driver, 
lash in hand. " As I had given public notice to 



Rodney 207 

all my captains, etc. that I should hoist my flag 
on board one of my frigates, and that I expected 
implicit obedience to every signal made, under 
the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, 
it had an admirable effect, as they were all con- 
vinced, after their late gross behaviour, that they 
had nothing to expect at my hands but instant 
punishment to those who neglected their duty. 
My eye on them had more dread than the 
enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal. 
No regard was paid to rank, — admirals as well 
as captains, if out of their station, were instantly 
reprimanded by signals, or messages sent by frig- 
ates : and, in spite of themselves, I taught them 
to be what they had never been before — officers ; 
and showed them that an inferior fleet, properly 
conducted, was more than a match for one far 
superior." Making allowance for exaggeration in 
the irresponsible utterances of family life, the 
above is eminently characteristic of temperament. 
It must be added, as equally characteristic of an 
underlying justice which Rodney possessed, that 
in his official account of these last manoeuvres he 
gave credit to his subordinates as a whole. " I 
must inform their Lordships, in justice to the 
commanders and officers of the fleet under my 
command, that since the action of the 17th of 
April, and during the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, 
and in the two rencontres with them, all my officers, 
of every rank and denomination, were obedient 
and attentive to orders and sio^nals, and, I am 



2o8 Types of Naval Officers 

convinced, if the enemy had given them an 
opportunity, they would have done their duty to 
their King and Country." The claims of justice 
against its own strict requirements he also rec- 
ognized to Carkett. "Nothing but the former 
service you had done your King and Country, 
and my firm belief of your being a brave man, 
could have induced me, as commander of a great 
fleet, to overlook." It will not escape attention 
that this exact observance of credit, where due, 
lends increased weight to censure, when inflicted. 
To the pursuit of the French fleet, relin- 
quished forty leagues eastward of Martinique 
after the brush of May 19th, succeeded a period 
marked only by the routine administrative cares 
attendant upon an admiral charged with the de- 
fence of a lengthy, exposed chain of islands, and 
an extensive trade, against enemies numerically 
much superior. The details serve to show the 
breadth of intelligence, the sound judgment, and 
clear professional conceptions that characterized 
Rodney in small things as well as great ; but it 
would be wearisome to elaborate demonstration of 
this, and these quahties he had in common with 
many men otherwise inferior to himself. Reaction 
from the opening strain of the campaign, with the 
relaxation of vigor from the approach of the hot 
rainy season, now began to tell on his health ; and 
to this contributed the harassment of mind due 
to the arrival of a large Spanish fleet, while rein- 
forcements promised him unaccountably failed to 



Rodney 209 

appear. Nevertheless, his personal efficiency was 
not impaired, and towards the end of July he 
resolved to execute a project which he had long 
entertained, of carrying the mass of his fleet from 
the islands to the Continental waters of North 
America. 

During the year between his return from Paris 
and his present appointment, he had laid before 
the Admiralty two papers, containing an admir- 
able summary of the leading strategic conditions 
of the whole scene of war in the western hemi- 
sphere, with suggestions for action amounting 
to a plan of campaign. One feature of this was 
based upon the weather differences, which ren- 
dered cruising dangerous in the West Indies 
when most favorable to the northward, and un- 
sure in North America when most certain among 
the islands. He proposed to utilize this alterna- 
tion of seasons, by shifting a mobile reinforcement 
suddenly and secretly from one end to the other 
of the long front of operations. This is a com- 
mon enough expedient in military art, but had 
rarely received the convincing formulation which 
he gave it ; while that such a conception was a 
novelty to the average naval mind of the day, may 
be inferred from the startled wrath of the admiral 
in North America at Rodney's unexpected intru- 
sion upon his bailiwick. 

Sandwich, however, had entertained the project, 
and in October, 1779, just as Rodney's appoint- 
ment issued, a vessel sailed from England with 

H 



2IO Types of Naval Officers 

letters to Admiral Arbuthnot in New York, 
directing him to send several ships-of-the-line to 
the West Indies for the winter campaign. The 
vessel lost a mast, kept off to Nassau in the 
Bahamas, and after arrival there her captain, 
while spending some months in repairs, did not 
think to send on the despatches. Arbuthnot, 
therefore, received them only on March i6, 1780 ; 
too late, doubtless, to collect and equip a force 
in time to reach Rodney before the affair of 
April 17th. 

At the end of July, 1780, the conditions in the 
West Indies were that the allied French and 
Spanish fleets had gone to leeward from Martin- 
ique ; to Havana, and to Cap Fran9ois, in Hayti. 
At the latter port was assembling a large trade 
convoy- — three hundred ships, according to Rod- 
ney's information. He reasoned that this must 
go to Europe, but would not require the full 
strength of the French fleet ; therefore, transfer- 
ring his own insight to the enemy's mind, he con- 
vinced himself that a part of their vessels would 
seek Narragansett Bay, to reinforce the seven 
ships-of-the-line that had reached there on July 
12th, under De Ternay, of whose arrival Rodney 
now knew. Great possibilities might be open to 
such a combination, skilfully handled against the 
inferior numbers of Arbuthnot. " As it plainly 
appeared to me that His Majesty's territory, fleet, 
and army, in America were in imminent danger 
of being overpowered by the superior force of 



Rodney 211 

the public enemy, I deemed it a duty incumbent 
upon me to forego any emoluments that might 
have accrued by the enterprise intended by Gen- 
eral Vaughan and myself during the hurricane 
months, and without a moment's hesitation flew 
with all despatch possible to prevent the enemy's 
making any impression upon the continent before 
my arrival there." The protestation of disinter- 
estedness here is somewhat intrusive, and being 
wholly unnecessary excites rather criticism than 
confidence. 

Although reasonable precautions had been 
taken for the security of his own station, and all 
circumstances carefully weighed, there was in 
this step of Rodney's an assumption of responsi- 
bility, — of risk, — as in his similar action of 
1762, before noted. This, as well as the military 
correctness of the general conception, deserves to 
be noted to the credit of his professional capacity. 
Making the land about Charleston, South Caro- 
lina, he swept along the coast to the northward, 
until he anchored off Sandy Hook, September 
14th. The following day he issued an order 
to Admiral Arbuthnot, directing him to put 
himself under his command and to obey his 
instructions. 

Rodney's coming was a grievous blow to Wash- 
ington, who instead had hoped, as Rodney had 
feared, the arrival of De Guichen, or at the least 
of a strong French naval division. The enemy's 
disappointment is perhaps the best proof of sagac- 



212 Types of Naval Officers 

ity in a military movement, but Sandwich's clear 
approval was also forthcoming. " It is impossible 
for us to have a superior fleet in every part ; and 
unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great 
line, as you do, and consider the King's whole 
dominions as under their care, our enemies must 
find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their 
point against us." Arbuthnot, nevertheless, saw 
only personal injury to himself; a natural feeling, 
but one which should not be allowed display. 
Rodney had given various particular orders, and 
had suggested that it would be better that the 
commander-in-chief on the station should keep 
headquarters at New York, leaving the blockade 
of Ternay, a hundred and thirty miles distant, to 
a junior admiral; also, he intimated the opinion 
that such a blockade would be better conducted 
underway than anchored in Gardiner's Bay, fifty 
miles from the enemy's port. Though sugges- 
tion did not override discretion, Arbuthnot re- 
sented it in all its forms. After explaining his 
reasons, he added, " How far. Sir, your conduct 
(similarly circumstanced as you are) is praise- 
worthy and proper, consequences must determine. 
Your partial interference in the conduct of the 
American War is certainly incompatible with 
principles of reason, and precedents of service. 
The frigates attending on a cruising squadron 
you have taken upon you to counter-order, (a due 
representation of which and other circumstances 
I shall make where it will have every possible 



Rodney 213 

effect), and thus I have been for some time with- 
out even a repeater of signals." 

Though Rodney's step was unusual, his posi- 
tion as Arbuthnot's superior officer, locally pres- 
ent, was impregnable. He nevertheless kept his 
temper under provocation, and the dignified 
restraint of his reply is notable; indeed, the 
only significant feature of this incident, from the 
biographical point of view. " No offence to you 
was intended on my part. Every respect due to 
you, as an officer and a gentleman, my inclination 
as well as my duty led me to pay you in the 
strictest sense." He leaves no doubt, however, 
that he does not intend to allow his functions to 
lapse into a mere official primacy, — that he will 
rule, as well as reign. "Duty, not inclination, 
brought me to North America. I came to inter- 
fere in the American War, to command by sea in 
it, and to do my best endeavours towards the 
putting an end thereto. I knew the dignity of 
my own rank entitled me to take the supreme 
command, which I ever shall do on every station 
w^here His Majesty's and the public service may 
make it necessary for me to go, unless I meet a 
superior officer, in which case it will be my duty 
to obey his orders." He then proceeds to exer- 
cise his authority, by explicit directions and some 
criticism of existing arrangements. 

Afterwards, in submitting the papers to the 
Admiralty, Rodney wrote, " I am ashamed to 
mention what appears to me the real cause, and 



214 Types of Naval Officers 

from whence Mr. Arbuthnot's chagrin proceeds, 
but the proofs are so plain that prize-money is 
the occasion that I am under the necessity of 
transmitting them. I can solemnly assure their 
Lordships that I had not the least conception of 
any other prize-money on the coast of America 
but that which would be most honourably ob- 
tained by the destruction of the enemy's ships of 
war and privateers — but when prize-money ap- 
peared predominant in the mind of my brother 
officer, I was determined to have my share 
of that bounty so graciously bestowed by His 
Majesty and the public." Nelson's retort to 
Arbuthnot's successor, two years later, may be 
recalled. " You have come to a good station 
for prize-money." " Yes, but the West Indies is 
the station for honour." 

The visit to continental waters was on this oc- 
casion productive of litde result. Contrary ahke 
to Rodney's anticipations and those of Washing- 
ton, De Guichen's whole fleet had returned to 
Europe. Some slight redistribution of cruisers, 
the more frequent capture of privateers, with in- 
creased security to the trade of New York and 
incidental support to some rather predatory land 
operations, were all that Rodney could show of 
tangible consequence from his presence. Arbuth- 
not alone was superior to Ternay if neither re- 
ceived reinforcements. Rodney's health felt the 
keener atmosphere, so that he had to go ashore 
in New York, and he accepted the views of 



Rodney 215 

Arbuthnot as to the strength of the French 
fleet's position in Newport, without examining 
it himself. Had he done so, however, it is un- 
Hkely that he would have formed more stren- 
uous purposes. The disposition of the enemy's 
squadron there was so imposing that only the 
genius of a Nelson, mindful as at Revel of the 
moral influence of a great blow at a critical 
period of the war, could have risen to the neces- 
sity of daring such a hazard. His phrase was 
there applicable, " Desperate affairs require des- 
perate remedies." There is no indication of this 
supreme element in Rodney's composition. It is 
interesting to note, however, that personal obser- 
vation had given conviction of success at New- 
port to the officer who was afterwards Nelson's 
gallant second at Copenhagen, — Sir Thomas 
Graves. 

This paucity of results in no way lessens the 
merit of the movement from the West Indies to 
the continent. It was indubitably correct in idea, 
and, as has been pointed out, the conception was 
Rodney's own, the possibilities were great, the 
risk in many ways undeniable; when these can 
be affirmed of a military action, failure to obtain 
results, because conditions take an improbable 
direction, does not detract from credit. Nor 
should the obviousness of this measure hide the 
fact that the suggestion appears to have been 
original with him, occurring fully developed in 
his memorandum of May, 1778, to the Admi- 



21 6 Types of Naval Officers 

ralty ; whether written in Paris or England does 
not appear. The transfer of Hotham's squadron 
to the southward in the following December, 
1779, enabling Barrington to conquer Santa 
Lucia, — a place insisted upon in the same mem- 
orandum as of the first importance, — may not 
improbably be attributed to this fruitful paper. 
In the next year, 1781, a detachment was again 
sent to New York, and had Rodney been able 
to accompany it in person there is no room 
to doubt that he would have saved Cornwallis ; 
reversing issues, at least momentarily, certainly 
prolonging the war, possibly deciding the contest 
otherwise than as befell. 

Rodney's return to the West Indies in Decem- 
ber, 1780, concluded the most eventful and 
illustriously characteristic year of his life. The 
destruction of Langara's fleet in January, the 
brilliant tactical displays of April 17th, and of 
the chase manoeuvres in May, the strategic trans- 
ference in August of a large division, unawares to 
the enemy, from one point of the field of action 
to another, are all feats that testify to his great 
ability as a general officer. Nor should there be 
left out of the account the stern dignity of con- 
duct which assured his personal control of the 
fleet, his certainty of touch in the face of an 
enemy. Thus considered, it was a year full of 
events, successful throughout as regards per- 
sonal desert, and singularly significant of abil- 
ity and temperament. 



Rodney 217 

The year 1781 was far less happy, nor does the 
great victory, which in 1782 crowned his career 
with glory, contribute to the enhancement of 
his professional distinction ; rather the contrary. 
Upon reaching Barbados, December 5th, he 
found the island shorn to the ground by the 
noted hurricane, which in the previous October 
had swept the Caribbean, from the Lesser Antilles 
to Jamaica. Eight of the division left by him in 
the West Indies had been wrecked, — two being 
ships-of-the-line ; and the efficiency of the whole 
fleet was grievously impaired by the wide-spread 
injury to vessels. 

An event charged with more serious conse- 
quences to himself soon followed. On the 27th 
of January, 1781, at Barbados, despatches from 
the Admiralty notified him that Great Britain 
had declared war against Holland, and directed 
him to proceed at once against the Dutch 
shipping and West Indies. First among the 
enumerated objects of attack was the small island 
of St. Eustatius. This, having enjoyed the ad- 
vantages of neutrality at a time when almost the 
whole Caribbean was in hostilities, had become a 
depot for the accumulation and distribution of 
stores, commercial and warlike. Ostensibly, it 
served all parties, giving to and receiving from 
Europe, America, and the Caribbean alike. The 
political sympathies of Holland, however, and it 
may be added those of the West Indies in gen- 
eral, even of the British islands themselves, were 



21 8 Types of Naval Officers 

rather adverse to Great Britain in the current 
struggle ; and this, combined with the greater 
self-sufficingness of the British naval and commer- 
cial administration, had made the neutral support 
of St. Eustatius more benevolent, and much more 
useful, to the enemies of Great Britain, includ- 
ing the revolted colonists, than it was to the 
mother country. Rodney asserted that help 
from there was readily forth-coming to supply 
French and Spanish requirements, while profes- 
sions of inability abounded whenever his fleet 
made a demand in occasional emergencies. 

He was therefore full of gall against the island 
and its merchants, the more so because he sus- 
pected that British subjects, unpatriotically ardent 
for gain, were largely concerned in maintaining 
conditions thus hurtful to their country ; and, 
when the orders to act came, it needed but three 
days for himself and General Vaughan to sail 
on an errand of which they probably had previ- 
ous intimations. On the 3d of February they 
arrived off St. Eustatius, which in the face of 
their imposing force submitted at once. They 
took possession of the island, with goods stored 
to the estimated value of ;^3,ooo,ooo, — an im- 
mense spoil in those days. A Dutch ship-of-war, 
with a hundred and fifty sail of traders of various 
nationalities, were also seized ; while a convoy of 
thirty merchant ships, which had sailed thirty-six 
hours before, was pursued and captured by a 
British detachment, — the Dutch admiral com- 



Rodney 219 

manding the ships-of-war being killed in the at- 
tendant action. 

From one point of view this was an enormous 
success, though unproductive of glory. It de- 
stroyed at a blow a centre of commerce and sup- 
ply powerfully contributive to the maintenance of 
the enemies of Great Britain ; both to their 
hostile operations, and to the indirect but no less 
vital financial support that trade gives to national 
endurance, — to the sinews of war. Besides this, 
however, there was the unprecedented immediate 
booty, transferable as so much asset to the 
conquerors. It was upon this present tangible 
result that Rodney's imagination fastened, with 
an engrossment and tenacity that constitute a 
revelation of character. It perverted his under- 
standing of conditions, and paralyzed his proper 
action as commander-in-chief. It is needless in 
this connection to consider whether it was the 
matter of personal profit, through legitimate prize- 
money, that thus influenced him, — an effect to 
some extent pardonable in a man who had long 
suffered, and still was suffering, from pecuniary 
straitness, — or whether, as he loudly protested, 
it was the interest to the nation that made his 
personal superintendence of the proceeds impera- 
tive. In either case the point to be noted is not 
a palpable trait of covetousness, — if such it were, 
— but the limitation to activity occasioned by 
preoccupation with a realized, but imperfect, suc- 
cess. The comparatively crude impression of 



220 Types of Naval Officers 

greediness, produced by apparent absorption in a 
mere money gain, has prevented the perception 
of this more important and decisive element in 
Rodney's official character, revealed at St. Eusta- 
tius and confirmed on the evening of the 12th of 
April. What he had won, he had won ; what 
more he might and should do, he would not see, 
nor would he risk. 

His discontent with his junior flag-officers in 
the West Indies, and the peculiar demoralization 
of professional tone at the moment, had made it 
difficult for the Admiralty to provide him a sat- 
isfactory second in command. In order to do 
this, they had " to make a promotion," as the 
phrase went ; that is, in order to get the man 
wanted, the seniors on the captains' list were pro- 
moted down to and including him. The choice 
had fallen on Sir Samuel Hood, — in later days 
Nelson's honored Lord Hood, — than which none 
could have been happier in respect of capacity. 
It has been truly said that he was as able as 
Rodney, and more energetic ; but even this falls 
short of his merit. He had an element of pro- 
fessional — as distinguished from personal — dar- 
ing, and an imaginative faculty that penetrated 
the extreme possibilities of a situation, quickened 
by the resolve, in which Rodney was deficient, to 
have all or nothing ; and these invaluable traits 
were balanced by the sound and accurate judg- 
ment of a thorough seaman, without which imag- 
ination lures to disaster. The man who as a 



Rodney 221 

junior formed the idea of seizing De Grasse's 
anchorage in the Chesapeake in 1781, to effect 
the relief of Cornwallis, and who in 1782, when 
momentarily in chief command, illustrated the 
idea by actual performance under similar condi- 
tions in the West Indies, rose to heights of con- 
ception and of achievement for which we have no 
equivalent in Rodney's career. Unfortunately for 
him, though thus mighty in act, opportunity for 
great results never came to him. The hour never 
met the man. 

Hood with eight ships-of-the-line and a large 
convoy arrived on the station in January, 1781, 
and was at St. Eustatius with the commander-in- 
chief when Rodney received a report, which 
proved to be false, that eight to ten French ships- 
of-the-line, with a numerous supply-fleet, had been 
sighted in European waters evidently bound for 
the West Indies. He thereupon detached Hood, 
on February 12th, and directed him with seven- 
teen of-the-line to await the enemy to windward 
of Martinique, their probable destination. A 
month later he ordered the position to be shifted 
to leeward of the island, in front of the French 
arsenal port, Fort Royal. Hood dissented from 
this, remonstrating vigorously, and the event 
proved him right ; but Rodney insisted, the more 
injudiciously in that he was throwing the tactical 
burden upon his junior while fettering thus his 
tactical discretion. Meantime, twenty French 
ships-of-the-line did sail on March 2 2d for Mar- 



222 Types of Naval Officers 

tinique, under Count De Grasse : beginning then 
the campaign which ended in the great disaster of 
April 12, 1782, but not until it had been signal- 
ized by the surrender of Cornwallis, due to this 
fleet, as Washington said. On the 28th of April 
it came in sight of Hood ; but, owing to the lee- 
wardly position insisted upon by Rodney, the 
English commander could not prevent the junc- 
tion to it of four French ships then in the port. 
A battle followed next day, of eighteen British — 
one having just joined — against twenty-four 
enemies; odds which, combined with the weather 
gage held by the French, should have insured 
them a decisive victory. This result was pre- 
vented by the tentative action of De Grasse, 
encountering the tactical capacity and impertur- 
bable self-possession of Hood. 

Rodney could not have bettered Hood's man- 
agement, though he of course attributed to him 
the blame for results. It is evident, however, 
that for various reasons the commander-in-chief 
should have been with the body of his fleet. 
Even barring certain and timely information of 
the French coming, which Hood at least did not 
have, there was every reasonable probability that 
such an expedition would arrive at about the sea- 
son it did. Hood's insight, which was adequate 
to divining possibilities as well as to dealing with 
ascertained conditions, had taught him that the 
latter half of April — and not sooner — was the 
time by which the British should be refitted, 



Rodney 223 

provisioned and watered full, and in all respects 
ready for prolonged operations against a powerful 
enemy; as well as concentrated to windward. He 
reasoned thus from the fact that the French navy, 
to the number of forty odd, — being the combined 
fleets of D'Estaing from Brest and De Guichen 
from the West Indies, — had been assembled in 
Cadiz towards the end of 1780, and did not return 
to Brest until January, 1781. To refit, sail, and 
reach Martinique again, would in his judgment 
postpone arrival to the middle of April, and this 
respite should be improved by getting the British 
ships into the best campaigning condition, so as 
not to be hampered in subsequent movements 
by necessities of repair and supply. With this 
persuasion he became eager, by the first of the 
month, for the admiral's presence; the more so 
because confident that, if he were on the spot, he 
would see the necessity of changing position from 
leeward to windward. " I begin to be extremely 
impatient for the honour of being and acting 
immediately under your flag, as I do not find 
myself pleasant in being to leeward; for should an 
enemy's fleet attempt to get into Martinique, and 
the commander of it inclines to avoid battle, 
nothing but a skirmish will probably happen, 
which in its consequences may operate as a defeat 
to the British squadron, though not a ship is lost 
and the enemy suffer most." 

This is a clear case in which events that actu- 
ally befell were foreseen ; not by supernatural 



224 Types of Naval Officers 

iliumination, but by the clear light of unbiassed 
reason acting upon evident considerations. 
There was but a skirmish, the British did suffer 
badly, and the consequences were equivalent to 
defeat ; for, had the whole British force of the 
line been present to windward, it would have 
prevented the junction of the French, and there- 
fore have been so nearly equal to the main body 
as to have assured an action inflicting very 
serious injury, incapacitating the enemy for the 
attacks upon Santa Lucia and Tobago, before 
which the latter fell, and not improbably deter- 
ring De Grasse from the expedition to the Chesa- 
peake which forced the capitulation of Cornwallis. 
Such deductions are of course dependent upon 
the contingencies inseparable from warfare. 
They are not certainties, indeed; but they are 
inferences of very great probability. So much 
hinged upon the presence of an officer with the 
full discretion denied to Hood ; of the officer 
primarily responsible for the fleet, which was 
intrusted to him and not to another. 

Probable also is Hood's solution of Rodney's 
persistence in remaining at St. Eustatius, and 
keeping the squadron under the command of his 
second to leeward of Martinique. He was pos- 
sessed with the fancied paramount necessity of 
protecting St. Eustatius against a sudden attack 
by the enemy, which he imagined might be sup- 
ported by the small division in Fort Royal ; and 
the value of the booty shut his eyes to every other 



Rodney 225 

consideration. As on the evening of the 12th 
of April, the great day of glory in his career, the 
captures already made assumed sufficiency in 
his eyes, and co-operating with surmisings as to 
what the beaten and scattered French might do 
deterred him from further action; so now the 
prize already secured at St. Eustatius combined 
with the imaginative " picture he made for him- 
self" — to use Napoleon's phrase — of its pos- 
sible dangers, to blind him to the really decisive 
needs of the situation. It is clear, however, that 
local naval provision for the safety of a petty 
island was in point of difficulty, as of conse- 
quence, a secondary matter, within the compe- 
tence of many of his captains ; and that the 
primary factor, on which all depended, was the 
control of the sea, by the British fleet predomi- 
nating over the enemy's. Consequently the 
commander-in-chief should have been where his 
second was, at the centre of decisive action, 
where an enemy's fleet was to be expected. 

This was the more incumbent because Rodney 
himself, writing to Admiral Parker in Jamaica on 
April 1 6th, said, "As the enemy hourly expect 
a great fleet in these seas, I have scarcely a 
sufficient number of line-of-battle-ships to block- 
ade the island of Martinique, or to engage the 
enemy's fleet should they appear, if their number 
should be so large as reported," — twenty-four. 
This report came from French sources, and it 
will be noted, from the date of his letter, was in 

15 



226 Types of Naval Officers 

his possession twelve days before the enemy 
arrived. It was both specific and antecedently 
probable, and should have determined the ad- 
miral's action. Whether he had similar news 
from home does not appear. Sandwich writing 
him on March 21st, the day before the French 
left Brest, professed ignorance of their destination, 
bat added, " the most prevailing and most probable 
opinion is that they are to go to the West India 
Islands, and afterwards to North America." 
Their number he estimated at twenty-five, which 
tallied with Rodney's intelligence of twenty-four. 
The latter was exact, save that four were armed 
enfiicte; that is, as transports, with their guns 
below, to be subsequently mounted. Despite 
everything, the admiral remained at St. Eustatius 
until May 4th, when the arrival of a crippled ship 
from Hood brought him the news of the skirmish. 
He was attending, doubtless, to details pertaining 
to his command, but he was chiefly occupied with 
the disposition of the property seized on the 
island; a matter which he afterwards found to 
his cost would have been much better committed 
to administrators skilled in the law. " Had they 
abided by the first plan settled before I left them," 
wrote Hood, " and not have interfered, but have 
left the management to the land and sea folk 
appointed for that purpose, all would have gone 
smooth and easy." 

However this might have proved, the immedi- 
ate supervision of the island and its spoils was no 



Rodney 227 

business for a commander-in-chief in active war 
time ; particularly when it entailed leaving the 
charge of his main fleet, at a critical moment, to 
a junior admiral of very recent appointment, and 
still unproved. It was not the separate import- 
ance of the position intrusted to Hood that made 
it peculiarly the station for the commander-in- 
chief. It might have been intrinsically as im- 
portant, yet relatively secondary ; but actually it 
was the centre and key upon which, and upon 
which alone, the campaign could turn and did 
turn. Neither was the question one of the rela- 
tive merits, as yet unknown, of Rodney and 
Hood. A commander-in-chief cannot devolve 
his own proper functions upon a subordinate, 
however able, without graver cause than can be 
shown in this instance. The infatuation which 
detained Rodney at a side issue can only be ex- 
cused — not justified — by a temporary inability 
to see things in their true proportion, induced on 
more than one occasion by a temperamental 
defect, — the lack of the single eye to military 
considerations, — which could find contentment 
in partial success, and be indifferent to further 
results to be secured by sustained action. 

There is a saying, apt to prove true, that war 
does not forgive. For his initial error Rodney 
himself, and the British campaign in general, 
paid heavily throughout the year 1781. The 
French fleet in undiminished vigor lay a dead 
weight upon all his subsequent action, which. 



228 Types of Naval Officers 

like the dispositions prior to its arrival, under- 
went the continued censure of Hood ; acrid, yet 
not undiscriminating nor misplaced. As already 
observed, the surrender of Cornwallis can with 
probability be ascribed to this loss of an oppor- 
tunity afforded to strike a blow at the outset, 
when the enemy was as yet divided, embarrassed 
with convoy, raw in organization and drill, in all 
which it could not but improve as the months 
passed. The results began at once to be ap- 
parent, and embarrassments accumulated with 
time. Hood's ships, though no one was wholly 
disabled, had suffered very considerably; and, 
while indispensable repairs could temporarily be 
made, efficiency was affected. They needed, be- 
sides, immediate water and supplies, as Rodney 
himself stated — a want which Hood would have 
anticipated. To increase difficulty, the French 
mounted the batteries of the vessels en flute, and 
so raised their total nominal force to twenty-eight. 
Hood was unable to regain Santa Lucia, because 
his crippled ships could not beat against the 
current. He therefore left it to itself, and bore 
away to the northward, where he joined Rodney 
on May nth, between St. Kitts and Antigua. 
The campaign of 1781, destined to be wholly de- 
fensive for the British, opened under these odds, 
the responsibility for which lies in considerable 
measure on Rodney. 

After the junction, the British fleet went to 
Barbados, where it arrived May i8th. Mean- 



Rodney 229 

time, the French had proceeded in force against 
Santa Lucia, landing a considerable body of 
troops, and investing the island with twenty-five 
sail-of-the-line, two of which with 1300 soldiers 
went on to attempt the British Tobago. The 
attack on Santa Lucia failed, and the French re- 
turned to Martinique; but learning there that 
Rodney was at sea, heading southward, De Grasse 
became alarmed for his detachment at Tobago, 
and moved to its support with his entire fleet. 
Rodney, knowing of the detachment only, sent 
against it six ships under Rear Admiral Drake ; 
a half-measure severely censured by Hood, whose 
comments throughout indicate either a much su- 
perior natural sagacity, or else the clearer insight 
of a man whose eye dwells steadfastly on the mili- 
tary situation, untroubled by conflicting claims. 
" What a wonderful happy turn would have been 
given to the King's affairs in this country had Sir 
George Rodney gone with his whole force to 
Tobago as soon as he might, and in my humble 
opinion ought to have done. Nay, had he even 
gone when Mr. Drake did, the island would have 
been saved. I laboured much to effect it, but all 
in vain, and fully stated my reasons in writing as 
soon as the intelligence came. Every ship there 
with all the troops must have fallen into our hands 
two days before De Grasse got there with his 
twenty-one sail ; " to which Rodney, in full strength, 
would again have opposed twenty. ''Now the 
enemy may do as they will ; " for they were united 



230 Types of Naval Officers 

in Martinique, twenty-eight to twenty. In short, 
Rodney saw at Tobago only the one French 
detachment ; Hood saw therein the definition of 
the enemy's purpose, the necessity laid on them 
to fly to the aid of their exposed division, and the 
chance to anticipate them, — to gain an advan- 
tage first, and to beat them afterwards. 

Rodney's tentative and inadequate action was 
not improbably induced partly by the " extreme 
want of water," which he reported in his de- 
spatches ; and this again was due to failure to 
prepare adequately during the period of respite 
foreseen by Hood, but unnoted by his own pre- 
occupied mind. The result is instructive. Drake 
fell in with the main body of the French, and of 
course had to retire, — fortunate in regaining 
his commander-in-chief unmolested. De Grasse's 
movement had become known in Barbados, and 
as soon as Drake appeared Rodney sailed with 
the fleet, but upon arriving off Tobago, on June 
5th, learned that it had surrendered on the 2d. Its 
fall he duly attributed to local neglect and cow- 
ardice ; but evidently the presence of the British 
fleet might have had some effect. He then re- 
turned to Barbados, and during the passage the 
hostile fleets sighted each other on the 9th, — 
twenty British to twenty-three French ; but Rod- 
ney was unwilling to engage lest he might be 
entangled with the foul ground about Grenada. 
As that island was then in the enemy's hands, he 
could get no anchorage there, and so might be 



Rodney 23 i 

driven to leeward of his opponent, exposing Bar- 
bados. It is perhaps needless to point out that 
had he been to windward of Martinique when De 
Grasse first arrived, as Hood \%ished, he would 
have been twenty to twenty, with clear ground, 
and the antagonist embarrassed with convoy. 
His present perplexities, in their successive 
phases, can be seen throughout to be the result 
of sticking to St. Eustatius, not only physically, 
but mentally. 

And so it was with what followed. On reach- 
ing Barbados again, he had to report that the 
French were back in Martinique, and now twenty- 
eight through the arming of the ships en flute. 
Despite their superiority, " they do not venture 
to move," he said somewhat sneeringly, and doubt- 
less his " fleet in being " had an effect on them ; 
but they were also intent on a really great 
operation. On July 5th, De Grasse sailed for 
Cap Fran9ois in Hayti, there to organize a visit 
to the continent in support of Washington's 
operations. Rodney, pursuant to his sagacious 
plan of the previous years, sent also a detach- 
ment of fourteen ships under Hood, which he 
endeavored, but unsuccessfully, to have increased 
by some from Jamaica. That De Grasse would 
take his whole fleet to North America, leaving 
none in the West Indies, nor sending any to 
Europe, was a step that neither Rodney nor 
Hood foresaw. The miscalculation cannot be 
imputed to either as an error at this time. It 



232 Types of Naval Officers 

was simply one of the deceptions to which the 
defensive is ever liable ; but it is fairly chargeable 
to the original fault whereby the French admiral 
was enabled to enter Fort Royal uninjured in 
the previous April. From the time his fleet 
was concentrated, the British had to accept the 
defensive with its embarrassments. 

Rodney had contemplated going in person with 
his ships, which Sandwich also had urged upon 
him ; but his health was seriously impaired, and 
the necessity for a surgical operation combined 
to induce his return to England. The final deci- 
sion on this point he postponed to the last mo- 
ment of the homeward voyage, keeping a frigate 
in company in w^hich to go to New York, if 
able; but ultimately he felt compelled to give 
up. This conclusion settled Cornwallis's fate, 
antecedently but finally. That year Great Britain 
fell between two stools. In view of De Grasse's 
known expressions, it may be affirmed with great 
confidence that he would have seen reason to 
abandon the Chesapeake, leaving open the sea- 
road for Cornwallis to escape, had either Rodney 
or Hood commanded the British fleet there in 
the battle of September 5th; but Rodney was 
away, and Hood second only to an incompetent 
superior. 

Rodney landed in England, September 19th, 
and was again afloat by December 12th, although 
he did not finally sail for his station until the 
middle of January, 1782. This brief period was 



Rodney 233 



one of the deepest military depression ; for during 
it occurred Cornwallis's surrender, October 19th, 
under conditions of evident British inferiority, 
on sea and shore alike, which enforced the con- 
viction that the colonies must be granted their 
independence. Not only so, but the known 
extensive preparations of the Bourbon courts 
pointed to grave danger also for the Caribbean 
colonies, the sugar and import trade of which 
counted largely in the financial resources of the 
empire. Amid the general gloom Rodney had 
his own special vexation ; for, before he left, news 
was received of the recapture of St. Eustatius 
by a small French expedition, prior to the re- 
turn of Hood to the West Indies from the un- 
fortunate operations on the continent. As in 
the case of Tobago, Rodney severely blamed the 
local defence, and very possibly justly ; but atten- 
tion should not wander from the effect that must 
have been produced upon all subsequent con- 
ditions by preparation and action on the part of 
the British fleet, in the spring of 1781, on the 
lines then favored by Hood. 

Shortly before he had sailed for home, Rod- 
ney had written his wife, "In all probability, the 
enemy, when they leave these seas, will go to 
America. Wherever they go, I will watch their 
motions, and certainly attack them if they give 
me a proper opportunity. The fate of England 
may depend upon the event." The last sentence 
was in measure a prophecy, so far, that is, as 



234 Types of Naval Officers 

decisive of the original issue at stake, — the sub- 
jugation or independence of the United Col- 
onies ; but, without further laboring the point 
unduly, it may be permitted here to sum up 
what has been said, with the remark that in the 
summer of 1781 control of events had passed out 
of Rodney's hands. From the time of the original 
fault, in suffering the French to meet Hood to 
leeward of Martinique, with an inferior force, 
more and more did it become impossible to him 
to assure conditions sufficiently favorable. With 
the highest personal courage, he did not have 
eminent professional daring ; nor, with consider- 
able tactical acquirement, was he gifted with 
that illuminative originality which characterized 
Hood and Nelson. He therefore needed either 
a reasonable probability of success, or the spur 
of imminent emergency, to elicit the kind of 
action needed to save the British cause. The 
chances to windward of Martinique would have 
been ninety out of a hundred ; from that time 
forward they diminished with continually increas- 
ing rapidity. With such a situation he was not 
the man to cope. 

On reaching Barbados, February 19, 1782, 
Rodney learned that the garrison of St. Kitts 
was besieged in Brimstone Hill, and the island 
itself beleaguered by the French fleet, thirty- 
three of-the-line, which Sir Samuel Hood, with 
two thirds their number, had so far held in check 
by a series of manoeuvres unusually acute in con- 



Rodney 235 



ception and brilliant in execution. Proceeding 
immediately to Antigua, he there heard on the 
23d that St. Kitts had capitulated on the 13th. 
Two days later he was joined by Hood, and then 
took the united fleet to Santa Lucia, where he 
was on March 5 th. The knowledge of a large 
supply fleet expected for the French, and essen- 
tial to the known project of the allies against 
Jamaica, carried the British fleet again to sea; 
but it failed to intercept the convoy, and returned 
once more to Santa Lucia, where it anchored in 
Gros Ilet Bay, thirty miles from Fort Royal, 
where the French were lying. Various changes 
made the respective numbers, when operations 
opened, British thirty-six of-the-line, French 
thirty-iive, with two fifty-gun ships ; a near ap- 
proach to equality. 

Rodney's faculties were now^ all alert. He had 
had some needed repose, and he was again under 
the stimulus of reputation to restore ; for it would 
have been vain to assert, even to himself, that he 
was entirely clear, not merely of error, to which 
the most careful is liable, but of serious fault in 
the previous year. Moreover, he had been 
sharply assailed in Parliament for the transac- 
tions at St. Eustatius on the civil side, distinct 
from his military conduct. To such ills there is 
no plaster so healing as a victory ; and the occa- 
sion about to arise proved, in its successive stages, 
— until the last, — admirably adapted to his 
natural and acquired qualifications. First, a 



236 Types of Naval Officers 

series of manoeuvres protracted over three or four 
days; and afterwards a hard fought battle, con- 
verted by a happy yet by no means unusual acci- 
dent into a decided and showy success. Decided, 
but not decisive; for, like the soldier desperate 
in deed before rewarded, but who, when sum- 
moned again, advised that the chance be given to 
a man who had not a purse of gold, Rodney pre- 
ferred to pause on that personally safe side of 
moderation in achievement which is rarely con- 
ducive to finality, and is nowhere so ill-placed as 
in the aims of a commander-in-chief. The true 
prudence of war, — as it is also its mercy, to 
friend and to foe, — is to strike without cessation 
or slackness till power of future action is crushed. 

De Grasse's immediate task was to protect a 
large convoy from Martinique to Cap Frangois 
(now Cap Haytien), in Hayti, a distance of about 
a thousand miles. Cumbered with merchant 
vessels, and aware that Rodney would be at once 
on his track, he could not go straight across the 
Caribbean; the British fleet, not so hampered, 
would be sure to overtake and destroy. He 
purposed, therefore, to skirt the Antilles, keep- 
ing continually in reach of a port of refuge. 
Rodney, knowing the aim to be Jamaica, had 
little doubt of overtaking in any case, if started 
promptly. He therefore kept himself in signal 
touch of Fort Royal by a chain of frigates, ex- 
tending from its ofling to his own anchorage. 

On the 8th of April the French sailed. The 



Rodney 237 



British followed instantly, and before sundown 
had them in sight, not only by lookout vessels, 
but from the mastheads of the main fleet. At 
daybreak next morning they were visible from 
the decks of the British van; a very marked gain. 
De Grasse saw that at that rate, unless he got rid 
of the convoy, he would certainly be overtaken, 
which it was his aim to elude in pursuance of the 
usual French policy of ulterior purposes; so, 
being then north of Dominica, he sent the mer- 
chant vessels into Guadaloupe, and undertook 
to carry the ships-of-war through the passage 
between the two islands, beating to windward. 
This would draw the British away from the con- 
voy, unless they were content to let the fleet go, 
which was not to be expected. 

Between 8 a. m. and 2 p. m. of April 9th, sev- 
eral sharp skirmishes took place between the 
French and the British van, under Hood.^ De 
Grasse had here an opportunity of crushing a 
fraction of the enemy, but failed to use it, thus 
insuring his own final discomfiture. Rodney, 
who was becalmed with the centre and rear of 
his command, could do nothing but push forward 
reinforcements to Hood as the wind served ; and 
this he did. Pursuit was maintained tenaciously 
during the following night and the next two days, 

^ The writer does not purpose to give an account of these actions, 
except so far as Rodney himself is concerned. They can be found In 
Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power upon History," pp. 480-495, or in the 
♦'History of the Royal Navy," (Sampson Low, Marston & Co.), edited 
by Mr. W. Laird Clowes, vol. iii. pp. 520-535. 



238 Types of Naval Officers 

— April loth and i ith ; but in sustained chases of 
bodies of ships, the chased continually drops units, 
which must be forsaken or else the retreat of the 
whole must be retarded. So in this case, certain 
of De Grasse's ships were either so leewardly or 
so ill handled that the bulk of the fleet, which 
had gained considerably to windward, had to bear 
down to them, thus losing the ground won. 
Under such circumstances the chapter of acci- 
dents — or of incidents — frequently introduces 
great results ; and so it proved here. 

At 2 A.M. of April 12th, De Grasse's flag-ship, 
the Ville de Paris, and the seventy-four-gun ship 
Zele, crossing on opposite tacks, came into collision. 
The former received little damage, but the Zete 
lost her foremast and bowsprit. De Grasse then 
ordered her into Guadaloupe, in tow of a frigate. 
When day broke, about five o'clock, these two were 
only about six miles from the British rear, under 
Hood, whose division had been shifted from the 
van in consequence of injuries received on the 
9th. The British column was then standing 
east-northeast, closehauled on the starboard tack, 
the crippled vessel under its lee, but the French 
of the main body well to windward. To draw 
them within reach, Rodney signalled Hood to 
send chasers after the Zele. De Grasse took the 
bait and ran down to her support, ordering his 
ships to form line-of-battle on the port tack, which 
was done hastily and tumultuously. The two 
lines on which the antagonists were respectively 



Rodney 239 

advancing now pointed to a common and not 
distant point of intersection, which the French, 
despite the loss of ground already undergone, 
reached first, passing in front and to windward of 
the head of the British column. Eight ships thus 
went by clear, but the ninth arrived at the same 
moment with the leading British vessel, which 
put her helm up and ran along close to leeward 
of the French line towards its rear, followed in 
so doing by the rest of her fleet. 

The battle thus assumed the phase of two 
fleets passing each other in opposite directions, 
on parallel lines; a condition usually unproduc- 
tive of results, and amounting to little more than 
a brush, as had been the case in two rencounters 
between Rodney and De Guichen in the pro- 
longed chase of May, 1780. Chance permitted a 
different issue on this occasion. The wind at 
the moment of first collision, shortly before 8 
A. M., was east, and so continued till five minutes 
past nine, when it shifted suddenly to the south- 
eastward, ahead for the French, abaft for the 
British. The former, being already close to the 
wind, could keep their sails full only by bearing 
away, which broke up their line ahead, the order 
of battle as ranged for mutual support; while 
the British being able to luff could stand into the 
enemy's line. Rodney's flag-ship, the Formidable, 
90, was just drawing up with the Glorieux, 74, 
nineteenth from the van in the French order and 
fourth astern of the Ville de Paris, De Grasse's 



240 Types of Naval Officers 

flag-ship. Luffing to the new wind, she passed 
through the French line at this point, followed 
by the five ships astern of her ; while the sixth 
astern, the Bedford, 74, luffing on her own ac- 
count, broke also through the French astern of 
the Cesar and the Hector, 74's, eleventh and 
twelfth in their order. The twelve British vessels 
in rear of the Bedford followed in her wake. 
Hood was in one of these, the Barfleur, 90. Of 
the ships ahead of Rodney the nearest one imi- 
tated his example instantly and went through 
the line ; the remainder, sixteen in all, continued 
northward for a space. 

These sudden and unexpected movements over- 
powered the Cesar, Hector, and Glorieux under a 
weight of successive broadsides that completely 
crushed them, separated De Grasse with six com- 
panion vessels from his van and his rear, and 
placed the British main body to windward of the 
French. Both sides were disordered, but the 
French were not only disordered but severed, into 
three formless groups, not to be united except by 
a good breeze and exceeding good management, 
neither of which was forthcoming. Even to 
frame a plan operative under such conditions re- 
quires in an admiral accuracy of judgment and 
readiness rarely bestowed ; but to communicate 
his designs and enforce execution upon captains 
under such a staggering shock of disaster is even 
more uncommon of accomplishment. During the 
remainder of the day light airs from the eastward 



Rodney 241 

prevailed, interspersed with frequent calms ; con- 
ditions unfavorable to movement of any kind, but 
far more to the French, deprived of concert of 
purpose, than to the British, whose general course 
was sufficiently defined by the confusion of the 
enemy, and the accident of a small group sur- 
rounding their commander-in-chief, to capture 
whom was always a recognized principal object. 
The very feebleness of the breeze favored them 
by comparison ; for they had but to go before 
it with all their light sails, while their opponents, 
in order to join, were constrained to lateral move- 
ment, which did not allow the same canvas. 

There was, in short, during the rest of the day 
an unusual opportunity for success, on such a 
scale as should be not only brilliant, but really 
decisive of the future course of the war ; oppor- 
tunity to inflict a maritime blow from which the 
enemy could not recover. Does it need to say 
clearly that here the choice was between a per- 
sonal triumph, already secured for the successful 
admiral, and the general security of the nation 
by the "annihilation " — the word is Nelson's — 
of the enemy ? That Rodney thus phrased the 
alternative to himself is indeed most unlikely; 
but that he failed to act efficiently, to rise to 
an emergency, for the possible occurrence of 
which he had had ample time as well as warning 
to prepare, is but too certain. Even after the 
British had got to windward of the enemy and 

seen their disorder, although the signal for the 

16 



242 Types of Naval Officers 

line was hauled down, none was made for a gen- 
eral chase. That for close action, hoisted at i 
P.M., was discontinued thirty minutes later, when 
five full hours of daylight remained. Even in 
example the admiral was slack, by Hood s ac- 
count. " He pursued only under topsails (some- 
times his foresail set, and at other times his miz- 
zen topsail aback) the greatest part of the after- 
noon, though the flying enemy had all the sail set 
their very shattered state would allow." Hood, 
curbed by his superior's immediate presence, 
did what he could by putting all sail on the 
BarfleMv, and signalling the various ships of his 
personal command to do the same ; " not one but 
chased in the afternoon with studding sails below 
and aloft." It was bare poetic justice, therefore, 
that the Ville de Paris, the great prize of the 
day, though surrounded by numerous foes, struck 
formally to him. 

The Hector, Cesar, and Glorieux, already par- 
alyzed ere the chase began, were the only results 
of this languid movement, except the French 
flag-ship and the Ardent, 64. The latter was 
taken because, notwithstanding her being an in- 
different sailer, she gallantly tried to pass from 
her own division, the van, to support her com- 
mander-in-chief in his extremity. It was 6.29 p. m. 
when the Ville de Paris struck ; sixteen minutes 
later, 6.45, Rodney made signal to bring-to for 
the night — to give over pursuit. Only the Ville 
de Paris and the Ardent can be considered to 



Rodney 243 

have been secured by following, after the battle 
proper closed. 

Nor was any other attempt made to profit by 
the victory. On the 13th the fleet began to 
move very slowly towards Jamaica, the local pro- 
tection of which had become imperative through 
the failure to annihilate the enemy, who must 
now go to leeward — to Hayti ; but after four 
hours Rodney brought-to again, and on the i6th, 
according to Hood, was in " the exact same spot 
off Guadaloupe. It has indeed been calm some 
part of the time, but we might have been more 
than twenty leagues farther to the westward." 
The Cesar h^LYing been accidentally burned on the 
night of the battle, the prizes Hector 2^\^ Glorieux 
were sent ahead in charge of three ships-of-the- 
line. This was a questionable disposition, as they 
were advancing in the direction of the enemy, 
without being covered by the interposition of 
the main fleet. The Ville de Paris Rodney kept 
close by his own side, unable to tear himself from 
her ; so at least said Hood, who " would to God 
she had sunk the moment she had yielded to the 
arms of His Majesty," for " we would then have 
had a dozen better ships in lieu of her." Rodney 
was so tickled with her that he "can talk of 
nothing else, and says he will hoist his flag on 
board of her." 

On April 17th Hood, having vainly urged his 
commander to improve the situation by more en- 
ergetic action, represented to him that the small 



244 Types of Naval Officers 

detachment convoying the Hector and Glorieux 
might fall in with a superior enemy, if not sup- 
ported. Rodney then directed him to go ahead 
with ten ships until as far as Altavela, midway 
on the south side of Santo Domingo, where he 
was to await the main body. Hood gave a wide 
construction to these orders, and pushed for the 
Mona Passage, between Santo Domingo and 
Porto Rico, where on the 19th he intercepted two 
sixty-four gun ships, and two smaller cruisers. In 
reporting this incident to Rodney, he added, " It 
is a very mortifying circumstance to relate to 
you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to 
flight on the 12th went through the Mona Chan- 
nel on the 1 8th, only the day before I was in it." 
That sustained vigorous chase could not have 
been fruitless is further shown by the fact that 
Rodney himself, deliberately as he moved, appar- 
ently lying-to each night of the first half-dozen 
succeeding the battle, reached Jamaica three days 
only after the main body of the defeated French 
gained Cap Fran9ois, though they had every 
motive to speed. 

Of the reasons for such lethargic action, wholly 
inconsistent with true military principle, and bit- 
terly criticised by Hood, — who affirmed that 
twenty ships might have been taken, — Rodney 
drew up an express account, which cannot be 
considered as adequate to his justification. In 
this he argued that, if he had pursued, the enemy, 
who " went off in a close connected body, might 



Rodney 245 

have defeated by rotation the ships that had 
come up with them, and thereby exposed the 
British fleet, after a victory, to a defeat." " They 
went off in a body of twenty-six ships-of-the- 
line, and might, by ordering two or three of their 
best-sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights 
at times, and by changing their course, have in- 
duced the British fleet to have followed them, 
while the main of their fleet, by hiding their 
lights, might have hauled their wind, have been 
far to windward before daylight, and intercepted 
the captured ships, and the most crippled ships of 
the English ; " and he even conceived that, as the 
main body of the British would at the same time 
have gone far to leeward, the French, regaining 
their own ports in Guadaloupe and Martinique, 
might have taken Antigua, Barbados, and Santa 
Lucia. 

The principal impression produced by this for- 
mal summary of reasons is that of unwisdom 
after the event, and that it was elicited by the 
remonstrances of Hood to himself, which are 
known to have voiced discontent prevalent in 
the fleet, and rendered some ready reply expe- 
dient. The substance of them, when analyzed, 
is that war must be rendered effective by not 
running risks, and that calculation to that effect 
is to be made by attributing every chance and 
advantage to the enemy, and none to one's self. 
Further, no account is to be taken of that most 
notable factor, ultimate risk, — as distinguished 



246 Types of Naval Officers 

from present risk. This phantasm, of the sudden 
assumption of the offensive by a beaten and dis- 
ordered fleet, which, through the capture of its 
chief, had changed commanders at nightfall, is 
as purely and mischievously imaginative as the 
fiction, upon which it rests, of the close con- 
nected body. Instead of being close-connected, 
the French were scattered hopelessly, utterly 
disabled for immediate, or even proximate, re- 
sistance to a well sustained chase and attack. 
During the next twenty-four hours their new ad- 
miral had with him but ten ships ; and only five 
joined in the following twelve days, to April 25th, 
when he reached Cap Fran9ois, where four more 
were found. Six others had strayed to Cura9ao, 
six hundred miles distant, whence they did not 
rejoin the flag until May. Neither in Rodney's 
surmises, nor in the actual facts of the case, is to 
be found any reasonable excuse for failure to ob- 
serve the evident military duty of keeping touch 
with the enemy during the dark hours, — " pur- 
sue under easy sail," to use Hood's words, " so as 
never to have lost sight of the enemy in the 
night," — with a view to resume the engagement 
next day, at farthest. This, and to regain to 
windward, were as feasible to the victor as to the 
vanquished. 

A truer explanation of this grave negligence is 
to be found in Rodney's more casual words re- 
corded by Hood. " I lamented to Sir George on 
the twelfth that the signal for a general chase 



Rodney 247 

was not made when that for the Hne was hauled 
down, and that he did not continue to pursue so 
as to keep sight of the enemy all night ; to which 
he only answered, ' Come, we have done very 
handsomely as it is.' I could therefore say no 
more upon the subject." He did, however, re- 
sume the subject with Sir Charles Douglas, the 
chief of staff. Douglas was of the same opinion 
as Hood, and for making the suggestion at the 
proper moment had been snubbed by Rodney, 
who had established over him a domination of 
manner which precluded proper insistence, or 
even due representation, such as became his ofhce. 
" His answer was, ' Sir George chose to pursue in 
a body; '" that is, in regular order, not by general 
chase. " ' Why, Sir Charles,' I replied, ' if that 
was Sir George's wish, could it have been more 
effectually complied with than by the signal for a 
general chase, with proper attention ? Because, if 
a ship is too wide on the starboard wing, you 
have a signal to make her steer more to port. If a 
ship is too wide on the larboard wing, you have a 
signal to make her steer more to starboard. If 
a ship is too far ahead, you can by signal make 
her shorten sail,' " etc. This by da3dight ; while, 
" ' if Sir George was unwilling his ships should en- 
gage in the night, there is a signal to call every 
ship in, and, that followed by the one for the 
form of sailing, the fleet might have gone on in 
sight of the enemy all night in the most compact 
and safe order for completing the business most 



248 Types of Naval Officers 

gloriously the next day.' Sir Charles walked off 
without saying another word." There was in 
fact nothing to say. Hood's methods were not 
only correct, but in no respect novel. Every 
capable officer was familiar with them before, as 
well as after the battle. The trouble was that 
Rodney was content with a present clear success, 
and averse from further risk. He had reached 
his limitations. It is known now that Douglas 
agreed with Hood, but he was too loyal to his 
chief to say so publicly, then or afterwards ; and 
especially, doubtless, to so irritable a talker. 

As illustrative of Rodney's professional charac- 
ter the events of April 8th to 12th are therefore 
unfavorable rather than the reverse. Concern- 
ing his stronger qualities their evidence is simply 
cumulative ; the new light thrown reveals defects, 
not unsuspected excellencies. The readiness in 
which his fleet was held at Santa Lucia, the 
promptness with which he followed, the general 
conduct of the chase as far as appears, though 
doubtless open to criticism in detail as in the ever 
censorious remarks of Hood, — all these show 
the same alert, accomplished, and diligent officer, 
resolute to the utmost of his natural and ac- 
quired faculties. It is the same after the battle 
joins, so long as its progress does not transcend 
his accepted ideas,— which were much in advance 
of the great mass of his contemporaries, —though 
under the conditions he saw no chance to apply 
the particular methods familiar to his thought. 



Rodney 249 

But when sudden opportunity offered, of a 
kind he had not anticipated, he is found unequal 
to it. Neither natural temper, nor acquired 
habit of mind, respond to the call. To pass 
through the French line, when the wind shifted, 
was an instigation too sudden and a risk too 
great for his own initiative. The balance of evi- 
dence shows that it was due to the suggestion, 
and even more to the pressure, of Sir Charles 
Douglas. Carried beyond his habitual submission 
by the impulse of a great thought, and unbur- 
dened by the ultimate responsibility which must 
remain with the admiral, the Captain of the Fleet 
not only urged lufHng through the enemy's line, but 
— so the story runs^ — in the excitement of the 
moment, and seeing the chance slipping past, 
even under the then sluggish breeze, he ordered 
the helm down. The admiral, thus faced, coun- 
termanded the order. A moment of silence fol- 
lowed, during which the two men stepped apart, 
the admiral even entering the cabin, which would 
be but a few paces from the wheel. Returning, 
he permitted Douglas to have his way ; an act 
which, whether done courteously or grudgingly, 
does not bespeak professional conviction, but 
the simple acceptance of another's will in place 
of one's own indecision. 

The incident is in entire keeping with the 
picture of Rodney's irresolution, and consequent 
uncertain course, drawn in successive touches by 
Hood in the hours and days succeeding the 



250 Types of Naval Officers 

victory. Events had called him to deeds beyond 
his limitations. Age of course counted for much; 
fatigue, after three days of doubtful chase and 
one of prolonged battle, for more ; but it may 
here be recalled that an older man, after a more 
wearisome and doubtful exposure, willed of his 
own motion to do what Rodney left undone. 
Sir Byam Martin has recorded,^ " After the battle 
of the ist of June, Lord Howe was quite ex- 
hausted, as well indeed he might, considering 
that they had been manoeuvring and fighting for 
three days. Although feeble in body, and so 
exhausted as to be obliged to sit down in a chair 
on deck, he expressed a wish to pursue the 
flying enemy ; but Sir Roger Curtis, the Cap- 
tain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff, as Douglas to 
Rodney) said, ' I vow to God, my lord, if you 
do they will turn the tables upon us.' This 
anecdote I had from the late Admiral Bowen, 
who was master of the Queen Charlotte and a 
party to the conversation." Under circumstances 
approaching similarity, — so far as North Atlantic 
fogs and weather resemble West India climate, 
— Howe was sixty-eight, Rodney sixty-three, at 
the moment of testing. The one lost the sup- 
port of the man — Curtis — upon whom he must 
chiefly rely for observation and execution; the 
other was urged in vain by the officer who held 
the same relation to him. Nelson once spoke 

1 Journals of Sir T. Byam Martin, Navy Records Society, vol. iii. 
P- 137. 



Rodney 251 

slightingly of " a Lord Howe's victory, take a 
part, and retire into port ; " as a trait of official 
character, however, Howe's purpose was far in 
advance of Rodney's, as this was viewed by 
Nelson's ideal admiral, Hood. It is now known, 
by a letter of Nelson's very recently published, 
that he held the same opinion of Rodney's remiss- 
ness in this instance, although he cordially recog- 
nized the general obligation of the country and 
the navy to that eminent seaman. Writing in 
1804 to his intimate friend Cornwallis, one of 
Rodney's captains, he used these words : " On 
the score of fighting, I believe, my dear friend, 
that you have had your full share, and in obtain- 
ing the greatest victory, if it had been followed 
up, that our country ever saw." ^ It was a clear 
case of spirit being brought into subjection to 
form. 

Rodney's professional career may be reckoned 
to have ended with his arrival at Jamaica on the 
29th of April. The change of ministry conse- 
quent upon Cornwallis's surrender brought into 
power his political opponents, and in May the 
new Admiralty superseded him. News of the 
victory reached England just too late to permit 
them to revoke the order ; his successor. Admiral 
Pigot, having already sailed. On the 2 2d of 
July Rodney left Jamaica, and on the 15th of 
September landed at Bristol. Although not so 

1 The Blockade of Brest, Navy Records Society. Introduction, 
p. xvi. Author's italics. 



252 Types of Naval Officers 

intended, his recall may be considered in line 
with his proverbial good fortune. He left his 
successor to grapple with difficulties, and with 
numbers, the continued existence of which was 
due chiefly to his own neglect after April 12th, 
and by the burden of which the conditions of 
peace were influenced adversely to Great Britain. 
To quote again Hood's apt comment, " Had Sir 
George Rodney's judgment, after the enemy had 
been so totally put to flight, bore any proportion 
to the high courage, zeal and exertion, shown 
by every captain, oflicer, and man under his com- 
mand in battle, all difliculty would now have 
been at an end. We might have done just as we 
pleased, instead of being at this hour (April 30th) 
upon the defensive." This is ultimate risk, 
which is entailed by exaggerated concern for 
immediate apparent security, and ends in sapping 
endurance. 

The auspicious moment at which the news of 
the battle reached England, and the surface 
brilliancy of the achievement, — especially the 
capture of the enemy's commander-in-chief, — 
diverted attention from any examination of pos- 
sible shortcomings. Rodney received a vote of 
thanks from Parliament, and was advanced to 
the peerage by the King. A pension of ^2,000 
per annum was also voted, additional doubtless 
to a similar sum granted after his destruction 
of Langara's squadron and relief of Gibraltar. 
Other rewards and recognition had already at- 



Rodney 2^2 

tended his naval career. He had been made a 
baronet in 1764, at the expiration of his first 
tenure of the Leeward Islands Station ; in 1 780 
the order of the Bath was bestowed upon him, 
— the distinction being enhanced by not await- 
ing a vacancy, but making him a supernu- 
merary member, — and in 1781, upon the death 
of Lord Hawke, he became Vice-Admiral of Great 
Britain, the highest professional honor in the 
service. 

After his return to England Rodney lived 
generally in retirement. His latter years were 
harassed by law suits, growing chiefly out of his 
proceedings at St. Eustatius, and the attendant 
expenses kept him poor. He died in May, 
1792, at the age of seventy-three. 



HOWE 

I726-I799 

THE name of Howe, albeit that of a stranger 
to the land, has a special claim upon the 
esteem and cordial remembrance of Americans. 
The elder brother of the subject of this sketch, 
during the few short months in which he was 
brought into close contact with the colonists of 
1758, before the unlucky campaign of Ticonder- 
oga, won from them not merely the trust inspired 
by his soldierly qualities and his genius for war, — 
the genius of sound common sense and solidity 
of character, — but got a deep hold upon their 
affections by the consideration and respect shown 
to them by him, traits to which they had been 
too little accustomed in the British officers of 
that day. Nor was this attitude on his part only 
a superficial disguise assumed by policy to secure 
a needed support. The shrewd, suspicious pro- 
vincials w^ould soon have penetrated a veil so thin, 
that covered only the usual supercilious arro- 
gance which they had heretofore encountered. 
Lord Howe, almost alone among his military 
contemporaries, warmly greeted them as fellow- 




Richard, Earl Howe. 



Howe 



^SS 



countrymen, men of no alien or degenerate blood. 
He admitted at once the value of their experi- 
ence, sought their advice, and profited by both; 
thus gaining, besides the material advantage of 
methods adapted to the difficulties before him, 
the adhesion of willing hearts that followed en- 
thusiastically, confident in their leader's wisdom, 
and glowing with the unaccustomed sense of 
being appreciated, of receiving recognition long 
withheld, but now at last ungrudgingly accorded. 
" The army felt him, from general to drummer 
boy. He was its soul ; and while breathing 
into it his own energy and ardor, he broke 
through the traditions of the service, and gave it 
new shapes to suit the time and place. . . . He 
made himself greatly beloved by the provincial 
officers, and he did what he could to break down 
the barriers between the colonial soldiers and the 
British regulars."^ 

In campaign. Lord Howe adopted the tried 
expedients of forest warfare, associating with 
himself its most practised exponents ; and on 
the morning of his death, in one of those petty 
skirmishes which have cut short the career of so 
many promising soldiers, he discussed the ques- 
tion of Ticonderoga and its approaches, lying on 
a bearskin beside the colonial ranger, John Stark, 
to whose energy, nineteen years later, was due 
the serious check that precipitated the ruin of 
Burgoyne's expedition. Endeared as he was to 

1 Parkman's "Montcalm and Wolfe," vol. ii. p. 90. 



256 Types of Naval Officers 

American soldiers by the ties of mutual labors 
and mutual perils gladly shared, and to all classes 
by genial bearing and social accomplishments, 
his untimely end was followed throughout the 
Northern colonies by a spontaneous outburst of 
sorrow, elicited not only by the anticipated fail- 
ure of the enterprise that hung upon his life, but 
also by a sense of personal regret and loss. Mass- 
achusetts perpetuated the memory of her grief 
by a tablet in Westminster Abbey, which hands 
down to our day " the affection her officers and 
soldiers bore to his command." 

Captain Richard Howe of the Royal Navy, 
afterwards Admiral and Earl, succeeded him in 
the Irish viscounty which had been bestowed 
upon their grandfather by William III. Of a 
temperament colder, at least in external manifes- 
tation, than that of his brother, the new Lord 
Howe was distinguished by the same fairness of 
mind, and by an equanimity to which perturba- 
tion and impulsive injustice were alike unknown. 
There seems to have been in his bearing some- 
thing of that stern, impassive gravity that marked 
Washington, and imposed a constraint upon by- 
standers ; but whatever apparent harshness there 
was in the face only concealed a genuine warmth 
of heart, which at times broke with an illumining 
smile through the mask that covered it, and was 
always ready to respond to the appeals of benev- 
olence. If, as an officer, he had a fault con- 
spicuously characteristic, it was a reluctance to 



Howe 257 

severity, a tendency to push indulgence to undue 
extremes, into which may perhaps have entered 
not merely leniency of disposition, but the weak- 
ness of loving popularity. To be called by the 
seamen, as Howe was, the " sailor's friend," is in 
the experience of navies a suspicious encomium, 
involving more of flattery to a man's foibles than 
of credit to his discretion and his judgment. But 
at the time when the quarrel between Great 
Britain and her colonies was fast becoming im- 
bittered, the same kindliness, coupled with a calm 
reasonableness of temper, ruled his feelings and 
guided his action. Although by political creed 
a moderate Tory, he had none of the wrong- 
headedness of the party zealot; and the growing 
alienation between those whom he, like his 
brother, regarded as of one family, caused only 
distress and an earnest desire to avert coming: 
evils. Influenced by these sentiments, he sought 
the acquaintance of Franklin, then in London as 
a commissioner from the colonies ; and the inter- 
views between them, while resultless by reason 
of the irreconcilable differences of opinion sever- 
ing the two parties to the dispute, convinced the 
wary American of the good will and open-minded- 
ness of the already distinguished British seaman. 
The same qualities doubtless suggested the selec- 
tion of Howe for the mission of conciliation to 
America, in 1776, where his associate was his 
younger brother, Sir William, in whom the 
family virtues had, by exaggeration, degenerated 

17 



258 Types of Naval Officers 

into an indolent good humor fatal to his military 
efficiency. The admiral, on the contrary, was 
not more remarkable for amiability and resolute 
personal courage than he was for sustained energy 
and untiring attention to duty, — traits which 
assured adequate naval direction, in case concili- 
ation should give place, as it did, to coercive 
measures. 

It is to be regretted that the methods, or the 
opportunities, of naval biographers and historians 
of the past century have preserved to us little, 
in personal detail and anecdote, of a period the 
peculiarities of which, if not exactly picturesque, 
were at least grotesque and amusing. The 
humor of Smollett has indeed drawn in broad 
caricature some of the salient features of the sea- 
man of his day, which was that of Howe's entrance 
into the navy ; and those who are familiar with 
the naval light literature based upon the times of 
Nelson can recognize in it characteristics so simi- 
lar, though evidently softened by advancing civ- 
ilization and increased contact with the world, as 
to vouch for the accuracy of the general impres- 
sion conveyed by the earlier novelist. It is, how- 
ever, correct only as a ^^;^^r<3;/ impression, in which, 
too, allowance must be made for the animus of 
an author who had grievances to exploit, and 
whose great aim was to amuse, even if exact 
truthfulness were sacrificed at the shrine of exag- 
gerated portrayal. Though not wholly without 
occasional gleams of light, shed here and there 



Howe 259 

by recorded incident and anecdote upon the 
strange life of the seamen of that period, the 
early personal experiences of individuals have 
had scant commemoration ; and with the excep- 
tion of St. Vincent, who fortunately had a gar- 
rulous biographer, we learn little of men like 
Hawke, Howe, Hood, and Keppel, until, already 
possessors of naval rank, they stand forth as 
actors in events rather historical than biograph- 
ical. 

Of Howe's first services, therefore, not much 
record remains except a bare summary of dates, 
— of promotions, and of ships to which he was 
attached, — until 1 755, the beginning of the Seven 
Years War, when he was already a post-captain. 
Born in 1726, he entered the navy in 1739, ^^ ^^^ 
outbreak of the war with Spain which initiated a 
forty years' struggle over colonies and colonial 
trade. With short intervals of peace, this contest 
was the prominent characteristic of the middle 
of the eighteenth century, and terminated in 
the conquest of Canada, the independence of the 
United States, and the establishment of British 
predominance in India and upon the ocean. This 
rupture of a quiet that had then endured a quar- 
ter of a century was so popular with the awak- 
ened intelligence of England, aroused at last to 
the imminent importance of her call to expansion 
by sea, that it was greeted by a general pealing 
of the bells, which drew from the reluctant prime 
minister, Walpole, that bitter gibe, "Ay, to-day 



aSo Types of Naval Officers 

they are ringing their bells, and to-morrow they 
will be wringing their hands." Howe embarked 
with Anson's squadron, celebrated for its suf- 
ferings, its persistence, and its achievements, to 
waste the Spanish colonies of the Pacific ; but 
the ship in which he had started was so racked 
in the attempt to double Cape Horn that she was 
forced to return to England. The young officer 
afterwards served actively in the West Indies and 
in home waters. On the ist of May, 1746, being 
then in command of a small sloop of war, he 
was severely wounded in action with a superior 
enemy's force off the coast of Scotland. A few 
days before that, on the loth of April, he had 
been promoted post-captain, being barely turned 
twenty. Thus early he was securely placed on 
the road to the highest honors of his profes- 
sion, which, however, were not to prove beyond 
the just claim of his already established personal 
merit. 

During the first thirty months of the Seven 
Years War, Howe was closely engaged with, 
and at times in command of, the naval part of 
combined expeditions of the army and navy, 
fitted out to harass the French coasts. The 
chief, though not the sole aim in these un- 
dertakings was to effect diversions in favor of 
Frederick the Great, then plunged in his desper- 
ate struggle with the allied forces of Russia, Aus- 
tria, and France. It was believed that the last 
would be compelled, for the defence of her own 



Howe 261 

shores against those raids, — desultory, it is true 
but yet uncertain as to the time and place where 
the attack would fall, — to withdraw a number of 
troops that would sensibly reduce the great odds 
then overbearing the Prussian king. It is more 
than doubtful whether this direction of British 
power, in partial, eccentric efforts, produced re- 
sults adequate to the means employed. In im- 
mediate injury to France they certainly failed, 
and it is questionable whether they materially 
helped Frederick ; but they made a brisk stir in 
the Channel ports, their operations were within 
easy reach of England in a day when news trav- 
elled slowly, and they drew the attention of the 
public and of London society in a degree wholly 
disproportionate to their importance relatively to 
the great issues of the war. Their failures, which 
exceeded their achievements, caused general scan- 
dal ; and their occasional triumphs aroused exag- 
gerated satisfaction at this earlier period, before 
the round of unbroken successes under the first 
Pitt had accustomed men, to use Walpole's lively 
phrase, to come to breakfast with the question, 
" What new victory is there this morning ? " 
The brilliant letter-writer's correspondence is full 
of the gossip arising from these usually paltry 
affairs; and throughout, whether in success or 
disaster, the name of Howe appears frequently, 
and always as the subject of praise. " Howe, 
brother of the lord of that name, was the third 
on the naval list. He was undaunted as a rock. 



262 Types of Naval Officers 

and as silent, the characteristics of his whole 
race. He and Wolfe soon contracted a friend- 
ship like the union of cannon and gunpowder." 
" Howe," he says in another place, "never made 
a friendship except at the mouth of a cannon." 
Of his professional merits, however, professional 
opinions will be more convincing. A Frenchman, 
who had acted as pilot of his ship, the Magna- 
nime, when going into action, was asked if it were 
possible to take a lighter vessel, the Burford, 
close to the walls of another fort farther in. 
" Yes," he replied, " but I should prefer to take 
the Magnanimer " But why ? " it was rejoined ; 
" for the Burford draws less water." " True," he 
said, ''mats le capitaine Howe est jeune et brave T 
Sir Edward Hawke, the most distinguished ad- 
miral of that generation, gave a yet higher com- 
mendation to the " young and brave " captain, 
who at this time served under his orders, — one 
that must cause a sigh of regretful desire to 
many a troubled superior. Several years later, 
when First Lord of the Admiralty, he nominated 
Howe, in October, 1770, to command a squadron 
destined to the Mediterranean, when hostilities 
with Spain were expected. The appointment was 
criticised on the ground that he was a junior 
admiral in the fleet, having been very recently 
promoted; but Hawke, doubtless mindful that 
the same objection had been made to him at a 
similar period of his career, answered, in the spirit 
of St. Vincent defending his choice of Nelson, 



Howe 262 

" I have tried Lord Howe on most important 
occasions. He never asked me kow he was to 
execute any service entrusted to his charge, but 
always went straight forward and did iC Some 
quaint instances are recorded of the taciturnity 
for which he was also noted. Amid the recrim- 
inations that followed the failure at Rochefort, 
Howe neither wrote nor said anything. At last 
the Admiralty asked why he had not expressed 
an opinion. In the somewhat ponderous style 
that marked his utterances, he replied, "With 
regard to the operations of the troops I was 
silent, as not being at that time well enough 
informed thereof, and to avoid the mention of 
any particulars that might prove not exactly 
agreeable to the truth." The next year, an army 
officer of rank, putting questions to him and 
receiving no answer, said, " Mr. Howe, don't you 
hear me ? I have asked you several questions." 
Howe answered curtly, " I don't like questions," 
— in which he was perhaps not peculiar. 

It was during the continuance of these petty 
descents upon the French coast, in 1758, that 
Howe was directed to receive on board, as mid- 
shipman, and for service in the fleet, the Duke 
of York, a grandson of the reigning monarch ; in 
connection with whom arose a saying that was 
long current, perhaps is still current, in the Brit- 
ish navy. The young lad of nineteen, before 
beginning his routine duties, held a reception on 
board Commodore Howe's ship, at which the 



264 Types of Naval Officers 

captains of the squadron were presented to him. 
The seamen, unpractised in ceremonial distinc- 
tions other than naval, saw with wonder that the 
midshipman kept on his hat, while the rest un- 
covered. " The young gentleman," whispered 
one, '' is n't over civil, as I thinks. Look if he 
don't keep his hat on before all the captains ! " 
" Why," another was heard to reply, " where 
should he learn manners, seeing as how he was 
never at sea before ? " 

It is likewise from this period of Howe's career 
that two of the rare personal anecdotes have 
been transmitted, illustrative of his coolness and 
self-possession under all circumstances of danger, 
as well as when under the enemy's fire ; one of 
them also touched with a bit of humor, — not a 
usual characteristic of his self-contained reticence. 
The service involved considerable danger, being 
close in with the enemy's coast, which was in- 
differently well known and subject to heavy gales 
of wind blowing dead on shore. On one such 
occasion his ship had anchored with two anchors 
ahead, and he had retired to his cabin, when the 
officer of the watch hurriedly entered, saying, 
"My lord, the anchors are coming home," — the 
common sea expression for their failure to grip 
the bottom, whereupon the ship of course drags 
toward the beach. " Coming home, are they ? " 
rejoined Howe. " I am sure they are very right. 
I don't know who would stay abroad on such a 
night, if he could help it." Yet another time he 



Howe 265 

was roused from sleep by a lieutenant in evident 
perturbation : " My lord, the ship is on fire close 
to the magazine; but don't be frightened; we 
shall get it under shortly." " Frightened, sir ! " 
said Howe. " What do you mean ? I never was 
frightened in my life." Then, looking the un- 
lucky officer in the face, he continued, " Pray, 
Mr. , how does a man/^^/ when he is fright- 
ened ? I need not ask how he /oo^s.'' 

The even, unaffected self-possession indicated 
by these anecdotes of the early prime of life 
remained with him to the end, as is shown by 
another incident collected by a biographer who 
knew many of his contemporaries. " When 
Howe was in command of the Channel Fleet, 
after a dark and boisterous night, in which the 
ships had been in some danger of running foul of 
each other. Lord Gardner, then the third in com- 
mand, the next day went on board the Quee7Z 
Charlotte and inquired of Lord Howe how he 
had slept, for that he himself had not been able 
to get any rest from anxiety of mind. Lord 
Howe said he had slept perfectly well, for as he 
had taken every possible precaution he could 
before dark, he laid himself down with a con- 
scious feeling that everything had been done, 
which it was in his power to do, for the safety 
of the ships, and the lives of those intrusted to 
his care, and this conviction set his mind at ease." 
The apprehensiveness with which Gardner was 
afflicted "is further exemplified by an anecdote 



266 Types of Naval Officers 

told by Admiral Sir James Whitshed, who com- 
manded the Alligator, next him in the line. 
Such was his anxiety, even in ordinary weather, 
that, though each ship carried three poop lan- 
terns, he always kept one burning in his cabin, 
and when he thought the Alligator ^2,'^ approach- 
ing too near he used to run out into the stern 
gallery with the lantern in his hand, waving it 
so as to be noticed." From Gardner's rank at 
the time, the conversation narrated must have 
occurred during the early years of the French 
Revolution, when Howe was over sixty-seven. 
As illustrative of character it is particularly 
interesting, for Gardner was not only a much 
younger man, but one whose gallantry and com- 
petence had been eminently proved as a captain 
in several hard fought battles, while as an admiral 
in chief command he later acquired considerable 
reputation as a tactician. 

Composure under suspense is chiefly a matter 
of temperament ; of the constitutional outfit with 
which Nature favors some, and does not others. 
It may be cultivated by its happy possessor ; but 
when wanting, the sufferer can supply its place 
only by laborious self-control, the tension of which 
by itself expends the energies it seeks to main- 
tain, and so imposes limitations of strength that 
are often insuperable obstacles to achievement, 
especially if prolonged. The strain of this en- 
durance is prominent among those borne by com- 
manders-in-chief, who can at no moment afford 



Howe 267 

to be lax, nor yet precipitate; and it increases 
with time at compound interest. Howe's native 
imperturbability was therefore one of the chief 
factors in his great professional powers, making 
possible the full exercise of all the others. By 
dint of it principally he reached the eminence 
which must be attributed to him as a general 
officer; for it underlay the full, continuous, and 
sustained play of the very marked faculties, per- 
sonal and professional, natural and acquired, 
which he had. It insured that they should be 
fully developed, and should not flag; for it 
preserved his full command over them by deliv- 
ering him from the factitious burdens of the 
imagination. 

This quality not only entered into his external 
professional life, but characterized the habitual 
temper of his mind. " He divested himself in a 
remarkable manner," says his biographer, "of 
every approach to a state of anger or resentment" 
— instancing herein, it may be noted, the improve- 
ment of a natural gift ; " and he carefully abstained 
from all irritating language, whether in speaking 
or writing. In the perusal of the four hundred 
letters and upwards that have been mentioned, 
embracing opinions of, and unreserved discus- 
sions upon, the merits or otherwise of many and 
various characters, of all classes of individuals, 
it did not fail forcibly to strike the reader of them, 
how invariably, with one single exception, he 
takes the good natured and favorable side of 



268 Types of Naval Officers 

every question. In the whole series, the harshest 
word employed is ' blockhead,' bestowed on his 
steward for not taking care of his ow7i interests." 

This equable frame of mind was thus a funda- 
mental trait in Howe, private as well as public, 
personal as well as professional ; not assumed for 
the moment, but constant in operation. He had 
none of the irritability attributed to genius, as 
also he gives no sign of its inspiration, — of 
originality. He is seen at his strongest in deal- 
ing stage by stage with difficult situations created 
for him, following step by step, and step by step 
checking, the lead of another; his action being 
elicited by successive circumstances, not deriving 
from some creative, far-reaching conception of his 
own. The temperament is one eminently prac- 
tical, capable on due opportunity of very great 
deeds, as Howe showed; for, having improved 
much native capacity by the constant cultivation 
of professional knowledge, and with the self-con- 
fidence which naturally springs from such acquisi- 
tion, he rose readily to the level of exertion 
demanded by any emergency not in excess of his 
abilities, and so long as the need lasted main- 
tained himself there easily, without consciousness 
of exhaustive effort, or apprehension of improb- 
able contingencies. " Never hasting, never rest- 
ing," might be safely affirmed of him. 

He is seen therefore at his best in a defensive 
campaign, such as that against D'Estaing in the 
summer of 1778, which in the writer's opinion 



Howe 269 

was his greatest achievement ; or again in a great 
deliberate operation like the relief of Gibraltar, 
— the one of his deeds most esteemed, it is said, 
by himself, — protracted over a month in its per- 
formance, and essentially defensive in character, 
not only because of the much superior fleet of 
the enemies, but because the adverse forces of 
nature and the obstinate incapacity of the cap- 
tains of supply ships had to be counteracted by 
unremitting watchfulness, foresight, and skill, 
dealing however with conditions determined for 
him, not imposed by his own initiative ; or, finally, 
in the chase and partial actions of May 28 and 
29, 1794, in which persistence, endurance, and 
aptitude are alike and equally displayed, assuring 
to him beyond dispute the credit of a great tac- 
tician. Accordingly, in direct consequence of 
what has been noted, it is as a tactician, and not 
as a strategist, that he can claim rank ; for what- 
ever may be the fundamental identity of principles 
in the military art, whether applied to strategy 
or to tactics, it in the end remains true that the 
tactician deals with circumstances immediately 
before him and essentially transient, while the 
strategist has to take wider views of more lasting 
conditions, and into them to introduce his own 
conceptions to be modifying factors. Creative 
thought and faculty of initiation are therefore 
more characteristic of the natural endowments of 
the born strategist. There is also more room for 
them in his work, because in the larger and more 



270 Types of Naval Officers 

complicated field there is greater elasticity and 
opportunity to effect new combinations, to con- 
trive which makes a greater call upon originative 
power. 

In the chain of eminent typical names which 
leads up to that of Nelson, there will be found 
between Howe and his next conspicuous suc- 
cessor, — conspicuous, that is, not only by merit, as 
was Hood, but by achievement, which was denied 
to Hood, — between Howe and Jervis, just that 
difference which essentially separates the tac- 
tician from the strategist : the lifting of the eye 
from the moves of the game immediately before 
one, to glance over the whole board, to view the 
wider field, and from its possibilities to form con- 
ceptions directive of immediate action for distant 
ends. In both these distinguished general offi- 
cers, — for such both were, — there is seen a 
similar close attention to details, based upon and 
guided by an acquaintance with their profession 
profound as well as extensive, minute as well as 
general ; in both the sam.e diligence and iron 
equanimity in difficult situations, although in 
Jervis the impression received is rather that of a 
burden borne with resolute fortitude, whereas in 
Howe the burden is thrown off by a placid, un- 
foreboding temper; but in the adoption of meas- 
ures, those of Howe will be found generally not to 
extend beyond the situation immediately before 
him, by which they are dictated, whereas Jervis 
seeks to bend circumstances to his will, according 



Howe 



271 



to a conception he has formed of what the situa- 
tion ought to be, and can be forced to become. 

The idiosyncrasy of either officer is emphasized 
in their respective plans of campaign, while com- 
manding the Channel Fleet during the French 
Revolution. Howe will maintain a certain sta- 
tion in port, keeping his fleet there in hand, 
well conditioned, and as far as may be well 
drilled ; then, when the French do something, he 
also will do something to counteract them. Jer- 
vis, on the contrary, confronting substantially the 
same conditions, frames his measures with a view 
to prevent the enemy from doing anything, and 
all the details of his plan rest upon this one idea, 
to the fulfilment of which they contribute. He 
puts the fleet at once into the position of action, 
instead of that of awaiting, as Howe does. Both 
are charged with the same duty, — the defence of 
Great Britain, — and by the same Government, 
which evidently in each case frames its instruc- 
tions upon the ascertained views of the eminent 
officer intrusted with the work. To carry out 
this defensive campaign, Howe of his own choice 
narrows his strategic plan to the sheer defensive, 
w^hich follows the initiative of the enemy ; Jervis 
of set purpose seeks the same object by offensive 
dispositions, by which the enemy is to be forced 
to regulate his movements. Howe sees the de- 
fence of the empire in the preservation of his 
own fleet ; Jervis in the destruction of the enemy. 
The one view is local, narrow, and negative ; the 



272 Types of Naval Officers 

other general, broad, and positive. As often hap- 
pens — and very naturally — Jervis's preoccupa- 
tion with considerations wider than his own com- 
mand found expression, twice at least, in phrases 
which pithily summed up his steadfast enduring 
habit of mind. On the morning of St. Vincent 
he was overheard to mutter, " A victory is very 
necessary to England at this time." The present 
odds to his own fleet, twenty-seven against fifteen, 
disappeared in the larger needs of the country. 
Again, when wrestling with the perplexities and 
exigencies of the wild Brest blockade in mid- 
winter, in January, 1801, he wrote concerning 
repairs to his own vessels, " Under the present 
impending storm from the north of Europe, and 
the necessity there is of equipping every ship in 
the royal ports that can swim, no ship under my 
command must have anything done to her at Ply- 
mouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this 
anchorage," — at Torbay, an open though partially 
sheltered roadstead. Here again is seen the sub- 
ordination of the particular and personal care to 
the broad considerations of a great strategic 
emergency. 

The series of diversions upon the French coast 
in which Howe was employed during 1758, ter- 
minated with that season, and he returned to his 
own ship, the Magnanime, rejoining with her the 
main fleet under Hawke in the great Brest block- 
ade of 1759. The French Government, after four 
years of disaster upon the continent, of naval 



Howe 273 

humiliation, and of loss of maritime and colonial 
power, had now realized that its worst evils and 
chief danger sprang from the sea power of Great 
Britain, and, like Napoleon a half-century later, 
determined to attempt an invasion. Its prepa- 
rations and Hawke's dispositions to counteract 
them, have been described in the life of that 
admiral, as have Rodney's bombardment of Havre 
and interception of coastwise communications; 
all directed to the same general end of confound- 
ing designs against England, but no longer as 
mere diversions in favor of Frederick. Howe 
was still a private captain, but he bore a charac- 
teristically conspicuous part in the stormy final 
scene at Quiberon, when Hawke drove Conflans 
before him to utter confusion. When the French 
fleet was sighted, the Magnanime had been sent 
ahead to make the land. She was thus in the 
lead in the headlong chase which ensued, and was 
among the first in action; at 3 p.m., by Howe's 
journal, the firing having begun at 2.30, according 
to Hawke's despatch. The foreyard being soon 
shot away, the consequent loss of manoeuvring 
power impeded her captain's designs in placing 
her, but she remained closely engaged throughout, 
compelling one French vessel to strike and anchor 
alongside her. The bad weather prevented tak- 
ing possession that night of the prize, w^hich, in 
consequence, availed herself of her liberty by 
running ashore, and so was lost to her captors. 
The Magna7iime was reported as having thirteen 

18 



274 Types of Naval Officers 

killed and sixty-six wounded, out of a total of 
hurt not much exceeding three hundred in the 
entire fleet. The casualty list proves exposure to 
fire, doubtless ; but is no sure test of the effective- 
ness of a vessel's action. The certainty of Howe's 
conduct in this affair, otherwise imperfecdy de- 
scribed, rests on a broader and firmer basis of 
reputation, won by unvarying efficiency in many 
differing capacities and circumstances. 

He continued to serve, but without further 
noteworthy incident, up to the peace made in the 
winter of 1762-63. From that time until the 
difficulties with the American colonies came to 
a head in 1775, he was not actively employed 
afloat, although continuously engaged upon pro- 
fessional matters, especially as a close student of 
naval tactics and its kindred subjects, to which 
he always gave sympathetic attention. During 
this period, also, he became a member of the 
House of Commons, and so continued until trans- 
ferred from the Irish peerage to that of Great 
Britain, in 1782. In 1770, at the age of forty- 
five, he became a rear-admiral, and, as has been 
already stated, received at once a proof of 
Hawke's high confidence, by being appointed to 
the command of the squadron destined for the 
Mediterranean, when hostilities concerning the 
Falkland Islands threatened with Spain ; a dis- 
pute chiefly memorable as the means of bringing 
into the navy both Nelson and Exmouth. In 
1775 he was promoted to vice-admiral, and in 



Howe 275 

February of the following year was appointed 
commander-in-chief of the North American sta- 
tion. Together with his military duties, he was, 
as has before been said, given powers, conjointly 
with his brother, to treat for the settlement of 
existing troubles. 

Although his habitual reticence restrained his 
sentiments from finding expression in positive 
words, there can be little doubt that the necessity 
of raising his hand against the Americans caused 
Howe keener regret than it did to many of his 
brother officers. He took instant occasion to 
address to Franklin a personal note, recalling 
their former association, and expressing an ear- 
nest hope that their friendship might contribute 
something to insure the success of his official 
mission. In the five years that had elapsed, how- 
ever, Franklin had been in the heat of the politi- 
cal struggle, and, philosopher though he was, 
he had not Howe's natural phlegm. Hence, his 
reply, while marked by respect and even formal 
cordiality toward the admiral himself, displayed a 
vivacity of resentment and a bitterness for w^hich 
the latter had scarcely looked. Still, his habitual 
equanimity was not ruffled, and he read the letter 
with the simple comment, " My old friend ex- 
presses himself very warmly." 

Howe's arrival antedated the signature of the 
Declaration of Independence by less than a 
week. During the period of attempted negotia- 
tion, while scrupulously faithful to his instructions, 



276 Types of Naval Officers 

he showed to his late fellow-countrymen all the 
courtesy and consideration that the most cor- 
dial esteem could extend. The incident of the 
official communication addressed by the Howes 
to Washington, in which they sought to evade 
giving him the title of " General," is sufficiently 
familiar; but it is more rarely recalled that, in 
verbal intercourse with American officers, the 
admiral habitually styled him "General Wash- 
ington," and sent complimentary messages to 
him as such. He even spoke of the colonies as 
"states," and at the same time dwelt with evident 
emotion upon the testimonials of respect and 
ajEfection which had been shown to his brother's 
memory by the colonists. 

To narrate Howe's share in the operations by 
which New York in 1776, and Philadelphia in 
1777, fell into the hands of the British, would be 
only to repeat well-known historical episodes, 
enlivened by few or no incidents personal to 
himself. In them the navy played a part at once 
subordinate and indispensable, as is the office of 
a foundation to its superstructure. The cause 
of the Americans was hopeless as long as their 
waters remained in the undisputed control of the 
enemy's ships ; and it was the attempt of Great 
Britain to cast aside this essential support, and 
to rely upon the army alone in a wild and intri- 
cate country, that led to her first great disaster, 
— Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga. Upon this, 
France at once recognized the independence of 



Howe 277 

the colonies, and their alliance with that king- 
dom followed. A French fleet of twelve ships-of- 
the-line under the Count D'Estaing, left Toulon 
April 15, 1778, for the American coast. This 
force far exceeded Howe's ; and it was no thanks 
to the British Government, but only to the ad- 
miral's sleepless vigilance and activity, seconded, 
as such qualities are apt to be, by at least an 
average degree of supineness on the part of his 
antagonist, that his scanty squadron was not 
surprised and overpowered in Delaware Bay, 
when Sir Henry Clinton evacuated Philadel- 
phia to retreat upon New York. Howe, who 
had the defects of his qualities, whose deliberate 
and almost stolid exterior evinced a phlegmatic 
composure of spirit which required the spur of 
imminent emergency to rouse it into vehement 
action, never in his long career appeared to 
greater advantage, nor achieved military results 
more truly brilliant, than at this time, and up to 
the abandonment of the attack on Rhode Island 
by the Americans under Sullivan, three months 
later. Then only, if ever, did he rise above the 
level of an accomplished and resolute general 
officer, and establish a claim to genius, of that 
order, however, which is not originative in char- 
acter, but signalized by an infinite capacity for 
taking pains ; and that not for a short time 
merely, but through a long, protracted period of 
strain. The display, nevertheless, does not as- 
sure him a place in the front rank of great com- 



278 Types of Naval Officers 

manders, whose actions find their source in the 
Hving impulse of their own creative energy ; for 
it is elicited by extreme circumstances alone, 
by obvious pressure, to which he must adapt 
himself. This he does with unfailing adequacy, 
indeed ; resolutely checkmating, but never initia- 
ting. Steady as a rock, like a rock, also, Howe 
only gave forth sparks under blows that would 
have broken weaker men. 

D'Estaing was twelve weeks in coming from 
Toulon to Cape May, but Howe knew nothing of 
his sailing until three weeks after he had started. 
Then orders were received to abandon Phila- 
delphia and concentrate upon New York. The 
naval forces were scattered, and had to be col- 
lected ; the suppKes of the army, except those 
needed for the march across Jersey, were to be 
embarked at Philadelphia, and the great train of 
transports and ships of war moved over a hundred 
miles down a difficult river, and thence to New 
York. Despite every effort, a loss of ten days 
was incurred, through calms, in the mere transit 
from Philadelphia to the sea ; but during this 
momentous crisis D'Estaing did not appear. 
Two days more sufficed to bring the fleet into 
New York Bay on June 29th; but yet the grave 
admiral, roused to the full tension of his great 
abilities, rested not. With a force little more 
than half that coming against him, he knew that 
all depended upon the rapidity with which his 
squadron took the imposing position he had in 



Howe 279 

mind. Still D'Estaing tarried, giving to his un- 
tiring enemy twelve more precious days, during 
which the army of Sir Henry Clinton, reaching 
Navesink beach the day after the fleet, was 
snatched by it from the hot pursuit of the disap- 
pointed Washington, and carried safely to New 
York. 

In the expected French squadron were eight 
ships of seventy-four guns or over, with three 
sixty-fours. To confront these, for the defence 
of the port, Howe disposed of six, none heavier 
than a sixty-four ; but they were ranged to com- 
mand the entrance of the harbor upon a tactical 
plan that evinced both a careful study of the 
ground and the resources of a thorough seaman. 
This instance alone, had Howe never done any- 
thing else, would have established his reputation 
as a tactician. The ships, placed in echelon, 
and enabled to turn their batteries in any direc- 
tion, by the provision of springs and adaptation 
to the tide conditions at the moment when 
alone attack would be possible, could concentrate 
their entire force of guns upon the enemy, rak- 
ing them as they advanced up channel ; while, if 
they succeeded in coming abreast, then also the 
broadsides would be turned upon them. When 
D'Estaing at last came, all was ready ; the en- 
ergy that had improved every fleeting moment 
then gave place to the imperturbable resolution 
which was Howe's greatest attribute, and against 
which, seconded by his careful preparation, sue- 



28o Types of Naval Officers 

cess could be won only by a desperate and san- 
guinary struggle. The attempt was not made. 
Ten days after arriving, the French admiral again 
put to sea, heading to the southward. By com- 
bined energy and skill Howe had won the first 
move in the game. Clinton's army and New 
York were saved. 

" The arrival of the French fleet," wrote Wash- 
ington a little later, " is a great and striking event ; 
but the operations of it have been injured by a 
number of unforeseen and unfavorable circum- 
stances, which have lessened the importance of 
its services to a great degree. The length of the 
passage, in the first instance, was a capital mis- 
fortune; for, had even one of common length 
taken place, Lord Howe, with the British ships 
of war and all the transports in the river Dela- 
ware, must inevitably have fallen ; and Sir Henry 
Clinton must have had better luck than is com- 
monly dispensed to men of his profession under 
such circumstances, if he and his troops had not 
shared at least the fate of Burgoyne." If this 
narration of events is so carefully worded as not 
to imply a censure upon D'Estaing, it none the 
less, however unintentionally, measures the great 
military merit of Lord Howe. 

Nor did this end his achievements. Two or 
three days after the French departed a small 
reinforcement from England reached New York, 
and in the course of a week Howe, who had not 
failed to keep touch with the enemy's fleet till it 



Howe 281 

was ninety miles at sea, heard that it had been 
seen again, heading for Narragansett Bay, then 
controlled by a British garrison on Rhode Island. 
This was in pursuance of a prearranged plan to 
support the American forces under General Sul- 
livan, which had already advanced against the 
place. Adapting anew his action to the circum- 
stances of the enemy's movements, Howe, though 
still much inferior, hurried to the spot, arriving 
and anchoring off Point Judith, at the entrance 
to Newport, on August 9th, the day after 
D'Estaing had run the fire of the British works 
and entered the harbor. With correct strategic 
judgment, with a flash of insight which did not 
usually distinguish him when an enemy was not 
in view, and contrary to his avowed policy when 
commander of the Channel Fleet, he saw that the 
true position for his squadron was in face of the 
hostile port, ready to act as circumstances might 
dictate. His mere presence blocked this opera- 
tion also. D'Estaing, either fearing that the 
British admiral might take the offensive and gain 
some unexpected advantage, or tempted by the 
apparent opportunity of crushing a small hostile 
division, put to sea the next day. Howe, far su- 
perior as a seaman to his antagonist, manoeuvred 
to avoid a battle with a force superior by a half 
to his own ; and this purpose was effected by his 
skilful management of his fleet, aided by his ad- 
versary's irresolution, notwithstanding that the 
unusual action of the wind thwarted his effort 



282 Types of Naval Officers 

to control the situation by gaining the weather 
eaee. Both the s^eneral manoeuvres, and the 
special dispositions made of his ships to meet 
the successive intentions of the enemy, as they 
became apparent, showed a mind fortified by pre- 
vious preparation as well as by the natural self- 
possession for which he was conspicuous. It was 
eminently a tactical triumph. 

A tremendous gale followed, scattered both 
fleets, and dismasted several of the French. 
D'Estaing appeared again off Rhode Island only 
to notify Sullivan that he could no longer aid 
him; and the latter, deprived of an indispensa- 
ble support, withdrew in confusion. The disap- 
pointment of the Americans showed itself by 
mobbing some French seamen in Boston, whither 
their fleet retired. "After the enterprise upon 
Rhode Island had been planned," continues Wash- 
ington, in the letter above quoted, " and was in 
the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with 
the British ships should interpose merely to cre- 
ate a diversion, and draw the French fleet from 
the island, was again unlucky, as the Count had 
not returned on the 17th to the island, though 
drawn from it on the loth; by which the whole 
was subjected to a miscarriage." What Wash- 
ington politicly calls bad luck was French bad 
management, provoked and baffled by Howe's ac- 
curate strategy, untiring energy, consummate sea- 
manship, and tactical proficiency. Clinton's army 
delivered, the forcing of New York frustrated, 



Howe 283 

Rhode Island and its garrison saved, by a squad- 
ron never more than two thirds of that opposed 
to it, were achievements to illustrate any career ; 
and the more so that they were effected by sheer 
scientific fencing, like some of Bonaparte's great- 
est feats, with little loss of blood. They form 
Howe's highest title to fame, and his only claim 
as a strategist. It will be observed, however, 
that the characteristic of his course throughout is 
untiring and adequate adaption to the exigencies 
of the situation, as momentarily determined by 
the opponent's movements. There is in it no 
single original step. Such, indeed, is commonly 
the case with a strictly defensive campaign by a 
decisively inferior force. It is only the rare men 
who solve such difficulties by unexpected excep- 
tional action. 

It is indicative of Howe's personal feelings 
about the colonial quarrel, during the two years 
in which he thus ably discharged his official 
duties, that both he and his brother determined 
to ask relief from their commands as soon as it 
appeared that all hopes of conciliation were over. 
The appointment of other commissioners has- 
tened their decision, and the permission to return 
was already in the admiral's hands when the 
news of D'Estaing's coming was received. Fight- 
ing a traditional foreign foe was a different thing 
from shedding the blood of men between whom 
and himself there was so much in common ; nor 
was Howe the man to dodge responsibility by 



284 Types of Naval Officers 

turning over an inferior force, threatened by such 
heavy odds, to a junior officer before the new com- 
mander-in-chief came. His resolution to remain 
was as happy for his renown as it was creditable 
to his character. After the brief campaign just 
sketched, true to his steady previous policy, he 
followed the French fleet to Newport when he 
heard of its reappearance there, and thence to 
Boston, coming off that port only three days after 
it ; but finding it now sheltered under shore bat- 
teries, impregnable to his still inferior numbers, 
and learning that it was in need of extensive 
repairs, he resigned the command in New York 
to a rear-admiral, and departed to Newport to meet 
his successor, Vice-Admiral Byron. Upon the 
latter's arrival he sailed for England, towards the 
end of September, 1778. General Howe had 
preceded him by four months. 

The two brothers went home with feelings 
of great resentment against the ministry. The 
course of the war had so far been unfortunate. 
The loss of Boston, the surrender of Burgoyne, 
the evacuation of Philadelphia, and finally the 
entrance of France into the contest, constituted a 
combination of mishaps which certainly implied 
fault somewhere. As usual, no one was willing 
to accept blame, and hot disputes, with injurious 
imputations, raged in Parliament. There is here, 
happily, no necessity for apportioning the re- 
sponsibility, except in the case of Lord Howe ; 
and as to him, it is reasonably clear that all was 



Howe 285 

done that could be up to the coming of the 
French, while it is incontestable that afterwards, 
with a force utterly inadequate, for which the 
Government was answerable, he had averted im- 
minent disaster by most masterly management. 
His words in the House of Commons were bitter. 
" He had been deceived into his command, and 
he was deceived while he retained it. Tired and 
disgusted, he had desired permission to resign it ; 
and he would have returned as soon as he obtained 
leave, but he could not think of doing so while a 
superior enemy remained in American seas ; that, 
as soon as that impediment was removed, he 
gladly embraced the first opportunity of return- 
ing to Europe. Such, and the recollection of 
what he had suffered, were his motives for resign- 
ing the command, and such for declining any 
future service so long as the present ministry 
remained in ofiBce." 

In terms like these could ofHcers holding seats 
in ParHament speak concerning the Government 
of the day. It was a period in w^hich not only 
did party feeling run high, but corruption was an 
almost avowed method of political management. 
The navy itself was split into factions by political 
bias and personal jealousies, and there was a say- 
ing that " if a naval officer were to be roasted, 
another officer could always be found to turn the 
spit." The head of the Admiralty, Lord Sand- 
wich, was a man of much ability, but also of 
profligate character, as well public as private. He 



286 Types of Naval Officers 

doubtless wished the success of his department, 
— under the terrible chances of war no chief can 
do otherwise, for the responsibility of failure must 
fall upon his own head ; but through corrupt 
administration the strength of the navy, upon the 
outbreak of war, had been unequal to the work it 
had to do. Some one must suffer for this remiss- 
ness, and who more naturally than the comman- 
der of a distant station, who confessed himself " no 
politician " ? Hence, Howe certainly thought, 
the neglect with which he had been treated. " It 
would not be prudent to trust the little reputation 
he had earned by forty years' service, his personal 
honor and everything else he held dear, in the 
hands of men who have neither the ability to act 
on their own judgment, nor the integrity and 
good sense to follow the advice of others who 
might know more of the matter." A year later, 
it was roundly charged that the Channel Fleet had 
been brought home at a most critical moment, 
losing an exceptional opportunity for striking the 
enemy, in order to affect the elections in a dock- 
yard town. Admiral Keppel considered that he 
had been sacrificed to party feeling ; and a very 
distinguished officer, Barrington, refused to take 
a fleet, although willing to serve as second, even 
under a junior. " Who," he wrote, " would trust 
himself in chief command with such a set of 
scoundrels as are now in office ? " Even a quar- 
ter of a century later. Earl St. Vincent gave to 
George HI. himself the same reason for declin- 



Howe 287 

ing employment. After eliciting from him an 
unfavorable opinion as to the discipline and effi- 
ciency of the Channel Fleet, the king asked, 
" Where such evils exist, does Lord St. Vincent 
feel justified in refusing his conspicuous ability 
to remedy them ? " " My life," replied the old 
seaman, "is at your Majesty's disposal, and at 
that of my country ; but my honour is in my own 
keeping, and I will not expose myself to the risk 
of losing it by the machinations of this ministry, 
under which I should hold command." To such 
feelings it was due that Howe, Keppel, and Bar- 
rington did not go to sea during the anxious 
three years that followed the return of the first. 
The illustrious Rodney, their only rival, but in 
himself a host, was the one distinguished naval 
chief who belonged heart and soul to the party 
with which Sandwich vi^as identified. 

Thus it happened that Rodney's period of 
activity during the war of the American Revolu- 
tion coincided substantially with that of Howe's 
retirement. The same change of administration, 
in the spring of 1782, that led to the recall of the 
older man, brought Howe again into service, to 
replace the mediocrities who for three campaigns 
had commanded the Channel Fleet, the mainstay 
of Great Britain's safety. Upon it depended not 
only the protection of the British Islands and of 
the trade routes converging upon them, but also 
the occasional revictualling of Gibraltar, now 
undergoing the third year of the famous siege. 



288 Types of Naval Officers 

Its operations extended to the North Sea, where 
the Dutch, now hostile, flanked the road to the 
Baltic, whence came the naval stores essential to 
the efficiency of the British fleet ; to the Bay of 
Biscay, intercepting the convoys despatched from 
France to her navies abroad ; and to the Chops 
of the Channel, where focussed the trade routes 
from East and West, and where more than once 
heavy losses had been inflicted upon British 
commerce by the allies. All these services 
received conspicuous and successful illustration 
during Howe's brief command, at the hands 
either of the commander-in-chief or of his sub- 
ordinates, among whom were the very dis- 
tinguished Barrington and Kempenfelt. Howe 
himself, with twenty- five sail-of-the-line, in July 
encountered an allied fleet of forty off Scilly. 
By an adroit tactical movement, very character- 
istic of his resolute and adequate presence of 
mind, he carried his ships between Scilly and 
Land's End by night, disappearing before morn- 
ing from the enemy's view. He thus succeeded 
in meeting to the westward a valuable Jamaica 
convoy, homeward bound, and taking it under 
his protection. The allies being afterwards 
driven south by a heavy gale, the vessels of war 
and trade slipped by and reached England safely. 
Thus does good luck often give its blessing to 
good management. 

To relieve Gibraltar, however, was the one 
really great task, commensurate to his abilities, 



Howe 289 

that devolved upon Howe during this short com- 
mand. In the summer of 1782, the Spaniards 
were completing ten heavy floating batteries, ex- 
pected to be impervious to shot and to combus- 
tion, and from an attack by which upon the sea 
front of the works decisive results were antici- 
pated. At the same time prolonged blockade by 
land and sea, supported by forty-nine allied ships- 
of-the-line anchored at Algeciras, the Spanish 
port on the opposite side of the Bay, was produc- 
ing its inevitable results, and the place was now 
in the last extremity for provisions and muni- 
tions of war. To oppose the hostile fleets and 
introduce the essential succors, to carry which 
required thirty-one sail of supply ships, Great 
'Britain could muster only thirty-four of-the-line, 
but to them were adjoined the superb professional 
abilities of Lord Howe, never fully evoked except 
when in sight of an enemy, as he here must act, 
with Barrington and Kempenfelt as seconds ; the 
one the pattern of the practical, experienced, 
division commander, tested on many occasions, 
the other an oflicer much of Howe's own stamp, 
and like him a diligent student and promoter of 
naval manoeuvres and naval signals, to the devel- 
opment of which both had greatly contributed. 
To the train of supply ships were added for con- 
voy a number of merchant vessels destined to 
different parts of the w^orld, so that the grand 
total which finally sailed on September nth was 
183. While this great body was gathering at 

19 



290 Types of Naval Officers 

Spithead, there occurred the celebrated incident 
of the oversetting of the Royal George at her 
anchors, on August 29th, 

" When Kempenfelt went down 
With twice four hundred men." 

Howe thus lost the man upon whom principally 
he must have relied for the more purely tac- 
tical development of the fleet, opportunity for 
which he anticipated in the necessarily slow and 
graduated progress of so large an assemblage. 

The occasion was indeed one that called for 
deliberation as well as for calculated audacity, 
both controlled by a composure and ability rarely 
conjoined to the same great extent as in Howe. 
Circumstances were more imminent than in the 
two previous reliefs by Rodney and Darby ; for 
the greatly superior numbers of the allies were 
now not in Cadiz, as before, but lying only four 
miles from the anchorage which the supply ves- 
sels must gain. True, certainly, that for these a 
certain portion of their path would be shielded by 
the guns of the fortress, but a much greater part 
would be wholly out of their range ; and the 
mere question of reaching his berth, a navi- 
gational problem complicated by uncertain winds, 
and by a very certain current sweeping in from 
the Atlantic, was extremely difficult for the mer- 
chant skipper of the day, a seaman rough and 
ready, but not always either skilful or heedful. 
The problem before Howe demanded therefore 



Howe 291 

the utmost of his seamanlike qualities and of his 
tactical capacity. 

The length of the passage speaks for the delib- 
erate caution of Howe's management, as his con- 
duct at the critical moment of approach, and 
during the yet more critical interval of accom- 
plishing the entrance of the supply ships, evinces 
the cool and masterful self-control which always 
assured the complete and sustained exertion 
of his great professional powers at a required 
instant. Thirty days were consumed in the voy- 
age from Spithead to Gibraltar, but no transport 
was dropped. Of the huge convoy even, it is 
narrated that after a heavy gale, just before reach- 
ing Cape Finisterre, the full tally of 183 was 
counted. After passing that cape, the traders 
probably parted for their several destinations, 
each body under a suitable escort. The stoppages 
for the rounding-up of straying or laggard vessels, 
or for re-establishing the observance of order 
which ever contributes to regulated movement, 
and through it to success, were not in this case 
time lost. The admiral made of them opportu- 
nities for exercising his ships-of-the-line in the 
new system of signals, and in the simple evolu- 
tions depending upon them, which underlie flexi- 
bility of action, and in the day of battle enable 
the fleet to respond to the purposes of its com- 
mander with reasonable precision, and in mutual 
support. 

Such drill was doubly necessary, for it not only 



2Q2 



Types of Naval Officers 



familiarized the intelligence of the captains with 
ideas too generally neglected by seamen until 
called upon to put them into practice, and 
revealed to them difficulties not realized until 
encountered, but also enforced recognition of 
the particular qualities of each vessel, upon the 
due observance of which substantial accuracy of 
manoeuvre depends. The experience gained dur- 
ing this cruise, going and returning, probably 
opened the eyes of many officers to unsuspected 
deficiencies in themselves, in handling a ship 
under the exigencies of fleet tactics. Howe cer- 
tainly was in this respect disappointed in his fol- 
lowers, but probably not greatly surprised. At 
the same time it is but fair to note that the 
service was performed throughout without any 
marked hitch traceable to want of general pro- 
fessional ability. A French writer has com- 
mented upon this. " There occurred none of 
those events, so frequent in the experiences of 
a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take 
a course wholly contrary to the end they have 
in view. It is impossible not to recall the 
unhappy incidents which, from the 9th to the 
12th of April, of this same year, befell the 
squadron of the Count De Grasse. If it is just 
to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest 
talent, it should be added that he had in his 
hands excellent instruments." 

On the loth of October the fleet and store- 
ships drew nigh the Straits of Gibraltar. On 



Howe 293 

that day it was rejoined by a frigate, which 
forty-eight hours before had been sent ahead to 
communicate the approach of the relief, and to 
concert action. She brought the cheering news 
of the victorious repulse by the British of the 
grand attack by sea and land upon September 
13th, with the entire destruction of the trusted 
floating batteries. Under this flush of national 
triumpli, and with a fair westerly wind, the great 
expedition entered the straits on October nth, 
in ranged order for action. The convoy went 
first, because, sailing before the wind, it was thus 
to leeward of the ships of war, in position to be 
immediately defended, if attacked. Two squad- 
rons of the fleet succeeded them, in line-of-battle 
ahead, formed thus for instant engagement, Howe 
leading in the Victory; while the third of the 
squadr^'ons followed in reserve, in an order not 
stated, but probably in a line abreast, sweeping 
a broader belt of sea, and more nearly under the 
eye of the Commander-in-chief, who, for the pur- 
poses of the present operation, had left his tradi- 
tional post in the centre. Howe's reasons for 
this change of position, if ever stated, have not 
come under the eyes of the writer; but analysis 
shows that he was there close to the storeships, 
whose safe entrance to the port was at once the 
main object of the enterprise and the one most 
critically uncertain of achievement, because of 
the general bad behavior of convoys. There he 
could control them more surely, and at the same 



294 Types of Naval Officers 

time by his own conduct indicate his general 
purposes to subordinates, who, however deficient 
in distinctly tactical proficiency, had the seaman- 
ship and the willingness adequately to support 
him. 

At 6 p. M. the supply ships were off the mouth 
of the bay, with the wind fair for their anchor- 
age ; but, although full and particular instruc- 
tions had been issued to them concerning cur- 
rents and other local conditions, all save four 
missed the entrance and were swept to the east- 
ward of the Rock. The fleet of course had to 
follow its charge, and by their failure a new task 
confronted Howe's professional abilities and en- 
durance. Fortunately he had an able adviser in 
the captain of the fleet, who had had long experi- 
ence of the locality, invaluable during the trying 
week that ensued. The allies had not yet stirred. 
To move near fifty sail-of-the-line in pursuit of an 
enemy, inferior indeed, but ranged for battle, and 
the precise moment of whose appearance could 
not have been foreseen, was no slight under- 
taking, as Nelson afterwards said. It may be 
recalled that before Trafalgar over twenty-four 
hours were needed for the allied thirty-three to 
get out of Cadiz Bay. On the 13th, however, 
the combined French and Spaniards sailed, intent 
primarily, it would seem, not on the true and 
vital offensive purpose of frustrating the relief, 
but upon the very secondary defensive object of 
preserving two of their own numbers, which in 



Howe 295 

a recent gale had been swept to the eastward. 
Thus trivially preoccupied, they practically neg- 
lected Howe, who on his part stripped for action 
by sending the supply vessels to the Zaffarine 
Islands, where the vagarious instincts of their 
captains would be controlled by an anchor on 
the bottom. On the 14th the allies bore north 
from the British, close under the Spanish coast, 
and visible only from the mastheads. On the 
15th the wind came east, and the convoy and 
fleet began cautiously to move towards Gibraltar, 
the enemy apparently out of sight, and certainly 
to the eastward. On the evening of the i6th 
eighteen supply ships were at the mole, and on 
the 1 8th all had arrived. Gibraltar was equipped 
for another year's endurance. 

We have less than could be wished of particu- 
lars touching this performance of Howe's, from 
the day of leaving England to that of fulfilment, 
five full weeks later. Inference and comment has 
to be built up upon incidents transmitted dis- 
connectedly, interpreted in connection with the 
usual known conditions and the relative stren2:th 
of the two opposing parties. To professional 
understanding, thus far supplemented, much is 
clear; quite enough, at the least, to avouch the 
deliberation, the steadiness, the professional apti- 
tude, the unremitting exertion that so well sup- 
plies the place of celerity, — never resting, if 
never hasting, — the calculated daring at fit 
moments, and above all the unfailing self-posses- 



296 Types of Naval Officers 

sion and self-reliance which at every instant up to 
the last secured to the British enterprise the full 
value of the other qualities possessed by the Com- 
mander-in-chief. A biographical notice of Howe 
cannot be complete without quoting the tribute 
of an accomplished officer belonging to one of the 
navies then arrayed against him. " The qualities 
displayed by Lord Howe during this short cam- 
paign," says Captain Chevalier of the French 
service, " rose to the full height of the mission 
which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of 
the finest in the War of American Independence, 
merits a praise equal to that of a victory. If the 
English fleet was favored by circumstances, — and 
it is rare that in such enterprises one can succeed 
without the aid of fortune, — it was above all the 
Commander-in-chief's quickness of perception, the 
accuracy of his judgment, and the rapidity of his 
decisions that assured success." 

Having accomplished his main object and 
landed besides fifteen hundred barrels of powder 
from his own ships, Howe tarried no longer. 
Like Nelson, at Gibraltar on his way to St. Vin- 
cent, he would not trifle with an easterly wind, 
without which he could not leave the Straits 
against the constant inset ; neither would he ad- 
venture action, against a force superior by a third, 
amid the currents that had caused him so trying 
an experience. There was, moreover, the im- 
portant strategic consideration that if the allied 
fleets, which were again in sight, followed him 



Howe 297 

out, they would thereby be drawn from any pos- 
sible molestation of the unloading of the supply 
ships, which had been attempted, though with 
no great success, on the occasion of the relief 
by Darby, in 1781. Howe therefore at once 
headed for the Atlantic. The allies pursued, 
and engaged partially on the afternoon and even- 
ing of October 20th ; but the attack was not 
pushed home, although they had the advantage of 
the wind and of numbers. On the 14th of Novem- 
ber the British fleet regained Spithead. It may 
be remarked that Admirals Barrington and Mill- 
bank both praised their captains very highly, for 
the maintenance of the order in their respective 
divisions during this action ; the former saying 
it " was the finest close connected line I ever 
saw during my service at sea." Howe, who held 
higher ideals, conceived through earnest and pro- 
longed study and reflection, was less well satis- 
fied. It seems, however, reasonable to infer that 
the assiduity of his efforts to promote tactical 
precision had realized at least a partial measure 
of success. 

Another long term of shore life now intervened, 
carrying the gallant admiral over the change- 
fraught years of failing powers from fifty-six to 
sixty-seven, at which age he was again called into 
service, in the course of which he was to perform 
the most celebrated, but, it may confidently be 
affirmed, not the most substantial, nor even the 
most brilliant, action of his career. During 



298 Types of Naval Officers 

much of this intermediate period, between 1783 
and 1788, Howe occupied the Cabinet position 
of First Lord of the Admiralty, the civil head 
and administrator of the Navy. Into the dis- 
charge of this office he carried the same quali- 
ties of assiduous attention to duty, and of close 
devotion to details of professional progress, which 
characterized him when afloat ; but, while far 
from devoid of importance, there is but little in 
this part of his story that needs mention as 
distinctive. Perhaps the most interesting in- 
cidents, seen in the light of afterwards, are that 
one of his earliest appointments to a ship was 
given to Nelson ; and that the cordiality of his 
reception at the end of the cruise is said to 
have removed from the hero an incipient but 
very strong disgust for the service. "You ask 
me," wrote the future admiral to his brother, 
"by what interest did I get a ship? I answer, 
having served with credit was my recommenda- 
tion to Lord Howe. Anything in reason that I 
can ask, I am sure of obtaining from his justice." 
At the outbreak of the French Revolution, 
Howe stood conspicuously at the head of the 
navy, distinguished at once for well-known pro- 
fessional accomplishments and for tried capacity 
in chief command. His rivals in renown among 
his contemporaries — Keppel, Barrington, and 
Rodney — had gone to their rest. Jervis, Dun- 
can, Nelson, Collingwood, and their compeers, 
had yet to show what was in them as general 



Howe 299 

officers. Lord Hood alone remained ; and he, 
although he had done deeds of great promise, 
had come to the front too late in the previous 
war for his reputation to rest upon sustained 
achievement as well as upon hopeful indication. 
The great commands were given to these two : 
Hood, the junior, going to the Mediterranean with 
twenty ships-of-the-line, Howe taking the Channel 
Fleet of somewhat superior numbers. 

The solid, deliberate, methodical qualities of 
the veteran admiral were better adapted to the 
more purely defensive role, forced upon Great 
Britain by the allied superiority in 1782, than to 
the continuous, vigilant, aggressive action de- 
manded by the new conditions with which he 
now had to deal, when the great conflagration of 
the Revolution was to be hemmed in and stamped 
out by the unyielding pressure and massive blows 
of the British sea power. The days of regulated, 
routine hostilities between rulers had passed 
away with the uprising of a people; the time 
foretold, when nation should rise against nation, 
was suddenly come with the crash of an ancient 
kingdom and of its social order. An admirable 
organizer and indefatigable driller of ships, though 
apparently a poor disciplinarian, Howe lacked 
the breadth of view, the clear intuitions, the 
alacrity of mind, brought to bear upon the problem 
by Jervis and Nelson, who, thus inspired, framed 
the sagacious plan to which, more than to any 
other one cause, was due the exhaustion alike 



300 Types of Naval Officers 

of the Revolutionary fury and of Napoleon's im- 
perial power. Keenly interested in the material 
efficiency of his ships, as well as in the precision 
with which they could perform necessary evolu- 
tions and maintain prescribed formations, he 
sought to attain these ends by long stays in port, 
varied by formal cruises devoted to secondary 
objects and to fleet tactics. For these reasons also 
he steadfastly refused to countenance the system of 
close-watching the enemy's ports, by the presence 
before each of a British force adequate to check 
each movement at its beginning. 

Thus nursing ships and men, Howe flattered 
himself he should insure the perfection of the in- 
strument which should be his stay in the hour of 
battle. Herein he ignored the fundamental truth, 
plainly perceived by his successor, St. Vincent, that 
the effectiveness of a military instrument consists 
more in the method of its use, and in the practised 
skill of the human element that wields it, than in 
the material perfection of the weapon itself. It 
may justly be urged on his behalf that the prepara- 
tion he sought should have been made, but was not, 
by the Government in the long years of peace. 
This is true; but yet the fact remains that he 
pursued his system by choice and conviction 
repeatedly affirmed ; that continuous instead of 
occasional cruising in the proper positions would 
better have reached the ends of drill ; and that to 
the material well being of his ships he sacrificed 
those correct military dispositions before the 



Howe 301 

enemy's ports, instituted and maintained by 
Hawke, and further developed and extended by 
Jervis, who at the same time preserved the effi- 
ciency of the vessels by increased energy and 
careful prevision of their wants. The brilliant 
victory of the ist of June has obscured the 
accompanying fact, that lamentable failure char- 
acterized the general strategic use of the Channel 
Fleet under Howe and his immediate successor. 

Once in sight of the enemy, however, the old 
man regained the fire of youth, and showed the 
attainments which long study and careful thought 
had added to his natural talent for war, enabling 
him to introduce distinct advances upon the tac- 
tical conceptions of his predecessors. The battle 
of June I, 1794, was brought about in the follow- 
ing manner. Political anarchy and a bad season 
had combined to ruin the French harvests in 
1793, and actual famine threatened the land. 
To obviate this, at least partially, the Government 
had bought in the United States a large quantity 
of breadstuff s, which were expected to arrive in 
May or June, borne by one hundred and eighty 
merchant vessels. To insure the safety of this 
valuable convoy, the Brest Fleet was sent to meet 
it at a designated point ; five ships going first, 
and twenty-five following a few days later. Robes- 
pierre's orders to the admiral, Villaret-Joyeuse, 
were to avoid battle, if possible, but at all hazards 
to secure the merchant fleet, or his head would 
answer for it. 



302 Types of Naval Officers 

About the same time, Howe, who had kept his 
vessels in port during the winter, sailed from the 
Channel with thirty-two ships-of-the-line. These 
he soon divided into two squadrons ; one of which, 
numbering six, after performing a specific service, 
was not ordered to rejoin the main body, but to 
cruise in a different spot. These ships were sadly 
missed on the day of battle, when they could have 
changed a brilliant into a crushing victory. Howe 
himself went to seek the French, instead of tak- 
ing a position where they must pass ; and after 
some running to and fro, in which the British 
actually got to the westward of their foes, and 
might well have missed them altogether, he was 
lucky enough, on the 28th of May, some four 
hundred miles west of the island of Ushant, to 
find the larger of their two detachments. This 
having been meanwhile joined by one ship 
from the smaller, both opponents now numbered 
twenty-six heavy vessels. 

The French were to windward, a position 
which gives the power of refusing or delaying 
decisive action. The average speed of any fieet, 
however, must fall below the best of some of the 
force opposed to it ; and Howe, wishing to com- 
pel battle, sent out six of his fastest and handiest 
ships. These were directed to concentrate their 
fire upon the enemy's rear, which, from the point 
of view of naval tactics, was the weakest part 
of a line-of-battle of sailing ships ; because, to 
aid it, vessels ahead must turn round and 



Howe 303 

change their formation, performing a regular 
evolution, whereas, if the van be assailed, the 
rear naturally advances to its help. If this partial 
attack crippled one or more of the French, the 
disabled ships would drift towards the British, 
where either they w^ould be captured, or their com- 
rades would be obliged to come to their rescue, 
hazarding the general engagement that Howe 
wanted. As it happened, the French had in the 
rear an immense ship of one hundred and ten 
guns, which beat off in detail the successive 
attacks of her smaller antagonists; but in so 
doing she received so much injury that she left 
the fleet after nightfall, passing the British un- 
molested, anxi went back to Brest. One of her 
assailants, also, had to return to England; but, 
as the relative force of the units thus clipped 
from the respective opponents was as three to two, 
the general result was a distinct material gain for 
Howe. It is to be scored to his credit as a tacti- 
cian that he let this single enemy go, rather than 
scatter his fleet and lose ground in trying to take 
her. He had a more important object. 

The next morning. May 29th, the French by 
poor seamanship had lost to leeward, and were 
consequently somewhat nearer. Both fleets were 
heading southeasterly, with the wind at south- 
southwest; both, consequently, on the starboard 
tack. Howe saw that, by tacking in succession, 
his column would so head that several of his ves- 
sels in passing could bring the hostile rear under 



304 Types of Naval Officers 

their guns, and that it was even possible that 
three or four might be cut off, unless reinforced ; 
to attempt which by the enemy would involve 
also tactical possibilities favorable to the Brit- 
ish. The necessary movement was ordered ; and 
the French admiral, seeing things in the same 
light, was justly so alarmed for the result that he 
turned his head ships, and after them his whole 
column in succession, to run down to help the 
rear. Judicious, and indeed necessary, as this 
was, it played right into Howe's hands, and was 
a tribute to his tactical skill, by which it was 
compelled ; for in doing this the French neces- 
sarily gave up much of their distance to wind- 
ward, and so hastened the collision they wished 
to avoid. Although the attack upon their rear 
was limited to a few desultory broadsides, the 
two fleets were at last nearly within cannon shot, 
whereas the day before they had been eight or 
ten miles apart. Both were now on the port tack, 
running west in parallel lines. 

Towards noon, Howe saw that the morning's 
opportunity of directing his whole column upon 
the enemy's rear again offered, but with a far 
better chance ; that if his ships manoeuvred well 
half a dozen of the French must be cut off, unless 
their admiral, to save them, repeated his previous 
manoeuvre of running down to their assistance, 
which would infallibly entail the general engage- 
ment sought by the British. The signal to tack 
in succession was again made, and to pass through 



Howe 305 

the enemy's line ; but here Howe's purpose was 
foiled, as Rodney's on April 17th, by the failure of 
his leading vessel. Her captain, like Carkett, 
was of considerable seniority, having commanded 
a ship-of-the-line under Howe at New York, in 
1778. His conduct during this brief campaign 
was so unfavorably noticed by his admiral that 
he asked a Court-Martial, w^hich dismissed him 
from his ship, though clearing him of cowardice. 
Upon the present occasion he for some time 
delayed obedience; and, when he did go about, 
wore instead of tacking, which lost ground and 
caused confusion by going to leeward. The 
second ship acted well, and struck the French 
column some distance from its rear, proving 
Howe right in judging that the enemy's order 
could there be pierced. As this vessel was not 
closely supported, she received such injuries 
from successive fires, that, when she at last 
found an opening through which to pass, she was 
unable to manoeuvre. 

Seeing that the van was failing him, Howe, 
whose flag-ship, the Quee7i Charlotte, was tenth 
from the head of his column, now took the lead 
himself, tacked his own vessel, though her turn 
was not yet come, and, accompanied by his next 
ahead and astern, — another striking instance of 
the inspiring influence of a high example, — 
stood straight for the hostile order. The three 
broke through astern of the sixth ship from the 
French rear, and cut off two of the enemy. 



3o6 Types of Naval Officers 

which were speedily surrounded by others of 
the British. Villaret-Joyeuse then repeated his 
former evolution, and nothing could have saved a 
general engagement except the disorder into which 
the British had fallen, and Howe's methodical 
abhorrence of attacks made in such confusion as 
prevailed. Moreover, the decisive result of this 
last brush was that the French entirely lost the 
windward position, and the British admiral knew 
that he now had them where they could not 
escape; he could afford to postpone the issue. 
Accordingly, fighting ceased for the day ; but 
the French had been so mauled that three more 
ships had to go into port, leaving them but 
twenty-two to the enemy's twenty-five. 

To appreciate Howe's personal merit as a 
tactician, reflection should be bestowed upon the 
particulars of his conduct on these two days, 
with which the First of June is not to be com- 
pared ; for in them culminated, so to speak, a 
long course of preparation in the study of tactical 
possibilities, and of the system of signals needed 
to insure necessary evolutions. His officers, as 
a body, do not appear to have deserved by their 
manoeuvring the encomium passed by Rodney 
upon his, during the long chase to windward in 
May, 1780; and, as Howe had now held com- 
mand for a year, this failure may probably be 
assigned to lack of that punctilious severity to 
which Rodney attributed his own success. But 
in the matter of personal acquirement Howe 



Howe 307 

shows a distinct advance upon Rodney's ideas, 
and methods. There is not to be noted in 
Rodney's actions any foreshadowing of the judi- 
cious attack upon the enemy's rear, on May 28th, 
by a smart flying squadron. This doubtless pre- 
sents some analogy to a general chase, but there 
is in it more of system and of regulated action ; 
in short, there is development. Again, although 
Rodney doubtless tacked in succession repeatedly, 
between May 9th and May 20th, in his efforts to 
reach the enemy to windward, there does not 
then appear, nor did there appear on either of 
the two occasions when he succeeded in striking 
their column from to leeward, any intention, such 
as Howe on the 29th communicated by signal 
and enforced by action, of breaking through the 
enemy's line even at the cost of breaking his 
own. Not even on April 12th had Rodney, as far 
as appears, any such formulated plan. There is 
here, therefore, distinct progress, in the nature of 
reflective and reasoned development ; for it is 
scarcely to be supposed that Howe's assiduity 
and close contact with the navy had failed to 
note, for future application, the incidents of 
Rodney's battles, which had been the subject 
of animated discussion and censure by eye- 
witnesses. 

It will be recognized that the conception in 
Howe's mind, maintained unchangeably and 
carried consistently into effect during these two 
days, was to attack continually, as opportunity 



3o8 Types of Naval Officers 

offered, the rear end of the enemy's column, which 
corresponds precisely with the attack upon the 
flank of a line of battle on shore. Merit does 
not depend upon result, but fortunate result 
should be noted for the encouragement and 
guidance of the future. In consequence of these 
sustained and judiciously directed movements, 
and of the steps found necessary by the French 
admiral because of injuries received, the enemy 
had lost from their line four ships, of which one 
was of one hundred and twenty guns, another of 
eighty ; while of those retained one had lost all her 
spars save the lower masts, and had thenceforth 
to be towed in action. Against this was to be 
set only one British seventy-four, disabled on the 
28th and returned to port ; their other damaged 
vessels refitted at sea and stayed with the fleet. 
On the other hand, Howe's separated division of 
six remained separated, whereas four fresh French 
ships joined their main fleet on the 30th. Admir- 
able tactics were thus neutralized by defective 
strategy; and therefore it may with substantial 
accuracy be said that Howe's professional qualities 
and defects were both signally illustrated in this, 
his last conspicuous service. 

The French admiral on the evening of the 
29th saw that he now must fight, and at a dis- 
advantage ; consequently, he could not hope to 
protect the convoy. As to save this was his 
prime object, the next best thing was to entice 
the British out of its path. With this view he 



Howe 309 

stood away to the northwest ; while a dense fog 
coming on both favored his design and prevented 
further encounter during the two ensuing days, 
throughout which Howe continued to pursue. 
In the evening of May 31st the weather cleared, 
and at daybreak the next morning the enemies 
were in position, ready for battle, two long 
columns of ships, heading west, the British twenty- 
five, the French again twenty-six through the 
junction of the four vessels mentioned. Howe 
now had cause to regret his absent six, and to 
ponder Nelson's wise saying, "Only numbers 
can annihilate." 

The time for manoeuvring was past. Able 
tactician as he personally was, and admirable as 
had been the direction of his efforts in the two 
days' fighting, Howe had been forced in them to 
realize two things, namely, that his captains were, 
singly, superior in seamanship, and their crews 
in gunnery, to the French ; and again, that in 
the ability to work together as a fleet the British 
were so deficient as to promise very imperfect re- 
sults, if he attempted any but the simplest forma- 
tion. To such, therefore, he resorted; falling back 
upon the old, unskilful, sledge-hammer fashion 
of the British navy. Arranging his ships in one 
long line, three miles from the enemy, he made 
them all go down together, each to attack a speci- 
fied opponent, coming into action as nearly as 
might be at the same instant. Thus the French, 
from the individual inferiority of the units of 



jio Types of Naval Officers 

their fleet, would be at all points overpowered. 
The issue justified the forecast ; but the manner 
of performance was curiously and happily marked 
by Howe's own peculiar phlegm. There was 
a long summer day ahead for fighting, and no 
need for hurry. The order was first accurately 
formed, and canvas reduced to proper propor- 
tions. Then the crews went to breakfast. After 
breakfast, the ships all headed for the hostile line, 
under short sail, the admiral keeping them in 
hand during the approach, as an infantry officer 
dresses his company. Hence the shock from end 
to end was so nearly simultaneous as to induce 
success unequalled in any engagement conducted 
on the same primitive plan. 

Picturesque as well as sublime, animating as 
well as solemn, on that bright Sunday morning, 
was this prelude to the stern game of war about 
to be played : the quiet summer sea stirred only 
by a breeze sufficient to cap with white the little 
waves that ruffled its surface ; the dark hulls 
gently rippling the water aside in their slow ad- 
vance, a ridge of foam curling on either side of 
the furrow ploughed by them in their onward way ; 
their massive sides broken by two, or at times 
three, rows of ports, whence, the tompions drawn, 
yawned the sullen lines of guns, behind which, un- 
seen, but easily realized by the instructed eye, 
clustered the groups of ready seamen who served 
each piece. Aloft swung leisurely to and fro the 
tall spars, which ordinarily, in so light a wind. 



Howe 311 

would be clad in canvas from deck to truck, 
but whose naked trimness now proclaimed the 
deadly purpose of that still approach. Upon the 
high poops, where floated the standard of either 
nation, gathered round each chief the little knot 
of officers through whom commands were issued 
and reports received, the nerves along which 
thrilled the impulses of the great organism, from 
its head, the admiral, through every member to 
the dark lowest decks, nearly awash, where, as 
farthest from the captain's own oversight, the 
senior lieutenants controlled the action of the 
ships' heaviest batteries. 

On board the Queen Charlotte, Lord Howe, 
whose burden of sixty-eight years had for four 
days found no rest save what he could snatch in 
an arm-chair, now, at the prospect of battle, " dis- 
played an animation," writes an eye-witness, " of 
which, at his age, and after such fatigue of body 
and mind, I had not thought him capable. He 
seemed to contemplate the result as one of un- 
bounded satisfaction." By his side stood his 
fleet-captain, Curtis, of whose service among the 
floating batteries, and during the siege of Gib- 
raltar, the governor of the fortress had said, " He 
is the man to whom the king is chiefly indebted 
for its security;" and Codrington, then a lieuten- 
ant, who afterwards commanded the allied fleets at 
Navarino. Five ships to the left, Collingwood, 
in the Barfleur, was making to the admiral whose 
flag she bore the remark that stirred Thackeray: 



312 Types of Naval Officers 

" Our wives are now about going to church, 
but we will ring about these Frenchmen's ears a 
peal which will drown their bells." The French 
officers, both admirals and captains, were mainly- 
unknown men, alike then and thereafter. The 
fierce flames of the Revolution had swept away 
the men of the old school, mostly aristocrats, 
and time had not yet brought forward the very 
few w^ho during the Napoleonic period showed 
marked capacity. The commander-in-chief, Vil- 
laret-Joyeuse, had three years before been a lieu- 
tenant. He had a high record for gallantry, but 
was without antecedents as a general officer. 
With him, on the poop of the Montague, which 
took her name from Robespierre's political sup- 
porters, stood that anomalous companion of the 
generals and admirals of the day, the Revolution- 
ary commissioner, Jean Bon Saint-Andre, about 
to learn by experience the practical working of 
the system he had advocated, to disregard all tests 
of ability save patriotism and courage, deprecia- 
ting practice and skill as unnecessary to the valor 
of the true Frenchman. 

As the British line drew near the French, 
Howe said to Curtis, " Prepare the signal for 
close action." " There is no such signal," replied 
Curtis. " No," said the admiral, " but there is 
one for closer action, and I only want that to be 
made in case of captains not doing their duty." 
Then closing a little signal book he always car- 
ried, he continued to those around him, " Now, 



Howe 313 

gentlemen, no more book, no more signals. I 
look to you to do the duty of the Queen Char- 
lotte in engaging the flag-ship. I don't want the 
ships to be bilge to bilge, but if you can lock the 
yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be 
the quicker decided." His purpose was to go 
through the French line, and fight the Montague 
on the far side. Some doubted their succeed- 
ing, but Howe overbore them. "That's right, 
my lord ! " cried Bowen, the sailing-master, who 
looked to the ship's steering. " The Charlotte 
will make room for herself." She pushed close 
under the French ship's stern, grazing her ensign, 
and raking her from stern to stem with a wither- 
ing fire, beneath which fell three hundred men. 
A length or two beyond lay the French Jacobin, 
Howe ordered the Charlotte to luff, and place 
herself between the two. " If we do," said Bowen, 
" we shall be on board one of them." " What is 
that to you, sir.? " asked Howe quickly. " Oh ! " 
muttered the master, not inaudibly. " D — n my 
eyes if I care, if you don't. I '11 go near enough 
to singe some of our whiskers." And then, see- 
ing by the Jacobins rudder that she was going 
off, he brought the Charlotte sharp round, her jib 
boom grazing the second Frenchman as her side 
had grazed the flag of the first. 

From this moment the battle raged furiously 
from end to end of the field for nearly an hour, 
— a wild scene of smoke and confusion, under 
cover of which many a fierce ship duel was 



J 14 Types of Naval Officers 



fought, while here and there men wandered, lost, 
in a maze of bewilderment that neutralized their 
better judgment. An Enghsh naval captain tells 
a service tradition of one who was so busy watch- 
ing the compass, to keep his position in the ranks, 
that he lost sight of his antagonist, and never 
again found him. Many a quaint incident passed, 
recorded or unrecorded, under that sulphurous 
canopy. A British ship, wholly dismasted, lay 
between two enemies, her captain desperately 
wounded. A murmur of surrender was some- 
where heard ; but as the first lieutenant checked 
it with firm authority, a cock flew upon the stump 
of a mast and crowed lustily. The exultant note 
found quick response in hearts not given to 
despair, and a burst of merriment, accompanied 
with three cheers, replied to the bird's triumphant 
scream. On board the Brunswick, in her struggle 
with the Vengeur, one of the longest and fiercest 
fights the sea has ever seen, the cocked hat was 
shot off the effigy of the Duke of Brunswick, 
which she bore as a figure-head. A deputation 
from the crew gravely requested the captain to 
allow the use of his spare chapeau, which was 
securely nailed on, and protected his grace's wig 
during the rest of the action. After this battle 
with the ships of the new republic, the partisans 
of monarchy noted with satisfaction that, among 
the many royal figures that surmounted the stems 
of the British fleet, not one lost his crown. Of a 
harum-scarum Irish captain are told two droll 



Howe 



3^5 



stories. After being hotly engaged for some time 
with a French ship, the fire of the latter slackened, 
and then ceased. He called to know if she had 
surrendered. The reply was, " No." " Then," 
shouted he, "d — n you, why don't you fire?" 
Having disposed of his special antagonist without 
losing his own spars, the same man kept along in 
search of new adventures, until he came to a 
British ship totally dismasted and otherwise 
badly damaged. She was commanded by a cap- 
tain of rigidly devout piety. " Well, Jemmy," 
hailed the Irishman, ''you are pretty well mauled; 
but never mind, Jemmy, whom the Lord loveth 
he chasteneth." 

The French have transmitted to us less of 
anecdote, nor is it easy to connect the thought of 
humor with those grimly earnest republicans 
and the days of the Terror. There is, indeed, 
something unintentionally funny in the remark 
of the commander of one of the captured ships to 
his captors. They had, it was true, dismasted 
half the French fleet, and had taken over a fourth ; 
yet he assured them it could not be considered a 
victory, " but merely a butchery, in which the 
British had shown neither science nor tactics." 
The one story, noble and enduring, that will ever 
be associated with the French on the ist of June 
is in full keeping with the temper of the times 
and the enthusiasm of the nation. The seventy- 
four-gun ship Vengeur, after a three hours' fight, 
yardarm to yardarm, with the British Brunswick, 



3i6 Types of Naval Officers 

was left in a sinking state by her antagonist, who 
was herself in no condition to help. In the con- 
fusion, the Vengeurs peril was for some time not 
observed ; and when it was, the British ships that 
came to her aid had time only to remove part of 
her survivors. In their report of the event the 
latter said : " Scarcely had the boats pulled clear 
of the sides, when the most frightful spectacle 
was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades 
who remained on board the Ve^igeur du Peuple, 
with hands raised to heaven, implored, with 
lamentable cries, the help for which they could no 
longer hope. Soon disappeared the ship and the 
unhappy victims it contained. In the midst of 
the horror with which this scene inspired us all, 
we could not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled 
with our grief. As we drew away, we heard some 
of our comrades still offering prayers for the 
welfare of their country. The last cries of these 
unfortunates were, ' Vive la Republique ! ' They 
died uttering them." Over a hundred Frenchmen 
thus went down. 

Seven French ships were captured, including 
the sunk Vengeur. Five more were wholly dis- 
masted, but escaped, — a good fortune mainly to 
be attributed to Howe's utter physical prostration, 
due to his advanced years and the continuous 
strain of the past five days. He now went to 
bed, completely worn out. "We all got round 
him," wrote an officer. Lieutenant Codrington, 
who was present; "indeed, I saved him from a 



Howe 317 

tumble, he was so weak that from a roll of the ship 
he was nearly falling into the waist. ' Why, you 
hold me up as if I were a child,' he said good- 
humoredly." Had he been younger, there can be 
little doubt that the fruits of victory would have 
been gathered with an ardor which his assistant, 
Curtis, failed to show. The fullest proof of this 
is the anecdpte, already quoted in the sketch of 
Rodney,^ which has been transmitted by Admiral 
Sir Byam Martin direct from the sailing-master 
of the Queen Charlotte, afterwards Admiral 
Bowen ; but his account is abundantly confirmed 
by other officers, eye and ear witnesses. Taken 
in connection with these, Codrington's story of his 
physical weakness bears the note, not of pathos 
only, but of encouragement ; for the whole testifies 
assuredly to the persistence, through great bodily 
debility, of a strong quality diligently cultivated 
in the days of health and vigor. In truth, it 
was impossible for Howe to purpose otherwise. 
Having been continuously what he was in his 
prime, it could not be that he would not intend, 
with all the force of his will, to persevere to the 
utmost in the duty before him. The faithfulness 
of a life-time does not so forsake a man in his 
end. What he lacked in that critical hour was 
not the willing mind, but the instrument by which 
to communicate to the fleet the impulse which 
his own failing powers were no longer able directly 
to impart. 

1 Ante, p, 250. 



ji8 Types of Naval Officers 

Lord Howe's career practically ended with this 
battle and the honors that followed it. Infirm- 
ities then gained rapidly upon him, and it would 
have been well had his own wish to retire been 
granted by the Government. He remained in 
nominal command of the Channel Fleet, though 
not going to sea, until the occurrence of the great 
mutinies of 1797. The suppression — or, more 
properly, the composing — of this ominous out- 
break was devolved upon him by the ministry. 
He very wisely observed that " preventive meas- 
ures rather than corrective are to be preferred 
for preserving discipHne in fleets and armies;" 
but it was in truth his own failure to use such 
timely remedies, owing to the lethargy of increas- 
ing years, acting upon a temperament naturally 
indulgent and unapprehensive, that was largely 
responsible for disorders of whose imminence he 
had warning. From the military standpoint, the 
process of settlement had much the air of opera 
bouffe, — a consummation probably inevitable 
when just grievances and undeniable hardships 
get no attention until the sufferers break through 
all rules, and seek redress by force. The mutinous 
seamen protested to Howe the bitterness of their 
sorrow at the sense of wTong doing, but in the 
same breath insisted that their demands must be 
conceded, and that certain obnoxious officers must 
be removed from their ships. The demands were 
yielded, Howe gently explaining to the men how 
naughty they had been ; and that, as to the 



Howe 



319 



unpopular officers, they themselves asked relief 
from so unpleasant a situation. In his curiously 
involved style, he wrote : " This request has been 
complied with, under the pretext of an equal 
desire on the part of the officers not to be 
employed in ships where exception, without 
specification of facts, has been taken to their 
conduct. However ineligible the concession, it 
was become indispensably necessary." Under 
this thin veil, men persuaded themselves that 
appearances were saved, as a woman hides a smile 
behind her fan. Admiral Codrington, a firm 
admirer of Howe, justly said : " It was want of 
discipline which led to the discontent and mutiny 
in the Channel Fleet. Lord Howe got rid of the 
mutiny by granting the men all they asked ; but 
discipline was not restored until the ships most 
remarkable for misconduct had been, one after 
the other, placed under the command of Lord St. 
Vincent." 

With the settlement of this mutiny Lord 
Howe's long career of active service closed. 
Immediately afterwards he retired formally, as 
he sometime before had actually, from the com- 
mand of the Channel Fleet, and on the 5th of 
August, 1799, he died full of years and honors; 
having lived just long enough to welcome the ris- 
ing star of Nelson's glory as it burst upon men's 
sight at Cape St. Vincent and the Nile. 



J ERVIS 

1735-1823 

THE renown of Nelson is part of the her- 
itage of the world. His deeds, although 
their full scope and real significance have been 
but little understood, stand out conspicuous 
among a host of lesser achievements, and are 
become to mankind the symbol of Great Britain's 
maritime power in that tremendous era when it 
drove the French Revolution back upon itself, 
stifling its excesses, and so insuring the survival 
of the beneficent tendencies which for a time 
seemed well nigh lost in the madness of the 
nation. 

The appearance of a prodigy like Nelson, how- 
ever, is not an isolated event, independent of 
antecedents. It is the result of a happy meeting 
of genius and opportunity. The hour has come, 
and the man. Other men have labored, and the 
hero enters into their labors ; not unjustly, for 
thereto he also has been appointed by those 
special gifts which fit him to reap as theirs fitted 
them to sow. In relation to Nelson and his 
career, the illustrious officer whose most distin- 



John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent. 



Jervis 321 

guishing characteristics we have now to trace 
stood pre-eminent among many forerunners. It 
was he, above all others, who made the prepara- 
tion indispensable to the approaching triumphal 
progress of the first of British naval heroes, so 
that his own work underlies that of his successor, 
as foundation supports superstructure. There is 
not between them the vital connection of root to 
branch, of plant to fruit. In the matter of pro- 
fessional kinship Nelson has far more in common 
with Hood. Between these there is an identity 
of kind, an orderly sequence of development, an 
organic bond, such as knits together the series 
of a progressive evolution. It is not so with 
Jervis. Closely conjoined as the two men long 
were in a common service, and in mutual admira- 
tion and sympathy, it would be an error to think 
of the elder as in any sense the professional pro- 
genitor of the younger ; yet he was, as it were, an 
adoptive father, who from the first fostered, and 
to the last gloried in, the genius which he con- 
fessed unparalleled. " It does not become me to 
make comparisons," he wrote after Copenhagen ; 
*'all agree that there is but one Nelson." And 
when the great admiral had been ten years in his 
grave, he said of an officer's gallant conduct at 
the Battle of Algiers, " He seems to have felt 
Lord Nelson's eye upon him;" as though no 
stronger motive could be felt nor higher praise 
given. 

John Jervis was born on the 20th of January, 



322 Types of Naval Officers 

1735, at Meaford, in Staffordshire. He was in- 
tended for his father's profession, the law ; but, 
by his own account, a disinclination which was 
probably natural became invincible through the 
advice of the family coachman. " Don't be a 
lawyer, Master Jacky," said the old man ; " all 
lawyers are rogues." Some time later, his father 
receiving the appointment of auditor to Green- 
wich Hospital, the family removed to the neigh- 
borhood of London ; and there young Jervis, 
being thrown in contact with ships and seamen, 
and particularly with a midshipman of his own 
age, became confirmed in his wish to go to sea. 
Failing to get his parents' consent, he ran away 
towards the close of the year 1747. From this 
escapade he was brought back; but his father, 
seeing the uselessness of forcing the lad's incli- 
nations, finally acquiesced, though it seems likely, 
from his after conduct, that it was long before 
he became thoroughly reconciled to the dis- 
appointment. 

In January, 1748, the future admiral and peer 
first went afloat in a ship bound to the West 
Indies. The time was inauspicious for one mak- 
ing the navy his profession. The war of the 
Austrian succession had just been brought to an 
end by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the 
monotonous discomfort of hard cruising, unre- 
lieved by the excitements of battle or the flush of 
prize-taking, was the sole prospect of one whose 
narrow means debarred him from such pleas- 



Jervis 323 

ures as the station afforded and youth naturally 
prompted him to seek. His pay was little over 
twenty pounds a year, and his father had not 
felt able to give more than that sum towards 
his original outfit. After being three years on 
board, practising a rigid economy scarcely to be 
expected in one of his years, the lad of sixteen 
drew a bill upon home for twenty pounds more. 
It came back dishonored. The latent force of his 
character was at once aroused. To discharge 
the debt, he disposed of his pay tickets at a heavy 
discount ; sold his bed, and for three years slept 
on the deck ; left the mess to which he belonged, 
livinor forward on the allowance of a seaman, and 
making, mending, and washing his own clothes, 
to save expense. Doubt has been expressed as 
to the reality of these early privations, on the 
ground that his father's ofifice at Greenwich, and 
the subsequent promotions of the young officer, 
show the existence of a family influence, which 
would have counteracted such extreme restriction 
in money matters. The particulars, however, 
have been so transmitted as to entitle them to 
acceptance, unless contradicted by something 
more positive than circumstantial inference from 
other conditions, not necessarily contradictory. 

This sharp experience was singularly adapted 
to develop and exaggerate his natural character- 
istics, self-reliance, self-control, stern determina- 
tion, and, it must be added, the exacting harshness 
which demanded of others all that he had himself 



J 24 Types of Naval Officers 

accepted. His experience of suffering and depri- 
vation served, not to enlarge his indulgence, but 
to intensify his severity. Yet it may be remarked 
that Jervis was at all periods in thorough touch 
with distinctively naval feeling, sympathizing 
with and respecting its sensibilities, sharing its 
prejudices, as well as comprehending its weak- 
nesses. Herein he differed from Rodney, who in 
the matter of community of sentiment stood 
habitually external to his profession ; in it, but in 
heart not of it ; belonging consciously and wil- 
lingly to a social class which cherished other 
ideals of life and action. His familiarity with the 
service quickened him to criticise more keenly 
and accurately than a stranger, to recognize fail- 
ings with harsher condemnation ; but there ap- 
pears no disposition to identify himself with it 
further than as an instrument of personal advance- 
ment and distinction. 

Upon Jervis's naval future, the results of his 
early ordeal were wholly good. Unable to pur- 
sue pleasure ashore, he stuck to sea-going ships ; 
and the energies of a singularly resolute mind 
were devoted to mastering all the details of his 
profession. After six years in the Caribbean, 
he returned to England in the autumn of 1754. 
The troubles between France and Great Britain 
which issued in the Seven Years War had al- 
ready begun, and Jervis, whose merit commanded 
immediate recognition from those under whom 
he served, found family influence to insure his 



Jervis 325 

speedy promotion and employment. Being made 
lieutenant early in 1755, he was with Boscawen 
off the Gulf of St. Lawrence when that admiral, 
although peace yet reigned, was ordered to seize 
the French fleet bearing reinforcements to Que- 
bec. At the same time, Braddock's unfortunate 
expedition was miscarrying in the forests of 
Pittsburg. A year later, in 1756, Jervis went to 
the Mediterranean with Admiral Hawke, sent to 
relieve Byng after the fiasco at Minorca which 
brought that unhappy commander to trial and to 
death. 

Before and during this Mediterranean cruise 
Jervis had been closely associated with Sir 
Charles Saunders, one of the most distinguished 
admirals of that generation, upon whom he made 
so favorable an impression that he was chosen 
for first lieutenant of the flag-ship, when Saun- 
ders, in 1758, was named to command the fleet to 
act against Quebec. The gallant and romantic 
General Wolfe, whose death in the hour of vic- 
tory saddened the triumph of the conquerors, 
embarked in the same ship ; and the long pas- 
sage favored the growth of a close personal inti- 
macy between the two young men, who had been 
at school together as boys, although the soldier 
was several years older than the sailor. The 
relations thus formed and the confidences ex- 
changed are shown by a touching incident re- 
corded by Jervis's biographer. On the night 
before the battle on the Heights of Abraham, 



326 Types of Naval Officers 

Wolfe went on board the Porcupine, a small sloop 
of war to whose command Jervis had meanwhile 
been promoted, and asked to see him in private. 
He then said that he was strongly impressed with 
the feeling that he should fall on the morrow, and 
therefore wished to entrust to his friend the mini- 
ature of the lady. Miss Lowther, to whom he was 
engaged, and to have from him the promise that, 
if the foreboding proved true, he would in person 
deliver to her both the portrait and Wolfe's own 
last messages. From the interview the young 
general departed to achieve his enterprise, to 
which daring action, brilliant success, and heroic 
death have given a lustre that time itself has not 
been able to dim, whose laurels remain green to 
our own day ; while Jervis, to whose old age was 
reserved the glory that his comrade reaped in 
youth, remained behind to discharge his last 
request, — a painful duty which, upon returning 
to England, was scrupulously fulfilled. 

Although the operations against Quebec de- 
pended wholly upon the control of the water by 
the navy, its influence, as often happens, was so 
quietly exerted as to draw no attention from the 
general eye, dazzled by the conspicuous splendor 
of Wolfe's conduct. To Jervis had been assigned 
the distinofuished honor of leadins: the fleet with 
his little ship, in the advance up river against the 
fortifications of the place ; and it is interesting to 
note that in this duty he was joined with the 
afterwards celebrated explorer, James Cook, who, 



Jervis 327 

as master of the fleet, had special charge of the 
pilotage in those untried waters. Wolfe, Cook, 
and Jervis form a striking trio of names, then 
unknown, yet closely associated, afterwards to be 
widely though diversely renowned. 

When the city fell. Commander Jervis was sent 
to England, probably with despatches. There he 
was at once given a ship, and ordered to return 
with her to North America. Upon her proving 
leaky, he put in to Plymouth, where, as his mission 
was urgent, he was directed to take charge of a 
sloop named the Albany, then lying at anchor 
near by, and to proceed in her. To this moment 
has been attributed an incident which, as regards 
time and place, has been more successfully im- 
peached than the story of his early privations, in 
that no mention of it is found in the ship's log ; 
and there are other discrepancies which need 
reconcilement. Nevertheless it is, as told, so 
entirely characteristic, that the present writer 
has no doubt it occurred, at some time, substan- 
tially as given by his biographer, who was son to 
a secretary long in close relations with him when 
admiral. It would be entirely in keeping with all 
experience of testimony that the old man's recol- 
lections, or those of his secretary, may have gone 
astray on minor circumstances, while preserving 
accurately the fundamental and only really im- 
portant facts, which are perfectly consistent with, 
and illustrative of, the stern decision afterwards 
shown in meeting and suppressing mutiny of the 



328 Types of Naval Officers 

most threatening description. The crew of the 
Albany, it is said, from some motives of discontent 
refused to sail. Jervis had brought with him a few 
seamen from his late command. These he ordered 
to cut the cables which held the ship to her 
anchors, and to loose the foresail. Daunted 
more, perhaps, by the bearing of the man than 
by the mere acts, the mutineers submitted, and 
in twenty-four days, an extraordinarily short pas- 
sage for that time, the Albany was at New York. 
Here Jervis was unfortunately delayed, and 
thus, being prevented from rejoining Sir Charles 
Saunders, lost the promotion which a British 
commander-in-chief could then give to an officer 
in his own command who had merited his pro- 
fessional approval. It was not until October, 
1 761, when he was twenty-six, that Jervis obtained 
" post " rank, — the rank, that is, of full, or post, 
captain. By the rule of the British navy, an 
officer up to that rank could be advanced by 
selection ; thenceforth he waited, through the 
long succession of seniority, for his admiral's 
commission. This Jervis did not receive until 
1787, when he was fifty-two. 

It was as a general officer, as an admiral com- 
manding great fleets and bearing responsibilities 
unusually grave through a most critical period of 
his country's history, that Jervis made his high 
and deserved reputation. For this reason, the 
intervening years, though pregnant with the fin- 
ished character and distinguished capacity which 



Jervis 329 

fitted him for his onerous work, and though by 
no means devoid of incident, must be hastily 
sketched. The Treaty of Paris, which in 1763 
closed the Seven Years War, was followed by 
twelve years of peace. Then came the American 
Revolution, bringing in its train hostilities with 
France and Spain. During the peace, Jervis for 
nearly four years commanded a frigate in the 
Mediterranean. It is told that while his ship 
was at Genoa two Turkish slaves escaped from a 
Genoese galley, and took refuge in a British boat 
lying at the mole, wrapping its flag round their 
persons. Genoese officers took them forcibly 
from the boat and restored them to their chains. 
Jervis resented this, as being not only an insult 
to the British flag, but also an enforcement of 
slavery against men under its protection ; and so 
peremptory was his tone that an apology was made, 
the two captives were given up on the frigate's 
quarter-deck, and the offending officers punished. 
The captain's action, however, was not sustained 
by his own government. It is curious to note 
that, notwithstanding his course in this case, 
and although he was not merely nominally, but 
strenuously, a Whig, or Liberal, in political faith, 
connected by party ties with Fox and his coterie of 
friends, Jervis was always opposed to the abolition 
of the slave trade and to the education of the lower 
orders. Liberty was to him an inherited worship, 
associated with certain stock beliefs and phrases, 
but subordination was the true idol of his soul. 



330 Types of Naval Officers 

In 1775 Captain Jervis commissioned the 
Foudroyant, of eighty-four guns, a ship captured 
in 1758 from the French, and thereafter thought 
to be the finest vessel in the British fleet. To 
this, her natural superiority, Jervis added a degree 
of order, discipline, and drill which made her the 
pride and admiration of the navy. He was forty 
when his pennant first flew from her masthead, 
and he held the command for eight years, a period 
covering the full prime of his own maturity, as 
well as the entire course of the American Revo- 
lution. It was also a period marked for him, 
professionally, less by distinguished service than 
by that perfection of military organization, that 
combination of dignified yet not empty pomp 
with thorough and constant readiness, which was 
so eminently characteristic of all the phases of 
Jervis's career, and which, when the rare moments 
came, was promptly transformed into unhesitating, 
decisive, and efficient action. The Foudroyant, in 
her state and discipline, was the type in miniature 
of Jervis's Mediterranean fleet, declared by Nelson 
to be the finest body of ships he had ever known ; 
nay, she was the precursor of that regenerate 
British navy in which Nelson found the instru- 
ments of his triumphs. Sixty years later, old 
officers recalled the feelings of mingled curiosity 
and awe with which, when sent to her on duty 
from their own ships, they climbed on board the 
Foudroyant, and from the larboard side of her 
quarter-deck gazed upon the stern captain, whose 



Jervis 331 

qualities were embodied in his vessel and consti- 
tuted her chief excellences. 

During Jervis's command, the Foudroyant was 
continuously attached to the Channel Fleet, 
whose duty, as the name imphes, was to protect 
the English Channel and its approaches ; a func- 
tion which often carried the ships far into the 
Bay of Biscay. Thus he took a prominent part 
in Keppel's battle off Ushant in 1778, in the 
movements occasioned by the entrance into the 
Channel of an overpowering Franco-Spanish fleet 
in 1779 and 1781, and in the brilliant relief of 
Gibraltar by Admiral Howe towards the end of 
1782. His most distinguished service, however, 
was taking, single-handed, the French seventy- 
four Pegase, in the spring of the latter year. The 
capture was effected after an action of fifty min- 
utes, preceded by a chase of twelve hours, run- 
ninp- before a half-gale of wind. The Foudroyant 
was unquestionably superior in battery to her 
enemy, who, moreover, had but recently been 
commissioned ; but, as has justly been remarked 
of some of the victories of our own ships over 
those of the British in the War of 181 2, although 
there was disparity of forces, the precision and 
rapidity with which the work was done bore in- 
controvertible testimony to the skill and training 
of the captain and crew. Single combats, such 
as this, were rare between vessels of the size of 
the Foudroyant and Pegase, built to sail and fight 
in fleets. That one occurred here was due to 



J32 Types of Naval Officers 

the fact that the speed of the two opponents left 
the British squadron far astern. The exploit 
obtained for Jervis a baronetcy and the ribbon of 
the Order of the Bath. 

Sir John Jervis did not serve afloat during the 
ten years of peace following 1783, although, 
from his high repute, he was one of those sum- 
moned upon each of the alarms of war that from 
time to time arose. Throughout this period he 
sat in Parliament, voting steadily with his party, 
the Whigs, and supporting Fox in his opposition 
to measures which seemed to tend towards hos- 
tilities with France. When war came, however, 
he left his seat, ready to aid his country with his 
sword in the quarrel from which he had sought 
to keep her. 

Having in the mean time risen from the rank 
of captain to that of rear- and of vice-admiral, 
Jervis's first service, in 1794, was in the Carib- 
bean Sea, as commander of the naval part of a 
joint expedition of army and navy to subdue the 
French West India islands. The operation, al- 
though most important and full of exciting and 
picturesque incident, bears but a small share in his 
career, and therefore may not be dwelt upon in 
so short a sketch as the present aims to be. At- 
tended at first by marked and general success, it 
ended with some severe reverses, occasioned by 
the force given him being less than he demanded, 
and than the extent of the work to be done re- 
quired. A quaintly characteristic story is told of 



Jervis ;^23 

the admiral's treatment of a lieutenant who at 
this period sought employment on board his ship. 
Knowing that he stood high in the old seaman's 
favor, the applicant confidently expected his 
appointment, but, upon opening the " letter on 
service," was stunned to read : — 

Sir, — You, having thought fit to take to yourself a 
wife, are to look for no further attentions from 

Your humble servant, 

J. Jervis. 

The supposed culprit, guiltless even in thought 
of this novel misdemeanor, hastened on board, 
and explained that he abhorred such an offence 
as much as could the admiral. It then appeared 
that the letter had been sent to the wrong person. 
Jervis was himself married at this time ; but his 
well-regulated affections had run steadily in har- 
ness until the mature age of forty-eight, and he 
saw no reason why other men should depart 
from so sound a precedent. "When an officer 

marries," he tersely said, "he is d d for the 

service." 

Returning to England in February, 1795, Jervis 
was in August nominated to command the Med- 
iterranean station, and in November sailed to take 
up his new duties. At the end of the month, in 
San Fiorenzo Bay, an anchorage in the north 
of Corsica, he joined the fleet, which continued 
under his flag until June, 1799. He had now 
reached the highest rank in his profession, though 



334 Types of Naval Officers 

not the highest grade of that rank as it was then 
subdivided ; being a full Admiral of the Blue. 
The crowning period of his career here began. 
Admirable and striking as had been his previous 
services, dignified and weighty as were the re- 
sponsibilities borne by him in the later part of a 
life prolonged far beyond the span of man, the 
four years of Jervis's Mediterranean command 
stand conspicuous as the time when preparation 
flowered into achievement, solid, durable, and 
brilliant. It may be interesting to Americans to 
recall that his age was nearly the same as that 
of Farragut when the latter assumed the charge 
in which, after long years of obscure preparation, 
he also reaped his harvest of glory. It is like- 
wise worthy of note that this happy selection 
was made wholly independent of the political 
bias, which till then had so often and un- 
worthily controlled naval appointments. Jervis 
belonged to the small remnant of Whigs who 
still followed Fox and inveighed against the cur- 
rent war, as unnecessary and impolitic. It was 
a pure service choice, as such creditable alike to 
the Government and the officer. 

Though distinguished success now awaited 
him, a period of patient effort, endurance, and 
disappointment had first to be passed, repro- 
ducing in miniature the longer years of faith- 
ful service preceding his professional triumphs. 
Jervis came to the Mediterranean too late for 
the best interests of England. The year 1 795, just 



Jervis 33 s 

ending, was one in which the energies of France, 
after the fierce rush of the Terror, had flagged 
almost to collapse. Not only so, but in its 
course the republic, discouraged by frequent 
failure, had decided to abandon the control of 
the sea to its enemy, to keep its great fleets in 
.port, and to confine its efforts to the harassment 
of British commerce. To this change of policy in 
France is chiefly to be ascribed the failure of 
naval achievement with which Macaulay has re- 
proached Pitt's earlier ministry. Battles cannot 
be fought if the foe keeps behind his walls. 
Prior to this decision, two fleet battles had been 
fought in the Mediterranean in the spring and 
summer of 1795, in which the British had missed 
great successes only through the sluggishness of 
their admiral. " To say how much we wanted 
Lord Hood " (the last commander-in-chief), wrote 
Nelson, " is to ask, ' Will you have all the French 
fleet or no battle ? ' " Could he have foreseen all 
that Jervis was to be to the Mediterranean, his 
distress must have been doubled to know that 
the fortunes of the nation thus fell between two 
stools. 

His predecessor's slackness in pushing mil- 
itary opportunities, due partly to ill health, 
was mainly constitutional, and therefore could 
not but show itself by tangible evidences in 
the more purely administrative and discipli- 
nary work. Jervis found himself at once under 
the necessity of bringing his fleet — in equip- 



^2^ Types of Naval Officers 



ment, in discipline, and in drill — sharply up 
to that level of efficiency which is essential to the 
full development of power when occasion offers. 
This his perfect achievement, of organization and 
administration, in its many intricate details, needs 
at least to be clearly noted, even though space do 
not admit many particulars ; because his capacity 
as administrator at the head of the Admiralty a 
few years later has been seriously impugned, 
by a criticism both partial and excessive, if not 
wholly unjust. Nelson, a witness of his Mediter- 
ranean service from beginning to end, lauded to 
the utmost the excellence there reached, and 
attributed most of the short-coming noted in 
the later office to the yielding of a man then 
advanced in years, to advisers, in trusting 
whom fully he might well believe himself war- 
ranted by experience. 

Although, when taking command, his fleet 
reached the seemingly large proportions of twen- 
ty-five ships-of-the-line and some fifty cruisers, 
heavy allowance must be made for the variety 
of services extending over the two thousand 
miles of the Mediterranean, from east to west. 
Seven of-the-line had to be kept before Cadiz, 
though still a neutral port, to check a French 
division within. One of the same class was on 
the Riviera with Nelson; and other demands, 
with the necessities of occasional absences for 
refit, prevented the admiral from ever assembling 
before Toulon, his great strategic care, much 



Jervis 337 

more than a round dozen to watch equal French 
numbers there. The protection of Corsica, then 
in British hands ; the convoy of commerce, dis- 
persed throughout the station ; the assurance of 
communications to the fortress and Straits of 
Gibraltar, by which all transit to and from the 
Mediterranean passes ; diplomatic exigencies 
with the various littoral states of the inland sea ; 
these divergent calls, with the coincident neces- 
sity of maintaining every ship in fit condition for 
action, show the extent of the administrative 
work and of the attendant correspondence. The 
evidence of many eye-witnesses attests the suc- 
cessful results. 

Similar attention, broad yet minute, was 
demanded for the more onerous and invidious 
task of enforcing relaxed discipline and drill. 
Concerning these, the most pregnant testimony, 
alike to the stringency and the persistence of his 
measures, may be found in the imbittered expres- 
sions of enemies. Five years later, when the 
rumor spread that he was to have the Channel 
Fleet, the toast was drunk at the table of the 
man then in command, " May the discipline of 
the Mediterranean never be introduced into the 
Channel." " May his next glass of wine choke 
the wretch," is a speech attributed to a captain's 
wife, wrathful that her husband was kept from 
her side by the admiral's regulations. For 
Jervis's discipline began at the top, with the 
division and ship commanders. One of the 



338 Types of Naval Officers 

senior admirals under him persisting in a remon- 
strance, beyond the point which he considered 
consistent with discipline, was sent home. " The 
very disorderly state of His Majesty's ship under 
your command," he writes to a captain, " obliges 
me to require that neither yourself nor any of your 
officers are to go on shore on what is called plea- 
sure." " The commander-in-chief finds himself 
under the painful necessity of publicly reprimand- 
ing Captains and for neglect of duty, in 

not maintaining the stations assigned to their ships 
during the last night." In a letter to a lieutenant 
he says, " If you do not immediately make a 
suitable apology to Commissioner Inglefield for 
the abominable neglect and disrespect you have 
treated him with, I will represent your behaviour 
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
and recommend your name to be struck ofif the 
list of lieutenants." Captains of vessels were not 
only subject to strict regulation as to their personal 
proceedings, compelled to sleep on board, for 
instance, even in home ports; but duties cus- 
tomarily left to subordinates, with results to dis- 
cipline that might not now obtain but which 
were in those days deplorable, were also assigned 
to them. 

" The commander-in-chief has too exalted an 
opinion of the respective captains of the squadron 
to doubt their being upon deck when the signal 
is made to tack or wear in the night, and he re- 
quires all lieutenants then to be at their stations, 



Jervis 339 

except those who had the watch immediately pre- 
ceding." Nor did he leave this delicately worded, 
but pointed, admonition, issued in the Mediterra- 
nean, to take care of itself. In after years, when 
he was nigh seventy, his secretary tells that on a 
cold and rainy November night off Brest, the sig- 
nal to tack being made, he hurried to the cabin to 
persuade the old man not to go on deck, as was his 
custom. He was not, however, in his cot, nor 
could he for a long time be found ; but at last a 
look into the stern gallery discovered him, in 
flannel dressing-gown and cocked hat, watching 
the movements of the fleet. To remonstrance he 
replied, " Hush, I want to see how the evolution 
is performed on such a night, and to know 
whether Jemmy Vashon (commanding the ship 
next astern) is on deck ; " but soon hearing the 
captain's well-known shrill voice, crying, " Are you 
all ready forward ? " he consented then to retire. 
Post-captains and commanders were required 
to attend at points on shore where the boats and 
crews of ships congregated on service ; at landing 
places and watering places, — scenes fruitful in 
demoralization, — to maintain order and suppress 
disturbance. " The Masters and Commanders 
are to take it in turn, according to rank, to attend 
the duty on shore at the ragged staff [at Gibraltar], 
from gun-fire in the morning to sunset, to keep 
order and prevent disputes, and to see that boats 
take their regular turns. They are never to 
be absent from the spot except at regular meal 



340 Types of Naval Officers 

times." " When the squadron is at anchor in 
Torbay [in the English Channel], a captain of a 
ship-of-the-line is to command at the watering 
place at Brixham, taking to his assistance his 
commanding officer of marines with a party of 
his men. He also may take with him a Heutenant 
of the ship and as many midshipmen as he thinks 
fit; but he himself is not to quit his command 
until regularly relieved." A greater stringency 
is observable at this later date, in the Channel 
Fleet, than in the Mediterranean ; for at the 
earlier period the spirit of mutiny had not openly 
broken out, and he had besides on the distant 
station better captains than those who had clung 
to the home fleet under its lax discipline. " Old 
w^omen in the guise of young men," he affirmed 
many of them to be. 

There was in fact an imminent necessity that 
naval rank should be made to feel its responsibil- 
ities, and to exert its predominance ; to be restored 
to prestige, not by holding aloof in its privileges, 
but by asserting itself in act. The preponderance 
of political and family influence in determining 
promotion of officers, unbalanced by valid tests of 
fitness such as later days imposed, had not only 
lowered the competency of the official body as a 
whole, but impaired the respect which personal 
merit alone can in the long run maintain. On the 
other hand, the scarcity of seamen in proportion 
to the heavy demands of the war, and the irregular 
methods of impressment and recruiting then pre- 



Jervis 341 

vailing, swept into the service a vast number of 
men not merely unfit, but of extremely bad char- 
acter, — " miscreants," to use Collingwood's word, 
— to be ruled only by fear of the law and of their 
officers, supported by the better element among 
the crews. But these better men also were be- 
coming alienated by the harsh restrictions of the 
times, and by the procrastination of superiors — 
Howe, the Sailor's Friend, among others — to 
heed their just complaints. The stern Jervis, 
whom none suspected of fatherly tenderness, if 
less indulgent to culprits, was far more attentive 
to meet the reasonable demands of those under 
him. While quelling insubordination mercilessly, 
he ever sought to anticipate grievance ; exhibiting 
thus the two sides of the same spirit of careful, 
even-handed justice. 

Jervis's work during the first eighteen months 
of his command was therefore not only necessary, 
but most timely. By improving that period of 
comparative internal quiet, he educated his officers 
and men to pass steadfastly, though not unmoved, 
through the awful crisis of the mutinies in 1797- 
98. Professional self-respect, a most powerful 
moral force, was more than restored; it was in- 
tensified by the added dignity and power manifest 
in the surroundings of daily life, as well as in the 
military results obtained. Seamen, like others, 
deal more conservatively w^ith that of which they 
are proud because it reflects honor upon them- 
selves ; and they obey more certainly men who 



342 Types of Naval Officers 

share their labors and lead them capably in 
danger, as did Jervis's Mediterranean captains. 
With himself, severity was far from being the 
only instrument. Thoroughly capable profession- 
ally, and thereby commandful of respect, he 
appealed also to men's regard by intelligent and 
constant thought for the wants and comfort of 
those under him ; by evidence of strong service 
feeling on his own part ; by clear and clearly 
expressed recognition of merit, wherever found ; 
by avoidance of misunderstandings through ex- 
planation volunteered when possible, — not apolo- 
getically, but as it were casually, yet appealing 
to men's reason. Watchfulness and sympathetic 
foresight were with him as constant as sternness, 
though less in evidence. 

Of this prevalence of kindly naval feeling amid 
the harshness which seemed superficially the 
chief characteristic of his rule, many instances 
could be cited. Passing by the frequent inci- 
dental praise of distinguished captains. Nelson, 
Troubridge, and others, he thus advocates the 
claims of one of the humble, hopeless class of 
sailing-masters, out of the line of promotion. 
After an act of brilliant merit in the West Indies, 
" Mr. White was ambitious to become a lieuten- 
ant ; but not having served six years in the navy, 
and being a master, I could not then comply with 
his wishes. He is now Master of the Defence, and 
his captain speaks in the highest terms of him ; 
and it is a tribute due to the memory of Captain 



Jervis 343 

Faulknor, — whose certificate of that matchless 
service is enclosed, — and to the galla^itry of his 
officers and crew, to state the claims of Mr. White 
to your Lordship, who is the protector of us all." 
The present and the past, the merits of the living, 
the memory of the glorious dead, the claims of 
the navy to see well-doers rewarded, are all pressed 
into service to support a just request, and with 
a manifest heartiness which in virtue of its reality 
approaches eloquence. " I have given an order 
to Mr. Ellis to command as a lieutenant, he being 
the son of a very old officer whom I knew many 
years ; and coming very strongly recommended 
from his last ship, I place him under your Lord- 
ship's protection as a child of the serviced 
When a man thus bears others' deserts and 
the profession on his heart, he can retain the 
affections of his subordinates even though he 
show all the unbending severity of Jervis, and 
despite the numerous hangings, which, for that 
matter, rarely fell except on the hopelessly bad. 
A most significant feature of his rule as a dis- 
ciplinarian was his peculiar care of health, by 
instructed sanitary measures, by provision of 
suitable diet, and by well-ordered hospital service. 
This was not merely a prudential consideration 
for the efficiency of the fleet ; he regarded also 
the welfare of the sufferers. He made it a rule 
to inspect the hospitals himself, and he directed 
a daily visit by a captain and by the surgeons of 
the ships from which patients were sent, thus 



344 Types of Naval Officers 

keeping the sick in touch with those they knew, 
and who had in them a personal interest. An 
odd provision, amusingly illustrative of the ob- 
verse side of the admiral's character, was that 
the visiting captain should be accompanied by 
a boatswain's mate, the functionary charged with 
administering floggings, and, " if they find the 
patients do not conduct themselves properly and 
orderly, they are to punish them agreeably to the 
rules of the Navy." It was, however, on his care 
of health, in its various exposures, that the ad- 
miral specially valued himself ; it was, he said, 
his proudest boast among the services to which 
he laid claim. 

But while he labored thus for the welfare of 
the seamen, it was naturally upon the professional 
tone of his officers that his chief reliance must be 
placed ; and the leaders among them he grappled 
to his soul with hooks of steel, as they recognized 
the wisdom and force of his measures, and the 
appreciation given to them and others. What- 
ever beneficent influence might issue from him 
as a fountain-head must through them be dis- 
tributed, and by them reinforced and sustained. 
" The discipline of the fleet," he said, " is in the 
ward-room ; " and greatly did he lament the loose 
insubordinate talk, the spirit of irresponsible criti- 
cism that found voice at mess-tables, within the 
hearing of servants, by whom it was disseminated 
throughout the body of the ship. Not only he, 
but many, attributed to this hot-bed the fomenting 



Jervis 345 

of discontent into organized mutiny. This could 
not be stopped by direct measures, but only by 
imposing a feeling of fear, and nurturing that of 
officer-like propriety, by stringent prescription of 
forms of respect and rigid exaction of their obser- 
vance. To stand uncovered before a superior, 
instead of lightly touching the hat, to pay out- 
ward reverence to the national flag, to salute the 
quarter-deck as the seat of authority, were no 
vain show under him. " Discipline," he was fond 
of quoting, "is summed up in the one word, 
' Obedience ; ' " and these customs were charged 
with the observance which is obedience in spirit. 
They conduced to discipline as conventional 
good manners, by rendering the due of each to 
each, knit together the social fabric and maintain 
the regularity and efficiency of common life ; re- 
moving friction, suppressing jars, and minister- 
ing constantly to the smooth and even working 
of the social machinery. 

By measures such as these, extending to all 
ranks and every detail, exemplifying, in spirit 
and in form, the extremes of cordial reward, iron 
restraint, and weighty punishment, Jervis patiently 
fashioned the fleet which was to be both a pat- 
tern for coming days, and the highly tempered 
instrument to achieve his own victory of Cape 
St. Vincent and the earlier triumphs of Nelson ; 
as well as to sustain and to crush the onset of 
mutiny which soon afterwards shook the Navy to 
its centre. For purely military action of an 



346 Types of Naval Officers 

aggressive character no opportunity was afforded 
him. His coming to the Mediterranean coincided 
with that of Napoleon Bonaparte to the Army 
of Italy. During 1795, wrote Nelson, if the 
British fleet had done its duty, the French army 
could not have moved along the Riviera of Genoa. 
It failed, and the Austrian general, its ally, also 
failed to act with vigor. So the year had ended, 
for the Austrians, with a disastrous defeat and a 
retreat behind the Apennines. To the Riviera 
they never returned to receive the cooperation 
which Jervis stood eager to give. At their first 
move to cross the mountains, Bonaparte struck, 
and followed up his blows with such lightning- 
like rapidity that in thirty days they were 
driven back over a hundred miles, behind 
the Adige ; their chief fortress, Mantua, was 
blockaded ; all northwest Italy with its seaboard, 
including Leghorn, was in the power of France ; 
and Naples also had submitted. Jervis, power- 
less to strike a blow when no enemy was within 
reach, found his fleet without a friendly port 
nearer than Gibraltar, while Corsica, where alone 
he could expect anchorage and water, was 
seething with revolt against the British crown, 
to which, by its own vote, it had been annexed 
but two years before. 

Amid these adverse circumstances, the only 
large operation possible to him was the close 
watching of the port of Toulon, conducted on 
the same general plan that was afterwards more 



Jervis 347 

illustriously exhibited before Brest, between 1800 
and 1805, under conditions of surpassing difB- 
culty. All contemplated movements of the 
French fleet were thus dammed at the source, 
for it must first fight the British, after which 
there was little hope of being in a state to fulfil 
any further mission. For six months, from April 
to October, Jervis held his fleet close up to the 
port, the advanced body two miles from the 
entrance. The effort was admirable as a pattern, 
and for disciplinary purposes. The ships, forced 
to self-dependence, became organically self-reliant. 
Their routine life of seamanship and military 
exercise perfected habit and efficiency, and diffi- 
culties to others insuperable were as the light 
burdens which a giant carries unwittingly. 

Further than this, achievement could not then 
go. During the summer Bonaparte held Man- 
tua by the throat, and overthrew one after an- 
other the Austrian forces approaching to its 
relief. Two French armies, under Jourdan and 
Moreau, penetrated to the heart of Germany; 
while Spain, lately the confederate of Great 
Britain, made an offensive and defensive alliance 
with France, and sent a fleet of over twenty 
ships-of-the-line into the Mediterranean. Stag- 
gered by these reverses, the British ministry 
ordered Corsica evacuated and the Mediterranean 
abandoned. Jervis was cruelly embarrassed. A 
trusted subordinate of high reputation had been 
before Cadiz with seven ships-of-the-line, watch- 



348 Types of Naval Officers 

ing a French division in that port. Summoned, 
in view of the threatening attitude of Spain, to 
reinforce the main fleet in San Fiorenzo Bay, he 
lost his head altogether, hurried past Gibraltar 
without getting supplies, and brought his ships 
destitute to the admiral, already pressed to main- 
tain the vessels then with him. Although there 
were thirty-five hostile ships in Toulon and the 
British had only twenty-two, counting this divis- 
ion, there was nothing to do but to send it back to 
Gibraltar, under urgent orders to return with all 
speed. With true military insight and a correct 
appreciation of the forces opposed to him, Jervis 
saw the need of fighting the combined enemies 
then and there. 

Unfortunately, the division commander. Admi- 
ral Mann, on reaching Gibraltar, became infected 
with the spirit of discouragement then prevailing 
in the garrison, called a council of naval captains, 
and upon their advice, which could in no wise 
lessen his own responsibility, decided to return 
to England. This culpably unwarrantable act 
aptly illustrates the distinction, rarely appreciated, 
between an error of judgment and an error of 
conduct. Upon arrival, he was at once deprived 
of his command, a step of unquestionable justice, 
but which could not help Jervis. " We were all 
eyes, looking westward from the mountain tops," 
wrote Collingwood, then a captain in the fleet, 
"but we looked in vain. The Spanish fleet, 
nearly double our number, was cruising almost 



Jervis 349 

in view, and our reconnoitring frigates sometimes 
got among them, while we expected them hourly 
to be joined by the French fleet." " I cannot 
describe to your lordship," wrote Jervis himself, 
" the disappointment my ambition and zeal to 
serve my country have suffered by this diminu- 
tion of my force ; for had Admiral Mann sailed 
from Gibraltar on the loth of October, the day 
he received my orders, and fulfilled them, I have 
every reason to believe the Spanish fleet would 
have been cut to pieces. The extreme disorder 
and confusion they were observed to be in, by 
the judicious officers who fell in with them, leave 
no doubt upon my mind that a fleet so trained 
and generally well commanded as this is would 
have made its way through them in every direc- 
tion." 

Nelson shared this opinion, the accuracy of 
which was soon to be tested and proved. " They 
at home," wrote he to his wife, " do not know 
what this fleet is capable of performing ; any- 
thing and everything. The fleets of England 
are equal to meet the world in arms ; and of all 
the fleets I ever saw, I never beheld one, in point 
of officers and men, equal to Sir John Jervis's, 
who is a commander-in-chief able to lead them 
to glory." To a friend he wrote : " Mann is 
ordered to come up ; we shall then be twenty-two 
sail-of-the-line such as England hardly ever pro- 
duced, commanded by an admiral who will not 
fail to look the enemy in the face, be their force 



350 Types of Naval Officers 

what it may. I suppose it will not be more than 
thirty-four of-the-line." " The admiral is firm as 
a rock," wrote at the same moment the British 
viceroy of Corsica. Through all doubts and un- 
certainties he held on steadily, refusing to leave 
the rendezvous till dire necessity forced him, lest 
Mann, arriving, should be exposed alone and 
lost. At last, with starvation staring him in the 
face if delaying longer, he sailed for Gibraltar, 
three men living on the rations of one during 
the passage down. 

Mann's defection had reduced the fleet from 
twenty-two vessels to fifteen. A series of single 
accidents still further diminished it. In a violent 
gale at Gibraltar three ships-of-the-line drove 
from their anchors. One, the Courageux, stretch- 
ing over toward the Barbary coast, ran ashore 
there and was totally wrecked, nearly all her crew 
perishing. Her captain, a singularly capable sea- 
man named Hallowell, was out of her upon a 
court-martial, and it was thought she would not 
have been lost had he been on board. Another, 
the Gibraltar, struck so heavily on a reef that 
she had to be sent to England. Upon being 
docked, a large piece of rock was found to have 
penetrated the bottom and stuck fast in the hole. 
Had it worked out, the ship w^ould have foun- 
dered. The third vessel, the Zealotis, was less 
badly hurt, but she had to be left behind in 
Gibraltar when Jervis, by orders from home, took 
his fleet to Lisbon. There, in entering the 



Jervis 351 

Tagus, a fourth ship was lost on a shoal, so that 
but eleven remained out of twenty-two. Despite 
these trials of his constancy, the old man's temper 
still continued " steady as a rock." " Whether 
you send me a reinforcement or not," he wrote 
to the Admiralty, " I shall sleep perfectly sound, 
— not in the Tagus, but at sea ; for as soon as 
the S^. George has shifted her topmast, the 
Captain her bowsprit, and the Blenheim repaired 
her mainmast, I will go out." " Inactivity in the 
Tagus," he wrote again, " will make cowards of 
us all." This last expression summed up much 
of his naval philosophy. Keep men at sea, he 
used to say, and they cannot help being seamen, 
though attention will be needed to assure ex- 
ercise at the guns. And it may be believed he 
would thus contemn the arguments which sup- 
ported Howe's idea of preserving the ships by 
retaining them in port. Keep them at sea, he 
would doubtless have replied, and they will learn 
to take care of themselves. 

In quitting the river another vessel took the 
ground, and had to be left behind. This, how- 
ever, was the last of the admiral's trials for that 
time. A few days later, on the 6th of February, 
1797, there joined him a body of five ships-of-the- 
line, detached from England as soon as the 
government had been freed from the fear of the 
invasion of Ireland, which the French had at- 
tempted on a large scale in December. On the 
13th, Nelson, a host in himself, returned from an 



3^2 Types of Naval Officers 

adventurous mission up the Mediterranean. The 
next day, February 14th, Jervis with his fifteen 
ships met a Spanish fleet of twenty-seven some 
thirty miles from Cape St. Vincent, which has 
given its name to the battle. 

The Spaniards were running for Cadiz, to the 
east-southeast, — say, across the page from left to 
right, inclining a little downward, — while Jer- 
vis's fleet was approaching nearly at right angles 
from the north, or top of the page. It was in 
two close, compact columns, of seven and eight 
ships respectively. The Spaniards, on the con- 
trary, were in disorder and dispersed. Six of their 
ships were far ahead of the others, an interval of 
nearly eight miles separating the two groups. 
The weather, which was foggy, cleared gradually. 
Jervis was walking back and forth on the poop 
with Hallowell, lately captain of the wrecked 
Courageux, and he was heard to say, " A victory 
is very essential to England at this moment." 
As ship after ship of the enemy loomed up 
through the haze, successive reports were made 
to him. "There are eight sail-of-the-line. Sir 
John." " There are twenty sail-of-the-line. 
Sir John." " There are twenty-five of-the-line. 
Sir John." Finally, when the full tale of twenty- 
seven was made out, the captain of the fleet re- 
marked on the greatness of the odds. " Enough 
of that, sir," retorted the admiral, intent on that 
victory which was so essential to England ; " if 
there are fifty sail, I will go through them." 



Jervis 253 

This reply so delighted Hallowell, an eccentric 
man, who a year later gave Nelson the coffin 
made from the mainmast of the Orient, that he 
patted his august superior on the back. " That 's 
right, Sir John," said he, "and, by G — , we'll 

give them a d d good licking ! " 

When the weather finally cleared, toward ioa.m., 
the British were near to the enemy and head- 
ing direct for the gap, which the Spaniards, 
too late, were trying to close. Almost at the 
moment of meeting, Jervis formed his two col- 
umns into one — the order of battle — " with the 
utmost celerity;" thus doubling the length of 
the line interposed between the two divisions of 
the enemy. Soon opened the guns of the lead- 
ing ship, the Culloden, Captain Troubridge ; the 
reports following one another in regular succes- 
sion, as though firing a salute by watch. The 
Cullodens course led so direct upon a Spanish 
three-decker, that the first lieutenant reported a 
collision imminent. "Can't help it, Griffiths," 
replied Troubridge; "hardest fend off." But 
the Spaniard, in confusion, put his helm up and 
went clear. By this time the Spanish division 
on the right, or west, of the British had changed 
its course and was steering north, parallel but op- 
posite to its foes. As the Culloden went through, 
the admiral signalled her to put about and follow 
it. Troubridge, fully expecting this order, obeyed 
at once ; and Jervis's signal was scarce unfurled 
when, by the flapping of the Cullodens sails, he 

23 



354 Types of Naval Officers 

saw it was receiving execution. " Look at Trou- 
bridge ! " he shouted. " Does n't he handle his 
ship as though the eyes of all England were on 
him ? I would to God they were, that she might 
know him as I know him ! " But here a graver 
matter drew the admiral's care. The Spanish 
division from the left, steering across his path of 
advance, approached, purposing in appearance to 
break through the line. The Victory stopped, 
or, as seamen say, hove-to ; and as the Spanish 
admiral came near within a hundred yards, her 
broadside rang out, sweeping through the crowded 
decks and lofty spars a storm of shot, to which, 
in the relative positions, the foe could not reply. 
Staggered and crippled he went about, and the 
Victory stood on. 

Meanwhile, the ships which Troubridge and his 
followers were pursuing drew toward the tail of 
the British column, and as they did so made a 
movement to pass round it, and so join their 
friends who had just been so severely handled in 
making the attempt to pass through. But Nelson 
was in this part of the order, there being but two 
ships behind him. Now, as far as signals went, 
he should continue on, and, like the others, follow 
in due succession behind the Culloden. He saw 
that if this were done the Spaniards would effect 
their junction, so he instantly turned his ship 
toward the rear, out of her place, and threw her 
alone across the enemy's advance. It is said that 
the Captain of the Fleet drew Jervis's attention to 



Jervis 355 

this breach of discipline. " Ay," replied the old 
seaman, " and if ever you offend in the same way, 
I promise you my forgiveness beforehand." For 
a while Nelson took the brunt of the hostile fire 
from half a dozen ships, but not for long. Soon 
Troubridge, his dearest friend, came up with a 
couple of others ; and Collingwood, the close as- 
sociate of early days, who had the rear ship, was 
signalled to imitate Nelson's act. In doing this, 
he silenced the fire of two enemies; but, wrote 
Nelson, " disdaining the parade of taking posses- 
sion of beaten ships, Captain Collingwood most 
gallantly pushed on to save his old friend and 
messmate, who appeared to be in a critical state, 
being then fired upon by three first-rates, and the 
San Nicolas, eighty." To get between Nelson's 
ship and the San Nicolas, Collingwood had to 
steer close, passing within ten feet of the latter ; 
so that, to use his own expression, "though we 
did not touch sides, you could not put a bodkin 
between us." His fire drove the San Nicolas 
upon one of the first-rates, the San Josef; and 
when, continuing on to seek other unbeaten foes, 
he left the field again clear for Nelson, the latter, 
by a movement of the helm, grappled the San 
Nicolas, Incredible as it may appear, the crew 
of this one British seventy-four carried, sword in 
hand, both the enemy's ships, though of far su- 
perior force. " Extravagant as the story may 
seem," wrote Nelson, " on the quarter-deck of a 
Spanish first-rate I received the swords of the 



2^6 Types of Naval Officers 

vanquished Spaniards, which, as I received, I gave 
to WiUiam Fearney, one of my bargemen, who 
placed them with the greatest sang-froid under 
his arm." 

Four Spanish ships, two of them of the largest 
size, were the trophies of this victory; but its 
moral effect in demonstrating the relative values 
of the two navies, and the confidence England 
could put in men like Jervis, Nelson, and the 
leading captains, was far greater. The spirit of 
the nation, depressed by a long series of re- 
verses, revived like a giant refreshed with wine. 
Jervis had spoken truth when he said a victory 
was essential to England at that time. The 
gratitude of the state was shown in the profusion 
of rewards showered upon the victors. Promo- 
tions and honors were liberally distributed. The 
Government had already purposed to recognize 
Jervis's previous services by raising him to the 
lower ranks of the peerage ; but this timely tri- 
umph procured him at one step a higher eleva- 
tion. He w^as created Earl of St. Vincent, with 
a pension of three thousand pounds per annum. 

The tactical decisions made by Jervis on this 
momentous occasion were correct as far as they 
went ; but, except the initial determination to 
attack the larger body of the enemy, because to 
windward, there is no evidence of tactical ori- 
ginality in him, no innovation comparable to 
Howe's manoeuvres on May 28 and 29, — and 
there was undoubted oversight in not providing 



Jervis 357 

by signal against that move of the weather Span- 
ish division which it became Nelson's opportunity 
and glory to counteract. It is also possible that 
the signal to tack in succession, a wholly routine 
proceeding, might have been made earlier to 
advantage ; but the writer does not think that 
the body of the fleet should then have tacked 
together, as some criticism would have it. Until 
the British van approached on the new tack, the 
broadsides of the centre were better ranged on 
the original line to counteract the efforts, actu- 
ally made, by the lee Spanish division to break 
through. As regards the decision not to follow 
the victory further, which has been censured in 
the instances of Rodney and Howe, the condi- 
tions here differed in much. The disparity of 
numbers was very great ; if many of the enemy 
had suffered greatly, many also had not suffered 
at all ; they were now reunited ; above all Jervis's 
strategic and political insight — far superior to 
his tactical equipment — had rightly read the 
situation when he said that what England needed 
was a victory, — moral effect. The victory was 
there, undeniable and brilliant, it was better not 
risked. 

The rest of the Spaniards, many of them badly 
crippled, took refuge in Cadiz, and there Jervis, 
after repairing damages, held them blockaded for 
two years, from April, 1797, to May, 1799. For 
the greater part of this time the operation was 
conducted by anchoring the British fleet, a 



2§S Types of Naval Officers 

resource which the character of the ground 
permitted, and which, though not everywhere 
possible, St. Vincent declared the only way of 
assuring the desired end of holding a position 
in all weathers. During this period was ren- 
dered the other most signal service done by 
him to the state, in suppressing the mutinous ac- 
tion of the seamen, which there, as everywhere 
else in the British navy at that time, sought to 
overthrow the authority of the officers. 

The cause of the mutinies of 1797 is not here 
in question. Suffice it to say that, in their origin, 
they alleged certain tangible material grievances 
which were clearly stated, and, being undeniable, 
were redressed. The men returned to their duty ; 
but, like a horse that has once taken the bit 
between his teeth, the restive feeling remained, 
fermenting in a lot of vicious material which the 
exigencies of the day had forced the navy to 
accept. Coinciding in time with the risings in 
Ireland, 1 796-1 798, there arose between the two 
movements a certain sympathy, which was fos- 
tered by the many Irish in the fleets, where agents 
were in communication with the leaders of the 
United Irishmen on shore. 

In the Channel and the North Sea, the sea- 
men took the ships, with few exceptions, out of 
the hands of their officers. In the former, they 
dictated their terms ; in the latter, after a month 
of awful national suspense, they failed : the dif- 
ference bein^ that in the one case the demands, 



Jervis 359 

being reasonable, carried conviction, while in the 
other, becoming extravagant, the Government's 
resistance was supported by public opinion. It 
remained to be seen how the crisis would be met 
in a fleet so far from home that the issue must 
depend upon the firmness and judgment of a 
man of adamant. It was no more than prudent 
to expect that the attempt would be made there 
also ; and the watchfulness of the superior 
officers of the fleet soon obtained certain infor- 
mation of its approach, though as yet without 
proof adequate to the arr€st of individuals. The 
policy of the admiral, broadly stated, was that of 
isolating ship from ship — divide et impera — to 
prevent concerted action ; a measure effected to 
all practical purpose by his unremitting vigilance, 
and by the general devotion to his policy among 
his leading officers. On the other hand, evidence 
was not wanting that in the ships long under his 
orders his own character was now fairly under- 
stood, and obtained for him a backing among the 
seamen themselves, without which his severity 
alone might have failed. 

The first overt sign of trouble was the appear- 
ance of letters addressed to the leading petty 
officers of the different ships of the Mediter- 
ranean fleet. These were detected by a captain, 
who held on to them, and sent to St. Vincent to 
ask if they should be delivered. Careful to be- 
tray no sign of anxiety, the admiral's reply was a 
general signal for a lieutenant from each ship to 



360 Types of Naval Officers 

come to him ; and by them word was sent that 
all letters should be delivered as addressed, un- 
opened. " Should any disturbance arise," he 
added, " the commander-in-chief will know how 
to repress it." 

Disturbance soon did arise, and it is significant 
to note that it appeared in a ship which, by tak- 
ing the ground when leaving Lisbon, had not 
shared in the Battle of St. Vincent. In July, 
1797, two seamen of the S^. George had been 
condemned to death for an infamous crime. 
Their shipmates presented a petition, framed in 
somewhat peremptory terms, for their liberation, 
on the ground that execution for such an offence 
would bring disgrace upon all. The admiral 
refusing to pardon, the occasion was seized to 
bring mutiny to a head. A plot to take posses- 
sion of the ship was formed, but was betrayed to 
the captain. The outburst began with a tumul- 
tuous assembling of the crew, evidently, however, 
mistrustful of their cause. After vainly trying to 
restore order, the captain and first lieutenant 
rushed among them, each collaring a ringleader. 
The rest fell back, weakened, as men of Anglo- 
Saxon traditions are apt to be, by the sense of 
law-breaking. The culprits were secured, and at 
once taken to the flag-ship. A court-martial was 
ordered for the next day, Saturday ; and as the 
prisoners were being taken to the court, St. Vin- 
cent, with a hard bluntness of speech which char- 
acterized him, — a survival of the frank brutality 



Jervis 361 

of the past century, — said, "My friends, I hope 
you are innocent, but if you are guilty make 
your peace with God ; for, if you are condemned, 
and there is day Ugh t to hang you, you will die 
this day." 

They were condemned ; but the trial ended 
late, and the president of the court told them 
they should have Sunday to prepare. " Sir," said 
the earl, " when you passed sentence, your duty 
w^as done; you had no right to say that execution 
should be delayed ; " and he fixed it for eight the 
next morning. One of the junior admirals saw 
fit to address him a remonstrance upon what he 
termed a desecration of the Sabbath. Nelson, on 
the contrary, approved. " Had it been Christmas 
instead of Sunday," wrote he, " I would have 
hanged them. Who can tell what mischief would 
have been brewed over a Sunday's grog ? " Con- 
trary to previous custom, their own shipmates, 
the partners and followers in their crime, were 
compelled to hang them, manning the rope by 
which the condemned were swayed to the yard- 
arm. The admiral, careful to produce impression, 
ordered that all the ships should hold divine 
service immediately upon the execution. Accord- 
ingly, when the bell struck eight, the fatal gun 
was fired, the bodies swung with a jerk aloft, the 
church flags were hoisted throughout the fleet, 
and all went to prayers. Ere yet the ceremony 
was over, the Spanish gunboats came out from 
Cadiz and opened fire; but St. Vincent would 



362 Types of Naval Officers 

not mar the solemnity of the occasion by shorten- 
ing the service. Gravely it was carried to its 
end; but when the flags came down, all boats 
were ordered manned. The seamen, with nerves 
tense from the morning's excitement, gladly 
hurried into action, and the enemy were forced 
back into port. 

One such incident was far from ending the 
ordeal through which the admiral had to pass, 
and which was prolonged throughout the period 
of the Cadiz blockade. In May, 1798, when 
Nelson was sent into the Mediterranean to win 
the Battle of the Nile, the detachment committed 
to him was replaced by a dozen ships-of-the-line 
from the Channel, seething with the mutinous 
temper which at home had been humored rather 
than scotched. Immediately on their joining, 
request was made for a Court Martial on some 
men of the Marlborough, on board which two 
violent mutinies had occurred, — one on the 
passage out. St. Vincent, having known before- 
hand that this ship had been pre-eminent for in- 
subordination, had ordered her anchored in the 
centre of the fleet, between the two lines in which 
it was ranged ; and the Court met without delay. 
The remainder of the incident is quoted substan- 
tially from one of St. Vincent's biographers, for it 
illustrates most forcibly the sternness of his action, 
as well when dealing with weakness in offlcers 
as with mutiny in crews. The written order to 
the commander of the division of launches appears 



Jervis 36 :i 

among the earl's papers, as does also a similar 
one in the case of a mutiny on board the Defence 
some months earlier. The ulterior object of 
parading these boats was kept profoundly secret. 
They appeared to be only part of the pageantry, 
of the solemn ceremonial, with which the wisdom 
of the great commander-in-chief providently 
sought to invest all exhibitions of authority, in 
order to deepen impression. 

The object of the last mutiny on board the 
Marlborough had been to protect the life of a 
seaman forfeited by a capital crime. No sooner 
was one sentenced to die than the commander- 
in-chief ordered him to be executed on the fol- 
lowing morning, " and by the crew of the Marl- 
borough alone, no part of the boats' crews from 
the other ships, as had been used on similar 
occasions, to assist in the punishment, — his 
lordship's invariable order on the execution of 
mutineers. On the receipt of the necessary com- 
mands for this execution, Captain Ellison of the 
Marlborough waited upon the commander-in-chief, 
and reminding his lordship that a determination 
that their shipmates should not suffer capital 
punishment had been the very cause of the ship's 
company's mutiny, expressed his conviction that 
the MarlborougJi s crew would never permit the 
man to be hanged on board that ship. 

" Receiving the captain on the Ville de Paris' s 
quarter-deck, before the officers and ship's com- 
pany hearkening in breathless silence to what 



364 Types of Naval Officers 

passed, and standing with his hat in his hand over 
his head, as was his lordship's invariable custom 
during the whole time that any person, whatever 
were his rank, even a common seaman, addressed 
him on service, Lord St. Vincent listened very 
attentively till the captain ceased to speak; and 
then after a pause replied, — 

" ' Do you mean to tell me, Captain Ellison, that 
you cannot command his Majesty's ship, the 
Marlborough? for if that is the case, sir, I will 
immediately send on board an officer who can.' 

" The captain then requested that, at all events, 
the boats' crews from the rest of the fleet might, 
as always had been customary in the service, on 
executions, attend at this also, to haul the man 
up ; for he really did not expect the Marlborough's 
would do it. 

"Lord St. Vincent sternly answered: 'Captain 
Ellison, you are an old officer, sir, have served 
long, suffered severely in the service, and have 
lost an arm in action, and I should be very sorry 
that any advantage should be now taken of your 
advanced years. That man shall be hanged, at 
eight o'clock to-morrow morning, and by his own 
ship's company: for not a hand from any other 
ship in the fleet shall touch the rope. You will 
now return on board, sir ; and, lest you should 
not prove able to command your ship, an officer 
will be at hand who can.' 

" Without another word Captain Ellison in- 
stantly retired. After he had reached his ship. 



Jervis 365 

he received orders to cause her guns to be housed 
and secured, and that at daybreak in the morning 
her ports should be lowered. A general order 
was then issued to the fleet for all launches to 
rendezvous under the Prince at seven o'clock on 
the following morning, armed with carronades 
and twelve rounds of ammunition for service ; 
each launch to be commanded by a lieutenant, 
having an expert and trusty gunner's-mate and 
four quarter gunners, exclusive of the launch's 
crew. The whole were to be under the com- 
mand of Captain Campbell, of the Blenheim, to 
whom, on presenting to him the written orders 
under which he was to act, Lord St. Vincent 
further said, ' he was to attend the execution, and 
if any symptoms of mutiny appeared in the Marl- 
borough, any attempt to open her ports, or any 
resistance to the hanging of the prisoner, he was 
to proceed close touching the ship, and to fire 
into her, and to continue to fire until all mutiny 
or resistance should cease ; and that, should it 
become absolutely necessary, he should even sink 
the ship in face of the fleet.' 

*' Accordingly, at seven the next morning, all 
the launches, thus armed, proceeded from the 
Prince to the Blenheim, and thence. Captain 
Campbell having assumed the command, to the 
Marlborough. 

" Having lain on his oars a short time along- 
side, the captain then formed his force in a line 
athwart her bows, at rather less than pistol shot 



^66 Types of Naval Officers 

distance off, and then he ordered the tompions 
to be taken out of the carronades, and to load. 

" At half-past seven, the hands throughout the 
fleet having been turned up to witness punish- 
ment, the eyes of all bent upon a powerfully 
armed boat as it quitted the flagship ; every one 
knowing that there went the provost-marshal 
conducting his prisoner to the Marlborough for 
execution. The crisis was come ; now was to be 
seen whether the Marlborough! s crew would hang 
one of their own men. 

" The ship being in the centre between the 
two lines of the fleet, the boat was soon along- 
side, and the man was speedily placed on the cat- 
head and haltered. A few awful minutes of uni- 
versal silence followed, which was at last broken 
by the watch bells of the fleet striking eight 
o'clock. Instantly the flagship's gun fired, and 
at the sound the man was lifted well off ; 
but then, and visibly to all, he dropped back 
again ; and the sensation throughout the fleet 
was intense. For, at this dreadful moment, when 
the eyes of every man in every ship was straining 
upon this execution, as the decisive struggle 
between authority and mutiny, as if it were 
destined that the whole fleet should see the 
hesitating unwillingness of the Marlborough! s 
crew to hang their rebel, and the efficacy of 
the means taken to enforce obedience, by an 
accident on board the ship the men at the yard- 
rope unintentionally let it slip, and the turn of 



Jervis 367 

the balance seemed calamitously lost; but then 
they hauled him up to the yard arm with a run. 
The law was satisfied, and, said Lord St. Vin- 
cent at the moment, perhaps one of the greatest 
of his life, ' Discipline is preserved, sir ! ' " 

Again a year later, in May, 1799, when twenty- 
five French ships-of-the-line broke through the 
wretchedly inefficient guard at that time kept 
before Brest, and entered the Mediterranean, a 
reinforcement of over a dozen was sent from the 
Channel to Lord St. Vincent, who was found then 
in Port Mahon, Minorca. Sir Edward Pellew, 
captain of one of the new-comers, asked a Court- 
Martial upon a mutiny that had occurred just 
before leaving the home port. St. Vincent at 
first demurred, startled, according to Pellew's 
biographer, by the extent of the plot then re- 
vealed, and thinking it politic to suppress the 
facts; but it is alleged with equal probability 
that he was indignant at being continually called 
upon to remedy evils due to the general indis- 
cipline of the Channel Fleet. "What do they 
mean by invariably sending the mutinous ships 
to me ? Do they think that I will be hangman, to 
the fleet ? " Both versions are likely enough to be 
correct. There is a limit to all human endur- 
ance, and the earl was now broken in health ; 
he was sixty-four, had borne his load for three 
years, and was on the point of resigning his 
command to Lord Keith. The Court, however, 
was ordered, and three men were sentenced to be 



368 Types of Naval Officers 

hanged. Pellew then interceded for one, on 
the ground of previous good character. " No," 
repHed St. Vincent. " Those who have suffered 
hitherto have been so worthless before that their 
fate was of little use as an example. I shall 
now convince the seamen that no character, 
however good, shall save a man who is guilty of 
mutiny." . 

But St. Vincent was not content with mere 
repression. Outwardly, and indeed inwardly, 
unshaken, he yet unwearyingly so ordered the 
fleet as to avoid occasions of outbreak. With 
the imposing moral control exerted by his un- 
flinching steadiness, little trouble was to be 
apprehended from single ships ; ignorant of what 
might be hoped from sympathizers elsewhere, 
but sure of the extreme penalty in case of failure, 
the movements lacked cohesion and w^ere easily 
nipped. Concerted action only was to be feared, 
and careful measures were taken to remove 
opportunities. Captains were forbidden to enter- 
tain one another at dinner, — the reason, neces- 
sarily unavowed, being that the boats from 
various ships thus assembling gave facilities for 
transmitting messages and forming plans ; and 
when ships arrived from England they underwent 
a moral quarantine, no intercourse with them 
being permitted until sanctioned by the admiral. 
When the captain reported to him, his boat, 
while waiting, was shoved off out of earshot. It 
is said that on one occasion a seaman in such 



Jervis 369 

a boat managed to call to one looking out of a 
port of the flag-ship, " I say, there, what have you 
fellows been doing out here, while we have been 
fighting for your beef and pork ? " To which the 
other replied, " You 'd best say nothing at all 
about that out here, for if old Jarvie hears ye 
he '11 have ye dingle-dangle at the yard-arm at 
eight o'clock to-morrow morning." 

The severe strain of this prolonged watchful- 
ness told on even his iron hardihood, and it would 
almost appear that some of the rough practical 
jokes told of this period must represent reaction 
from the tension under which he necessarily was 
through the grave anxieties pressing upon him. 
Humor he certainly had, but at this time it often 
showed itself in horse-play, so fantastic as to sug- 
gest some unusual exciting cause. Thus, for one 
such prank he seemed to draw his inspiration from 
the Sunday celebration of Divine Service. Upon 
its conclusion, he framed and published a new 
signal, for " all chaplains," the employment of 
which, however, was postponed to an occasion 
suited to his lordship's fun. " A few days after it 
blew great guns from west-southwest, which is 
directly into the Bay of Cadiz. The inshore 
squadron lay six miles from the flag-ship, directly 
to leeward, and up went the signal for all chap- 
lains. It was a hard pull for the rowers, and no 
luxury for the sitters. When they reached the 
quarter-deck of the Ville de Paris, literally 

drenched with salt-water, the admiral presented 

24 



370 Types of Naval Officers 

them to ' Bishop Morgan,' as he called the chap- 
lain of the flag-ship, and desired that they would 
go down into the ward-room and hold a conclave." 
One who has had a pull of that kind, as most offi- 
cers have in their day, can understand that the 
humor was less appreciable to the victims than 
to the author. 

" He sometimes amused himself by paying a 
visit to the quarter-deck at what most people 
would deem very unseasonable hours. Coming 
up one morning at half-past two, in the middle 
watch, he sent for Colonel Flight, the command- 
ing officer of marines. Up came the colonel, 
armed at all points, supposing that some enter- 
prise was in hand. ' I have sent for you,' said 
the Chief, in the quiet and gentlemanly style 
which he could always command, ' I have sent 
for you, Colonel, that you might smell, for the 
first time in your life, the delicious odors brought 
off by the land wind from the shores of Andalusia. 
Take a good sniff, and then you may go and turn 
in again.' " 

"A lieutenant one day came on board to 
answer a signal. Lord St. Vincent thought 
there was about him too much embonpoint for 
an officer of that rank. ' Calder,' said he to the 
captain of the fleet, ' all the lieutenants are run- 
ning to belly ; they have been too long at anchor 
(for the fleet was still off Cadiz) ; block up the 
entering port, except for admirals and captains, 
and make them climb over the hammocks.' The 



Jervis 37 1 

entering port in a three-decked ship being on 
the middle deck, the difference between going 
into that and climbing over the hammocks may 
be compared to entering the drawing-room by 
the balcony window, or mounting to the parapet 
and taking the attics by storm. There was also 
great inconvenience, and even expense, attending 
this painful operation, since in those days all 
officers wore white knee-breeches, or shorts, as 
they were called, and many useful garments 
which could not readily be replaced, were torn 
and spoiled in this attempt at juvenile activity, 
and many oaths probably sworn, which but for 
this needless exertion would not have been 
elicited." 

A more pleasing, and it may well be believed 
much more characteristic, instance of his playful- 
ness has also been transmitted; one illustrative 
too of his deep fund of kindliness which was 
shown in many acts, often of large pecuniary 
liberality, and tinged especially with a certain 
distinct service coloring, with sympathy for the 
naval officer and the naval seaman, which must 
have gone far to obtain for him the obedience 
of the will as well as submission of conduct. 
He wisely believed in the value of forms, and 
was careful to employ them, in this crisis of the 
mutinies, to enforce the habit of reverence for 
the insignia of the state and the emblems of 
military authority. Young lieutenants — for there 
were young lieutenants in those days — were 



372 Types of Naval Officers 

directed to stand cap in hand before their supe- 
riors, and not merely to touch their hats in a 
careless manner. " The discipline of the cabin 
and ward-room officers is the discipline of the 
fleet," said the admiral ; and savage, almost, were 
the punishments that fell upon officers who dis- 
graced their cloth. The hoisting of the colors, 
the symbol of the power of the nation, from 
which depended his own and that of all the 
naval hierarchy, was made an august and impos- 
ing ceremony. The marine guard, of near a 
hundred men, was paraded on board every ship- 
of-the-line. The national anthem was played, 
the scarlet-clad guard presented, and all officers 
and crews stood bareheaded, as the flag with 
measured dignity rose slowly to the staff-head. 
Lord St. Vincent himself made a point of attend- 
ing always, and in full uniform ; a detail he did 
not require of other officers. Thus the divinity 
that hedges kings was, by due observance, asso- 
ciated with those to whom their authority was 
delegated, and the very atmosphere the seaman 
breathed was saturated with reverence. 

The presence of Lord St. Vincent on these 
occasions, and in full uniform, gave rise to an 
amusing skit by one of the lieutenants of the 
fleet, attributing the homage exacted, not to the 
flag, but to the great man himself; and this, 
becoming known to the admiral, elicited from 
him in turn the exhibition of practical humor to 
which allusion has just been made. Parodying 



Jervis 373 

the Scriptural story of Nebuchadnezzar's golden 
image, the squib began : — 

" I. The Earl of St. Vincent, the commander- 
in-chief, made an Image of blue and gold, whose 
height was about five feet seven inches, and the 
breadth thereof was about twenty inches " (which 
we may infer were the proportions of his lord- 
ship). " He set it up every ten o'clock a. m. on 
the quarter-deck of the Ville de Paris, before 
Cadiz." 

Passing from hand to hand, it can be under- 
stood that this effusion, which was characterized 
throughout by a certain sprightliness, gave more 
amusement to men familiar with the local sur- 
roundings, and welcoming any trifle of fun in the 
dulness of a blockade, than it does to us. At 
last it reached the admiral, who knew the author 
well. Sending for him on 'Some pretext, an hour 
before the time fixed for a formal dinner to the 
captains of the fleet, he detained him until the 
meal was served, and then asked him to share it. 
All passed off quietly until the cloth was removed, 
and then the host asked aloud, " What shall be 
done to the man whom the commander-in-chief 
delights to honour } " " Promote him," said one 
of the company. " Not so," replied St. Vincent, 
" but set him on high among the people. So, 
Cumby," addressing the lieutenant, " do you sit 
there," — on a chair previously arranged at some 
height above the deck, — " and read this paper to 
the captains assembled." Mystified, but not yet 



jy4 Types of Naval Officers 

guessing what was before him, Cumby took his 
seat, and, opening the paper, saw his own parody. 
His imploring looks were lost upon the admiral, 
who sat with his stern quarter-deck gravity un- 
shaken, while the abashed lieutenant, amid the 
suppressed mirth of his audience, stumbled 
through his task, until the words were reached, 
*' Then the Earl of St. Vincent was full of fury, 
and the form of his visage was changed against 
the poor Captain of the Main-Top," who had not 
taken off his hat before the Image of blue and 
gold. Here a roar of laughter from the head of 
the table unloosed all tongues, and Cumby 's pen- 
ance ended in a burst of general merriment. 
*' Lieutenant Cumby," said the admiral, when 
quiet was restored, "you have been found guilty 
of parodying Holy Writ to bring your commander- 
in-chief into disrespect ; and the sentence is that 
you proceed to England at once on three months' 
leave of absence, and upon your return report to 
me to take dinner here again." 

Compelled by general break-down of health to 
seek rest at home, St. Vincent returned to Eng- 
land in August, 1799. He was not left long in 
repose. The condition of the Channel Fleet as 
regards discipline has already appeared, and the 
very recent incident of the escape of the great 
French fleet from Brest, coupled with the equally 
humiliating and even more threatening experience 
of the same character in 1 796, when the invasion 
of Ireland was attempted, — both which occurred 



Jervis 375 

under the same British commander-in-chief, — 
showed the urgent necessity of placing in control 
the only man of suitable rank, whose complete 
adequacy to such a post had been demonstrated. 
St. Vincent accordingly hoisted his flag in April, 
1800. 

In the effort to restore discipline, he here en- 
countered not only opposition, intensified by the 
greater desire for shore privileges that' always 
attends a home station and the proximity of wives 
and children, but something very like an attempt 
at combination against his orders — a very grave 
military offence — on the part of the captains. 
All this he trampled down with severity amount- 
ing to ruthlessness. The insubordinate toast — 
" May the discipline of the Mediterranean never 
be introduced into the Channel Fleet" — was 
met face to face by republishing every order and 
restriction upon which the discipline of the Med- 
iterranean had rested. In the more distinctly 
military part of his task, the closing of the port 
of Brest to evasions by the enemy, such as those 
just mentioned, he achieved a noteworthy success. 
Modelling his scheme upon that of Hawke, forty 
years before, he gave to it a development, a 
solidity, and an extension which his distinguished 
forerunner had not been able to impart. Hawke 
had not the advantage, which St. Vincent had, of 
following a period of inefficiency, the remembrance 
of which compelled the Admiralty vigorously to 
support all measures of the commander-in-chief, 



376 Types of Naval Officers 

if they desired to replace the interminable uncer- 
tainties and anxieties of the last administration of 
the fleet by a sense of security, and consequent 
popular content. 

St. Vincent's institution and maintenance of 
the Brest blockade must be regarded under two 
principal heads. There is, first, the usefulness of 
the blockade as an instrument to the general 
ends of the current war, which is the strategic 
point of view, involving a conception permanent 
in character; and there are again the local dis- 
positions, arising from the local conditions, that 
may rightly be styled tactical, and vary from port 
to port thus watched. The former, the strategic, 
was more directly in line with his natural gifts ; 
and in the possession which the idea took of him 
is to be found the germ of the system that thence- 
forward began to throttle the power of the French 
Revolution, whether under the Republic or the 
Empire. . The essence of the scheme was to cut 
loose from the beach, and keep to the sea ; ever 
watchful, with the same watchfulness that had not 
only crushed mutiny, but by diligent care fore- 
stalled occasions of revolt. " Our great reliance," 
he said, — not directly in reference to the blockade, 
but to the general thought of which the blockade, 
as instituted by him, was the most illustrious ex- 
emplification, — " is on the vigilance and activity 
of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number 
of which, by applying them to guard our ports, in- 
lets, and beaches, would in my judgment tend to 



Jervis 377 

our destruction." Amplified as the idea was by 
him, when head of the Admiralty, to cover not only 
Brest but all ports where hostile divisions lay, it 
became a strategic plan of wide sweep, which 
crushed the vitality of the hostile navies, isolated 
France from all support by commerce, and fatally 
sapped her strength. To St. Vincent, more than 
to any one man, is due the effective enforcement 
and maintenance of this system; and in this 
sense, as practically the originator of a decisive 
method, he is fairly and fully entitled to be con- 
sidered the organizer of ultimate victory. 

The local dispositions before Brest will not 
here be analyzed.^ Suffice it to say that, as 
revealed in Jervis's correspondence, they show that 
equipment of general professional knowledge, 
that careful study of conditions, — of what cor- 
responds to " the ground " of a shore battle- 
field, — and the thoughtful prevision of pos- 
sibilities, which constitute so far the skilful 
tactician. The defence and the attack of sea- 
ports, embracing as they do both occupation of 
permanent positions and the action of mobile 
bodies, are tactical questions ; differing much, 
yet not radically, from field operations, where 
positions are taken incidentally, but where move- 
ment of armed men is the principal factor. In 
the one sense St. Vincent displayed a high degree 
of aptitude for ordered permanent dispositions, 

1 This has been done by the author elsewhere (Influence of Sea 
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol. I. pp. 371-377). 



378 Types of Naval Officers 

which is the side of tactics most akin to strategy. 
On the more distinctively tactical side, in the 
movements of a fleet in action, he had little 
opportunity. As far as shown by his one battle. 
Cape St. Vincent, it would not appear that either 
by nature or cultivation he possessed to any great 
extent the keen insight and quick appreciation 
that constitute high tactical ability. 

Earl St. Vincent rendered three great servi- 
ces to England. The first was the forming and 
disciplining the Mediterranean fleet into the per- 
fection that has been mentioned. Into it, thus 
organized, he breathed a spirit which, taking its 
rise from the stern commander himself, rested 
upon a conviction of power, amply justified in 
the sequel by Cape St. Vincent and the Nile, 
its two Q:reatest achievements. The second was 
the winning of the Battle of St. Vincent at a most 
critical political moment. The third was the sup- 
pression of mutiny in 1 797 and 1 798. But, in esti- 
mating the man, these great works are not to be 
considered as isolated from his past and his future. 
They were the outcome and fruitage of a char- 
acter naturally strong, developed through long 
years of patient sustained devotion to the ideals 
of discipline and professional tone, which in them 
received realization. Faithful in the least, Jervis, 
when the time came, was found faithful also in 
the greatest. Nor was the future confined to 
his own personal career. Though he must yield 
to Nelson the rare palm of genius, which he 



Jervis 379 

himself cannot claim, yet was the glory of Nel- 
son, from the Nile to Trafalgar, the fair flower 
that could only have bloomed upon the rugged 
stalk of Jervis's navy. Upon him, therefore. Nel- 
son showered expressions of esteem and rever- 
ence, amounting at times almost to tenderness, 
in his early and better days. In later years their 
mutual regard suffered an estrangement which, 
whatever its origin, appears as a matter of feeling 
to have been chiefly on the part of the younger 
man, whose temper, under the malign influence 
of an unworthy passion, became increasingly im- 
bittered, at strife within itself and at variance with 
others. The affectionate admiration of St. Vin- 
cent for his brilliant successor seems to have re- 
mained proof against external differences. 

It was poetic justice, then, that allotted to St. 
Vincent the arrangement of the responsible expe- 
dition which, in 1798, led to the celebrated Bat- 
tle of the Nile ; in its lustre and thorough work- 
manship the gem of all naval exploits. To him 
it fell to choose for its command his brilliant 
younger brother, and to winnow for him the 
flower of his fleet, to form what Nelson after the 
victory called *' his band of brothers." " The 
Battle of the Nile,'* said the veteran admiral. 
Lord Howe, "stands singular in this, that every 
captain distinguished himself." The achievement 
of the battle was Nelson's own, and Nelson's only ; 
but it was fought on St. Vincent's station, by a 
detachment from St. Vincent's fleet. He it was 



380 Types of Naval Officers 

who composed the force, and chose for its leader 
the youngest flag-officer in his command. Bit- 
ter reclamations were made by the admirals senior 
to Nelson, but St. Vincent had one simple suffi- 
cient reply, — " Those who are responsible for 
measures must have the choice of the men to 
execute them." 

When St. Vincent, in 1799, quitted the Medi- 
terranean, he had yet nearly a quarter of a 
century to live. His later years were distin- 
guished by important services, but they embody 
the same spirit and exemplify the same methods 
that marked his Mediterranean command, which 
was the culminating period of his career. In 
1 80 1, when Pitt's long term of office came to an 
end, he became First Lord of the Admiralty, — 
the head of naval affairs for the United King- 
dom, — and so continued during the Addington 
administration, till 1804. ^^ 1806, at the age of 
seventy-two, he was again for a short time called 
to command the Channel fleet; but in 1807 he 
retired from active service, and the square flag 
that had so long flown with honor was hauled 
down forever. 

The rest of his life was spent chiefly at his 
country-seat, Rochetts, in Essex, sixteen miles 
from London. Having a handsome income, 
though not wealthy, he entertained freely ; and 
his retreat was cheered by frequent visits from 
his old naval subordinates and political friends. 
Generous in the use of money, and without chil- 



Jervis 381 

dren for whom to save, the neighborhood learned 
to love him as a benefactor. In cases of ne- 
cessity, his liberality rose to profusion, and he 
carried into the management of his estate a 
carelessness he never showed in administering 
a fleet. It is told that he once undertook to 
raise a sum by mortgage, in entire forgetful- 
ness of a much larger amount in bank. Far 
into old age he retained the active habits of 
his prime. To say that he rose at four, asserts 
a biographer, would be to understate the case ; 
he was frequently in the fields at half-past two 
in the early summer dawn of England, — always 
before his laborers, — and he was not pleased if 
his male guests did not appear by six. To ladies 
he was more tolerant. With mind unclouded 
and unweakened to the last, he retained his inter- 
est in public affairs and in the navy, contributing 
to the conversation which animated his home the 
judgment of an acute intellect, though one deeply 
tinged by prejudices inseparable from so strong a 
character. Thus honored and solaced by the 
companionship of his friends, he awaited in calm 
dignity the summons, which came on the 13th of 
March, 1823. He was two months over eighty- 
eight when he passed away, the senior admiral of 
Great Britain. 



SAUMAREZ 

1757-1836 

" ^ I^HESE were honourable among the thirty," 
A says the ancient Hebrew chronicler, " yet 
they attained not unto the first three." Since 
that far-away day, when the three mighty men 
broke through the host of the Philistines that 
they might bring their chieftain water from the 
well of Bethlehem, to how many fighters, land 
and sea, have these words been applicable ! — 
men valiant in deed, wise in council, patient in 
endurance, yet lacking that divine somewhat 
which, for want of a better name, we call genius. 
Of such an one now, and, in contrasted sequence, 
of another of his peers, we are about to give an 
account ; men who in their respective careers 
illustrated more conspicuously, the one the 
distinctively military, the other the more purely 
nautical, aspects, in the due blending of which 
the excellence of the profession is realized ; fore- 
most, both, among the ocean warriors whose 
pennants flew through the wild scenes where 
England's flag was called to brave the battle and 
the breeze. 



James, Lord de Saumare{. 



Saumarez 3 83 



" Till danger's troubled night depart, 
And the star of peace return." 

James Saumarez was born on the nth of 
March, 1757, in Guernsey, one of the Channel 
group of islands that still remain attached to the 
English crown, — the sole remaining fragment of 
the Norman duchy to which the kingdom itself 
was for a while but an appendage. In Saumarez's 
childhood, French was still so generally spoken 
there that, despite the very early age at which 
he went to sea, he always retained a perfect mas- 
tery of that language; and it is recorded that 
one of his uncles, being intended for the sea ser- 
vice, was sent to school in England when ten 
years old, in order to acquire the use of English. 
From such a stock, whose lineage among the 
gentry of the island can be traced to the four- 
teenth century, sprang three distinguished officers 
of this name, destined to illustrate the British 
flag by their deeds in several wars, in which their 
chief opponent was the French navy. Among 
these, the subject of this article attained the most 
brilliant renown. Eighteen months older than 
Nelson, not even Nelson saw more or harder 
fighting than did James Saumarez, nor bore 
himself more nobly throughout their day and 
generation. 

Having early shown a taste for the navy, his 
father, who had six sons and a restricted income, 
obtained of a naval captain to have his name 
borne on the books of a ship of war at the early 



384 Types of Naval Officers 

age of ten ; a curious custom of that day allowing 
such constructive service to be counted in the 
time prescribed for attaining a lieutenant's com- 
mission. The boy did not actually go afloat 
until 1770, when a little over thirteen. This first 
employment kept him from home continuously 
for five years, a period spent wholly in the Medi- 
terranean, and for the most part in the Levant ; 
the active naval war then existing between Tur- 
key and Russia, in the waters of Asia Minor, 
necessitating a special protection to British in- 
terests. It is a singular circumstance that this 
sea, esteemed so important to Great Britain, was 
never again visited by him, with the exception of 
the few brief months from May to October, 1 798, 
when, as second in command, he followed Nel- 
son's flag during the pursuit of Bonaparte's fleet 
which ended in its destruction at the Battle of the 
Nile. 

Returning to England in 1775, his actual and 
constructive service permitted Saumarez to ap- 
pear for examination for a lieutenancy. This he 
passed, but was not at once promoted. The 
troubles with the American colonies had now be- 
come open hostilities, and he was appointed, as 
master's mate or passed midshipman, to the 
Bristol of fifty guns, selected as flag-ship for 
the expedition against Charleston. This duty, 
which, by bringing him immediately under the 
eyes of the naval commander-in-chief, placed him 
also on the highway to advancement, he owed to 



Saumarez 385 



Admiral Keppel, then one of the leading flag 
officers of the British navy. His uncle, Philip 
Saumarez, and Keppel had shared the perils and 
sufferings of Anson s well-known expedition to 
the South Seas in 1740. Together they had buf- 
feted the wild weather off Cape Horn, with ships' 
companies more than decimated by scurvy; to- 
gether they had spread terror among the Spanish 
colonies of the Pacific ; together they had cap- 
tured the great galleon off Manila ; and Keppel 
still retained an affectionate interest in the kins- 
man of his old shipmate, who had long since 
fallen gloriously on the deck of his ship, in close 
action with a French vessel of far superior force. 
The squadron, which was commanded by Com- 
modore Sir Peter Parker, assembled at Cork, 
whence it sailed in January, 1776. Embarked on 
board the Bristol was Lord Cornwallis, afterwards 
so closely, and for himself disastrously, associated 
with the course of the American Revolution. 
Struck by Saumarez's activity and efficiency, he 
offered him a commission in his own regiment, 
with the position of aide-de-camp to himself. The 
young seaman, having a naturally strong mili- 
tary bent, which at that moment seemed more 
likely to receive satisfaction on shore than at sea, 
and swayed doubtless also by the prospect of a 
powerful patron, in the days when patronage had 
so much to do with men's careers, was on the 
point of accepting ; but his messmates chaffed 
him so mercilessly upon adopting a profession 

25 



386 Types of Naval Officers 

which habitually supplied them with derisive illus- 
trations and comparisons, that he finally declined. 
Many years later, when Saumarez was among the 
senior captains of the navy, the two gentlemen 
met as guests at the table of the head of the Ad- 
miralty, who upon hearing the incident from Corn- 
wallis remarked that he would have deprived the 
navy of one of its best officers. 

Owing partly to delays inseparable from sailing 
vessels, and partly to the dilatoriness with which 
war was most often waged before the days of the 
French Revolution, the British expedition did 
not appear off Charleston until the beginning of 
June, 1776. To Americans who know their own 
history, the stirring story of Fort Moultrie and 
its repulse of the British fleet has been familiar 
from childhood. Few are the American boys to 
whom the names of Jasper, of Marion, and of 
their brave commander, Moultrie himself, are un- 
known. But while all honor is due to the band 
of raw provincials who at this critical moment — 
one week before the Declaration of Independence 
was signed — withstood the enemy, and for the 
moment saved the province, the steady, obstinate 
valor shown by the seamen of kindred race, who 
contended with them, was no less brilliant, and 
was even more severely tested. The loss of the 
fort was thirty-seven killed and wounded ; that 
of the Bristol alone was one hundred and eleven 
out of a crew of three hundred and fifty; and 
during much of the action, which lasted thirteen 



Saumarez 387 



hours, she was powerless to return the raking 
fire of the enemy, in consequence of shot severing 
the ropes that kept her broadside in position. 
Saumarez was here for the first time engaged, 
and had two narrow escapes. Once, when point- 
ing a gun, a cannon-ball entering the port swept 
away seven of the eight men who served the 
piece; and somewhat later another ball struck 
off the head of a messmate by whom he was 
standing, covering him with blood. 

In this, his maiden action, Saumarez gave full 
proof of the steady courage which ever dis- 
tinguished him ; and it is worthy of passing 
remark that, in the doggedness of the fighting 
and the severity of the slaughter, the battle was 
typical of a great part of his after experience. 
Several death vacancies resulting among the 
officers, he was promoted to be lieutenant a 
fortnight later ; and when the Bristol went north 
he was again actively engaged in the operations 
on Long Island, and along the East and Hudson 
rivers, up to the evacuation of New York by the 
Americans. His conspicuous activity at length 
obtained for him the command of a galley, with 
which he was sent to Rhode Island in February, 
1778. The judgment of the illustrious Rodney, 
as well as the repeated efforts of the Americans 
to regain control of Narragansett Bay, may be 
cited against the opinion expressed by Bancroft, 
that the seizure of this important naval centre by 
the British was a mistake. The tenure of the 



J 88 Types of Naval Officers 

island, however, depended upon the control of 
the surrounding waters, and upon the active 
destruction of the American means of transport. 
Saumarez's galley was one of the force stationed 
in the eastern, or Seakonnet, passage ; and in the 
five months thus employed it is recorded that he 
was forty-seven times under fire. 

Sullivan was at this time preparing for his 
attack upon the British lines, expecting co-opera- 
tion by the French fleet. This arrived on the 
29th of July, and six days later Seakonnet Chan- 
nel was entered by a detachment superior in force 
to the British there. The latter burned their 
ships and retreated to Rhode Island, where the 
officers and seamen, Saumarez among them, con- 
tinued actively engaged in the defence of the 
works. On August 8th, the main French fleet, 
under the Count d'Estaing, ran the batteries of the 
principal channel, and anchored off the north end 
of the island, seriously increasing the perils of the 
defenders ; but next day the appearance of Lord 
Howe with an inferior squadron lured the French 
admiral out of the bay, his vessels were crippled 
by a storm, and he abandoned the coast. Sul- 
livan, deprived of an essential factor in his 
scheme, had then to fall back ; and the British 
captains, with their crews, being no longer needed, 
returned to England to seek other ships. 

Both by fortune and by choice, Saumarez's lot 
throughout life was thrown with the line-of-battle 
force of the navy, that body of heavy fighting 



Saumarez 389 

ships which constitute the true backbone of a 
sea service, because their essential function is to 
fight, not singly, but in masses, co-operating with 
others like themselves. In that respect they cor- 
respond to the solid masses of infantry, which, 
however disposed tactically, form the strength of 
armies. The aptitudes of brilliant ofHcers differ. 
Some are born frigate-captains, partisan warriors, 
ever actively on the wing, and rejoicing in the 
comparative freedom and independence of their 
movements, like the cavalry raider and outpost 
officer. Of this type was Pellew, Lord Exmouth, 
a seaman inbred, if ever there was one, who in 
this sphere won the renown most distinctively 
associated with his name, while giving proof 
throughout a long career of high professional ca- 
pacity in many directions. But while Saumarez, 
in his turn, was occasionally employed in frigate 
and light cruiser service, and always with great 
credit, his heart was with the ship-of-the-line, 
whose high organization, steady discipline, and 
decisive influence upon the issues of war appealed 
to a temperament naturally calm, methodical, and 
enduring. " He always preferred the command 
of a ship-of-the-line to a frigate," says his biogra- 
pher, who knew him well, — " notwithstanding the 
chances of prize-money are in favor of the latter ; " 
and he himself confirmed the statement, not only 
by casual utterance, — " My station as repeating 
frigate is certainly more desirable than a less con- 
spicuous one, at the same time I would rather 



390 Types of Naval Officers 

command a seventy-four," — but by repeated for- 
mal applications. In variety and interest of 
operations, as well as in prize-money, did a cruis- 
ing frigate have advantages ; for much of the 
time of ships-of-the-line passed necessarily in 
methodical routine and combined movements, 
unfavorable to individual initiative. Neverthe- 
less, their functions are more important and more 
military in character. In accordance with this 
preference Saumarez is found, whether by his 
own asking or not, serving the remaining three 
years of his lieutenant's time upon vessels of that 
class; and in one of them he passed through his 
next general action, a scene of carnage little infe- 
rior to the Charleston fight, illustrated by the 
most dogged courage on the part of the com- 
batants, but also, it must be said, unrelieved by 
any display of that skill which distinguishes 
scientific warfare ^om aimless butchery. This, 
however, was not Saumarez's fault. 

Towards the end of 1780, Great Britain, hav- 
ing already France, Spain, and America upon her 
hands, found herself also confronted by a league 
between the Baltic states to enforce by arms 
certain neutral claims which she contested. To 
this league, called the Armed Neutrality, Holland 
acceded, whereupon England at once declared war. 
Both nations had extensive commercial interests 
in the Baltic, and it was in protecting vessels 
engaged in this trade, by a large body of ships of 
war, that the only general action between the two 



Saumarez 391 



navies occurred. This was on the 5th of August, 
1 78 1, in the North Sea, off the Dogger-Bank, 
from which it has taken its name. 

At the time of meeting, the British, number- 
ing six ships-of-the-line, were returning from the 
Baltic ; the Dutch, with seven ships, were bound 
thither. Despite the numerical difference, no 
great error is made in saying that the two squad- 
rons were substantially of equal force. Each at 
once ordered the merchant vessels under its pro- 
tection to make the best of their way towards 
port, while the ships of war on either side began 
to form in order of battle between the enemy and 
their own convoy. The lists being thus cleared 
and the lines ranged, the British vessels, which 
were to windward, stood down together, after 
what was then the time-honored and unintelligent 
practice of their service, each to attack one of 
the Dutch ; disdaining to attempt doubling upon 
any part of the hostile line. Their ideal appears 
to have been that of the tournament, where every 
advantage of numbers and combination was re- 
jected in order to insure that the test should be that 
of individual courage and skill. So strong was this 
tradition in the British navy that its ablest con- 
temporary chronicler, James, has sought to explain 
away, half apologetically, the advantage gained by 
Nelson in doubling on the French van at the 
Nile. 

The Dutch, equally quixotic, refrained from 
taking advantage of the enemy's inability to use 



392 Types of Naval Officers 

his broadsides while thus approaching nearly- 
head-on. Arrayed in a close column, the ships 
about six hundred feet apart, the crews at the 
guns, and the marines drawn up on the poops, 
they waited in silence until the English, at 
8 A. M., were in position at half musket shot. 
Then the battle-flag w^as hoisted by each admiral, 
and all opened together, the conflict raging with 
fury for nearly four hours. It was the first time 
since the days of the great De Ruyter, more than 
a century before, that these kindred people had 
thus met in fair fight upon the sea. Equal in 
courage and in seamanship, and each neglecting 
to seek a tactical advantage, the usual result fol- 
lowed. Many men were killed and wounded, no 
ship was taken, and the combatants separated 
after a drawn battle ; but as one Dutch ship sank 
the next day, and their convoy could not proceed, 
the British claimed a victory. Their own mer- 
chant vessels, being on the return voyage, were 
able to complete it. 

Saumarez had shown his usual gallantry, and 
was again promoted. On the 23d of August, 
eighteen days after the action, he was made com- 
mander into the Tisiphone, a small but fast 
cruiser, technically called a fireship, and attached 
to the Channel fleet. In December, the British 
government learned that a large number of trans- 
ports and supply ships were about to sail from 
Brest for the West Indies. These were to carry 
troops and stores to the fleet of Count De Grasse, 



Saumarez 393 



who had returned to Martinique after the sur- 
render at Yorktown, and was now about to 
undertake the conquest of Jamaica. It was im- 
perative to intercept an expedition so essential 
to the success of the French plan, and Admiral 
Kempenfelt — the same who afterwards, in the 
Royal George^ " went down with twice four hun- 
dred men " — was sent in pursuit with twelve 
ships-of-the-line. The Tisiphone accompanied 
them as lookout vessel, and on the 12th of 
December, 1781, being then well ahead of the 
fleet, she was able to signal the admiral that the 
enemy was in sight to leeward with seventeen of- 
the-line ; but that the latter, instead of being 
between the British and the transports, were on 
the far side. Kempenfelt, an able tactician as 
well as seaman, seized his advantage, pushed 
between the men-of-war and the convoy, and car- 
ried off fifteen sail laden with military and naval 
stores, of great money value and greater military 
importance. More could not be done without 
risking a battle with a too superior force. It 
was essential, therefore, to apprise the British 
commander in the West Indies of the approach 
of the French reinforcements as well as of Kem- 
penfelt's successes, and the Tisiphojte was the 
same day despatched on this errand. 

Although he knew it not, Saumarez was now 
being borne by the tide which leads on to fortune. 
The next step in promotion then fixed, and still 
fixes, the seniority of a British officer, and the 



394 Types of Naval Officers 

Tisiphone s mission led him straight to it. 
Easily outsailing the unwieldy mass of enemies, 
he reached Barbados, and there learned that the 
British fleet, under Sir Samuel Hood, was an- 
chored off the island of St. Christopher, then 
invaded by a French army supported by De 
Grasse's fleet. The tenure of the island depended 
upon a fort on Brimstone Hill, still held by the 
British ; and Hood, though much inferior in force, 
had by a brilliant tactical move succeeded in 
dislodging De Grasse from his anchorage ground, 
taking it himself, and establishing there his fleet 
in such order that its position remained impreg- 
nable. The French, however, continued cruising 
to the southward, off the adjoining island of 
Nevis, where they interposed between Hood and 
Saumarez; and the latter could reach his com- 
mander only by threading the reefs lining the 
passage between the two islands, — a feat con- 
sidered hazardous, if not impracticable. Never- 
theless, the Tisiphone effected it by diligent care 
and seamanship, joining the fleet on January 31st, 
1782. 

Saumarez now found himself in the midst of the 
most active operations, at the opening of a cam- 
paign which promised to be of singular and 
critical importance. But in the midst of his re- 
joicing at the good fortune which had transferred 
him from the comparative inactivity of the Channel 
fleet, a momentary reverse befell. Called by 
signal on board the flag-ship, he received a bag of 



Saumarez 395 



despatches, with orders to sail that night for 
England. As he went dejectedly down the ship's 
side to his boat and was shoving off, the gig of 
a post-captain pulled alongside. " Hallo, Sau- 
marez," said its occupant, " where are you going ? " 
*' To England, I grieve to say." " Grieve ! " re- 
joined the other. " I wish I were in your place. 
I have been wanting this long time to go home 
for my health. Hold on a moment ; perhaps it can 
be arranged." The new-comer, named Stanhope, 
went at once to the admiral, who a few minutes 
later sent for Saumarez. Hood had learned to 
value the active young officer who had taken a 
forward part in the guerilla enterprises of the 
fleet. "Captain Saumarez," he said, "you know 
not how much I wish to serve you. Captain 
Stanhope shall go home, as he desires, and you 
shall have command of the Russell'' The same 
night the Tisiphone sailed ; Saumarez remaining 
as an acting post-captain, with a ship of seventy- 
four guns under him. 

Thus it happened that two months later, at 
the age of twenty-five, Saumarez commanded a 
ship-of-the-line in Rodney's renowned battle of 
the 12th of April; with one exception the most 
brilliant and decisive action fought by the British 
navy in a century. This circumstance alone 
would have insured the confirmation of his rank 
by the Admiralty, even had he not also eminently 
distinguished himself ; but it was for him one of 
those periods when inconstant fortune seems bent 



396 Types of Naval Officers 

upon lavishing her favors. He was near the 
head of the British column, as the hostile 
fleets passed in opposite directions, exchanging 
broadsides. As his ship cleared the French rear, 
a neighboring British vessel, commanded by one 
of the senior captains, turned to pursue the 
enemy. Saumarez gladly imitated him ; but 
when the other resumed his former course, 
because the admiral of the van, his immediate 
superior, had not turned, the Russell kept on after 
the French. At this moment, Rodney in the 
centre, and Hood in the rear, favored by a change 
of wind, were breaking through the French line. 
The RusselVs course carried her toward them, 
and consequently, in the melee which followed, 
she had the distinguished honor of engaging De 
Grasse's flag-ship, and of being in action with her 
when she surrendered. Indeed, although Sau- 
marez with characteristic modesty refrained from 
pressing his claim, he always, when questioned 
on the subject, maintained that although the 
enemy's vessel certainly struck to Hood's flag- 
ship, she did so immediately upon the latter 
joining the Russell. 

However regarded, this was a brilliant achieve- 
ment for so young a captain, less than a twelve- 
month having elapsed since he was but a 
lieutenant. Rodney, who had meanwhile sig- 
nalled his van to go about, was somewhat per- 
plexed at finding a single ship thus opportunely 
in the direction whence the Russell appeared; 



Saumarez 397 



and, upon being informed that she belonged to 
the van squadron, declared that her commander 
had distinguished himself above all others in the 
fleet. It proved, in fact, the keen military sense 
of the demands of an occasion which constitutes 
the born corps or division commander. This was 
Saumarez's third general action, at a time when 
Nelson, although three years a post-captain, had 
commanded only frigates, and had never seen a 
battle between fleets. But, if Saumarez used well 
the singular opportunities with which fortune 
favored him, it was characteristic of Nelson 
that his value transpired through the simplest 
intercourse and amid the most commonplace in- 
cidents of service. Men felt, rather than realized, 
that under the slight, quaint, boyish exterior there 
lay the elements of a great man, who would one 
day fulfil his own boast of climbing to the top of 
the tree ; and he had been made a full captain in 
1779, when not quite twenty-one. According to 
the rule of the British service, already mentioned, 
this assured for life his precedence over Sau- 
marez, promoted in 1782. 

The latter, however, if outstripped by a younger 
competitor, who was to become the greatest of 
British admirals, had secured a position of van- 
tage for that great war which then lay in the womb 
of the future. Returning to England in 1782, 
he passed in retirement the ten years that pre- 
ceded the outbreak of hostilities with the French 
republic. During this period he was twice called 



398 Types of Naval Officers 

out for service upon occasions of war threatening, 
— in 1787 with France, and in 1790 wath Spain; 
but though in each case appointed to a ship, the 
employment went no farther, as hostilities were 
timely averted. This protracted withdrawal from 
active pursuit of his profession, viewed in connec- 
tion with his prolonged and efficient service of 
the twenty following years, may be taken as indi- 
cating two things : first, that to professional ex- 
cellence once attained such a break is not as 
fatal as is commonly argued ; and second, con- 
sidered with his favorable entertainment of Corn- 
wallis's proposal to exchange into the army, this 
contentment with shore life during the peace 
confirms the remark already made, that, although 
a thorough seaman, Saumarez was so incidentally. 
His quickening interest was in the military rather 
than the nautical side of his calling. Pellew, on the 
contrary, now eagerly sought duty at sea, impelled 
thereto by clear restless predilection as well as, 
possibly, by need of increased income. It was 
during this interval of repose, in 1788, that Sau- 
marez married ; a step which did not in his case 
entail the professional deterioration charged 
against it by the cynical criticisms of St. Vincent. 
At this time, also, he made a trip to France, upon 
the occasion of sinking the first cone of the great 
Cherbourg breakwater, designed to give the 
French navy a first-class arsenal upon the Chan- 
nel, — a purpose which it now fulfils. Louis 
XVI. was present at this ceremony, and treated 



Saumarez 399 



Saumarez with much attention. This was the 
only time that he ever set foot upon French soil, 
although his home was in sight of the coast and 
he spoke the language fluently. 

When war with France again began, in 1793, 
Saumarez was appointed to the frigate Crescent, 
of thirty-six guns, with which he served actively 
in the Channel. In her, on the 20th of October, 
1793, he succeeded in intercepting the French 
frigate Reunion^ of substantially equal force, 
which he had learned was in the habit of quit- 
ting Cherbourg in pursuit of British merchant 
vessels every night, returning in the morning. 
The ensuing action called for an exhibition of 
seamanship which showed he had not lost aptitude 
during his retirement. In the beginning he 
placed the Crescent on the weather quarter of the 
French ship, — that is, on the windward side, but 
a little to the rear. This was well judged, because 
(i) the all-important rudder is thus less exposed, 
(2) in case of an unfavorable accident the adversary 
tends to leave rather than to approach, and (3) 
the vessel, moving ahead, is at once under com- 
mand to stop short of the opponent. After being 
placed, speed was regulated by backing or filling 
the mizzen-topsail, thus maintaining the relative 
positions, and directing fire upon the enemy's 
rudder. In this situation the fore-topsail yard 
and foretopmast of the Crescent were shot away 
in quick succession, and the ship flew up head 
to wind, bringing all her sails aback. For a 



400 Types of Naval Officers 

moment she was in an awkward plight, but the 
Reunion, drawing away, could not rake ; and Sau- 
marez, by adroit management of the rudder and 
sails, backedYivs^ ship round, — always a nice opera- 
tion and especially when near an enemy, — till the 
wind came again abaft, restoring the normal con- 
ditions of moving ahead under control of the helm. 
The contest was then renewed, and ended in the 
surrender of the French vessel. The disparity of 
loss — I British to ii8 French — proved the dis- 
cipline of the Crescent and the consummate sea- 
manship of her commander. For this exploit 
Saumarez was knighted. Faithful to his constant 
preference, he as soon as possible exchanged into 
a ship-of-the-line, the Orion, of seventy-four guns. 
In her he again bore a foremost part, in 1795, in 
a fleet-battle off the Biscay coast of France, 
where three enemy's ships were taken ; and two 
years later he was in the action with the Span- 
iards off Cape St. Vincent, of which an account 
has been given in the sketch of Earl St. Vincent. 
After this Saumarez remained on the same station, 
blockading Cadiz. 

In the following year, 1798, it became necessary 
to send a small detachment into the Mediter- 
ranean, and off the chief arsenal of the enemy, 
Toulon, to ascertain the facts concerning a great 
armament, since known as Bonaparte's Egyptian 
expedition, which rumor said was there in prep- 
aration. The hazardous nature of the duty, 
which advanced three ships of medium size, un- 



Saumarez 401 



supported, in the very teeth of over a dozen 
enemies, many of superior strength, demanded 
the utmost efficiency in each member of the little 
body so exposed ; a consideration which doubtless 
led Lord St. Vincent to choose Saumarez, though 
one of the senior captains, for this service, of 
which Nelson, the junior flag officer of the fleet, 
was given charge. 

It seems scarcely credible that, when it was 
afterwards decided to raise this detachment to 
fourteen ships-of-the-line, sufficient to cope with 
the enemy, both St. Vincent and Nelson wished 
to remove Saumarez, with his antecedents of 
brilliant service, so as to allow Troubridge, his 
junior, to be second in command. The fact, how- 
ever, is certain. Nelson had orders which would 
have allowed him to send the Orion back, when 
thus proceeding on a service pregnant with danger 
and distinction, to the immeasurable humiliation 
of her brave commander. After making every 
deduction for the known partiality for Troubridge 
of both St. Vincent and Nelson, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that Saumarez, with all his 
undoubted merit, was in their eyes inferior to 
Troubridge in the qualities necessary to chief 
command, in case of Nelson's death, at a junc- 
ture which called for the highest abilities of a gen- 
eral officer. The moment was too critical to 
permit mere favoritism to sway two such men 
against their judgment. As it was, however. 

Nelson felt he could not part with so efficient a 

26 



402 Types of Naval Officers 

ship; and he therefore contented himself with 
giving Troubridge and Saumarez each a sub- 
division of four vessels, keeping six under his 
own immediate direction. 

As all know, the French, when found, were at 
anchor. Thus surprised, the British fleet was 
hurled at them in a single mass ; nor was there 
any subordinate command exercised, by Saumarez 
or any other, except that of each captain over his 
particular ship. Nelson's first expectation was to 
overtake the unwieldy numbers of the enemy, 
amounting to over four hundred sail, at sea, and 
there to destroy both convoy and escort. In such 
an encounter there would be inestimable tactical 
advantage in those compact subdivisions, which 
could be thrown as units, under a single head, in 
a required direction. For such a charge Sau- 
marez possessed most eminent capacity. 

The warm family affection that was among the 
many winning traits of Saumarez's symmetrical 
and attractive character impelled him to copious 
letter-writing. Hence we have a record of this 
pursuit of the French fleet, with almost daily 
entries; an inside picture, reflecting the hopes, 
fears, and perplexities of the squadron. Bona- 
parte's enterprise has been freely condemned 
in later days as chimerical ; but it did not so 
appear at the time to the gallant seamen who 
frustrated it. The preparations had been so 
shrouded in mystery that neither Nelson nor his 
government had any certainty as to its des- 



Saumarez 403 



tination, — an ignorance shared by most of the 
prominent French officials. When, after many 
surmises, the truth gradually transpired, the Brit- 
ish officers realized that much time must yet 
elapse before the English ministry could know 
it. Two months, for instance, passed before 
news of the Battle of the Nile reached London. 
Then, if India were the ultimate object, to which 
Egypt was but the stepping-stone, four months 
more, at least, would be needed to get a naval 
reinforcement to the threatened point. What if, 
meanwhile, the ally of France in the peninsula, 
Tippoo Saib, had been assembling transports 
with the secrecy observed at Toulon and the 
other ports whence the divisions had sailed ? " I 
dined with Sir Horatio to-day," writes Saumarez 
on June 15th, nearly four weeks after Bonaparte's 
starting, " and find that his intelligence extends 
only to the enemy's fleet having been seen off 
Sicily ; but we have reason to suppose them 
gone for Alexandria, the distance from which to 
the Red Sea is only three days' journey. They 
may soon be transported thence by water to the 
East Indies, with the assistance of Tippoo Saib; 
and with their numerous army they expect to 
drive us out of our possessions in India. This 
profound scheme, which is thought very feasible, 
we hope to frustrate by coming up with them 
before they reach the place of their destination." 
A week later. Nelson received off Sicily news 
of the surrender of Malta to the French. In 



404 Types of Naval Officers 

accordance with the views above expressed, Sir 
James now — June 2 2d — gave Nelson his written 
opinion, favoring the course adopted of seeking 
the enemy off the coast of Egypt; one of the 
most responsible decisions ever taken by an ad- 
miral in chief command, especially at the begin- 
ning of a career, as Nelson then was. " We are 
now crowding sail for Alexandria ; but it is very 
doubtful if we fall in with them at all, as we are 
proceeding on the merest conjecture, and not on 
any positive information. If, at the end of our 
journey, we find we are upon the wrong scent, 
our embarrassment will be great indeed. Fortu- 
nately, I only act here en second ; but did the 
chief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would 
be more than my too irritable nerves would bear." 
Nelson, in truth, was passing these hoiirs in a 
fever of anxiety, scarce able to eat or drink. Yet 
at that very moment the British were crossing 
the enemy's wake, unseeing and unseen, and 
barely fifty miles separated the two fleets. 

The perplexity foreshadowed by Saumarez actu- 
ally fell upon the English admiral, through his 
reaching Alexandria three days before the French. 
Harassed out of his better judgment, he hurried 
back to the westward, touched at Sicily, and 
thence once more to Egypt. Meantime, the 
French had landed successfully. On the ist of 
August the British fleet again sighted Alexan- 
dria ; saw the French flag on the walls, but no 
ships of war. " When the reconnoitring squad- 



Sau 



marez 



405 



ron made the signal that the enemy was not 
there," wrote Saumarez, " despondency nearly 
took possession of my mind, and I do not re- 
member ever to have felt so utterly hopeless or 
out of spirits as when we sat down to dinner. 
Judge, then, what a change took place when, as 
the cloth was being removed, the officer of the 
watch hastily came in, saying, ' Sir, a signal is 
just now made that the enemy is in Aboukir Bay, 
and moored in a line of battle.' All sprang from 
their seats, and, only staying to drink a bumper 
to our success, we were in a moment on deck." 
As the captain appeared, the crew hailed him 
with three hearty cheers, a significant token of 
the gloom which had wrapped the entire squadron 
through the recent ordeal of suspense and disap- 
pointment. 

It is only with Saumarez's share in this re- 
nowned battle that we are here concerned. As 
is generally known, Nelson's tactics consisted in 
doubling upon the van and centre of the enemy, 
who lay at anchor in a column head to wind, 
or nearly so.. Their rear, being to leeward, was 
thus thrown out of action. The French had 
thirteen ships-of-the-line, of which one was of 
one hundred and twenty guns, and two eighties. 
The British also had thirteen, all seventy-fours, 
and one of fifty guns ; but one of the former 
going aground left them equal in numbers and 
inferior in force. There were two successive 
acts in the dram.a. In the first, ten British 



4o6 Types of Naval Officers 

ships engaged the eight leading French ; in 
the second, the fifty and two of the seventy- 
fours, which had been belated, came upon the field 
and strengthened the attack upon the enemy's 
centre. The Orio7i, being third in the order, 
was one of the five vessels which passed within 
the French, and fought on that side. In so doing, 
she described a wide sweep around her two pre- 
decessors. While thus standing down to her 
station, an enemy's frigate, the Serieuse, opened 
fire upon her, wounding two men. It was then 
part of the chivalrous comity of fleet-actions that 
frigates should not be molested by the ships-of- 
the-line, so long as they minded their own busi- 
ness, — an immunity which of course ceased if 
they became aggressive. Saumarez was urged to 
return her fire. " No," he replied, " let her alone ; 
she will get bolder and come nearer. Shorten 
sail." She did draw nearer, and then the Orion, 
swinging sharply towards her, let drive her broad- 
side of double-shotted guns. All the masts of 
the unlucky frigate went overboard, and she 
shortly sank, nothing but her poop being visible 
the next day. The helm of the British vessel was 
then shifted, but so much ground had been lost 
that she could anchor only abreast the fifth 
French ship; the interval left being filled by 
those who followed. In this position the Orion 
silenced her immediate opponent, the Peuple 
Souverain, w^hich, being in an hour and a half to- 
tally dismasted, cut her cables and dropped out of 



Saumarez 407 

the line ; the contest being then continued with 
the sixth in the French order, the Franklin^ 
next ahead of the flag-ship, Orient, The Orion 
was thus near by the latter when she blew up, 
but the few burning fragments which fell on 
board were quickly extinguished. 

Twenty-four hours after the battle, Saumarez, 
who had been delayed till then by a severe 
wound from a splinter, went on board the flag- 
ship to call on the admiral ; and to this visit we 
owe the knowledge of two closely related inci- 
dents, recorded by his biographer and friend, 
which are significant at once of his individual 
ideas on tactical combination, and of the lack of 
personal sympathy apparent between him and 
Nelson. He " found several of his brother offi- 
cers on the quarter-deck, discussing the merits of 
the action. Some regret having been expressed 
at the escape of the two sternmost ships of the 
French line. Sir James said to the admiral, ' It 
was unfortunate we did not — ' and was proceed- 
ing to say 'all anchor on the same side.' But, 
before he could finish the sentence, Nelson 
hastily interrupted him, exclaiming, ' Thank God 
there was no order ! ' Then turning the conver- 
sation, he entered his cabin and sent for Captain 
Ball. . . .We may relate the circumstances which 
induced Saumarez, without the least intention to 
offend, to make the observation at which offence 
was taken. It was Nelson's custom, when in com- 
munication or company with the captains under 



4o8 Types of Naval Officers 

his command, to converse with them on the vari- 
ous modes of attacking the enemy under different 
circumstances ; and, on one of these occasions, 
Sir James Saumarez, who had seen the evil con- 
sequences of doubling on the enemy, especially in 
a night action, had differed with the admiral in 
that plan of attack, saying that ' it never required 
two English ships to capture one French, and 
that the damage which they must necessarily do 
each other might render them both unable to fight 
an enemy's ship that had not been engaged ; 
and, as in this case two ships could be spared 
to the three-decker, everyone might have his 
opponent.' " 

Inasmuch as Nelson, in pursuance of his previ- 
ously announced idea, had himself in the flag-ship 
— the sixth to enter action — set the example of 
doubling, by anchoring on the side of the enemy's 
line opposite to that of his first five ships, and in 
doing so had deliberately taken position on one 
side of a French vessel already engaged on the 
other, Saumarez's remark was substantially a 
censure, inopportune to a degree singular in a 
man of his kindly and generous temper ; and its 
reception by Nelson is not a cause for surprise. 
On the other hand, as a matter of tactical criti- 
cism, based upon tactical conceptions previously 
adopted, if we assume it to be true that two 
British ships were not needed to capture one 
French, it may yet be confidently affirmed that 
to attack with decisively superior force a part 



Saumarez 409 



of the enemy's order — to combine in short — is 
shown by experience to attain the same degree of 
success more certainly and at less cost than the 
simple distribution of effort advocated by Sauma- 
rez. To double, and to beat in detail, remained the 
ideal of Nelson, as it had been of Howe. It was 
by him applied then and afterwards to all cases, 
small or great, actual or supposed. To it he 
chiefly owed his dazzling successes, and this 
divergence of ideals marks the difference in 
professional insight which mainly determines 
the relative positions of Nelson and Saumarez 
in naval biography. It indicates the distinction 
between the great general officer and the accom- 
plished and resolute division or corps commander. 
At the Battle of the Nile Saumarez received 
the only wound that ever fell to him throughout 
his numerous meetings with the enemy, being 
struck on the thigh and side by a heavy splinter, 
which had killed two officers before reaching him. 
The total loss of his ship was forty-two killed and 
wounded, out of a crew of six hundred. Ten 
days after the action he was ordered to take 
charge of six of the prizes, which had been partly 
repaired, and with seven of the fleet to convoy 
them to Gibraltar. At the same time he was 
notified that the Orion was to go home as soon 
as this duty was performed. A more charming 
prospect can scarcely be imagined than this re- 
turning to his family after a long absence, fresh 
from the completest achievement ever wrought 



4IO Types of Naval Officers 

by the British navy; but even his tranquil tem- 
per, whose expressions never lapse into the 
complaints of Nelson or the querulousness of 
Collingwood, was tried by the slow progress of 
his battered and crippled squadron. " The prizes 
get on very slowly," he writes ; " but I am en- 
dowed with unparalleled patience, having scarcely 
uttered a murmur at their tardiness, so perfectly 
satisfied am I with the prospect before me." 
Some time later he notes : " We have been three 
weeks effecting what might be accomplished in 
two days. This extraordinary delay makes me 
more fractious than can be imagined, and I begin 
to lose the character for patience which I had given 
myself, by so tiresome a situation." It was still 
the season of westerly winds, and the voyage from 
Alexandria to Gibraltar occupied sixty-nine days. 
The Orion was now completely worn out, hav- 
ing been continuously in commission since the 
war began in 1793. Besides the three general 
actions in which Saumarez commanded her, she 
had borne a valiant part in Howe's great battle of 
the 1st of June. " This last business has so 
shattered the poor Orion',' wrote Saumarez, " that 
she will not, without considerable repairs, be in a 
state for more service." On reaching England 
she was paid off ; and in February, 1 799, he 
was appointed to the CcBsar, of eighty-four guns, 
one of the finest ships in the navy, which was to 
bear his flag in the last and most brilliant episode 
of his hard-fighting career. 



Saumarez 41 1 



A year later, Lord St. Vincent, having re- 
turned from the Mediterranean, took command 
of the Channel Fleet, and at once instituted in 
its methods, and particularly in the blockade of 
Brest, changes which gradually revolutionized the 
character of the general naval war ; baffling be- 
yond any other single cause the aims of Napo- 
leon, and insuring the fall of his empire. One 
of the new requirements was the maintenance of 
a powerful advanced division of six or eight ships- 
of-the-line, within ten miles of the harbor's mouth. 
It was a duty singularly arduous, demanding 
neither dash nor genius, but calmness, steadiness, 
method, and seamanship of a high order, for all 
which Saumarez was conspicuous. From either 
side of the Bay of Brest a long line of reefs pro- 
jects for fifteen miles to the westward. Far in- 
side their outer limits, and therefore embayed by 
the westerly winds which blow at times with 
hurricane violence, was the station of the ad- 
vanced squadron, off some well-marked rocks of 
the northern reef, known as the Black Rocks. 
On this spot, called Siberia by the seamen, dur- 
ing fifteen weeks, from August to December, Sir 
James Saumarez kept so close a watch that not a 
vessel of any force entered or left Brest. " With 
you there," wrote Earl St. Vincent, " I sleep as 
sound as if I had the key of Brest in my pocket." 
No work ever done by him w^as more meritorious 
or more useful. Near its expiration St. Vincent 
wrote to him, " The employment you have con- 



412 Types of Naval Officers 

ducted is the most important of this war." He there 
demonstrated that what before had apparently been 
thought impossible could be done, though involv- 
ing a degree of anxiety and peril far exceeding 
that of battle, while accompanied by none of the 
distinction, nor even recognition, which battle 
bestows. " None but professional men who have 
been on that service," says his biographer with 
simple truth, "can have any idea of its difH- 
culties, — surrounded by dangers of every kind, 
exposed to the violence of storms, sailing amidst 
a multitude of rocks and variable currents in the 
longest and darkest nights, and often on a lee shore 
on the enemy's coast, while the whole of their fleet 
is near, ready to take advantage of any disaster." 
ColHngwood, who in the next war succeeded 
to the same unenviable duty, wrote home that, 
even in the summer month of August, " I bid 
adieu to comfortable naps at night, never lying 
down but in my clothes. An anxious time I 
have of it, what with tides and rocks, which 
have more of danger in them than a battle once 
a week." In this laborious task Saumarez was 
the patient, unobserved pioneer. 

There was one man, however, who could and 
did recognize to the full the quality of the work 
done by Saumarez, and its value to those saga- 
cious plans which he himself had framed, and 
which in the future were to sap the foundations 
of the French power. That man was St. Vin- 
cent. "The merit of Sir James Saumarez," he 



Saumarez 



413 



said, " cannot be surpassed ; " and again, to Sau- 
marez himself, " The manner in which you have 
conducted the advanced squadron calls upon me 
to repeat my admiration of it." Succeeding soon 
after to the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, 
he gave him an opportunity for distinction, which 
resulted in an action of singular lustre and strik- 
ing success. 

Bonaparte, long before returned from Egypt, 
and now, as First Consul, practically the abso- 
lute ruler of France, had overthrown all ene- 
mies on the Continent. Peace with Austria, after 
her disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, had 
been signed in February, 1801. The great ob- 
jects of the French ruler now were to compass 
a maritime peace and withal to retain Egypt, 
associated from far back with the traditional 
policies of France, and moreover a conquest in 
which his own reputation was peculiarly inter- 
ested. To compel Great Britain to peace, he 
sought, by diplomacy or force, to exclude her 
commerce from the Continent, as well as to 
raise up maritime enemies against her. Thus 
he had fostered, if not actually engendered, the 
Baltic league of 1801, shattered by Nelson at 
Copenhagen ; and for this purpose he intended 
to occupy both Portugal and the kingdom of 
Naples. A powerful British expedition against 
Egypt had entered the Mediterranean. It was 
essential either to attack this directly, or to crip- 
ple its communications. Unable to do the for- 



414 Types of Naval Officers 

mer, and persistently thwarted in his attempts 
to reinforce his own troops in that distant de- 
pendency by the close watch of the British navy, 
of which Saumarez gave so conspicuous an illus- 
tration before Brest, Napoleon resorted to the 
common and sound military expedient of col- 
lecting a threatening force upon the flank of 
his enemy's line of communications. He directed 
a concentration of the Spanish and French na- 
vies at Cadiz, which, by its nearness to the straits, 
met the desired requirement. Among others, 
three French ships were ordered thither from 
Toulon. 

The British ministry was informed that at Ca- 
diz were collecting Spanish vessels, said by report 
to be intended against Portugal. This is unlikely, 
as Bonaparte could have subdued that country 
from the land side by the assistance of Spain ; 
moreover, the object of the concentration is stated 
in his letters. A squadron of five ships-of-the 
line was accordingly formed, and placed under 
the command of Saumarez, who on the ist of 
January, 1801, had been made a rear admiral. His 
orders were to go off Cadiz, where he would find 
two more vessels, and to prevent the enemies 
within the port from sailing, or from being joined 
by any from outside. Whatever Bonaparte's 
object, it would be thwarted by a force thus inter- 
posed, in a position to meet either one or the 
other of the converging detachments before they 
could unite. 



Saumarez 



415 



Saumarez sailed on his mission June 16, 1801, 
and on the 28th arrived off Cadiz. On the 5th 
of July he was informed that three French ships 
had anchored off Algeciras, the Spanish port on 
the west side of Gibraltar Bay, confronting the 
British fortress on the east side. This was the 
division from Toulon, which upon reaching 
the straits first learned of the British squadron 
that effectually prevented its entrance to Cadiz. 

Saumarez at once started for Algeciras with 
six of his ships-of-the-line, the seventh being 
out of recall to the northward. The following 
day, July 6th, he entered the bay, and found the 
French moored in a strong position, under cover 
of Spanish land batteries, and supported by a 
number of gunboats. Still, though difficult and 
doubtful, the enterprise was not hopeless ; and, 
as the breeze allowed his vessels to head for 
the enemy, he steered to engage at once. Un- 
fortunately, the wind fell as the squadron drew 
nigh, and only four ships were able to take 
their intended places ; the other two had to an- 
chor outside their consorts, and fire as they 
could through the intervals. This mishap les- 
sened by one-third the fighting power of the 
British, and, coupled with the acknowledged su- 
periority of guns on solid ground over those 
afloat, reduced them to inferiority. Their dis- 
advantage was increased by the arrangements of 
the French admiral, carefully elaborated during 
the two preceding days. Had the preparations 



41 6 Types of Naval Officers 

of Brueys at the Nile equalled those of Linois at 
Algeciras, Nelson's task must have been harder 
and his victory less complete. Nevertheless, after 
an engagement of an hour and a half, the British 
fire so far prevailed that the enemy resorted to a 
measure for which precautions had been taken 
beforehand. Lines had been run from each French 
ship to the shoal water lying close inside them ; 
and by means of these they were warped away 
from their opponents until they took the ground. 
This increase of distance was in every way a gain 
to the party standing on the defensive, and a corre- 
sponding loss to the assailants. Saumarez ordered 
the cables cut and sail made to close once more ; 
but the light and fickle airs both baffled this ef- 
fort and further embarrassed the British, through 
the difficulty of keeping their broadsides in posi- 
tion. Here happened the great disaster of the day. 
One of the outer ships, the Hannibal, tried to pass 
inside the headmost of the French, not realizing 
that the latter had moved. In so doing she 
ran aground close under a battery, to whose 
fire she could make no reply. After a brave and 
prolonged resistance, in which she lost seventy- 
five killed and seventy wounded out of a crew 
of six hundred, and had many of her guns dis- 
mounted, she hauled down her flag. By this 
time another ship, the Pompee, was dismasted, 
and success was plainly hopeless. The British 
admiral, therefore, ordered the action discon- 
tinued, and withdrew to the Gibraltar side ; 



Saumarez 



417 



the Pompee having to be towed away by the 
boats of the squadron. 

Saumarez had failed, and failure, however ex- 
plained, can hardly be carried to a man's credit ; 
but his after course, by wresting success out of 
seemingly irretrievable disaster, has merited the 
highest eulogium. Maintaining both courage 
and energy unimpaired, every effort was instantly 
made to get the ships once more into fighting 
condition, that the attack might be renewed. 
" Tell the Admiralty," said he to the bearer of 
his despatches, " that I feel confident I shall soon 
have an opportunity of attacking the enemy again, 
and that they may depend upon my availing 
myself of it." 

The opportunity did come. On the morning 
of July 9th, the Superb, the seventh ship, which 
had not been in the action, was seen rounding 
the west point of the bay under all sail, with 
a signal flying that the enemy was in pursuit. 
A few moments later appeared five Spanish 
vessels, two of which, the Real Carlos and the 
Hermenegildo, carrying each one hundred and 
twelve guns, were among the largest then afloat. 
On board them had embarked a number of the 
jeunesse doree of Cadiz, eager to join the trium- 
phal procession which it was thought would soon 
enter the port, flushed w^th a victory considered 
by them to be rather Spanish than French, and 
escorting the rare trophy of a British ship-of- 

the-line that had struck to Spanish batteries. 

27 



41 8 Types of Naval Officers 

Besides the two giants, there were a ninety-gun 
ship and two seventy-fours ; and the next day a 
French vessel of the latter class joined, making a 
total reinforcement of six heavy ships. 

To these Saumarez could oppose but five. 
The Hannibal he had lost. The Pompee could 
not be repaired in time ; her people were there- 
fore distributed among the other vessels of the 
squadron. Even his own flag-ship, the Ccssar, 
was so injured that he thought it impossible to 
refit her ; but when her crew heard his decision, 
one cry arose, — to work all day and night till 
she was ready for battle. This was zeal not ac- 
cording to knowledge ; but, upon the pleading of 
her captain in their name, it was agreed that they 
should work all day, and by watches at night. 
So it happened, by systematic distribution of 
effort and enthusiastic labor, that the Ccesar, 
whose mainmast on the 9th was out and her rig- 
ging cut to pieces, was on the 12th able to sail in 
pursuit of the foe. 

During the forenoon of the latter day the 
combined squadron was seen getting under way. 
The wind, being easterly, was fair for the British, 
and, besides, compelled the enemy to make some 
tacks to clear the land. This delay was inval- 
uable to Saumarez, whose preparations, rapid as 
they had been, were still far from complete. Not 
till one in the afternoon did the headmost Span- 
iards reach the straits, and there they had to 
await their companions. The Hannibal was un- 



Saumarez 419 



able to join them, and reanchored at Algeciras. 
At half-past two the CcBsar hauled out from Gib- 
raltar mole, her band playing, " Cheer up, my 
lads, 't is to glory we steer ! " which was answered 
from the mole-head with " Britons, strike home ! " 
At the same moment Saumarez's flag, provision- 
ally shifted to another vessel, was rehoisted at her 
masthead. The rugged flanks of the rock and 
the shores of Algeciras were crowded with eager 
and cheering sight-seers, whose shouts echoed 
back the hurrahs of the seamen. Rarely, indeed, 
is so much of the pride and circumstance, if not 
of the pomp, of w^ar rehearsed before an audience 
which, breathless with expectation, has in it no 
part save to admire and applaud. 

Off Europa Point, on the Gibraltar side, there 
clustered round the Ccesar her four consorts, 
all but one bearing, like herself, the still fresh 
wounds of the recent conflict. Four miles away, 
off Cabrita Point, assembled the three French of 
Linois's division, having like honorable marks, 
together with the six new unscarred arrivals. At 
8 p. M. of the summer evening the allies kept 
away for Cadiz ; Linois's division leading, the 
other six interposing between them and the five 
ships of Saumarez, which followed at once. It 
was a singular sight, this pursuit of nine ships 
by five, suggestive of much of the fatal differ- 
ence, in ideals and efficiency, between the navies 
concerned. Towards nine o'clock Saumarez or- 
dered the Superb, whose condition alone was 



420 Types of Naval Officers 

unimpaired by battle, to press ahead and bring 
the rear of the enemy to action. The wind was 
blowing strong from the east, with a heavy sea. 
At half-past eleven the Superb overtook the Real 
Carlos, and opened fire. Abreast the Spanish 
vessel, on her other side, was the Hermenegildo, 
The latter, probably through receiving some of 
the Superb' s shot, fancied the ship nearest her to 
be an enemy, and replied. In the confusion, one 
of them caught fire, the other ran on board her, 
and in a few moments there was presented to the 
oncoming British the tremendous sight of these 
two huge ships, with their twenty hundred men, 
locked in a fast embrace and blazing together. 
At half-past two in the morning, having by 
that time drifted apart, they blew up in quick 
succession. 

Leaving them to their fate, the hostile squad- 
ron passed on. The Superb next encountered 
the St. Antoine, and forced her to strike. Soon 
afterwards the wind died away, and both fleets 
were much scattered. A British ship brought 
to action one of the French which had been 
in the first battle ; indeed, the French accounts 
say that the latter had fought three enemies. 
However that may be, she was again severely 
mauled; but the English vessel opposed to her 
ran on a shoal, and lost all her masts. With this 
ended the events of that awful night. 

The net results of this stirring week completely 
relieved the fears of the British ministers. What- 



Saumarez 42 1 



ever the objects of the concentration at Cadiz, 
they were necessarily frustrated. Though the 
first attack was repulsed, the three French ships 
had been very roughly handled ; and, of the re- 
lieving force, three out of six were now lost to the 
enemy. " Sir James Saumarez's action has put 
us upon velvet," wrote St. Vincent, then head of 
the Admiralty; and in the House of Peers he 
highly eulogized the admiral's conduct, as also 
did Nelson. The former declared that " this gal- 
lant achievement surpassed everything he had 
ever met with in his reading or service," a state- 
ment sufficiently sweeping ; while the praise of the 
hero of the Nile was the more to be prized be- 
cause there never was cordial sympathy between 
him and Saumarez. Closely as they had been 
associated, Nelson's letters to his brother officer 
began always " My dear Sir James," not " My 
dear Saumarez." 

In this blaze of triumph the story of Saumarez 
fitly terminates. He was never again engaged in 
serious encounter with the enemy. The first war 
with the French republic ended three months 
after the battle of Algeciras. After the second 
began, in 1803, he was, until 1807, commander- 
in-chief at the Channel Islands, watching the 
preparations for the invasion of England, and 
counteracting the efforts of cruisers against Brit- 
ish commerce. In 1808, in consequence of the 
agreements of Tilsit between the Czar and Napo- 
leon, affairs in the Baltic became such as to de- 



422 Types of Naval Officers 

mand the presence of a large British fleet, — first 
to support Sweden, then at war with Russia, and 
later to protect the immense British trade, which, 
under neutral flags and by contraband methods, 
maintained by way of the northern sea the inter- 
course of Great Britain with the Continent. Of 
this trade Sweden was an important intermediary, 
and her practical neutrality was essential to its 
continuance. This was insured by the firm yet 
moderate attitude of Sir James Saumarez, even 
when she had been forced by France to declare 
war against Great Britain. 

It may be said without exaggeration that from 
this time, and until the breach between Napoleon 
and Russia in 1 8 1 2, the maritime interest of the war 
between Great Britain and France centred in the 
Baltic. Elsewhere the effective but monotonous 
blockade of the continental ports controlled by 
the French Emperor absorbed the attention of 
the British fleets. Of great battles there were 
none after Trafalgar. To Saumarez, therefore, 
fell the most distinctive, and probably also the 
most decisive, field of work open to the British 
navy. The importance of the Baltic was two- 
fold. It was then the greatest source of materials 
essential to ship-building — commonly called 
naval stores ; and further, the Russian part of its 
coast line, being independent of Napoleon's direct 
regulation, was the chief means of approach by 
which Great Britain maintained commercial in- 
tercourse with the Continent, to exclude her 



Saumarez 423 



from which had become the leading object with 
the Emperor. The contravention of his policy in 
this way, in disregard, as he claimed, of the agree- 
ments existing between him and the Czar, led 
eventually to the Russian war, and so finally to 
his own overthrow and the deliverance of the 
Continent from his domination. 

The historical significance of the position now 
occupied by Saumarez, and its importance to the 
great issues of the future, are thus manifest. It 
was a post that he was eminently qualified to fill. 
Firm, yet calm, sagacious, and moderate, he met 
with rare efficiency the varied and varying de- 
mands of those changeful times. The unremit- 
ting and well directed efforts of his cruisers broke 
up reciprocal commerce between the countries 
surrounding the narrow inland sea, so essential 
to their welfare while submitting to Napoleon ; 
while the main fleet sustained the foreign trade 
with Russia and Sweden, carried on through 
neutral ships for the advantage of Great Britain. 
Two instances will illustrate his activities better 
than many words. In the year 1809 four hundred 
and thirty local vessels were captured, averaging 
the small size of sixty tons each, three hundred 
and forty of which belonged to Denmark, then 
under Napoleon's absolute sway. At the close of 
the open season of 18 10, the merchant ships for 
England, which ordinarily were despatched under 
convoy in bodies of five hundred, numbered, 
according to Saumarez's flag-lieutenant and biog- 



424 Types of Naval Officers 

rapher, no less than one thousand vessels, gath- 
ered in one mass. 

As long as Sweden remained friendly, the 
admiral's duties, though weighty, did not differ 
materially from those usual to his profession ; but 
when she was unwillingly forced into a declara- 
tion of war by Napoleon, his task became more 
complicated and more delicate. The British 
minister having to leave, Saumarez succeeded to 
a diplomatic situation, in which the problem was 
to support the interests and dignity of his own 
nation, without transforming the formal war into 
actual hostilities, and substituting imbitterment 
for the secret good will of the Swedish govern- 
ment and people, who, in common with the 
Russian nobles and subjects, were alienated by 
the imperious and merciless exactions of the 
French demands. The secret aim of Great Britain 
was so to nourish this ill-will towards France, and 
so to avoid causes of offence by herself, as to 
convert covert hostility into open antagonism, 
and thus to reverse the political and military com- 
binations of Europe. In the absence of regular 
accredited diplomatic representatives, Saumarez 
became at once the exponent and the minister of 
this vital policy. He had to avoid quarrels, and 
yet at the same time to restrain Sweden from acts 
of injury to which she was constantly impelled 
by the Emperor, whose purpose naturally was 
exactly the opposite of his ; and who sought fur- 
ther to estrange all people from Great Britain. 



Saumarez 425 



In the performance of this task Saumarez's 
success was not only complete, but peculiarly his 
own. His temper was at times severely tried, 
but it never got beyond his control. He repressed 
injury, and demanded satisfaction for it, when 
committed ; but, relying with good reason on the 
motives of the Swedish government, he contrived 
to secure redress without resorting to force, which, 
however understood by statesmen, would enrage 
the peoples he had to conciliate. After the ordeal 
was over, and Russia was at war with France, a 
leading Swedish statesman wrote to him: "You 
have been the guardian angel of my country ; by 
your wise, temperate, and loyal conduct, you have 
been the first cause of the plans which have been 
formed against the demon of the continent. . . . 
Once more I must tell you, that you were the 
first cause that Russia had dared to make war 
against France ; had you fired one shot when we 
declared war against England, all had been ended 
and Europe would have been enslaved." Sau- 
marez, an extremely religious man, may have 
reflected that " he who ruleth his spirit is greater 
than he that taketh a city." 

Though in the strictest sense professional, the 
Baltic service of Saumarez involved little of purely 
military interest. Shortly after his assuming the 
command, in 1808, a Russian fleet which had 
been keeping the sea took refuge, on the 
approach of the allied British and Swedes, in a 
harbor on the Gulf of Finland. Saumarez fol- 



426 Types of Naval Officers 

lowed close upon their heels, and after a consul- 
tation and reconnoissance of the position, which 
consumed two days, secured the co-operation of 
the Swedish admiral for an attack on the day 
following; an essential condition, for the Russian 
force was superior to his own in the proportion of 
eight to six. Unhappily, the wind shifted, and 
blew an adverse gale for eight days ; at the end 
of which time the enemy had so far fortified the 
surroundings that Saumarez thought it inexpedi- 
ent to attack. In this decision he was supported 
by the opinion of captains of such established 
reputation as, joined to his own brilliant record, 
must be taken to justify his action, which seems 
to have caused some dissatisfaction in England. 
On the face, it could not but be a disappointment 
to people accustomed to the brilliant victories of 
Nelson, and his apparent invincibility by obstacles; 
but in the end it was all for the best, for doubt- 
less the mortifying destruction of a Russian fleet 
would not have furthered the reconciliation, which 
soon became a leading object with the British 
government and the great bulk of the Russian 
nation. It is, however, probable that to this 
frustration of public expectation, which had been 
vividly aroused by preceding accounts of the con- 
ditions, is to be attributed the delay in granting 
the peerage, eagerly desired by Saumarez in his 
later days, — not for itself merely, but as a recog- 
nition which he not unnaturally thought earned 
by his long and distinguished service. 



Saumarez 427 



Saumarez held the Baltic command through 
five eventful years, — from 1808 to 1812. After 
Napoleon's disastrous Russian expedition, affairs 
in that sea no longer required a force adequate to 
his rank, and he then finally retired from service 
afloat, still in the full maturity of a healthy prime, 
at the age of fifty-five. The remainder of his life, 
with brief exception, was passed in his native 
island of Guernsey, amid those charms of family 
affection and general esteem which he had de- 
served by his fidelity to all the duties of the man 
and the citizen. Though so far removed from 
the active centres of life, he kept touch with it by 
the variety of his interests in all useful and be- 
nevolent undertakings, to which an ample fortune 
allowed him freely to contribute. " The hopes 
entertained of his assistance and sympathy," ob- 
serves his biographer, " were never disappointed." 
Among naval biographies, there is none that pre- 
sents a more pleasing picture of genial and digni- 
fied enjoyment of well-earned repose. In 1831, 
upon the accession of William IV., the Sailor 
King, the long-coveted peerage was at last be- 
stowed. Lord de Saumarez died on the 9th of 
October, 1836, in his eightieth year. 



P E LL E W 

1757-1833 

LIKE the English tongue itself, the names 
of British seamen show the composite 
origin of their nation. As the Danes after 
the day of Copenhagen, to them both glorious 
and disastrous, claimed that in Nelson they 
had been vanquished by a man of their own 
blood, descended from their Viking forefathers; 
as Collingwood and Troubridge indicate the 
English descent of the two closest associates of 
the victor of Trafalgar; so Saumarez and the 
hero of this sketch, whose family name was 
Pellew, represent that conquering Norman race 
which from the shores of the Northern ocean 
carried terror along the coasts of Europe and 
the Mediterranean, and as far inland as their 
light keels could enter. After the great wars 
of the French Revolution and the Battle of 
Algiers, when Lord Exmouth had won his renown 
and his position had been attained, kinship with 
him was claimed by a family still residing in Nor- 
mandy, where the name was spelled " Pelleu." 
Proof of common origin was offered, not only in 
the name, but also in the coat of arms. 





Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth, 



Pellew 429 



In England, the Pellew family was settled in 
the extreme southwest, in Cornwall and Devon- 
shire, counties whose nearness to the great 
Atlantic made them the source of so much of 
the maritime enterprise that marked the reign of 
Elizabeth. Lord Exmouth's grandfather was a 
man of wealth ; but, as he left many children, 
the juniors had to shift for themselves, and the 
youngest son, Samuel Pellew, the father of the 
admiral, at the time of the latter's birth com- 
manded a post-office packet on the Dover sta- 
tion. He accordingly made the town of that 
name the home of his wife and children ; and 
there Edward, the second of his four sons, was 
born, April 19, 1757. Their mother was the 
daughter of a Jacobite gentleman, who had been 
out for the Pretender in 171 5, — a fact which 
probably emphasized the strong Hanoverian sym- 
pathies of Samuel Pellew, whose habit was to 
make his children, every Sunday, drink King 
George's health upon their knees. 

In 1765, when the future admiral was only 
eight years old, his father died, and the mother 
making an imprudent marriage three years later, 
the children were thrown upon the world with 
small provision and scanty care. The resolute, 
active, and courageous character of the lads, 
however, brought them well forward among 
their equals in age. At school Edward was 
especially distinguished for fearlessness. Of this 
he gave a marked instance, when not yet twelve, 



43 o Types of Naval Officers 

by entering a burning house where gunpowder 
was stored, which no other of the bystanders 
would approach. Alone and with his own hands 
the lad brought out the powder. A less com- 
mendable but very natural result of the same 
energetic spirit was shown in the numerous 
fighting matches in which he was engaged. 
Being threatened with a flogging for one of 
these, the circumstance became the immediate 
occasion of his going to sea. If flogged, he 
declared, he would run away ; and as a decided 
taste for seafaring life had already manifested it- 
self, his guardian thought better to embrace at 
once the more favorable alternative and enter 
him regularly in the navy. He thus went afloat 
towards the end of 1770, the date at which Nel- 
son, also, though one year younger, began his 
career. 

His first cruise was in the Mediterranean. 
It came to a premature end through a quarrel 
between the commander of the ship and one of 
the midshipmen. In this the captain was clearly 
and grossly in the wrong ; yet nevertheless carried 
his resentment, and the power of oppression in 
his hands, then little restrained by law, so far as 
to expel the youngster from the ship and set him 
on shore in Marseilles. Pellew insisted upon 
accompanying his messmate, and the two lads of 
fourteen, aided by some of the lieutenants, secured 
a passage home. It shows a pleasing trait in our 
hero's character that, some years afterwards, he 



Pell 



ew 



431 



advanced materially the professional fortunes of 
the son of the officer who had thus abused his 
authority. 

He next passed under the command of a 
Captain Pownoll, between whom and himself 
were established such warm relations, of affec- 
tionate interest on the one side and reverential 
regard on the other, that Pownoll became a 
family name among the descendants of the 
admiral. He himself gave it to his first-born, 
and it still appears in the present generation. 
Under him, also, Pellew was brought into direct 
contact with the American Revolution ; for on 
board the frigate Blonde, Pownoll's ship, General 
Burgoyne embarked in 1775 for Canada, there 
beginning the undertaking which ended so dis- 
astrously for him. It is told that when the dis- 
tinguished passenger came on board, the yards 
being manned to receive him with the honors due 
to his rank, he was startled to see on one yard- 
arm a midshipman standing on his head. Upon 
expressing alarm, he was laughingly reassured by 
the captain, who said that Pellew — for he it was 
who put this extra touch upon the general's recep- 
tion — was quite capable of dropping from the 
yard, passing under the ship's bottom, and coming 
up on the other side. A few days later the young 
officer actually did leap from the yard-arm, the 
ship going fast through the water — not, however, 
as bravado, but to aid a seaman who had fallen 
overboard, and whom he succeeded in saving. 



432 Types of Naval Officers 

Throughout his youth the exuberant vitality 
of the man delighted in these feats of wanton 
power. To overturn a boat by press of canvas, 
as a frolic, is not unexampled among lads of dar- 
ing ; but it is at least unusual, when a hat goes 
overboard, to follow it into the water, if alone in 
a boat under sail. This Pellew did, on one occa- 
sion, when he was old enough to know better ; 
being at the moment in the open Channel, in a 
small punt, going from Falmouth to Plymouth. 
The freak nearly cost him his life ; for, though 
he had lashed the helm down and hove-to the 
boat, she fell off and gathered way whenever he 
approached. When at last he laid hold of her 
rail, after an hour of this fooling, barely strength 
remained to drag himself on board, where he fell 
helpless, and waited long before his powers were 
restored. It is trite to note in such exhibitions 
of recklessness many of the qualities of the ideal 
seaman, though not so certainly those of the fore- 
ordained commander-in-chief. Pellew was a born 
frigate captain. 

At the end of 1775 the Americans were still 
engaged in the enterprise against Quebec, the 
disastrous termination of which is familiarly 
known. After the fall of General Montgomery 
in the unsuccessful night assault of December 
31, 1775, the American operations were reduced 
to a land blockade of the town, which was cut off 
from the sea by ice in the river. A close invest- 
ment was thus maintained for five months, until 



Pel lew 433 



the early part of May, 1776, when the place was 
relieved by the arrival of a small naval force, 
commanded by Captain Charles Douglas. Im- 
mediately upon its appearance the commanding 
British general Carleton, attacked the besiegers, 
who, already prostrated by disease and privation, 
abandoned their positions and fell back upon 
Sorel, at the mouth of the river Richelieu, the 
outlet from Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence. 
Here they remained until June, when the enemy, 
who had received heavy reinforcements, advanced 
in overpowering numbers. The Americans again 
retired above the rapids of the Richelieu to St. 
Johns. Thence there is a clear channel south- 
ward ; and embarking there, the retreating force 
without further molestation reached Crown Point, 
a fortified post a hundred miles distant, at the 
head of the lake, commanding the narrow stream 
to which it is reduced in its upper part. Twelve 
miles above Crown Point is Ticonderoga, the 
well-known border fortress of the Colonial and 
Revolutionary wars ; and for fifteen or twenty 
miles farther the stream is navigable for boats of 
some size, thus affording an easy means of com- 
munication in those early days of impassable 
forests and scanty transport. 

Though greatly superior on land, the British 
had now for a time to stay their pursuit ; for the 
water highway essential to its continuance was 
controlled by the flotilla under the command of 
Benedict Arnold, forbidding further advance until 

28 



434 Types of Naval Officers 

it was subdued. The presence of these vessels, 
which, though few, were as yet unopposed, gained 
for the Americans, in this hour of extremity, the 
important respite from June to October, 1776; 
and then the lateness of the season compelled 
the postponement of the invasion to the follow- 
ing year. The toil with which this little force 
had been created, a few months before, was thus 
amply justified ; for delay is ever to the advantage 
of the defence. In this case it also gave time 
for a change of commanders on the part of the 
enemy, from Carleton to Burgoyne, which not 
improbably had a decisive effect upon the for- 
tunes of the next campaign. 

As soon as established at St. Johns, the Brit- 
ish took steps to place a naval force upon the 
lake, an undertaking involving trouble and delay, 
notwithstanding their greatly superior resources 
in men and material. Some thirty fighting ves- 
sels, suitable to the waters upon which they were 
to act, were required, and also four hundred bat- 
eaux for the transport of the troops. These had 
either to be built upon the spot, despite the lack 
of all dockyard facilities, or else to be brought 
bodily from the St. Lawrence, by road, or through 
the rapids of the Richelieu, until the deep water 
at St. Johns was reached. In this hardy, stren- 
uous work, Pellew naturally was conspicuously 
active ; and in its course he gained a particular 
professional accomplishment which afterwards 
stood him in good stead. Several vessels were 



Pellew 43 5 



built upon the shores of the stream ; among others, 
one of one hundred and eighty tons, the Inflex- 
ible, whose heavier timbers were brought overland 
to St. Johns. The construction of these craft 
was superintended by a lieutenant — afterwards 
Admiral Schank — of scientific knowledge as a 
ship architect ; and through close association 
with him Pellew's instinctive appreciation of all 
things nautical received an intelligent guidance, 
which gave him a quick insight into the probable 
behavior of a ship from an examination of her 
build, and enabled him often to suggest a suitable 
remedy for dangerous faults. During this period 
of equipment occurred a characteristic incident 
which has only recently become public through 
a descendant.-^ " On the day the Liflexible was 
launched, Pellew on the top of the sheers was 
trying to get in the mainmast. The machinery 
not being of the best gave way, and down came 
mainmast, Pellew, and all, into the lake. ' Poor 
Pellew,' exclaimed Schank, 'he is gone at last!' 
However, he speedily emerged and was the first 
man to mount the sheers again. ' Sir,' Admiral 
Schank used to conclude, ' he was like a squirrel.' " 
Thirty days after the keel of the Inflexible was 
laid at St. Johns, the vessel herself not only was 
launched, but had set sail for the southward. 
She carried eighteen twelve-pounders, nine on a 
side, and was thus superior in power, not only to 
any one vessel of the Americans, but to their 

1 Fleetwood Hugo Pellew, in *' Our Naval Heroes." 



436 Types of Naval Officers 

whole assembled flotilla on Lake Champlain. 
Except the principal pieces of her hull, the timber 
of which she was built was hewed in the neigh- 
boring forest ; and indeed, the whole story of the 
rapid equipment of this squadron recalls vividly 
the vigorous preparation of Commander Perry, of 
the United States navy, in 181 3, for his success- 
ful attempt to control Lake Erie. The entire 
British force, land and naval, now moved toward 
Crown Point. On the nth of October the 
American flotilla was discovered, a short distance 
above Plattsburg and about twenty miles from 
the foot of the lake, drawn up between Valcour 
Island and the western shore, which are from one- 
half to three-fourths of a mile apart. It lay there 
so snugly that the British, wafted by a northwest 
wind, had actually passed to the southward with- 
out seeing it, and the discovery was purely acci- 
dental, — a fact which suggests that Arnold, who 
must have felt the impossibility of a force so 
inferior as his own contesting, or even long 
delaying, the enemy's advance by direct oppo- 
sition, may have entertained some purpose of 
operating in their rear, and thus causing a diver- 
sion which at this late season might effectually 
arrest their progress. It is true that such a 
stroke would frightfully imperil his little squad- 
ron ; but, in circumstances of absolute inferiority, 
audacity, usually the best policy in war, offers the 
only chance of success. Mere retreat, however 
methodical, must end in final destruction. To 



Pellew 437 



act towards St. Johns, trusting to dexterity and 
to local knowledge of the network of islands at 
the foot of the lake to escape disaster, or at least to 
protract the issue, offered the best chance ; and 
that the situation thus accepted would not be 
hopeless was proved by the subsequent temporary 
evasion of pursuit by the Americans, even in the 
open and narrow water of the middle lake. 

The British moved to attack as soon as the 
hostile shipping was discovered. Pellew was sec- 
ond officer of the schooner Carleton, of twelve 
guns, the third vessel of the flotilla in point of 
force. The wind being contrary, and apparently 
light, the Carleton alone of the sailing vessels got 
into action ; and although she was supported by 
a number of rowing gunboats, whose artillery 
was heavy, the match was unequal. According 
to Arnold's own account, he had disposed his 
gunboats and gondolas "on the west side of 
Valcour Island, as near together as possible, 
and in such a form that few vessels can attack 
us at the same time, and those will be exposed 
to the fire of the whole fleet." To this Cap- 
tain Douglas, in his report of the occurrences, 
adds the suggestive particular that the Carleton, 
by a lucky slant of wind, fetched "nearly into 
the middle of the rebel half-moon, where she 
anchored with a spring on her cable." The 
position was one of honorable distinction, but 
likewise of great exposure. Her first oflicer lost 
an arm ; her captain, Lieutenant Dacres, was so 



438 Types of Naval Officers 

severely wounded that he was about to be thrown 
overboard as dead ; and Pellew, thus left with- 
out a superior, fought the vessel through the 
engagement. When signal was at last made to 
withdraw, the Carleton was able to do so only 
by help of the gunboats, which towed her out 
of fire. On the other hand, Arnold's flag-ship, 
the schooner Royal Savage, which had fought 
in advance of her consorts and under canvas, 
fell to leeward, and came there under the dis- 
tant fire of the hiflexible, by which she was 
badly crippled. She then was run ashore on the 
southern point of the island, where she fell mo- 
mentarily into the hands of the British, who 
turned her guns on her former friends. Later 
in the day, it seeming probable that she might 
be retaken, she was set on fire and burned to 
the water's edge. Thus abandoned, she sank 
to the bottom, where her hull rests to this day. 
During the recent summer of 1901 some gun- 
carriages have been recovered from her, after 
lying for a century and a quarter beneath the 
surface of the lake. 

Pellew's personal activity and strength en- 
abled his gallantry to show to particular ad- 
vantage in this sanguinary contest. When the 
Carleton, in her attempt to withdraw, hung in 
stays under the island, her decks swept by the 
bullets of the riflemen on shore, it was he who 
sprang out on the bowsprit to bear the jib over 
to windward. When the tow-rope was cut by 



Pellew 439 

a shot, it was Pellew again who exposed his 
person for the safety of the vessel. His two 
seniors being forced by their wounds to leave 
the schooner, he succeeded to the command, 
in which he was afterwards confirmed. In this 
sharp affair the Carletojt lost eight killed and 
six wounded, — about half her crew, — and had 
two feet of water in her hold when she anchored 
out of range. 

Towards evening the Inflexible succeeded in 
getting within point-blank range of the American 
flotilla, "when five broadsides," wrote Douglas, 
" silenced their whole line ; " a sufficient testi- 
mony to the superiority of her concentrated 
battery over the dispersed force of all her nu- 
merous petty antagonists. The British then an- 
chored to the southward of Arnold's little force ; 
but that active and enterprising officer succeeded 
in stealing during the night between the enemy 
and the western shore, and retired towards Crown 
Point. The chase to windward continued during 
the next day, but a favorable shift of wind, to 
the north, reached the British first, and enabled 
them to close. Arnold again behaved with the ex- 
traordinary bravery and admirable conduct which 
distinguished him in battle. Sending on the bulk 
of the squadron, he took the rear with two galleys, 
covering the retreat. Fighting like a lion, he op- 
posed the enemy's advance long enough to secure 
the escape of six of his vessels ; and then, seeing 
his one consort forced to strike, he ran his own 



440 Types of Naval Officers 

galley ashore and set her on fire. " Arnold," says 
the naval historian Cooper, " covered himself with 
glory, and his example seems to have been nobly 
followed by most of his officers and men. The 
manner in which the Congress was fought until 
she had covered the retreat of the galleys, and the 
stubborn resolution with which she was defended 
until destroyed, converted the disasters of this 
part of the day into a species of triumph." " The 
Americans," says a contemporary British writer, 
" chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention paid 
by Arnold to a nice point of honor, in keeping 
his flag flying, and not quitting his galley till 
she was in flames, lest the enemy should have 
boarded and struck it." 

Pellew received like recognition, not, perhaps, 
from the popular voice, but from his official su- 
periors. Douglas, the senior naval officer at 
Quebec, who was made a baronet in reward of 
these operations. Lord Howe at New York, and 
the First Lord of the Admiralty in England, all 
sent him personal letters of commendation; and 
the two latter promised him promotion as soon 
as he came within their respective jurisdictions. 
His continuance at the front of operations during 
this and the following year therefore postponed 
his deserved advancement to a lieutenancy, by 
retaining him from the "jurisdiction" of those 
able to bestow it. 

The two gallant enemies were soon again 
brought together in an incident which came near 



Pellew 441 



to change the career of one of them, and, in so 
doing, to modify seriously the fortunes of many 
others. Arnold having one day pulled out on 
the open lake, in his venturesome manner, Pel- 
lew gave chase in another boat. The Americans 
being hard pressed and capture probable, Arnold 
unbuckled his stock and himself took an oar. 
So nearly caught was he, that he had to escape 
into the bushes, leaving behind him stock and 
buckle ; and these, as late as sixty years after, 
remained in the possession of Pellew's brother. 
Had he thus been deprived of the opportunity 
that Saratoga gave him the next year, Arnold's 
name might now be known to us only as that 
of the brave ofBcer who kept his country's flag 
flying till his vessel was in flames. 

On the 14th of October Carleton landed at 
Crown Point, which the Americans had aban- 
doned ; but the lateness of the season deterred 
him from advancing against Ticonderoga, and 
he soon afterwards returned to Canada. The 
full import of this halt is too easily overlooked, 
with consequent failure to appreciate the mo- 
mentous influence exerted upon the course of the 
Revolutionary War by this naval campaign, in 
which Pellew bore so conspicuous a part. It 
has never been understood in America, where the 
smallness of the immediate scale has withdrawn 
attention from the greatness of the ultimate issue, 
in gaining time for the preparations which re- 
sulted in the admittedly decisive victories about 



442 Types of Naval Officers 

Saratoga. " If we could have begun our expe- 
dition four weeks earlier," wrote a German gen- 
eral there present, " I am satisfied everything 
would have been ended this year [1776]; were 
our whole army here, it would be an easy matter 
to drive the enemy from their entrenchments 
at Ticonderoga." The delay, not of four weeks 
only, but of the whole summer, was obtained 
by the naval force organized upon Champlain 
by Arnold and his superior. General Schuyler. 
The following year the invasion was resumed, 
under General Burgoyne. Pellew accompanied 
him with a body of seamen, taking part in all 
the operations down to the final surrender. 
Burgoyne, indeed, afterwards chaffed him with 
being the cause of the disaster, by rebuilding 
the bridge which enabled the army to cross from 
the east bank of the Hudson to the west. 

Returning to England in the early part of 1778, 
Pellew was made lieutenant, and in 1780 we find, 
him again serving under Captain Pownoll, as first 
lieutenant of the Apollo frigate. On the 15th of 
June, in the same year, the Apollo met the 
French frigate Stanislas. A severe action fol- 
lowed, and at the end of an hour Pownoll was 
shot through the body. As his young friend 
raised him from the deck, he had barely time to 
say, " Pellew, I know you won't give his Majesty's 
ship away," and immediately expired. The en- 
gagement lasted an hour longer, when the enemy, 
which had all the time been standing in for the 



Pellew 443 



Belgian coast, took the ground, the most of her 
spars, already wounded, going overboard with the 
shock. The Apollo had hauled off a few mo- 
ments before, finding that she had less than five 
feet of water under her keel. 

Though unable again to attack the Stanislas, 
which claimed the protection of the neutral flag, 
the result was substantially a victory; but to 
Pellew's grief for the death of a tried friend was 
added the material loss of a powerful patron. 
Happily, however, his reputation was known to 
the head of the Admiralty, who not only pro- 
moted him for this action, but also gave him a 
ship, though a poor one. After a succession of 
small commands, he was fortunate enough again 
to distinguish himself, — driving ashore and de- 
stroying several French privateers, under circum- 
stances of such danger and difficulty as to win 
him his next grade, post-captain. This step, 
which, so far as selection went, fixed his position 
in the navy, he received on the 25th of May, 1782. 

The ten years of peace that shortly followed 
were passed by many officers in retirement, which 
we have seen was contentedly accepted by his 
distinguished contemporary, Saumarez; but Pel- 
lew was a seaman to the marrow, and constantly 
sought employment afloat. When out of occupa- 
tion, he for a while tried farming, the Utopian 
employment that most often beguiles the imagi- 
nation of the inbred seaman in occasional weariness 
of salt water; but, as his biographer justly re- 



444 TyP^s ^^ Naval Officers 

marks, his mind, which allowed him to be happy 
only when active, could ill accommodate itself 
to pursuits that almost forbade exertion. " To 
have an object in view, yet to be unable to ad- 
vance it by any exertions of his own, was to him 
a source of constant irritation. He was wearied 
with the imperceptible grov/th of his crops, and 
complained that he made his eyes ache by watch- 
ing their daily progress." 

His assiduous applications, however, were not 
wholly unavailing to obtain him the professional 
employments usually so hard to get in times of 
peace. For five of the ten years, 1 783-1 793, he 
commanded frigates, chiefly on the Newfoundland 
station ; and in them, though now turning thirty, 
he displayed the superabundant vitality and rest- 
less activity that had characterized his early youth. 
" Whenever there was exertion required aloft," 
wrote a midshipman who served with him at this 
period, " to preserve a sail or a mast, the captain 
was foremost in the work, apparently as a mere 
matter of amusement, and there was not a man 
in the ship that could equal him in personal activ- 
ity. He appeared to play among the elements in 
the hardest storms. I remember once, in close- 
reefing the main topsail, the captain had given 
his orders from the quarter-deck and sent us aloft. 
On gaining the topsail yard, the most active and 
daring of our party hesitated to go upon it, as the 
sail was flapping violently, making it a service of 
great danger; but a voice was heard from the ex- 



Pel lew 445 



treme end of the yard, calling upon us to exert 
ourselves to save the sail, which would otherwise 
beat to pieces. A man said, ' Why, that 's the 

captain ! How the did he get there ? ' He 

had followed us up, and, clambering over the 
backs of the sailors, had reached the topmast 
head, above the yard, and thence descended by 
the lift," — a feat unfortunately not easy to 
be explained to landsmen, but which will be 
allowed by seamen to demand great hardihood 
and address. 

All this was the simple overflow of an animal 
energy not to be repressed, the exulting prowess of 
a giant delighting to run his course. It found 
expression also in joyous practical jests, like those 
of a big boy, which at times had ludicrous conse- 
quences. On one occasion of state ceremony, 
the king's birthday, Pellew had dressed in full 
uniform to attend a dinner on shore. The weather 
was hot, and the crew had been permitted an 
hour's swimming around the ship. While his 
boat was being manned, the captain stood by the 
frigate's rail watching the bathers, and near by 
him was one of the ship's boys. " I too shall 
have a good swim soon," called the latter to a 
comrade in the water. " The sooner, the better," 
said Pellew, coming behind him and tipping him 
overboard. No sooner had the lad risen to the 
surface from his plunge than it was plain that he 
could not swim ; so in after him went the practi- 
cal joker, with all his toggery. " If ever the cap- 



44^ Types of Naval Officers 

tain was frightened/' writes the officer just quoted, 
"it was then." 

But along with all this physical exuberance and 
needless assumption of many of the duties of a 
foremast hand, Pellew possessed to a very remark- 
able extent that delicate art of seamanship which 
consists in so handling a ship as to make her do 
just what you want, and to put her just where she 
should be; making her, to use a common sea 
expression, do everything but talk. This is a 
faculty probably inborn, like most others that 
reach any great degree of perfection, and, while a 
very desirable gift, it is by no means indispensable 
to the highest order of naval excellence. Nelson 
did not at all equal Pellew in this respect, as is 
indicated by an amusing story transmitted by a 
Colonel Stewart, who served on board the great 
admiral's flag-ship during the expedition against 
Copenhagen : " His lordship was rather too apt 
to interfere in the working of the ship, and not 
always with the best judgment or success. The 
wind, when off Dungeness, was scanty, and the 
ship was to be put about. Lord Nelson would 
give the orders, and caused her to miss stays. 
Upon this he said, rather peevishly, to the officer 
of the watch, ' Well, now see what we have done. 
Well, sir, what mean you to do now ? ' The 
officer saying, with hesitation, ' I don't exactly 
know, my lord. I fear she won't do,' Lord Nelson 
turned sharply to the cabin, and replied, ' Well, I 
am sure if you do not know what to do with her, 



Pellew 447 



no more do I, either.' He went in, leaving the 
officer to work the ship as he liked." Yet Nelson 
understood perfectly what ships could do, and 
what they could not ; no one could better handle 
or take care of a fleet, or estimate the possibility 
of performing a given manoeuvre ; and long be- 
fore he was called to high command he was dis- 
tinguished for a knowledge of naval tactics to 
which few, if any other, of his time attained. He 
was a great general officer ; and whether he had 
the knack of himself making a ship go through 
all her paces without a fault mattered as little as 
whether he w^as a crack shot with a gun. 

A ship is certainly the most beautiful and 
most graceful of machines ; a machine, too, so 
varied in its movements and so instinct with life 
that the seaman affectionately transfers to her 
credit his own virtues in handling her. Pellew's 
capacity in this part of his profession was so 
remarkable that it is somewhat singular to find 
him, in his first frigate action, compelled to dis- 
card manoeuvring, and to rely for victory upon 
sheer pluck and luck. When war with the 
French republic began in 1793, his high reputa- 
tion immediately insured him command of a 
frigate, the Nymphe. The strength of England 
as a naval power lay largely in the great reserve 
of able seamen manning her merchant ships ; but 
as these were scattered in all quarters of the 
world, great embarrassment was commonly felt at 
the outbreak of a war, and especially when it 



44 8 Types of Naval Officers 

came with the unexpected rapidity of the revolu- 
tionary fury. As the object of first importance 
was to get the fleets of ships-of-the-line to sea, 
Pellew had to depend chiefly upon his own inde- 
fatigable exertions to procure a crew for his ves- 
sel. Seamen being hard to find, he had on board 
a disproportionate number of landsmen w^hen the 
Nymphe, on the 19th of June, 1793, encountered 
the French vessel Cleopatre, of force slightly in- 
ferior, except in men, but not sufficiently so to 
deny the victor the claim of an even fight. 

A peculiar incident preceding the action has 
interest, as showing the strong preoccupation of 
men's minds at the opening of war, before meet- 
ings with the enemy have lost novelty. Pellew's 
younger brother, Israel, a commander in the 
navy, being otherwise unemployed, had come out 
with him for the cruise. The Cleopatre having 
been first seen in the early morning, Edward 
would not have him called till just as the Nymphe 
was closing. As he came on deck, the brother 
said affectionately, " Israel, you have no business 
here. We are too many eggs from one nest. I 
am sorry I brought you from your wife." But 
the other was unheeding, his eyes fixed upon the 
stranger. " That 's the very frigate," he cried, 
*' that I 've been dreaming of all night ! I 
dreamt that we shot away her wheel." And, 
hastening to the after-gun, he made the French 
ship's wheel the object of an unremitting fire. 

By the way the enemy was handled it was evi- 



Pellew 449 



dent that she was well manned and ably com- 
manded. She had, in fact, been in commission 
for over a year. Great as was his own skill, Pellew 
could not venture upon manoeuvres with a green 
crew, untrained save at the guns, and only filled 
the night before by pressing from a merchant 
vessel. He therefore determined upon a simple 
artillery duel. The Frenchman waited under 
short canvas, while the Nymphe, with greater 
way, drew slowly up on his starboard, or right- 
hand side ; both ships running nearly before the 
wind, but having it a little on the left side. Each 
captain stood uncovered, and as the bows of the 
Nymphe doubled upon the stern of the Cleopatre, 
within three hundred feet, a French sailor was 
seen to run aloft and fasten a red cap of liberty to 
the mainmast head. The eyes of the British sea- 
men were fastened upon their commander, await- 
ing the gesture which he had set, instead of word 
of mouth, for opening fire. At quarter-past six 
he gave it, raising his cap to his head. A furious 
cannonade at once began, and, the Nymphe short- 
ening sail as soon as fairly abreast her antago- 
nist, the two frigates continued on parallel lines, 
maintaining their relative positions as though at 
anchor, and rolling easily in the soft summer 
sea under the recoil of their guns. So nearly 
matched were the gunners that the conflict, un- 
usually deadly though it was, might have lasted 
long, but at a little before seven Israel Pellew's 

dream was fulfilled. The Frenchman's wheel 

29 



450 Types of Naval Officers 

was shot away, and, the mizzenmast going over- 
board at the same time, the Cleopatre yielded to 
the impulse of her forward sails, turned sharp 
round to the right, and ran perpendicularly into 
the Nymphe. The British boarded her, fixed in 
this disadvantageous position, fought their way 
aft, and, although the French crew was numeri- 
cally superior, in ten minutes hauled down the 
colors. In this brief hour they had lost twenty- 
three killed*and twenty-seven wounded, the enemy 
sixty-three killed and wounded, out of ships' com- 
panies numbering respectively two hundred and 
forty and three hundred and twenty. 

This was the first decisive frigate action of the 
War of the French Revolution, and in conse- 
quence great was the enthusiasm aroused. Lord 
Howe wrote to Pellew, " The manner in which 
you have taken the enemy's ship will set an ex- 
ample for the war." In truth, however, while 
admitting the soundness of Pellew's judgment in 
adopting the course he did, the actual demand 
upon his personal skill was less, and in so far the 
credit due therefore less, than in the second suc- 
cessful frigate action, in the following October, in 
which Sir James Saumarez commanded. Not 
only was the French vessel's superiority in force 
more marked in the latter instance, but Saumarez's 
ship there met with an accident similar in char- 
acter to that which befell the Cleopatre, from the 
consequences of which she was extricated by his 
masterly seamanship. Still, it may with fairness 



Pellew 451 



be argued that, as the one action from its attend- 
ant circumstances evidenced the individual skill 
of the commander, so the other testified to the 
antecedent preparation and efficiency of the crew, 
which are always to be attributed to the care of 
the captain, especially under the conditions of 
Pellew's enlistments. Both captains fully de- 
served the reward of knighthood bestowed upon 
their success. Israel Pellew was promoted to 
post-captain. 

During the first three years of this war British 
commerce in the neighborhood of the Channel 
suffered most severely from French cruisers. 
The latter resumed the methods of Jean Bart 
and other celebrated privateers of the days of 
Louis XIV.; the essence of which was to prey 
upon the enemy's commerce, not by single ves- 
sels, but by small squadrons of from five to 
seven. Cruisers so combined, acting in mutual 
support, were far more efficient than the same 
number acting separately. Spreading like a fan, 
they commanded a wider expanse than a ship 
alone ; if danger arose, they concentrated for 
mutual support; did opportunity offer, the work 
was cut out and distributed, thus insuring by 
co-operation more thorough results. At the sug- 
gestion of Sir Edward Pellew, the British Ad- 
miralty determined to oppose to these organized 
depredators a similar system. Groups of crack 
frigates were constituted, and sent to cruise 
within the limits of the Channel Fleet, but inde- 



452 Types of Naval Officers 

pendent of its admiral. In these Pellew served 
for the next five years, much of the time as squad- 
ron commander; to him a period of incessant, 
untiring activity, and illustrated by many brilliant 
and exciting incidents, for which the limits of 
this sketch afford no space. 

There are, however, two episodes in which he 
was so distinctly the central figure that they 
demand at least a brief narration. In January, 
1796, while his ship was repairing, a large East 
Indiaman, the Button, carrying some six hundred 
troops and passengers, was by a series of mishaps 
driven ashore on the beach of Plymouth, then an 
unprotected sound. As she struck, all her masts 
went overboard, and she lay broadside to the 
waves, pounding heavily as they broke over her. 
Pellew was at this moment driving to a dinner 
with his wife. Seeing crowds running from 
various directions towards the same quarter, he 
asked the reason. Upon learning it, he left his 
carriage and hurried to the scene. When he 
arrived, he recognized, by the confusion on board, 
by the way the ship was laboring, by the poverty 
of the means that had been contrived for landing 
the imperilled souls, — only a single hawser hav- 
ing been run to the shore, — that the loss of 
nearly all on board was imminent. Night, too, 
was falling, as well as the destruction of the ves- 
sel impending. After vainly offering rewards to 
the hardy boatmen standing by, if they would 
board the wreck with a message from him, he 



Pellew 



453 



said, " Then I must go myself." Though then 
close to forty years of age, his immense personal 
strength and activity enabled him, though sorely 
bruised thereby, to be hauled on board through 
the breakers by the hawser, which alternately 
slacked and then tightened with a jerk as the 
doomed ship rolled to and fro in the seas. Once 
on board, he assumed command, the want of 
which, through the absence of the proper captain, 
had until then hampered and well-nigh paralyzed 
all effectual effort. When his well-known name 
was spoken, three hearty cheers arose from the 
troops on board, echoed by the thousands of spec- 
tators on shore ; and the hope that revived with 
the presence of a born leader of men showed it- 
self at once in the renewed activity and intelli- 
gent direction of effort, on the decks and on 
the beach. The degree of the danger can be 
estimated from the fact that boats from the ships 
of war in port, his own included, tried in vain to 
approach and had to run for safety to the inner 
harbor. With sword drawn, — for many of the 
soldiers were drunk and riotous, — Pellew main- 
tained order, guided with a seaman's readiness 
the preparations for landing, and saw the women, 
the children, — one child but three weeks old, 
— the sick, landed first, then the soldiers, lastly 
the seamen. When he himself was transferred 
to the beach by the same means that his skill 
had contrived for others, but three persons re- 
mained on board, officers of the ship, who eased 



454 Types of Naval Officers 

him on shore. The injuries he had received in 
his perilous passage out, and which confined him 
to his bed for a week, forbade his being last. To 
the end of his life, this saving of the crew of the 
Dutton was the action in which he took most 
pride. 

The year that opened with this magnificent 
act of self-devotion saw Pellew, at its close, bear- 
ing a seaman's part in the most serious crisis that 
befell his country during the wars of the French 
Revolution. The end of 1796 and the earlier 
months of 1797 marked the nadir of Great 
Britain's military fortunes. The successes of 
Bonaparte's Italian campaign were then culmi- 
nating ; Austria was on the point of making 
peace with France ; England was about to find 
herself alone, and the discontent of the seamen 
of the navy, long smouldering, was soon to break 
out into the famous and threatening mutinies of 
the Channel Fleet and of the Nore. At the same 
time France, relieved on her eastern frontiers, felt 
able to devote seventeen ships-of-the-line and 
eighteen thousand troops to the invasion of 
Ireland. 

Pellew, with two frigates besides his own, was 
stationed off the mouth of Brest harbor to watch 
the enemy's movements; the main British fleet 
being some fifty miles to seaward. To this 
emergency he brought not only the intrepidity 
of a great seaman and the ardor of an anxious 
patriot, but likewise the intense though narrow 



Pellew 455 

Protestant feeling transmitted from a past, then 
not so remote, when Romanism and enmity to 
England were almost synonymous. " How would 
you like," said he to an officer who shared Pitt's 
liberal tendencies, " to see Roman Catholic chap- 
lains on board our ships? " and to the end of his 
life he opposed the political enfranchisement of 
persons of that creed. 

The French expedition against Ireland sailed 
from Brest on the i6th of December, 1796. Hav- 
ing sent off successively each of his consorts with 
information for the fleet, Pellew remained with 
his own ship alone, the hidefatigable, at the 
moment of the final start. There are two prin- 
cipal channels by which Brest can be left, one 
leading to the south, the other due west. The 
French admiral had at first intended to use the 
former ; but, the wind showing signs of an un- 
favorable shift, he endeavored to change the 
orders just as night was falling. The weather 
being hazy, his signals were understood by but 
few of the forty-odd vessels composing the force. 
Eight or ten joined him; the remainder followed 
the original instructions and went out by the 
south. Pellew attached himself to the admiral's 
division, kept along with it just out of gunshot, 
and by making false signals, burning blue lights 
and sending up rockets, introduced into the at- 
tempts to convey the wishes of the commander- 
in-chief such confusion as rendered them utterly 
futile. Havine satisfied himself as to the general 



456 Types of Naval Officers 

direction taken by the enemy, he left them, and 
made all sail for Falmouth, where he arrived on 
the 20th. 

The general fortunes of the expedition do not 
belong to the present story. Suffice it to say 
that the greater part reached Ireland safely, but 
through stress of weather was unable to land the 
troops, and went back to France by detachments, 
in January, 1797. It is during this process of 
return that Sir Edward Pellew again appears, in 
perhaps the most dramatic incident of his stir- 
ring career. 

On the afternoon of January 13th, being then in 
company with the frigate Amazon, and about one 
hundred and twenty miles west of Brest, a French 
ship-of-the-line was discovered. The stranger, 
named the Droits de r Homme, was returning 
from Ireland, and heading east. The frigates 
steered courses converging towards hers, seeking 
to cut her off from the land. The weather was 
thick and gloomy, with a strong west wind fast 
rising to a gale. At half-past four, as night was 
falling, the French ship carried away her fore 
and main topmasts in a heavy squall ; and an 
hour later the Indefatigable, now under close 
reefs, passed across her stern, pouring in a broad- 
side from so near that the French flag floated 
across her poop, where it was seized and torn 
away by some of the British seamen. The 
enemy, having on board nearly a thousand 
soldiers besides her crew, replied with rapid 



Pellew 457 



volleys of musketry, and, as the frigate passed 
ahead, sheered impetuously towards her, attempt- 
ing to board, and in her turn grazing the 
stern of the Indefatigable. In another hour the 
Amazon drew up, and then the British vessels 
took their positions, one on either bow of the 
Droits de V Homme ^ whence, by movements of 
the helm, they alternately raked her. The labor 
of the gunners, however, was arduous, due to the 
deep rolling of the ships, on board which, also, 
the seas poured in volumes through the gun- 
ports. On the main decks the men fought up to 
their middles in water, the heavy cannon broke 
away from the breech ings, or ropes used to con- 
trol them, and even iron bolts tore out from the 
ships' sides under the severe recoil of the guns. 
Thus through the long winter night the three 
ships rushed headlong before the gale towards 
the French coast, intent on mutual destruction ; 
the constant storm of shot, though flying wild 
under the violent motions of the vessels, tearing 
through spars and rigging, and crippling them in 
much that was essential to their safety. 

At four o'clock in the morning of the 14th, 
long before daybreak, land was sighted right 
ahead. The Indefatigable hauled at once to 
the southward, the Amazon to the northward ; 
the enemy alone, seemingly unconscious of the 
danger, kept on, and as she passed Pellew's ship 
fired a broadside which severely wounded all 
the masts. The situation of the combatants was 



458 Types of Naval Officers 

well-nigh desperate. They had reached the coast 
of France at a point where it forms a deep recess, 
called Audierne Bay, from either side of which 
project capes that must be cleared in order to 
gain once more the open sea. One only of the 
three escaped. The Droits de V Homme, un- 
manageable for want of sail power, tried to 
anchor, but drove, and struck on a shoal some 
distance from the beach. Of sixteen hundred 
souls on board when the battle began, over one 
hundred had been killed ; and of those who sur- 
vived the fight three hundred perished in the 
wreck. The Amazon, likewise crippled, though 
not so badly, had gone ashore to the northward 
only ten minutes after she ceased firing. Of her 
people, but six were drowned. The Indefatigable^ 
beating back and forth against the gale before the 
scene of the French disaster, upon which her crew 
gazed with the solemn feeling that such might 
soon be their own fate, succeeded at last in clear- 
ing the southern cape. At eleven o'clock, nearly 
twenty-four hours after first meeting the foe, and 
with six feet of water in her hold, she passed 
only three-quarters of a mile outside of the Pen- 
marcks, a rocky promontory thirty miles south 
of Brest. 

This remarkable encounter is said to have sug- 
gested to Marryat the vivid sea picture with 
which " The King's Own " ends. Pellew's un- 
usual personal endurance was signally illustrated 
on the same day, very shortly after the safety of 



Pellew 459 



the ship from wreck was assured. Her principal 
sails had been so torn by shot as to require 
immediate renewing, and this had scarcely been 
done when two vessels were sighted, one of which 
was for the moment supposed to be the Amazon, 
whose fate was yet unknown. Pellew gave orders 
to chase, but his officers represented to him that, 
whatever he himself was capable of, the ship's 
company was too exhausted for present further 
exertion ; and that, besides, the ammunition was 
very short, almost the last filled cartridge having 
been expended. Under these circumstances he 
was compelled to desist. 

The interest of Pellew's career centres mainly 
in his command of frigates. This independent 
but yet restricted sphere afforded the fullest 
scope for a conspicuous display of those splendid 
qualities — fearlessness, enterprise, sound judg- 
ment, instant decision, and superb seamanship 
— which he so eminently possessed. He was, 
above all, the frigate captain. " Nothing like 
hesitation was ever seen in him. His first order 
was always his last ; and he often declared of 
himself that he never had a second thought 
worth sixpence." In 1 799, by a new Admiralty 
rule, he was transferred to the Impetueux, a ship- 
of-the-line, and thenceforth served in that class 
of vessel until his promotion to admiral. 

As a general officer, Pellew had no opportun- 
ity to show whether he possessed ability of the 
highest order. For five years he held the com- 



460 Types of Naval Officers 

mand in India; and soon after Collingwood's 
death he was, in 181 1, appointed commander-in- 
chief in the Mediterranean. On both stations 
he evinced that faculty for careful organization, 
systematic preparation, and sagacious distribution 
of force which carries success up to the point 
which administrative capacity can reach. His 
ability in planning, while yet a subordinate in 
command of squadrons, had been recognized by 
St. Vincent during his management of the Brest 
blockade. " The disposition made by Sir Edward 
Pellew for the descent on a certain point is the 
most masterly I have ever seen. . . . Although 
the naval command in Quiberon may appear too 
important for a captain, I shall not divest him of 
it, unless I am ordered to do so; feeling a 
thorough conviction that no man in His Maj- 
esty's Navy, be his rank ever so high, will fill it 
so well." At the time this was written, June, 
1800, he had seven ships-of-the-line under his 
orders. After the Peace of Amiens, when war 
again began in 1803, he commanded a similar 
division watching the Spanish port of Ferrol, in 
which, although formally neutral, a French divi- 
sion lay at anchor ; and in discharge of this duty, 
both as a seaman and an administrator, he again 
justified the eulogium of the old Earl, now at the 
head of the navy as First Lord. 

In 1804 he was promoted Rear- Admiral, and 
soon afterwards assigned to the East India 
Station, which he held from 1805 ^^ 1809. Here 



Pellew 461 

no naval actions on the great scale were to be 
fought, but under his systematic organization 
of convoys and cruisers for the protection of 
commerce the insurance premium — the war risk 
— on the most exposed routes fell markedly, — for 
the port of Bombay fifty per cent less than at 
any former period of hostilities ; while the losses 
by capture, when the merchants observed his 
instructions, amounted to but one per cent on 
the property insured, which was less than those 
caused by the dangers of the sea, and consider- 
ably less, also, than the average war losses in 
other parts of the world. All this shows great 
ability, carefully utilized in diligent preparation 
and efficient precaution ; and the same character- 
istics are to be observed in his administration of 
the Mediterranean command, of wider scope and 
more purely military importance. Nevertheless, 
it gives no sure proof of the particular genius 
of a great captain. Whether, having forged his 
weapon, Pellew could also wield it; whether, 
having carefully sowed, he could also reap the 
harvest by large combinations on the battle-field, 
must remain uncertain, at least until probable 
demonstration of his conceptions is drawn from 
his papers. Nothing is as yet adduced to warrant 
positive inference. 

Pellew's Mediterranean command coincided in 
time with the period of Napoleon's falling for- 
tunes. After Trafalgar, the Emperor decided to 
increase his navy largely, but to keep it in port 



462 Types of Naval Officers 

instead of at sea, forcing Great Britain also to 
maintain huge fleets, the expense of which, con- 
curring with the commercial embarrassments that 
he sought to bring upon her, might exhaust her 
power to continue the war. In consequence of 
this policy, British military achievement on the 
grand scale was confined to the army in the 
Spanish peninsula ; and in the bestowal of re- 
wards, after Napoleon's first abdication, but one 
peerage was given to the navy. The great claims 
of Sir James Saumarez, who was the senior of 
the two, were disregarded on the ground that his 
flag was not flying at the moment, and Pellew 
was created Baron Exmouth. 

During the process of settlement which suc- 
ceeded the final fall of Napoleon at Waterloo, Lord 
Exmouth remained in the Mediterranean. In the 
early part of 18 16 he was ordered to visit with his 
fleet the Barbary ports, and to compel the uncon- 
ditional release of all slaves who were natives of 
the Ionian Islands ; they having become subjects 
of Great Britain by the terms of the peace. For 
many years, while the powers of Europe were 
engrossed in the tremendous strife of the French 
Revolution, these piratical states, under pretence 
of regular hostilities, had preyed upon the coasts 
as well as upon the commerce of the weak 
Mediterranean countries, and captives taken by 
them w^ere kept in bitter slavery. Nelson in his 
correspondence, in 1796, mentions a curious inci- 
dent which sufficiently characterizes the general 



Pellew 463 



motives and policy of these barbarian Courts. 
He asked an Algerine official visiting his ship, 
why the Dey would not make peace with 
Genoa and Naples, for they would pay well 
for immunity, as the United States also at that 
time did. The reply was, " If we make peace 
with every one, what is the Dey to do with his 
ships ? " In his later experience with the Medi- 
terranean the great admiral realized yet more 
forcibly the crying shame of Great Britain's 
acquiescence. " My blood boils that I cannot 
chastise these pirates. They could not show 
themselves in this sea did not our country per- 
mit. Never let us talk of the cruelty of the 
African slave trade, while we permit such a 
horrid war." The United States alone, although 
then among the least of naval powers, had taken 
arms before 1805 to repress outrages that were 
the common reproach of all civilized nations, — a 
measure the success of which went far to establish 
the character of her navy and prepare it for 181 2. 
Lord Exmouth was also directed to demand peace 
for Sardinia, as well as for any other state that 
should authorize him to act for it. Only Naples 
availed itself of this opportunity. 

As far as his instructions went, his mission 
was successful, and, by a happy accident, he was 
able at Tunis and Tripoli to extort further from 
the rulers a promise that thereafter captives 
should be treated as in civilized countries ; in 
other words, that they should no longer be re- 



464 Types of Naval Officers 

duced to slavery. Algiers refused this conces- 
sion; and the admiral could not take steps to 
enforce it, because beyond his commission. The 
Dey, however, undertook to consult the Porte; 
and the fleet, with a few exceptions, returned to 
Eno^land, where it arrived towards the end of 
June. 

Meanwhile British public feeling had become 
aroused ; for men were saying that the outrages 
of the past had been rather welcome to the com- 
mercial selfishness of the country. The well- 
protected traders of Great Britain, shielded by 
her omnipotent navy, had profited by crimes 
which drove their weaker rivals from the sea. 
Just then news came that at the port of Bona, 
on the Algiers coast, where there was under the 
British flag an establishment for carrying on 
the coral fishery, a large number of the fisher- 
men, mostly Itahans, had been wantonly slaugh- 
tered by a band of Turkish troops. To insist, 
arms in hand, upon reparation for such an out- 
rage, and upon guarantees for the future, would 
doubtless be condemned by some of our recent 
lights ; but such was not then the temper of 
Great Britain. The government determined at 
once to send a fleet to the spot, and Lord Ex- 
mouth was chosen for the command, with such a 
force as he himself should designate. The gist 
of his instructions was to demand the release, 
without ransom, of all Christian slaves, and a 
solemn declaration from the Dey that, in future 



Pellew 465 



wars, prisoners should receive the usage accorded 
them by European states. Great Britain thus 
made herself, as befitted the obligation imposed 
by her supreme maritime power, the avenger of 
all those oppressed by these scourges of the sea. 
The times of the barbarians were fulfilled. 

During a long career of successful piracy, the 
port of Algiers had accumulated an extensive 
and powerful system of defences. These had 
doubtless suffered in condition from the nonchalant 
fatalism of Turkish rule, encouraged by a long 
period of impunity ; but they constituted still, 
and under all the shortcomings of the defenders, 
a most imposing menace to an attacking fleet. 
To convey a precise impression of them by 
detailed verbal description would be difficult, and 
the attempt probably confusing. It may be said, 
in brief, that the town faces easterly, rising 
abruptly up a steep hill ; that from its front there 
then projected a pier, nearly a thousand feet long, 
at whose end was a circular fort, carrying seventy 
guns in three tiers ; from that point a mole ex- 
tended at right angles to the southward, — par- 
allel, that is, in a general sense, to the town 
front, but curving inward through the southern 
half of its length, so as better to embrace and 
shelter the vessels inside. This mole was some- 
what over a thousand feet in length, and had 
throughout two tiers of guns, linked at their 
northern extremity to the circular fort at the pier 
end. These principal works were flanked and 

30 



466 Types of Naval Officers 

covered, at either end and on the hillside, by 
others which it is unnecessary to particularize. 
The total number of guns bearing seaward num- 
bered near three hundred, of very respectable size 
for that day. The basin formed by the pier and 
the mole constituted the port proper, and in 
it, at the time of the attack, was collected the 
entire Algerine navy, nine frigates and corvettes 
and thirty-seven gunboats, the paltry force that 
had so long terrorized the Mediterranean. 

In prevision of his present enterprise, Lord 
Exmouth before leaving the Mediterranean had 
despatched a light cruiser to Algiers, on a casual 
visit similar to those continually made by ships 
of war to foreign ports. Her commander. Cap- 
tain Charles Warde, received from him very 
precise and most secret instructions to examine 
closely into the defences and soundings ; to do 
which it was necessary not only to observe every 
precaution of seeming indifference, — even to 
the extent of appearing engrossed with social 
duties, — but also to conduct under this cover 
measurements and observations of at least ap- 
proximate correctness. This duty was performed 
with singular diligence and success, with the 
double result of revealing the hopeless inaccuracy 
of existing charts and of placing in Exmouth's 
hands a working plan of the ground, perfectly 
trustworthy for his tactical dispositions. 

As before remarked, in the sketch of Lord 
St. Vincent, the defence and attack of seaports, 



Pellew 467 

involving as they do both occupation of perma- 
nent positions and the action of mobile bodies, 
are tactical questions. They differ much, though 
not radically, from operations in the open sea, 
or in the field, where positions may be taken 
incidentally, but where the movements of mo- 
bile bodies are the principal factor. In this 
way, though without using the word tactical, 
Exmouth treated the problem before him. Fur- 
nished, thanks to his own foresight and Warde's 
efficiency, with reliable information concerning 
the preparations of the enemy, he calculated the 
dispositions necessary to meet them and to crush 
their fire. Having assigned to the hostile works, 
severally and collectively, the force needed to 
overbear them, and having arranged the anchor- 
ing positions for the vessels of his command 
with reference to the especial task of each, as 
well as for mutual support, he had substantially 
his plan of battle, afterwards communicated to 
the fleet before going into action ; and the same 
data afforded the foundation for his statement to 
the Government of the number and character 
of ships needed for success. 

To the surprise of the Admiralty, Lord Ex- 
mouth asked for but five ships-of-the-line, five 
frigates, and five smaller vessels, to which were 
added four mortar boats to play upon the town 
and arsenal. When met with expressions of 
doubt, he replied, *' I am satisfied, and take the 
responsibility entirely upon myself." To satisfy 



468 Types of Naval Officers 

the hesitancy of the Government, he left with 
the Secretary to the Admiralty a written state- 
ment that his every requirement had been ful- 
filled, and that to him alone, therefore, would 
failure from deficient power be attributable. On 
the eve of departure he said to his brother Israel, 
" If they open fire when the ships are coming 
up, and cripple them in their masts, the diffi- 
culty and loss will be greater; but if they allow 
us to take our stations, I am sure of them, for 
I know that nothing can resist a line-of-battle 
ship's fire." He trusted to the extreme care of 
his preparations, which neglected no particular 
of equipment or organization, elaborating every 
detail of training and discipline, and providing, 
by the most diligent foresight and minute in- 
struction, that each officer concerned should know 
exactly what was expected of him. In short, 
it was to perfection of quality, and not to an 
unwieldy bulk of superfluous quantity, that Ex- 
mouth confided his fortunes in this last hazard. 

The fleet sailed from England on the 28th 
of July, 18 1 6, was joined at Gibraltar by a Dutch 
squadron of five frigates, whose commander asked 
to share the coming contest, and on the 26th of 
August was off the north point of Algiers Bay, 
some twenty miles from the town. At daybreak 
the next morning, the weather being almost calm, 
a flag of truce was sent in, bearing the British 
demands. During its absence a breeze from the 
sea sprang up, and the fleet stood in to a mile 



Pellew 469 

from the works, where it stopped to await the 
reply. At two p. m. the boat was seen returning, 
with the signal that no answer had been given. 
The flag-ship queried, " Are you ready ? " Each 
ship at once replied, " Yes ; " and all filling away 
together stood down to the attack, the admiral 
leading. 

The Algerine batteries were fully manned; 
the mole, moreover, was crowded with troops. 
With singular temerity, they fired no gun as the 
ships came on, thus relieving the most anxious 
of Exmouth's preoccupations concerning the dif- 
ficulties before him ; fearing, seemingly, that, if 
otherwise received, the prey might turn and es- 
cape. The British, on their side, observed the 
utmost silence ; not a gun, not a cheer, marred 
the solemn impression of the approach. The 
flag-ship. Queen Charlotte} piloted by an officer 
who had served continuously with Exmouth since 
1793, anchored by the stern across the mole head, 
at a distance of fifty yards, her starboard batter- 
ies pointing to sweep it from end to end. Still 
no sound of battle, as she proceeded to lash her 
bows to those of an Algerine brig lying just 
within the mole. This done, her crew gave three 
cheers, as well they might. Then the stolid, 
unaccountable apathy of the barbarians ceased, 
and three guns in quick succession were fired 

1 This Qtceen Charlotte was the successor of the ship which carried 
Howe's flag on the First of June, and which had been destroyed by 
fire off Leghorn in 1800. 



470 Types of Naval Officers 

from the eastern battery. Stirred by a movement 
of compassion, Lord Exmouth, from the flag- 
ship's poop, seeing the Moorish soldiery clus- 
tered thick upon the parapets to watch the ships, 
waved to them with his hand to get down. At 
the first hostile gun he gave the order " Stand 
by ! " at the second, " Fire ! " and simultaneously 
with the third the Queen Charlottes broadside 
rang out, and the battle began. 

The other vessels of the squadron were not all 
as successful as the flag-ship in taking the exact 
position assigned, and the admiral's plan thereby 
suffered some of that derangement to which every 
undertaking, especially military and naval, is lia- 
ble. This, however, produced no eflect upon 
the general result, except by increasing somewhat 
the lists of killed and wounded, through loss of 
advantageous offensive position, with consequent 
defect in mutual support. But the first broadside 
is proverbially half the battle. It was a saying 
of Collingwood to his crew, in a three-decker like 
the Qiteen Charlotte^ that if they could deliver 
three effective fires in the first ^m^ minutes no 
vessel could resist them ; and this was yet more 
certain when opposed to the semi-discipline of 
adversaries such as the Algerine pirates. Ex- 
mouth's general design was to concentrate his 
heavy ships at the southern end of the mole, 
whence the curve in the line of batteries would 
enable them to enfilade or take in reverse the 
works at the northern extremity. Here were to 



Pellew 



471 



be the two three-deckers, with a seventy-four be- 
tween them, all three in close order, stem to stern. 
The two-decker, however, anchored some seven 
hundred feet astern of the Queen Charlotte, the 
intervening space being left empty until filled 
by a thirty-six-gun frigate, upon whose captain 
St. Vincent passed the eulogium, " He seems to 
have felt Lord Nelson's eye upon him." The 
two remaining seventy-fours placed themselves 
successively close astern of the first, which was in 
accord with the original purpose, while the other 
three-decker took the right flank of the line, and 
somewhat too far out ; in which exposed and un- 
intended position, beyond the extreme north 
point contemplated for the British order, she 
underwent a very heavy loss. 

In general summary, therefore, it may be said 
that the broadsides of the ships-of-the-line were 
opposed from end to end to the heavy central 
batteries on the mole, while the lighter vessels en- 
gaged the flanking works on the shore to the south- 
ward, thus diverting the fire which would have 
harassed the chief assailants, — a service in which 
the Dutch squadron, composed entirely of frig- 
ates, rendered important assistance. The bomb 
vessels from the rear threw their shells over the 
fighting ships into the town and arsenal, and in 
the admiral's report are credited with firing all the 
shipping in the "harbor, except one frigate, creat- 
ing a conflagration which spread over the arsenal 
and storehouses. Soon after the contest opened, 



472 Types of Naval Officers 

the thirty-seven Algerine gunboats, crowded with 
troops, were seen advancing under cover of the 
smoke to board the flag-ship. The attempt, rash 
to insanity, met the fate it should have expected ; 
thirty-three were sent to the bottom by the guns of 
the Leander, stationed ahead of the Queen Char- 
lotte, and commanding the entrance to the port. 
An hour later, Lord Exmouth determined to set 
fire to the remaining frigate. The service was 
performed by an officer and boat's crew, with a 
steadiness which elicited from him such admira- 
tion that, on the return of the party, he stopped 
the working of the ship's upper battery to give 
them three cheers. As the hostile vessel burned, 
she drifted so near the Queen Charlotte as nearly 
to involve her in the same fate. 

From three to ten p. m. the battle lasted, steady 
disciplined valor contending with a courage in no 
way inferior, absolutely insensible to danger, but 
devoid of that coherent, skilful direction which is 
to courage what the brain and eye are to the 
heart. " I never," wrote Exmouth to his brother, 
" saw any set of men more obstinate at their guns, 
and it was superior fire only that could keep them 
back. To be sure, nothing could stand before 
the Queen Charlottes broadside. Everything 
fell before it, and the Swedish consul assures me 
we killed above five hundred at the very first fire, 
from the crowded way in which the troops were 
drawn up, four deep above the gunboats, which 
were also full of men. It was a glorious sight," 



Pellew 473 



he continues, " to see the Charlotte take her an- 
chorage, and to see her flag towering on high, 
when she appeared to be in the flames of the 
mole itself; and never was a ship nearer burnt; it 
almost scorched me off the poop. We were 
obliged to haul in the ensign, or it would have 
caught fire." He was himself struck thrice, 
though not seriously injured. A cannon-ball 
carried away the skirts of his coat, and one glass 
of the spectacles in his pocket was broken, and 
the frame bulged, by a shot. 

At ten p. M., the ammunition of the fleet run- 
ning short, and its work being substantially ac- 
complished, the ships began to haul off. The sea 
defences and a great part of the town were in 
ruins. " To be again effective," wrote Exmouth, 
" the defences must be rebuilt from the founda- 
tion." The flanking batteries and the hill forts 
continued to annoy the vessels as they retired, 
but the spirit of the Dey was broken. Towards 
eleven a light air from the land sprang up, which 
freshened into a violent and prolonged thunder- 
storm, lasting for three hours; and the flashes of 
heaven's artillery combined with the glare of the 
burning town to illuminate the withdrawal of the 
ships. 

The following morning the Dey signified his 
submission, and on the 30th of August Lord 
Exmouth made known to the fleet that all the 
terms of Great Britain had been yielded ; that 
Christian slavery was forever abolished, and that 



474 Types of Naval Officers 

by noon of the following day all slaves then in 
Algiers would be delivered to his flag. This was 
accordingly done, the whole number amounting 
to 1642; which, with those previously released 
at Tunis and TripoH, raised to 3003 the human 
beings whom Exmouth had been the instru- 
ment of freeing from a fate worse than death. 
Of this total, but eighteen were English ; the 
remainder were almost wholly from the Mediter- 
ranean countries. On the 3d of September, just 
one week after the attack, the fleet sailed for 
England. 

Profuse acknowledgment necessarily awaited 
the hero of a deed in which national exulta- 
tion so happily blended with the sentiment of 
pity for the oppressed. The admiral was raised 
to the next rank in the peerage, and honors 
poured in upon him from every side, — from 
abroad as well as from his own countrymen. His 
personal sense of the privilege permitted him, 
thus to crown a life of strenuous exertion by a 
martial deed of far-reaching beneficence, was a 
reward passing all others. In the opening words 
of his official report he voices his thankfulness : 
" In all the vicissitudes of a long life of public 
service, no circumstance has ever produced on 
my mind such impressions of gratitude and joy 
as the event of yesterday. To have been one of 
the humble instruments in the hands of Divine 
Providence for bringing to reason a ferocious 
Government, and destroying for ever the horrid 



Pellew 



475 



system of Christian slavery, can never cease to 
be a source of delight and heartfelt comfort to 
every individual happy enough to be employed 
in it." 

Here Lord Exmouth's career closes. Just 
forty years had elapsed since as a youth he had 
fought the Carleton on Lake Champlain, and he 
was yet to live sixteen in honored retreat ; bear- 
ing, however, the burden of those whose occupa- 
tion is withdrawn at an age too advanced to form 
new interests. Though in vigorous health and 
with ample fortune, " he would sometimes con- 
fess," says his biographer, " that he was happier 
amid his early difficulties." The idea of retire- 
ment, indeed, does not readily associate itself 
with the impression of prodigious vitality, which 
from first to last is produced by the record of 
his varied activities. In this respect, as in others, 
the contrast is marked between him and Sau- 
marez, the two who more particularly illustrate 
the complementary sides of the brilliant group of 
naval leaders, in the second rank of distinction, 
which clustered around the great names of Nelson, 
Howe, and Jervis. In the old age of Saumarez, 
the even, ordered tenor of his active military life 
is reflected in the peaceful, satisfied enjoyment of 
repose and home happiness, of the fruits of labors 
past, which Collingwood, probably without good 
reason, fancied to be characteristic of his own 
temperament. Lord Exmouth, compelled to be 
a passive spectator, saw with consequent increased 



476 Types of Naval Officers 

apprehension the internal political troubles of 
Great Britain in his later days. Though not a 
party man, he was strongly conservative, so that 
the ao^itations of the Reform era concealed from 
him the advantages towards which it was tending, 
and filled him with forebodings for the future of 
his country. 

Like his distinguished contemporary, Admiral 
Saumarez, and like many others of those lion- 
hearted, masculine men who had passed their lives 
amid the storms of the elements and of battle, 
— and like our own Farragut, — Lord Exmouth 
was a deeply religious man. Strong as was his 
self-reliance in war and tempest, he rested upon 
the Almighty with the dependence of a child 
upon its father. His noble brother. Sir Israel 
Pellew, who had followed Nelson into the fire at 
Trafalgar, departed with the words, " I know in 
Whom I have believed ; " and of the admiral 
himself, an officer who was often with him during 
the closing scene said, " I have seen him great in 
battle, but never so great as on his deathbed." 

Lord Exmouth died on January 23, 1833. He 
was at the time Vice-Admiral of England, that 
distinguished honorary rank having been con- 
ferred upon him but a few months before his 
death. 



Of the last four admirals whose careers have 
been here sketched, Howe alone inherited for- 



Pellew 477 

tune and high social rank ; but he also fought his 
way far beyond the modest position bequeathed 
to him by his brother. Eminent all, though in 
varying manner and degree, each illustrated a 
distinct type in the same noble profession. All 
were admirable officers, but they differed greatly 
in original endowments and consequent develop- 
ment. It was intuitive with St. Vincent to take 
wide and far-sighted views, and to embody them 
in sustained, relentless action. Endued by nature 
with invincible energy and determination, he 
moved spontaneously and easily along his difficult 
path. He approached, although he did not attain 
genius. In Howe is seen rather the result of 
conscientious painstaking acting upon excellent 
abilities, but struggling always against a native 
heaviness and a temper constitutionally both 
indolent and indulgent; a temper to which 
indeed he does not yield, over which he triumphs, 
but which nevertheless imposes itself upon his 
general course with all the force inseparable from 
hereditary disposition. A man of talent, he 
educates himself to acquirements which in his 
rival have the character of perception ; and only 
under the spur of emergency does he rise to the 
height of greatness. Both were great general 
officers, a claim which can scarcely be advanced 
for Saumarez and Exmouth, able, brilliant, and 
devoted as they were. Saumarez was the stead- 
fast, skilful, accomplished master of his profes- 
sion, but one whose aptitudes and tastes placed 



478 Types of Naval Officers 

him in the great organization of the fleet, as a 
principal subordinate rather than as head. Ex- 
mouth was the typical, innate seaman, intensely 
active, whose instincts are those of the partisan 
warrior, and who shines most in the freedom of 
detached service. All bore a conspicuous part 
in the greatest war of modern times, with honor 
such that their names will be remembered as 
long as naval history endures. 



Index 



Ind 



ex 



Aboukir Bay, 405. 

Age, standard of, a factor in effi- 
ciency, 70. 

Albany^ sloop, 327, 328. 

Alexandria, 403 ; 404 ; battle off, 
405-408; 410. 

Algeciras, allied fleet anchored at, 
289; French ships anchor off, 
415; Saumarez starts for, 415; 
Saumarez finds French ships 
moored at, 415; Hannibal re- 
anchors at, 419; crowded with 
eager sight-seers, 419; renewed 
battle off, 420. 

Algiers, battle of, 428; policy of, 
462, 463 ; Nelson denounces, 463 ; 
refuses demand of Lord Ex- 
mouth in regard to treatment of 
captives, 464; Italian coral fish- 
ermen slaughtered on coast of, 
464 ; Lord Exmouth demands re- 
lease of Christian slaves in, 464 ; 
its system of defences, 465 ; navy 
of, in port, 466; Capt. Warde 
examines defences in port of, 
466; Lord Exmouth sails against, 
468 ; battle at bay of, 470-473. 

Algiers, Dey of, 463 ; consults the 
Porte, 464 ; makes submission to 
Exmouth, 473 ; delivers up Chris- 
tian slaves, 473, 474. 

Alligator, ship, 266. 

Altavela, 244. 

Amazon^ ship, 456; fight of, with 
Droits de V Homme ^ 456, 457 ; 
wreck of, 458, 459. 

Amiens, Peace of, 460. 

Anglo-Dutch war, marks period 



of transition in naval warfare, 
12. 

Anglo-Saxon predominance, begin- 
ning of the struggle for, 100; ap- 
proaching its crisis, 100. 

Anson, Lord, takes command of 
Channel fleet, 122; presents 
Rodney at court, 153 ; succeeded 
by Earl of Sandwich, 154; 385. 

Antigua, 163; 228; 245. 

Apollo, frigate, 442 ; engages Stan- 
islas, 442 ; 443. 

Arbuthnot, Admiral, ordered to 
send ships to West Indies, 210; 
his force added to Rodney's, 211; 
regards himself injured, 212. 

Ardent, ship, 242. 

Arnold, Benedict, 433; 436; 437; 
bravery of, in battle, 439 ; retires 
toward Crown Point, 439 ; Coop- 
er's praise of, 440; 441 ; 442. 

Articles of War, modified, 95. 

Audierne Bay, 458. 

Austria, peace signed with, 413; 454. 

Baltic league, fostered by Napo- 
leon, 413; shattered by Nelson, 
413 ; Saumarez disturbs, 422, 423. 

Baltic Sea, affairs in, 421. 

Barbados, injuries at, by hurricane, 
217 ; British fleet arrives at, 228; 
Rodney returns to, 230 ; Rodney 
unwilling to fight French, off, 
230; Rodney reaches, 233; 245; 
Saumarez reaches, 394. 

Barfleur, ship, 240; 242; 311. 

Barrington, declines command 
of Channel fleet. 182 : refuses 



31 



482 



Index 



command of a fleet, 286; de- 
nounces ministry, 286; 287; sec- 
ond to Howe, 289; 297. 

Bart, Jean, French privateer, 451. 

Basque Roads, its character as a 
harbor, 112; 141. 

Bedford, ship, 240. 

Berwick, ship, 79, 81. 

BiRON, Marechal, makes money 
advance to Rodney, 179. 

Black Rocks, reef, 411. 

BleJiheim, ship, 351 ; 365. 

Blonde, ship, Burgoyne embarks 
on, 431. 

Bombay, 461. 

BoMPART, Commodore, leaves 
America, 134; his arrival, 135. 

Bonaparte, see Napoleon. 

BoscAWEN, Admiral, fleet under, 
collecting at Portsmouth, 103 ; 
sails to intercept French squad- 
ron, 103,104; loses two ships, 
104; before Toulon, 126; at- 
tacks French frigates near Tou- 
lon, 133 ; his failure, 133; returns 
to Gibraltar, 133 ; criticism of, 
133 ; surprised while repairing, 
134; his rapid movements, 134; 
goes in pursuit of De la Clue, 
134; destroys five French ships, 
134; succeeds Hawke tempo- 
rarily, 143. 

Boston, loss of, 284. 

Brest, Hawke's efficient blockade 
of,' 122; movements of French 
navy at, 126; De la Clue sails 
for, 133 ; Conflans's ships escape 
to, 141 ; Rodney operates against, 
1 58 ; Jervis closes port of, 375, 
392; blockade of, 411 ; bay of, 
411; Pellew stationed off, 454; 
French expedition against Ire- 
land sails from, 455. 

Brimstone Hill, 234 ; 394. 

Bristol, s\vi^, 384; 385: 386; 387. 

British Empire, non-existent in 
1748, 99. 



British Ministry, apprehensive over 
schooner Hawke incident, 172; 
cautions Rodney, 172; learns 
that Spain is concentrating ves- 
sels at Cadiz, 414. 

Brueys, at Battle of Nile, 416. 

Brunswick, ship, 314; 315. 

Burford, ship, 262. 

Burgoyne, 276; 284; 431; 434; 
leads renewed invasion, 442. 

Burrish, Capt. George, off Tou- 
lon, 30 ; his address to his lieu- 
tenants, 32 ; decision of court in 
case of, 35 ; cashiered, 37. 

Byng, Admiral, his incompetency 
at Minorca, 5, 20 ; finding of 
courtmartial of, 17 ; one of the 
judges of Mathews, 24 ; his 
punishment, 25 ; his situation at 
Minorca reviewed, 47-63 ; auth- 
or's criticism of, 64 ; discussion 
of trial of, 64 ; article under 
which he was convicted and ex- 
ecuted, 96, 97 ; his sailing for 
Minorca, 104; arrival off Port 
Mahon, 104 ; engages French 
fleet, 105; retires to Gibraltar, 
105 ; news of retreat of, reaches 
England, 105 ; superseded by 
Hawke, 105; sent home, 105; 
inquiry concerning in House of 
Commons, 105; defended by 
Pitt, 105 ; his execution a politi- 
cal exigency, 180. 

Byron, given North American 
command, 176; 284; relieves 
Howe and goes to West Indies, 
183 ; 284 ; his failure and return 
to England, 183. 

Cabrita Point, 419. 

Cadiz, French ships escape to, 134 ; 
336 ; 347 ; Spaniards running for, 
352 ; Spanish gunboats leave, 
361 ; blockade at, 362 ; Saumarez 
blockades, 400; French and 
Spanish navies concentrated at» 



Index 



483 



414 ; Saumarez ordered to block- 
ade, 414; Saumarez arrives off, 
415; Saumarez prevents en- 
trance of French ship to, 415; 
object of concentration at, frus- 
trated by Saumarez, 421. 

Cadiz, Bay of, 369. 

CcEsar, ship, Saumarez appointed 
to command, 410; injured at 
Algeciras, 418; refitted, 418; 
hauls out from Gibraltar mole, 
419; sails for Algeciras, 419; 
appears off Europa Point, 419. 

Campbell, Captain, aids in sup- 
pressing mutiny on board ship 
Marlborough, 365. 

Cape Horn, 260. 

Cape Passaro, Battle of, 69. 

Cape St. Vincent, see St. Vincent, 
Cape. 

Cap Frangois, 231; 236; 244; 246. 

Captain, ship, 351. 

Cardinals, The, rocks, 137, 139. 

Carkett, Captain, 200; his dis- 
obedience of Rodney's orders, 
200, 201. 

Carleton, General, 433 ; 434. 

Carleton, schooner, 437; Pellew 
left in command of, 438 ; obliged 
to withdraw, 438; 439; 475- 

Cartagena, harbor of, schooner 
Hawke taken to, 171; governor 
of, Rodney demands schooner 
Hawke from, 171. 

Cesar, ship, 240. 

Champlain, Lake, 433; 43^; battle 
on, 436, 437; 442; 475- 

Chandos, Duke of, 148. 

Channel Fleet, Keppel appointed 
to command of, 176; 183; 271; 
281 ; 286; 287 ; Howe takes com- 
mand of, 299 ; Howe remains in 
nominal command of, 318 ; Howe 
formally retires from command 
of, 319; Jervis attached to, 331 ; 
rumor concerning command of, 
337 ; lack of discipline in, 367 ; 



374; 375; St. Vincent again 
called to command of, 380 ; Tisi- 
phone attached to, 392; 394; St. 
Vincent takes command of, 411 ; 

451 ; 454- 

Channel Islands, Saumarez com- 
mander-in-chief at, 421. 

Charente, river, French vessels 
flee up, 117. 

Charleston, British fleet arrives off, 
386. 

Cherbourg, Saumarez present at be- 
ginning of work on breakwater at, 
398 ; frigate Riicnioti quits, 399. 

Chevalier, Captain, tribute of, 
to Admiral Howe, 296. 

Cleopdtre, ship, fight of, with 
Nymphe, 448, 449. 

Clinton, Sir Henry, his evacu- 
ation of New York, 277 ; at Cape 
May, 278; reaches Navesink, 
279; 280. 

CoDRiNGTON, Lieutenant, 311; 
316. 

CoLLiNGWOOD, 311 ; criticiscs 
movement of Admiral Mann, 
348; at battle off Cape St. Vin- 
cent, 355; 410; off Brest, 412; 
Pellew succeeds, 460. 

CoNFLANS, opposed by Hawke, 
126; sails, 135; his fleet breaks 
apart and flees, 141 ; his flagship 
destroyed, 141 ; 273. 

Cook, James, master of fleet at 
Quebec, 326, 327. 

Cooper, naval historian, his opin- 
ion of Arnold, 440. 

Copenhagen, 413; 446. 

Cornwall, 429. 

Cornwall, ship, 202. 

CoRNWALLis, Lord, his fate in 
America, settled, 232 ; his sur- 
render, 233 ; surrender of, 
change of ministry consequent 
upon, 251 ; offers commission to 
Saumarez, 385 ; meeting of, with 
Saumarez, sulDsequently, 385. 



484 



Index 



Corsica, 333 ; 337 ; in revolt against 
Britain, 346 ; evacuated by Brit- 
ish, 347. 

Courageux, ship, wrecked on Bar- 
bary coast, 350; 352. 

Crescent, frigate, Saumarez ap- 
pointed to command, 399 ; action 
of, with French frigate Reunion, 
399, 400. 

Crown Point, 433 ; 439 ; Pellew 
lands at, 441. 

Ctdloden, ship, 353, 354. 

Cumberland, Richard, his _ re- 
mark concerning Rodney, 178. 

CuMBY, Lieutenant, parody by, 
upon Admiral Jervis, 373 ; pre- 
tended revenge of Admiral upon, 

374. 
Cura9ao, 246. 

Curtis, Fleet Captain, 311. 
Curtis, Sir Roger, 250. 
Czar of Russia, 421. 

Dacres, Lieutenant, wounded, 

437, 438- 

Declaration of Independence, 275. 

De Court, Admiral, his comments 
on engagement off Toulon, 44; 
81. 

Defence, ship, 342 ; 363. 

De Grasse, Count, fleet under, 
sails for Martinique, 221, 222; 
sights Hood's division, 222 ; 
gives -Hood battle, 222 ; moves 
to support his detachment at 
Tobago, 229 ; sails for Hayti, 
231 ; protects convoy from Mar- 
tinique to Cap Francois, 236; 
is followed by Rodney, 236; 
separates ships of war from 
convoy, 237 ; fails to use his 
opportunity, 237 ; condition of 
ships of, 238 ; flagship of, collides 
with Zile, 238; battle with 
Rodney, 238-242 ; disaster to 
squadron of, 292 ; transports 
sail to carry stores to, 392 ; off 



St. Christopher, 394 ; Saumarez 
engages flagship of, 396. 

De Guichen, sails from Mar- 
tinique, 197 ; his battle with Rod- 
ney, 200-206 ; asks to be relieved, 
206 ; his fleet returns to Europe, 
214; 239. 

De la Clue, Admiral, sails for 
Brest, 133; near Gibraltar, 133; is 
seen by British frigate, 134; pur- 
sued by Boscawen, 134; fireships 
destroyed by Boscawen, 134. 

De Ruyter, pronounced great- 
est naval seaman in era of 
Charles IL, 12, 13. 

D'ESTAING, Count, Howe's cam- 
paign against, 268, 269; leaves 
Toulon for America, 277 ; his 
arrival delayed, 279; strength 
of squadron of, 279 ; arrives, 279; 
sails southward, 280 ; enters 
harbor of Newport, 281 ; again 
puts to sea, 281 ; fleet of, scat- 
tered, 282; appears again off 
Rhode Island, 282 ; retires to 
Boston, 282 ; runs batteries at 
Seakonnet channel, 388 ; is lured 
out of bay, 388 ; abandons coast, 
388. 

Devonshire, 429. 

Devonshi7'e, ship, 90, 91. 

Dey, of Algiers, see Algiers, Dey of. 

Dominica, 237. 

Dorsetshire, frigate, 41, 46, 137. 

Douglas, Sir Charles, his criti- 
cism of Rodney's encounter with 
De Grasse, 247 ; 433 ; 437 ; on 
battle of Lake Champlain, 439; 
commands Pellew, 440. 

Douglas, Sir James, 165. 

Drake, Rear Admiral, sent by 
Rodney against De Grasse, 229 ; 
forced to retire before superior 
force, 230. 

Droits de V Homme, ship, fight of, 
with Indefatigable and Amazon, 
456, 457 ; wreck of, 458. 



Index 



485 



Dungeness, anecdote of Nelson 
off, 446, 447. 

DuPLKix, recalled from India by 
French government, loi. 

Diitton, ship, driven ashore at 
Plymouth, 452 ; her troops, pas- 
sengers, and crew saved through 
action of Admiral Pellew, 452- 
454- 

Eagle, ship, 90, 153. 
East Indies, 403. 

East India, station, Pellew as- 
signed to, 460. 

Egypt, 403; 404; 413- 
Ellis, Lieutenant, 343. 
Ellison, Captain, Earl St. Vin- 
cent's rebuke to, 363, 364. 
Elphinstone, Captain, 165. 
Erie, Lake, 436. 
Essex, ship, 112. 
Europa Point, 419, 
ExMOU'L'H, Lord, see Pellew. 

Falkland Islands, incident at, 
brings Great Britain and Spain 
on verge of rupture, 172. 

Falmouth, 456. 

Faulkner, Captain, 342, 343. 

Fearney, William, bargeman, re- 
ceives surrendered Spanish 
swords from Nelson, 356. 

Ferrol, Spanish port of, Pellew 
watches, 460. 

Fighting Instructions, of 1740 and 
1756, compared with those of 
1665; Rooke's tactics adopted 
in, 16. 

Finisterre, Cape, 291. 

Finland, gulf of, Russian fleet takes 
refuge in, 425. 

First Consul, Napoleon as, 413. 

Flamborough, frigate, 78. 

Flight, Colonel, Admiral Jervis 
plays joke upon, 370. 

Formidable, flagship of Rodney, 
239- 



Fort Moultrie, see Moultrie Fort. 

Fort Royal, 235. 

Foudroyant, ship, 330 ; 331. 

Four Days Battle, British meet 
severe !check in, 11 ; attributed 
to strategic errors, 12 ; Penn's 
criticism of, 12. 

Fox, Captain, criticised for con- 
duct in battle off La Rochelle, 
93 ; court-martialled, 93 ; retired 
as a rear-admiral, 93. 

Fox, Charles J., supported in Par- 
liament by Admiral Jervis, 332. 

France, abandons Egypt, loi ; 
sends fleet and force against 
Minorca, 104 ; declares war 
against Great Britain, 105 ; 
captures British supply vessel 
off Gibraltar, 106 ; sends squad- 
ron to convoy troops to Cape 
Breton, 1758, 116; ships of, flee 
up river Charente, 117 ; vessels 
of, make their escape, 117; de- 
termines to invade England, 124 ; 
preparations of, for invasion of 
England, 124, 125; war between 
Great Britain and, imminent, 
176; declares war against Great 
Britain, 185 ; expedition of, 
against Ireland, sails from 
Brest, 455 ; failure of expedi- 
tion of, against Ireland, 456. 

Frangois, Cap, 231 ; 236 ; 244 ; 246. 

FRANKLiN,Benjamin,onFrench oc- 
cupation of Canada, 102 ; receives 
note from Admiral Howe, 275; 
bitter reply of, 275 ; Howe's com- 
ment on, 275, 

Franklin, ship, 406. 

Frederick the Great, 260. 

Free ports. Great Britain insti- 
tutes, in West Indies, 169 ; 
effect of, 169 ; Rodney's report 
concerning, 169 ; 170. 

French Navy, see Navy, French, 

French, the, their part in develop- 
ment of tactical science, 13; sea- 



486 



Index 



men mobbed in Boston, 282 ; 
land in Egypt, 404. 

Galley fighting, its superiority in 
effectiveness to that in sailing 
vessels, 7 ; its decline, 8 ; its 
traditions linger, 8. 

Gardner, Lord, 265. 

Geary, Francis, Hawke's advice 
to, 146. 

George I., King of England, 
stands sponsor for infant Rod- 
ney, 148. 

George II., King of England, 
takes knowledge of Hawke, 84. 

George III., King of England, 
conversation of, with Earl St. 
Vincent, 287. 

Gibraltar, Rooke's capture of, 16; 
Byng retires to, 105 ; Hawke 
reaches, 105 ; Boscawen returns 
to, 133; De la Clue near, 133; 
187 ; joy at, over Rodney's vic- 
tory off Cape St. Vincent, 193, 
194; 269 ; Howe's relief of, 288 - 
295 ; Jervis at relief of, 331 ; 346 ; 
348 ; three ships wrecked at, 
350; Saumarez convoys prizes to, 
409 ; 410 ; Saumarez withdraws 
from Algeciras to,4i6; Exmouth 
joins Dutch fleet at, 468. 

Gibraltar, ship, injured on a reef, 

350- 

Glorieux, ship, 239. 

Great Britain, declares war against 
France, 105 ; institutes free ports 
in Jamaica, 169 ; effect of this 
movement, 169; foreign policy 
of, enfeebled, 172 ; on verge of 
rupture with Spain over Falk- 
land Islands incident, 172; war 
between France and, imminent, 
176 ; pensions daughters of 
Marechal Biron, 180 ; declares 
war against Holland, 217; Na- 
poleon seeks to exclude com- 
merce of, 413. 



Great Britain, Navy of, see Navy of 
Great Britain. 

Greenwich Hospital, Palliser ap- 
pointed to governorship of, 182. 

Grenada, captured by British, 159. 

Gros Ilet Bay, 23S. 

Guadaloupe, 237 ; 238 ; 243 ; 245. 

Guernsey, Island, James Saumarez 
born on, 383 ; later years of 
Saumarez at, 427. 

Hallowell, Captain, 352 ; eccen- 
tric response of, to Jervis, 353. 

Hannibal, ship, loss of, at Alge- 
ciras, 416; 418; re-anchors at 
Algeciras, 419 

Havana, Rodney at fall of, 166; 
loss of, embitters Spain, 171. 

Havre, Rodney operates against, 
158. 

Hawke, Admiral, development of 
naval warfare identified with 
name of, 4 ; uplifted the navy, 6 ; 
off Toulon, 29, 39, 40 ; his cap- 
ture of the Spanish vessel, Poder, 
40 ; his birth and parentage, 77 : 
his promotion to post-captain, 
78 ; appointed to the Berwick, 
79 ; sails for the Mediterranean, 
79; loses his political influence, 
79 ; war against Spain declared, 
80; sails for West Indies in 
Portland, 80; war of Austrian 
succession, 80; before Toulon, 
81 ; his exceptional conduct in 
battle, 81 ; is complimented by 
Rear-Admiral Rowley, 84 ; effect 
of the battle on his fortunes, 84; 
the king takes knowledge of him, 
84 ; becomes a rear-admiral, 85 ; 
hoists his flag, 85 ; cruises in the 
Bay of Biscay, under Sir Peter 
Warren, 85 ; joined to Warren 
in command, 86 ; goes to sea in 
command, 86 ; subordinates 
pecuniary to military considera- 
tions, 88 ; descries the enemy off 



Index 



487 



La Rochelle, 89 ; overhauls fleet 
of French merchantmen con- 
voyed by Commodore L'Eten- 
duere, 89; orders general chase, 
90; overtakes the French rear, 
90 ; his brilliant victory, 91 ; his 
report of the engagement, 92; 
calls a council of war, 93 ; dis- 
pleased with Capt. Fox, 93 ; ac- 
tually commander in battle with 
L'Etenduere, 97 ; given Order 
of the Bath, 98 ; now known as 
Sir Edward Hawke, 98 ; pro- 
moted to rank of vice-admiral, 
98 ; in dock yard command, 98 ; 
most illustrious naval officer, 100; 
revolutionizes naval ideas, 100 ; 
his part in arbitrament with 
France, 103 ; again in command 
of a fleet, 103 ; sails against 
French, 104; seizes 300 trading 
vessels, 104 ; supersedes Byng, 
105 ; reaches Gibraltar, 105 ; 
sends Byng home, 105 ; institutes 
inquiry into conduct of Byng's 
captains, 105 ; denies allegations 
of Pitt in House of Commons, 
105 ; disliked by Pitt, 106 ; returns 
to England, 106; recaptures Brit- 
ish supply vessel in Spanish port, 
107 ; his characteristic indepen- 
dence illustrated, 107 ; his ser- 
vice henceforth confined to Chan- 
nel fleet, 108; maintains blockade 
of French ports, 108 ; his expedi- 
tion against Rochefort, 1 1 1 ; 
controversy concerning it, in; 
his maxim concerning pilots, 112; 
his surprise at Basque Roads, 
112; characterization of that 
harbor, 112; his coolness, 113; 
his self-assertion, 113; his bold 
disregard of pilotage difficulties 
at Quiberon, 114; declines to 
attend a council of war, 115; 
reaches Spithead, 115; resents 
language of Pitt, 1 16 ; his service 



against French squadron, 1758, 
116; his failure to destroy French 
squadron through defective 
equipment, 117 ; practically sup- 
planted by Howe, 118; abandons 
his command in an indignant 
note, 118, 119; his anger in some 
respects justified, 119; is sum- 
moned to the Admiralty, 121 ; 
defends his action, 121 ; his posi- 
tion strengthened, 121; accom- 
panies Anson as second in com- 
mand, 122; culminating epoch 
in career of, 122 ; his triumph at 
Quiberon Bay, 122; his capacity 
as a seaman proved, 122; his 
efficient blockade of Brest, 122: 
is burned in effigy, 124; opera- 
tions at Brest, 126; his double 
duty there, 126; his difficulties, 
126; opposes Conflans, 126 ; his 
method at Quiberon analyzed, 
127-130; assures the Admiralty, 
131 ; his great tact in correspon- 
dence, 132; discharges a mutin- 
ous surgical officer, 132 ; defends 
his act, 132 ; his liberality toward 
subordinates, 132 ; watches 
French ships at Cadiz, 134 ; 
sends ships to reinforce light 
squadron, 134; recalls ships-of- 
the-line, 134, anchors in Torbay, 
135; receives news of French 
fleet, 135; crowds all sail for 
Quiberon, 136; sights the French 
fleet, 136 ; gives pursuit, 136, 
137 ; opens fire, 137 ; his orders 
to his sailing master, 138; is 
overtaken by night, 139 ; follows 
French fleet round The Cardi- 
nals, 139 ; sinks two French 
ships, 140; cowes the French 
navy, 141 ; his losses at Quibe- 
ron, 141 ; his feat at Quiberon 
analyzed, 142 ; returns to Eng- 
land, 143 ; is succeeded by Bos- 
cawen temporarily, 143 ; received 



488 



Index 



with honors, 143 ; denied a peer- 
age, 143; his indifference to self- 
advancement, 143; his indepen- 
dence in professional conduct, 
toward superiors, 143, 144 ; hauls 
down his flag, 144; becomes first 
Lord of the Admiralty, 144 ; made 
vice-admiral of Great Britain, 
145; the peerage conferred, 145; 
his advice to Geary, 146; his 
death, '146; his distinctive glory, 
146; his opinion of Howe, 262 ; 

273- 

Hawke, schooner, 170, overhauled 
by Spanish coast guard vessels, 
170; taken to Cartagena, 171. 

Hayti, 231 ; 236. 

Hector^ ship, 240. 

Hermenegildo, ship, 417; 420; re- 
markable loss of, 420. 

Hohenlinden, 413. 

Holland, Great Britain declares 
war against, 217 ; 390. 

Hood, Sir Samuel, strength of his 
powers, 74; made second in 
command to Rodney, 220; ar- 
rives at West India station, 221 ; 
his disagreement with Rodney, 
221 ; gives battle to De Grasse, 
222 ; urges Rodney to effect a 
coalition of forces, 223 ; joins 
Rodney at St. Kitts, 228; criti- 
cises Rodney's movement against 
De Grasse at Tobago, 229 ; de- 
fends St. Kitts, 234; urges Rod- 
ney to more energetic action, 
243 ; criticises Rodney, 244-246; 
his comment on Rodney, 252 ; 
in command of Mediterranean 
fleet, 299; anchors off St. Chris- 
topher, 394 ; appoints Saumarez 
to command Russell, 395. 

Horn, Cape, 260. 

HosTE, Paul, historian of achieve- 
ments of Tourville, 13. 

Howe, Lord, his important mis- 
sion, 176; his return from 



America, 182 ; his character and 
temperament, 183, 184 ; anec- 
dote of, recorded by Sir Byam 
Martin, 250 ; 254 ; his especial 
claim on esteem of Americans, 
254; respect in American colo- 
nies for his elder brother, 254- 
256 ; succeeds to the peerage 
held by his brother, 256; char- 
acter compared with that of his 
brother, 256 ; his early service, 
259; enters the navy, 259; em- 
barks for Pacific in Anson's 
squadron, 259; serves in West 
Indies, 260; his part in Seven 
Years War, 260 ; his friendship 
with Wolfe, 262 ; characteriza- 
tion of, by a French pilot, 262 ; 
Hawke's opinion of, 262, 263 ; his 
taciturnity, 263 ; receives the 
Duke of York, 263 ; his coolness 
and self-possession, 263 ; anec- 
dotes of, 264, 265 ; his composure 
under suspense, 266, 267, 268 ; 
his campaign against D'Estaing, 
268 ; contrasted with Jervis, 270, 
271 ; at Quiberon, 273 ; in House 
of Commons, 274 ; becomes 
rear-admiral, 274 ; in confidence 
of Hawke, 274 ; appointed to 
command squadron, 274 ; vice- 
admiral, 275 ; commander-in- 
chief of North American station, 
275; given treaty powers, 275; 
addresses note to Franklin, 275; 
his comment on Franklin's re- 
ply, 275 ; concerning his letter 
to Washington, 276; his opera- 
tions about New York, 276; 
author's characterization of, 277, 
278 ; learns of coming of 
D'Estaing, 278 ; concentrates 
at New York, 278 ; disposition 
of squadron of, against D'Es- 
taing, 279, 280; manoeuvres to 
avoid battle with D'Estaing, 
281 ; fleet of, scattered, 282 ; 



Index 



489 



highest title of, to fame, 283 ; 
follows French fleet to New- 
port, and Boston, 284; resigns 
command, 284 ; succeeded by 
Vice-admiral Byron, 284; sails 
for England, 284 ; words of, in 
House of Commons, 284; again 
brought into service, 287 ; en- 
counters allied fleet off Scilly, 
288 ; tactical manoeuvre of, off 
Land's End, 288 ; relief of 
Gibraltar by, 288, 295; tribute 
of Chevalier to, 296 ; headed for 
Atlantic, 297 ; is pursued by 
allies, 297 ; regains Spithead, 
297 ; on shore duty, 297 ; as 
first Lord of Admiralty, 298 ; 
appoints Nelson to a ship, 298; 
at head of navy at outbreak of 
French revolution, 298 ; takes 
command of Channel fleet, 299 ; 
encounters French fleet and con- 
voy, 301, 302 ; gives chase, 302 ; 
tactical skill of, 303, 304 ; analy- 
sis of tactics in fight with Vil- 
laret-Joyeuse, 306, 307 ; attacks 
latter, in force, 310; conduct of, 
in action, 311 ; victory of, over 
French fleet, 315, 316; career 
of, ended, 318; in nominal com- 
mand of Channel fleet, 318 ; 
suppresses mutinies, 318 ; active 
service of, closed, 319 ; retires 
formally from command of 
Channel fleet, 319 ; estimate 
of, of Battle of the Nile, 379; 
appearance of, off Rhode Island, 
3S8, 409 ; commends Pellew, 440; 
again commends Pellew, 450, 
476, 477- 

Howe, General, departs for Eng- 
land, 284. 

Hudson, river, 442. 

Hyeres Islands, 21. 

Indefatigable^ ship, 455 ; fight of, 
wit. Droits de VHomvie, 456, 



457 ; narrow escape of, from 

wreck, 458. 
India, 403. 
Inflexible, ship, 435 ; launch and 

description of, 435, 436 ; in battle 

of Lake Champlain, 438, 439. 
Intrepide, ship, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 91. 
Ionian Isles, slaves, natives of, 

released by Pellew, 462. 
Ireland, French expedition against, 

sails from Brest, 455 ; expedition 

reaches, 456. 

Jacobi7i, ship, 313. 

Jamaica, threatened by Brest fleet, 
160; 161 ; succored by Rodney, 
162; 163; station, Rodney ap- 
pointed to command, 167 ; 
station, required high degree 
of executive ability to com- 
mand, 168 ; its situation in rela- 
tion to Spanish colonies, 168 ; 
free ports instituted in, 169 ; 
Rodney moves toward, 243 ; 

393- 

James II., Duke of York, his fight- 
ing instructions, 1665, 9. 

Jervis, Admiral, contrasted with 
Howe, 270-272, 320 ; contrasted 
with Nelson, 321 ; his opinion of 
Nelson, 321 ; birth of, 321, 322 ; 
early life of, 322 ; runs away to 
sea, 322 ; sails for West Indies, 
322; early privations, 323; con- 
trasted with Rodney, 324 ; cruises 
in the Caribbean, 324; returns 
to England, 324 ; is made lieu- 
tenant, 325; with Boscawen in 
the St. Lawrence, 325 ; goes to 
Mediterranean with Hawke, 325 ; 
relieves Byng, 325 ; associated 
with Sir Charles Saunders, 325 ; 
intimacy with Wolfe, 325 ; in 
command oi Porcupine, 326 ; con- 
versation of, with Wolfe before 
battle of Plains of Abraham, 326 ; 
leads fleet against Quebec, 326; 



490 



Index 



goes to England after fall of 
Quebec, 327 ; appointed to com- 
mand a ship, 327 ; ordered to 
return to North America, 327 ; 
puts in at Plymouth, leaking, 
327 ; given command of sloop 
Albany, 327 ; conquers mutinous 
sailors, and sets sail, 328 ; ar- 
rives at New York, 328; pro- 
moted to post-captain, 328; an 
admiral at fifty-two, 328; com- 
mands frigate in Mediterranean, 
328 ; resents insult to British flag, 
by Genoese officers, 329; forces 
an apology, 329; opposed to 
abolition of slave trade, 329; 
commissions the Foudroyant^ 
330; attached to the Channel 
fleet, 331 ; in Keppel's battle off 
Ushant, 331 ; at Gibraltar with 
Howe, 331 ; captures French ship 
Fegase, 331 ; receives a baronetcy, 
332 ; receives Order of the Bath, 
332; takes seat in Parliament, 
332; supports Fox, 332; attains 
rank of rear-admiral and of vice- 
admiral, 332 ; is again afloat, 332 ; 
on service in Caribbean Sea, 
332 ; his brusque treatment of a 
lieutenant, 332, 333 ; his attitude 
toward matrimony, 333 ; returns 
to England, 333 ; appointed to 
command Mediterranean Sta- 
tion, 333; joins fleet in San 
Fiorenzo Bay, 333 ; reaches 
grade of admiral of the Blue, 
334 ; reaches crowning period of 
his career, 334 ; disposition of 
fleet of, 336 ; as strict disciplina- 
rian, 337 ; anecdotes concerning 
this characteristic of, 337-34°; 
his care of health of officers and 
men, 343, 344 ; embarrassment 
of, 347 ; disappointment of, at 
Admiral Mann's failure to obey 
orders, 349; cheerfulness of, un- 
der discouragements, 351 ; rein- 



forcements reach, 351 ; encoun- 
ters large Spanish fleet, 352; 
courageous remark of, 352 ; 
victory of, at Cape St. Vincent, 
352-357 ; gratitude of England 
toward, 356; created Earl of St. 
Vincent, 356; analysis of move- 
ments of, in battle of Cape St. 
Vincent, 356, 357 ; blockades 
Spanish at Cadiz,357; suppresses 
mutinous action of seamen, 358, 
359; action of, in case of sea- 
men, of ship St. George, 360, 361 ; 
repels attack of Spanish gunboats 
from Cadiz, 361, 362; stern re- 
pression of mutiny by, on board 
ship Marlborough, 362-367 ; stern 
rebuke of, to Capt. Ellison, 363, 
364 ; brusque reply of, to Sir 
Edward Pellew, 367; sternness 
of, 368 ; forbids captains to dine 
each other, 368 ; quaint humor 
of, 369 ; anecdotes of, 369, 370 ; 
reverence of, for the flag, 372 ; 
satire upon, by Lieutenant Cum- 
by, 373 ; pretended revenge of, 
for, 373, 374 ; decline of health 
of, 374; return of, to England, 
374 ; placed in command of 
Channel fleet, 375; establishes 
rigid discipline in same, 375; 
closes port of Brest, 375 ; anal- 
ysis of last named movement, 
376; three great services of, to 
England, 378 ; discipline of, of 
Mediterranean fleet, 378; win- 
ning by, of Battle of St. Vincent, 
378 ; suppression of mutinies by, 
378 ; contrasted with Nelson, 
378, 379; Nelson's esteem for, 
379 ; Nelson's differences with, 
379; arranges expedition which 
led to Battle of the Nile, 379; 
credit due, for same, 379, 380 ; 
later years of, 380 ; succeeds 
Pitt as First Lord of the Ad- 
miralty, 380 ; retires from active 



Index 



491 



service, 380; hauls down his 
flag, 380; country seat of, 380; 
closing years of, 380, 381 ; liber- 
ality, of, 38 1 ; active habits of 
in old age, 381 ; death of, 
381. 
Judith, Point, 281. 

Keith, Lord, 367. 

Kempenfelt, Admiral, 288; sec- 
ond to Howe, 289; death of, 
290 ; sent in pursuit of De 
Grasse, 393 ; makes valuable 
capture, 393. 

Keppel, Admiral, appointed to 
Channel fleet, 176; resigns com- 
mand of Channel fleet, 182 ; cha- 
grin of, 286; 2S7 ; Jervis with, at 
Ushant, 331 ; assists Saumarez 
in advancement, 384, 385 ; com- 
panion of uncle of Saumarez, 
385- 

Land's End, Howe's tactical 
movement off, 288. 

Langara, his fleet destroyed by 
Rodney, 216. 

Leander, ship, 472. 

L'Etenduere, Commodore, at- 
tacked by Hawke, 89; Hawke 
commander in battle with, 97 ; 

157. 

Leghorn, in power of France, 346, 

Lestock, Vice-Admiral, off Tou- 
lon, 21, 22; his part in trial of 
Mathews, 21-25; his own trial 
and defence, 26. 

Levant, the, 384. 

LiNOis, at battle at Algeciras,4i6; 
his division in second attack, 
419. 

Lisbon, 350. 

Louisa, s\n^y 60, 61, 64. 

Louis XVI., treats Saumarez with 
attention, 398, 399. 

LowTHER, Miss, betrothed of Gen. 
Wolfe, 326. 



Madras, French conquest of, 103 ; 
yielded in exchange for Louis- 
burg, 103. 

Magnaninie, ship, 262; 272; 273. 

Malaga, movements of Rooke off, 
15; battle, 69, 70; 156. 

Malta, Nelson receives news of 
surrender of, to the French, 403. 

Manila, loss of, embitters Spain, 
171. 

Mann, Admiral, discouragement 
of, 348 ; calls council of officers, 
348; returns to England, 348; 
deprived of command, 348 ; 
Jervis's criticism of, 349; Nel- 
son's criticism of, 349 ; effect on 
fleet of defection of, 350. 

Mantua, blockaded, 346. 

Marengo, 413. 

Marlborough, frigate, 41 ; 42 ; 57 ; 
mutinies on, 362-367. 

Marseilles, 430. 

Martin, Sir Byam, records anec- 
dote of Lord Howe, 250. 

Martinique, Rodney operates 
against, 158; captured by Brit- 
ish, 158; 165; 236; 245; 393. 

Marryatt, Capt., Peter Simple 
quoted, 95, 96; source of sea 
picture in his The Kitig's Own, 
458. 

Mathews, Admiral, off" Toulon in 
I774> 5 > description of engage- 
ment, 21, 22, 41, 42, 43; court- 
martial of, 27, 28 ; author's criti- 
cism of, 45, 56. 

Mediterranean, fighting begins in, 
1759. 133 ; Nelson returns from 
cruise in, 351, 352; 400; 411; 
British expedition enters, 413 ; 
Pellew cruises in, 430 ; Pellew is 
appointed Commander-in-chief 
in, 460; 461. 

MiLLBANK, Admiral, 297. 

Minorca, Byng's incompetency at, 
5, 20 ; affair at, reviewed, 47-63 ; 
French send a fleet against, 104; 



492 



Index 



French fleet lands at, 104; 156; 

367- 
Mona Passage, 244. 
MoNCTON, General, his reluctance 

to move, 161 ; sends troops to 

Jamaica, 166. 
MoN'K, commands in Four Days 

Battle, II. 
Montague, ship, 312; 313. 
Montgomery, fall of, 432. 
MoREAU, French general, 347. 
Moultrie, Fort, attack of British 

fleet on, 386. 
Mutiny, in British navy, 1797, 358, 

359 ; on ship Marlborough, 363- 

367- 

Naples, Kingdom of, Napoleon 
designs to occupy, 413; 463. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, contem- 
porary of Jervis, 346 ; before 
Mantua, 347; 402; 403; 411; 
practically absolute ruler of 
Europe, 412; designs to occupy 
Portugal and Kingdom of 
Naples, 413; threatens Saum- 
arez's flank, 414; concentrates 
Spanish and French navies at 
Cadiz, 414; agreement of, with 
Czar, at Tilsit, 421 ; breach of, 
with Russia, 422 ; forces Sweden 
to declaration of war, 422 ; 454 ; 
decline of, coincides with Pel- 
lew's advance, 461. 

Narragansett Bay, 210; D'Es- 
taing's fleet at, 281 ; 387. 

Naval Warfare, in i8th century, 
3, et seq.; Hawke and Rodney 
identified with, 4; advance in, 
shown by two great failures, 5 ; 
waged with vessels moved by 
oars, 7 ; such method more re- 
liable than by sail, 7 ; its scene 
long in the Mediterranean, 8 ; 
introduction of cannon in, 8 ; a 
period of systematization sets 
in, 9; period of transition in. 



12 ; Tourville's influence on, 14; 
peace of Utrecht closed transi- 
tional period in, 68 ; Napoleon's 
influence on, 68, 69; conditions 
of, in i8th century, 74, 75; ad- 
vance of, in 19th century. 

Navy, French, its movements at 
Quiberon Bay, 125; attempts to 
concentrate at Brest, 126; van- 
quished by Hawke, 141 ; con- 
centrated at Cadiz, 414. 

Navy of Great Britain, in 1739, 69; 
permitted to decline, 100. 

Navy of U. S., in 18 12, 69. 

Nelson, Admiral, his remarkable 
order at Trafalgar, alluded to, 7 ; 
on true way of fighting, 30 ; on 
the comparative value of prize 
money, 88 ; 146 ; appointed to 
command a ship by Howe, 298 ; 
letter of, to his brother, 298; 
opinion of, of Jervis's Mediter- 
ranean fleet, 330; remark of, 
concerning Hood, 335 ; criticises 
movements of British fleet, 1795, 
346- his criticism of Admiral 
Mann, 349 ; return from mission 
up Mediterranean, 351, 352; at 
battle off Cape St. Vincent, 355; 
receives Spanish surrender, 355, 
356 ; approves sentence of sea- 
men of ship St. George, 361 ; 362 ; 
contrasted with Jervis, Earl St. 
Vincent, 378, 379 ; esteem of, for 
Jervis, 379; credit due to, for 
victory of the Nile, 379 ; con- 
trasted with Saumarez, 383 ; 401 ; 
402; his lack of personal sym- 
pathy with Saumarez, 407 ; 
Saumarez's unfortunate remark 
to, 407; at battle of the Nile, 
407-409; 410; Baltic league 
shattered by, 413; eulogizes 
Saumarez in House of Lords, 
421 ; seamanship of, contrasted 
with that of Pell ew, 446; anec- 
dote of, 446 ; mentions incident 



Index 



493 



of Algerine policy, 462, 463 ; de- 
nounces Algerine piracy, 463; 
Israel Pellew with, at Trafalgar, 
476. 

Nevis, island, 394. 

Newport, D'Estaing enters harbor 
of, 281. 

Nile, battle of, 362 ; Admiral 
Howe's estimate of, 379 ; credit 
due to Admiral Lord St. Vin- 
cent for, 379, 380 ; Saumarez 
cruises in, 384 ; 403 ; description 
of battle of, 405-408 ; Saumarez 
wounded at, 409. 

Nore, threatening mutinies of, 

454- 

NoRRis, Captain, absconds to 
avoid trial, 37. 

Nymphe, frigate, Pellew in com- 
mand of, 447 ; 448 ; fight of, 
with Cleopdtre, 448, 449. 

Orient, ship. Nelson's coffin made 

from mainmast of, 353 ; blows 

up, 407. 
Orion, ship, Saumarez appointed 

to command, 400 ; 401 ; 406 ; 

409; 410. 

Palliser, Vice-Admiral, accused 

of betrayal of his chief, 182 ; 

twelve admirals memorialize the 

king against, 182. 
Paris, Rodney settles in, 175. 
Parker, Admiral, Rodney writes 

to, 225. 
Parker, Commodore Sir Peter, 

385- 

Passaro, Cape, Battle of, 69. 

Pegase, ship, 331. 

Pellew, Admiral, asks for court- 
martial upon a mutiny, 367 ; 368 ; 
389 ; 428 ; of Norman extrac- 
tion, 428 ; early orthography of 
name, 428 ; settlement of family 
in England, 429 ; father of, 429; 
fearlessness of, at school, 429; 



goes afloat, 430; sides with a 
companion in a quarrel and 
leaves the ship, 430; intimacy 
of, with Captain PownoU, 431 ; 
brought in contact with Ameri- 
can revolution, 431 ; at recep- 
tion of Burgoyne on ship Blonde, 
431 ; saves a sailor from drown- 
ing, 431 ; exuberant vitality of, 
431 ; anecdote of recklessness 
of, 431 ; anecdote of accident to, 
435 \ second officer of Carleton, 
437 ; in battle of Lake Cham- 
plain, 436, 437 ; by loss of su- 
periors left in command, 438 ; 
gallantry of, in contest, 438 ; is 
commended by Douglas, Lord 
Howe and the Admiralty, 440 ; 
is promised promotion, 440; 
gives chase to Arnold, 441 ; 
lands at Crown Point, 441 ; ac- 
companies Burgoyne, 442 ; re- 
turns to England, 442 ; promoted 
to a lieutenancy, 442 ; serves 
under Capt. Pownoll, 442 ; lieu- 
tenant of frigate Apollo, 442 ; 
meets French frigate Stanislas, 

442 ; action with, 442 ; succeeds 
to command at death of Pownoll, 
442 ; grief of, for death of Pow- 
noll, 443 ; gains promotion, 443 ; 
destroys French privateers, 443 ; 
wins grade of post-captain, 443 ; 
in time of peace tries farming, 

443 ; commands frigate on New- 
foundland Station, 444 ; per- 
sonal activity of, 444 ; anecdotes 
of, 444, 445 ; his knowledge of 
seamanship, 446 ; 447 ; in com- 
mand of Nymphe, 447 ; at fight 
between Nymphe and CleopAtre, 
448, 449 ; Lord Howe com- 
mends, 450; opposes French 
privateers, 451, 452 ; directs res- 
cue of troops, passengers, and 
crew of ship Button, 452-454 ; 
stationed off Brest, 454 ; dis- 



494 



Index 



couraged appointment of Roman 
Catholic chaplains, 455 ; opposes 
enfranchisement of Roman Cath- 
olics, 455 ; follows French expe- 
dition against Ireland, 455, 456; 
sails for Falmouth, 456 ; fights 
Indefatigable and Amazon against 
Droits de PHonnne, 456-458 ; 
narrow escape of, from ship- 
wreck, 458 ; great personal 
endurance of, illustrated, 459 ; 
eminent qualities of, 459; holds 
command in India, 459, 460 ; 
appointed commander-in-chief in 
Mediterranean, 460 ; made a 
rear-admiral, 460 ; assigned to 
East India station, 460 ; Medi- 
terranean command of, coincides 
with Bonaparte's falling for- 
tunes, 461 ; created Baron Ex- 
mouth, 462 ; visits Barbary ports, 
462 ; compels release of slaves, 
462 ; demands peace for Sar- 
dinia, 463 ; arranges with Tunis 
and Tripoli for treatment of cap>- 
tives, 463 ; Algiers refuses con- 
cession to, regarding treatment 
of captives, 464 ; demands release 
of all Christian slaves in Algiers, 
464 ; despatches cruiser to Al- 
giers, 466 ; instructions of, to 
Capt. Charles Warde, 466 ; asks 
for small force against Algiers, 
467 ; preparations of, against 
Algiers, 468; sails for Algiers, 
468 ; joins Dutch fleet at Gibral- 
tar, 468 ; arrives at Algiers Bay, 
468 ; serves demands on Dey of 
Algiers, 468 ; receives no an- 
swer, 468 ; opens battle, 469, 
470; is slightly wounded, 473; 
receives submission of Dey, 473 ; 
frees Algerian, Tunisian, and 
Tripolitan slaves, 474 ; returns 
to England, 474 ; close of career 
of, 475; later days of, 475, 476; 
religious nature of, 476; death 



of, 476; rank of, at death 
476. 

Pellew, Israel, bravery of, in 
fight between Nymphe and 
Cleopdtre, 448, 449 ; promoted 
to post-captain, 451 ; 476. 

Penmarcks, rocks, 458. 

Penn, Sir William, his criticism 
of Four Days Battle, 12. 

Perry, Commander, 436. 

Petiple Soiiverain, ship, 406. 

Philadelphia, evacuation of, 284. 

Pitt, William, defends Admiral 
Byng, 105 ; his dislike of Hawke, 
106; his military purpose, no; 
proposed series of descents on 
French coast, no; his impetu- 
osity a spur to laggards, 113 ; his 
energy felt in civil administra- 
tion, 114; blames military and 
naval leaders, 115; his injustice 
meets rebuke, 116 ; profits by 
Hawke's suggestions, 117 ; 
leaves Hawke a commodore, 
144 ; succeeded by Lord St. 
Vincent in Admiralty, 380. 

Plattsburg, 436. 

Plymouth, ship Dutton driven 
ashore at, 452. 

PococK, Admiral, 164 ; 165. 

Poder, ship, 41, 42, 43, 86. 

Point Judith, 281. 

Fompee, ship, dismasted at Al- 
geciras, 416 ; withdraws under 
tow, 417; 418. 
Porcupine, sloop-of-war, 326. 
Portland, ship, 80. 

Port Mahon, surrendered, 105 ; 

156; 367- 

Porto Rico, 244. 

Portugal, Napoleon designs to 
occupy, 413; 414. 

Pow^NOLL, Captain, intimacy of, 
with Pellew, 431 ; commands fri- 
gate Apollo, 442 ; death of, 442. 

Prince, ship, 365. 

Prince M'illiam, ship, 188. 



Index 



495 



Quebec, 432. 

Queen Charlotte, ship, 250, 265 ; 

305; 311; 313; Z^T^ 469; 470; 

472; 473- 
Quiberon Bay, Hawke's disregard 

of pilotage difficulties at, 114; 

Hawke's triumph at, 122 ; 

France determines to invade 

England, 124; location of, 125; 

Hawke crowds all sail for, 136; 

islands of, cultivated as kitchen 

gardens, 141 ; Howe at, 273 ; 460. 

Ramillies, ship, 60, 61. 

Real, ship, 41, 44. 

Real Carlos, ship, 417; 420; re- 
markable loss of, 420. 

Red Sea, 403. 

Reunion, frigate, quits Cherbourg, 
399 ; meets British frigate Cres- 
cent, 399 ; action of, with Cres- 
cent, 399, 400. 

Revenge, ship, 59 ; 60 ; 62. 

Rhode Island, Saumarez sent to, 
387 ; British retreat to, 387. 

Richelieu, river, 433 ; 434. 

Robespierre, orders of, to Ad- 
miral Villaret-Joyeuse, 301. 

Rochefort, Hawke's expedition 
against, iii ; Conflans's vessels 
escape to, 141. 

Rochetts, country seat of Lord St. 
Vincent, 380. 

Rodney, Admiral, development of 
naval warfare identified with 
name of, 4 ; uplifted the navy, 6 ; 
before Havre, 126; succeeds 
Hawke, 145; his descent, 148; 
his father in command of the 
royal yacht, 148; George I. his 
sponsor, 148; given the name of 
the king, 148; his advancement, 
148 ; contrasted in temperament 
with Hawke, 152; presented at 
Court, 153; complimented to 
the king, 153; appointed Com- 
modore, and commander of 



Newfoundland station, 154; let- 
ter to, from Earl of Sandwich, 
154, 155; the Earl's confidence 
in, 1 55 ; returns to England, 1 56 ; 
elected to Parliament, 156; no 
connection with Minorca inci- 
dent, 156, breaks with tradition, 
156; accompanies Rochefort ex- 
pedition under Hawke, 157; 
commands ship-of-the-line under 
Boscawen, at Louisburg, 157; 
again returns to England, 157; 
promoted to rear-admiral, 158; 
operates against Havre and 
Brest, 158; again elected to Par- 
liament, 158; appointed to Lee- 
ward Islands station, 158; sails 
for his new post, 158; begins 
operations against Martinique, 
158; begins hostilities against 
Spain, 159; receives intelligence 
of approach of Brest fleet, 160; 
gives pursuit, 160; hastens to 
succor of Jamaica, 160; takes 
the responsibility, 162, 163; his 
bitter disappointment, 164; or- 
dered to join expedition under 
Pocock, 164; his letter to Earl 
of Sandwich, 164; goes to Mar- 
tinique, 166; at fall of Havana, 
166 ; active service in Seven 
Years War terminated, 166; re- 
turns to England, 1763, 166; 
made a vice-admiral of the Blue, 
and vice-admiral of the Red, 
167 ; appointed commander-in- 
chief at Jamaica, 167 ; governor 
of Greenwich hospital, 167 ; his 
report concerning free-ports, 169, 
170; was a pronounced Tory, 170 ; 
demands of governor of Carta- 
gena delivery of captured war 
schooner Haivke, 171 ; disturbs 
British ministry by Hawke inci- 
dent, 172 ; Sandwich's caution- 
ary letter to, 172, 173 ; his act 
justified by government, 174; 



496 



Index 



Sandwich reassures him, 174; 
his hopes for a colonial appoint- 
ment, 174; Jamaica his first 
choice, 174; Sandwich's renewed 
assurances, 175; is superseded, 
175; has permission to remain at 
Jamaica, 175; lands in England, 
175; lacked influence to obtain 
preferment, 175 ; settles in Paris, 
175; becomes pecuniarily in- 
volved, 175; applies to Admir- 
alty for employment, 176; his 
application disregarded, 176 ; ad- 
miral of white squadron, 177; 
declaration of Sandwich con- 
cerning, in House of Lords, 178 ; 
Richard Cumberland's remark 
concerning, 178; detained in 
France by creditors, 179; Lady 
Rodney's efforts to release, 179; 
Marechal Biron makes advance 
to, 179; demands of creditors of, 
satisfied, 179, 180; repays Biron, 
180; returns to England, 180; 
appointed to command Leeward 
Islands station, 185; analysis of 
his powers in 1782, 186; Sand- 
wich urges him to sea with all 
despatch, 187 ; sails from Plym- 
outh, 187 ; captures a Spanish 
convoy, 188 ; sights Spanish 
fleet, off Cape St. Vincent, 188; 
is congratulated by Sandwich, 
190; letter of latter to, 191 ; let- 
ter to, from Lady Rodney, 191 ; 
his reply, 192 ; his report of bat- 
tle, 192; Sandwich's letter to, 
193 ; England's joy over achieve- 
ment of, 193; reaches St. Lucia, 
194; place of, among naval chiefs, 
196; follows De Guichen's sail- 
ing from Martinique, 197; over- 
takes French fleet, 197 ; attacks 
the enemy, 198 ; criticises mis- 
conduct of his officers, 204 ; his 
stern discipline, 206, 207 ; makes 
suggestions to the Admiralty, 



209 ; sails for North American 
coast, 211; anchors off Sandy 
Hook, 21 1 ; his coming a grievous 
blow^ to Washington, 211; dis- 
claims intention of offending 
Arbuthnot, 213; lands at New 
York, 214; returns to West In- 
dies, 216; destruction of Lan- 
gara's fleet by, 216; reaches 
Barbados, 217 ; vessels lost in 
hurricane, 217 ; ordered to pro- 
ceed against Dutch shipping, 
217; captures St. Eustatius 
island, 218; captures Dutch fleet 
of merchant ships, 218; author 
criticises hampering of Hood, 
222 ; writes to Admiral Parker, 
225 ; is advised of approach of 
French fleet, 225, 226 ; devotes 
himself to supervision of St. 
Eustatius island, 226; his error, 
227 ; sends small force against 
De Grasse, 229 ; forced to retire, 
230; his return to England, 232; 
again afloat, 232 ; sails for his 
station, 232 ; reaches Barbados, 
234 ; learns of capitulation of St. 
Kitts, 235; takes united fleet to 
Santa Lucia, 235 ; is assailed in 
Parliament, 235 ; follows French 
fleet from Martinique, 236; 
pushes reinforcements to Hood, 
237 ; battle with De Grasse, 238- 
242 ; his victory, 242 ; moves 
toward Jamaica, 243 ; is criticised 
for lethargic action, by Hood, 
244; his defence, 244, 245 ; anal- 
ysis of character as shown in 
battle with De Grasse, 248, 249, 
250 ; his professional career 
ends, 251 ; is superseded, 251 ; 
succeeded by Pigot, 251 ; leaves 
Jamaica and lands at Bristol, 251; 
Hood's comment on, 252 ; re- 
ceives thanks of Parliament, 252 ; 
advanced to the peerage, 252 ; is 
voted a pension, 252 ; his other 



Index 



497 



honors, 253 ; made vice-admiral 
of Great Britain, 253 ; his troub- 
lous later years, 253; death of, 
253 ; in accord with Lord Sand- 
wich, 287. 

Rodney, Lady, goes to England 
to obtain pecuniary relief for 
husband, 179; her letter to hus- 
band concerning victory off Cape 
St. Vincent, 191, 192. 

RooKE, Admiral, his movements 
off Malaga, 15. 

Rowley, Rear-Admiral, off Tou- 
lon, 21, 28 ; compliments Hawke, 
84. 

Royal, Fort, 235. 

Royal George, ship, 140; loss of> 

290 ; 393- 
Royal Savage, schooner, 438. 
Rtissell, ship, Saumarez appointed 

to command, 395 ; 396. 
Russia, Sweden at war with, 421 ; 

breach of, with Napoleon, 422 ; 

fleet of, takes refuge in Gulf of 

Finland, 425. 
Russia, Czar of, 421. 

St. Antoine, ship, 420. 

St. Christopher, island, 394. 

St. Eustatius, island, captured by 
Rodney, 217, 218 ; recaptured by 
French, 233; Rodney assailed in 
Parliament for acts at, 235. 

St. George^ ship, 351 ; two seamen 
of, condemned for infamous 
crime, 360; outburst of crew of, 
360; execution of seamen of, 361. 

St. Johns (Canada) ; 434, 435 ; 
437- 

St. Kitts, 163; 165; 228; is be- 
sieged by French, 234; capitu- 
lates, 235, 

St. Lawrence, river, 433 ; 434. 

St. Vincent, Cape, captured by 
British, 159; Spanish fleet 
sighted by Rodney, off, 188 ; 
battle off, 190 ; victory of Jervis 



at, 345 ; 353 ; 355 ; Jervis's battle 
off, 352-357 ; Saumarez at battle 
off, 400. 
St. Vincent, Earl, declines a com- 
mand, 286; denounces ministry 
to George IIL, 287 ; Admiral 
Jervis created, 356; 359; 360; 
361; 362; 364; 367; 368; 370; 

372; 373; 374; 375; 376; zn\ 

379 ; 380 ; 381 ; 401 ; assumes 
command Channel fleet, 411 ; 
complimentary note of, to Sau- 
marez, 411, 412; his praise of 
Saumarez, 412, 413; recognizes 
ability of Pellew, 460, see also 
Jervis. 

Sainte-Andr6, Jean Bon, 312. 

Sandwich, Earl of, letter from, to 
Rodney, 154, 155; his confidence 
in Rodney, 155; his cautionary 
letter to Rodney, 172, 173 ; dis- 
regards Rodney's application for 
employment, 176; his remark 
concerning Rodney in House of 
Lords, 178 ; urges Rodney to 
sea with all despatch, 187 ; con- 
gratulates Rodney, 190; private 
letter from, to Rodney, 193; 
character of, 285, 286. 

Sandy Hook, Rodney anchors off, 
211. 

San Fiorenzo Bay, 333; 348. 

San Josef, %h\^, 355. 

San Nicolas, ship, 355. 

Santa Lucia, island, captured by 
British, 159; 228; French pro- 
ceed against, 229; failure of 
attack on, 229; Rodney takes 
united fleet to, 235 ; 245 ; 248. 

Santo Domingo, 244. 

Saratoga, 276 ; 441; 442. 

Sardinia, Lord Exmouth demands 
peace for, 463. 

Saumarez, Admiral, 382; birth of, 
383 ; his mastery of French lan- 
guage, 383; lineage of, 383 ; con- 
trasted with Nelson, 383 ; early 



32 



498 



Index 



taste of, for navy, 383 ; begins 
career at early age, 383, 384 ; goes 
afloat at thirteen, 384; cruises 
in Mediterranean, 384; follows 
Nelson in pursuit of Bonaparte's 
fleet, 384 ; return of, to England, 
384; examined for promotion to 
lieutenancy, 384 ; appointed Mas- 
ter's Mate, 384; owes advance- 
ment to Admiral Keppel, 384, 
385 ; sails in squadron com- 
manded by Commodore Sir 
Peter Parker, 385 ; offered com- 
mission by Lord Cornwallis, 385 ; 
meeting of, with Cornwallis 
subsequently, 385; arrives off 
Charleston, 386; aids in attack 
on Fort Moultrie, 386 ; courage 
of, in action, 387 ; promotion of, 
to lieutenancy, 387 ; in command 
of a galley, 387 ; is sent to Rhode 
Island, 387 ; stationed at Sea- 
komet, 388 ; returns to England, 
388 ; his lot thrown with line-of- 
battle force, 388, 389 ; in action 
with Dutch off Dogger Bank, 
391, 392 ; again promoted, 392 ; 
made commander of Tisiphone^ 
392 ; on the tide which leads to 
fortune, 393 ; reaches Barbados, 
394; joins fleet, 394; encounters 
French fleet under De Grasse, 
394 ; effects brilliant manoeuvre, 
394; ordered to England, 395; 
Hood substitutes another officer, 
395 ; appointed to command 
Russell, 495 ; an acting post-cap- 
tain, 395; bravery of, in Rod- 
ney's renowned battle, 395, 396 ; 
engages De Grasse's flagship, 
396; brilliant manoeuvre of, 

396 ; promoted and returns to 
England, 397; in retirement, 

397 ; marries, 398 ; makes trip 
to France, 398 ; at beginning of 
work on Cherbourg breakwater, 
398; receives attention from 



Louis XVI., 398; appointed to 
command Crescent, 399; inter- 
cepts French frigate Riunion, 
399 ; analysis of action between 
Crescent and Reunion, 399; is 
knighted for victory, 400; ap- 
pointed to ship-of-the-line Orion, 
400 ; captures three French 
ships, 400; at battle off Cape 
St. Vincent, 400; blockades 
Cadiz, 400 ; operates off Toulon, 
400; inferior to Trowbridge in 
eyes of St. Vincent and Nel- 
son, 401 ; given equal command 
with Trowbridge, 402 ; his at- 
tack upon French fleet before 
Toulon, 402; as a letter writer, 
402 ; his record of pursuit of 
French fleet, 402 ; favors seeking 
enemy off coast of Egypt, 404; 
reaches Alexandria, 404 ; returns 
westward, 404; again sights 
Alexandria, 404 ; despondency 
of, 405 ; learns of proximity of 
enemy in Aboukir Bay, 405; 
share of, in battle of the Nile, 
405 ; wounded, 407, 409 ; unfor- 
tunate remark of, to Nelson, 
407, 408 ; losses of, at battle of 
Nile, 409 ; convoys prizes to 
Gibraltar, 409; ordered to home 
station, 409 ; impatient at delays, 
410; reaches England, 410; ap- 
pointed to command the Ccesar, 
410 ; at blockade of Brest, 411 ; 
St. Vincent's flattering note to, 
411, 412 ; importance of situation 
of, off Brest, 412 ; St. Vincent's 
praise of, 412, 413; Napoleon 
threatens flank of, 414; given 
command of a squadron, 414; 
now a rear-admiral, 414 ; ordered 
to blockade Cadiz, 414 ; sails on 
his mission, 415; arrives off 
Cadiz, 415; learns of French 
vessels at Algeciras, 415; starts 
for Algeciras, 415; finds French 



Index 



499 



fleet moored at, 415; steers to 
engage French, 415; failure of 
wind interferes with plans of, 
415; disaster to two ships of, 
416; withdraws to Gibraltar, 
416; failure of, 416; confident 
despatch of, to Admiralty, 417 ; 
fresh opportunity of, 417 ; learns 
of approach of Spanish fleet, 
417, 418 ; sails in pursuit of 
Spaniards, 418; gives battle off 
Algeciras, 420 ; St. Vincent's 
praise of, 421 ; St. Vincent eulo- 
gizes, in House of Lords, 421 ; 
eulogized by Nelson, in House 
of Lords, 421 ; never again en- 
gaged in serious encounter with 
enemy, 421 ; commander-in-chief 
at Channel Islands, 421 ; insures 
Swedish neutrality, 422 ; main- 
tains importance of Baltic, 421 ; 
disturbs commerce between 
nations on the Baltic, controlled 
by Napoleon, 422 ; succeeds to 
diplomatic situation, 424 ; suc- 
cess of, 425 ; praise of, by Swed- 
ish statesman, 425; follows Rus- 
sian fleet in Gulf of Finland, 
426; retires from service, 427; 
later life at Guernsey, 427 ; re- 
ceives peerage from William IV., 
427 ; death of, 427 ; 476 ; 477. 

Saumarez, Lord de, 427. 

Saumarez, Philip, 385. 

Saunders, Captain, his conduct in 
battle off La Rochelle, 92. 

Saunders, Sir Charles, associated 
with Jervis, 325 ; 328. 

ScHANK, Admiral, 435. 

Schuyler, General, 442. 

Scilly, Howe encounters allied 
fleet off, 288. 

Serietise, frigate, 406. 

Seven Years War, contrasted with 
American revolution, 102; result 
of, in North America and India, 
102 ; finds Rodney a captain, 



156; Rodney's career in, termi- 
nated, 166; Howe's part in, 260. 

Siberia (on French coast), 411. 

Sicily, 403 ; 404. 

Smuggling, in West Indies, 168, 
169. 

Sorel, town of, 433. 

South African war, contrasted 
with American revolution, loi. 

Spain, refuses to surrender British 
supply vessel captured by the 
French, 106 ; Great Britain be- 
gins hostilities against, 159; in- 
creases custom-house force in 
West Indies, 169 ; seeks a 
quarrel with Great Britain, 
171 ; embittered by loss of 
Havana and Manila, 171 ; near 
verge of rupture with Great 
Britain, over Falkland Islands 
incident, 172; declares war, 185; 
fleet of, enters English Channel, 
185 ; navy of, concentrated at 
Cadiz, 414. 

Spanish colonies, in West Indies, 
their geographical relation to 
Jamaica, 168; smuggling in, 168. 

Stamp Act, discontent over, in 
American colonies, 172. 

Stanislas, frigate, 442 ; goes 
aground off Belgian coast, 442, 

443- 

Stewart, Colonel, 446. 

Superb, ship, 417 ; 419; 420. 

Sweden, British fleet supports, 
421 ; 424; forced by Napoleon 
to declaration of war, 424. 

Tagus, river, 351. 

Ternay, Admiral, 212; 214. 

Terrible, ship, 91. 

Thesee, ship, 140. 

Ticonderoga, 433 \ 441 ; 442. 

Tilsit, agreements at, 421. 

Tippoo Saib, 403. 

Tisiphone, ship, 392 ; 393 ; 395. 

Tobago, attack on, 229 ; Drake 



500 



Index 



meets De Grasse, off, 230 ; sur- 
renders to De Grasse, 230. 

Tormant, ship, 90, 91. 

Torbay, British fleet leaves, 128. 

Toulon, Admiral Mathews off, 5, 
20; engagement off, 21, 22 ; de- 
scription of action off, 30, 31 ; 
movements of fleet criticised, 
ZZ, 34; 346; 348; Saumarez 
operates off, 400 ; 403 ; 414 ; 415. 

TouRViLLE, characterization of, 
13 ; his death, 14. 

Trafalgar, 422 ; 461 ; 476. 

Transvaal, war in, some lessons 
from, 18. 

Trident, ship, 60, 61, 64, 91. 

Tripoli, agrees to treat captives as 
civilized countries, 463; releases 
Christian slaves, 474. 

Troubridge, Captain, 353 ; gal- 
lantry of, at battle off Cape St. 
Vincent, 353 ; 355 ; 401 ; 402. 

Tunis, agrees to treat captives as 
civilized countries, 463 ; delivers 
up Christian slaves, 474. 

Turkey, troops of, slaughter coral 
fishermen on Algerine coast, 464. 

United States, Navy of, see Navy 

of United States. 
Ushant, island, Howe encounters 

French fleet off, 302 ; Jervis in 

battle off, 331. 

Valcour Island, 436 ; 437. 

Vengeur, ship,3i4 ; 315; loss of, 316. 

Victory, ship, 293 ; 354. 

Vilaine, river, 141, 143. 

ViLLARET-JoYEUSE Admiral, or- 
ders of Robespierre to, 301 ; en- 
counters fleet under Howe, 302 ; 
306; attacked by Howe in force, 
310; record of, 312. 

Ville de Paris, flagship of De 
Grasse, collides with Zele, 238 ; 
strikes her flag,242j 363; 369; 373. 



Walpole, on the Colonies, loi. 

Warde, Captain Charles, instruc- 
tions of Lord Exmouth to, 466 ; 
examines defences and sound- 
ings in port of Algiers, 466. 

Washington, George, Rodney's 
coming to American coast a 
grievous blow to, 211; 214; con- 
cerning letter of Howe to, 276 ; 
279; comment of, on arrival of 
D'Estaing, 280; letter of, con- 
cerning movement against Rhode 
Island, 282, 

West Indies, smuggling in, 168; 
Arbuthnot ordered to send ships 
to, 210 ; conditions in, 1780, 210 
Rodney returns to, 216; 392; 

393- 

White, sailing-master, com- 
mended by Jervis, 342, 343. 

Whitshed, Admiral Sir James, 
266 ; his anecdote of Lord Gard- 
ner, 266. 

William III., King of England, 
grantor of peerage to grandfather 
of Lord Howe, 256. 

William IV., King of England, 
a midshipman at taking of Span- 
ish convoy, 188 ; confers a 
peerage on Admiral Saumarez, 
427. 

Wolfe, General, Howe's friend- 
ship with, 262 ; intimacy of, with 
Admiral Jervis, 325, 326; anec- 
dote concerning, 326; message 
of, by Jervis, to Miss Lowther, 
326. 

York, Duke of, received on ship- 
board by Howe, 263; holds re- 
ception, 263, 264. 

Yorktown, 393. 

Zealous, ship, 350. 
Zele, ship, 238 ; collides with flag- 
ship Ville de Paris, 238. 



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Captain Mahan has been recognized by all competent judges, not 
merely as the most distinguished living writer on naval strategy, but 
as the originator and first exponent of what may be called the 
philosophy of naval history. — London Times. 

No book of recent publication has been received with such en- 
thusiasm of grateful admiration as that written by an officer of the 
American Navy, Captain Mahan, upon Sea Power and Naval 
Achievements. It simply supplants all other books on the subject, 
and takes its place in our libraries as the standard work. — Dean 
Hole, in ^^ More Memories. ^^ 

An altogether exceptional work 5 there is nothing like it in the 
whole range of naval literature. . . . The work is entirely original 
in conception, masterful in construction, and scholarly in execution. 
— The Critic. 

Captain Mahan, whose name is famous all the world over as that 
of the author of **The Influence of Sea Power upon History," a 
work, or rather a series of works, which may fairly be said to have 
codified the laws of naval strategy. — The Westminster Gazette. 

An instructive work of the highest value and interest to students 
and to the reading public, and should find its way into all the libra - 
ries and homes of the land. — Magazine of American History. 

A book that must be read. First, it must be read by all school- 
masters, from the head-master of Eton to the head of the humblest 
board-school in the country. No man is fit to train English boys 
to fulfil their duties as Englishmen who has not marked, learned, 
and inwardly digested it. Secondly, it must be read by every 
Englishman and Englishwoman who wishes to be worthy of that 
name. It is no hard or irksome task to which I call them. The 
writing is throughout clear, vigorous, and incisive. . . . The book 
deserves and must attain a world-wide reputation. — Colonel 
Maurice, of the Bnitish Army, in the " United Ser'vice Magazine."" 



LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers 

254 Washington Street, Boston 



THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER 
upon the French Revolution and Em- 
pire. By Capt. a. T. Mahan. With 13 maps and 
battle plans. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $6.00. 

A highly interesting and an important work, having lessons and 
suggestions which are calculated to be of high value to the people 
of the United States. His pages abound with spirited and careful 
accounts of the great naval battles and manoeuvres which occurred 
during the period treated. — Nenv York "Tribune. 

Captain Mahan has done more than to write a new book upon 
naval history. He has even done more than to write the best book 
that has ever been written upon naval history, though he has done 
this likewise ; for he has written a book which may be regarded 
as founding a new school of naval historical writing. Captain 
Mahan' s volumes are already accepted as the standard authorities of 
their kind, not only here, but in England and in Europe generally. 
It should be a matter of pride to all Americans that an officer of 
our own navy should have written such books. — Theodore 
Roosevelt, in ** Political Science ^arterly.'"'' 



THE LIFE OF NELSON : The Em- 
bodiment of the Sea Power of Great 

Britain. By Capt. a. T. Mahan. With 19 por- 
traits and plates in photogravure and 21 maps and battle 
plans. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. ^8.00. 

Captain Mahan' s work will become one of the greatest naval 
classics. — London Times. 

The greatest literary achievement of the author of " The In- 
fluence of Sea Power upon History." Never before have charm of 
style, perfect professional knowledge, the insight and balanced 
judgment of a great historian, and deep admiration for the hero 
been blended in any biography of Nelson. — London Standard. 



LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers 
254 Washington Street, Boston 



THE PROBLEM OF ASIA and its 
Effect upon International Policies. 

By A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D., Capt. United 
States Navy, author of " The Influence of Sea Power 
upon History,'* ** Types of Naval Officers," **The 
Life of Nelson,*' etc. Crown 8vo. Cloth, gilt top, 
^2.00. 

Contents : I. The Problem of Asia. II. Effect of Asiatic Con- 
ditions upon World Policies. III. Merits of the Transvaal Dispute. 
Captain Mahan has scored another distinct success. ... A strong book, 
fascinating in its interest and invaluable as a philosophical statement of the 
greatest international problem the world has faced for many a year, — St. 
Paul Pioneer Press. 

Capt. Mahan is a writer of great influence, and his influence is not likely 
to wane while he continues to write such books as this. — Mail and Express, 

N. r. 

A volume which every thoughtful American may well read and ponder. — 
Boston Journal. 

LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH 

SPAIN, and other Articles. 

By Capt. A. T. MAHAN, author of "The Influence 
of Sea Power upon History," etc. Crown 8vo. Cloth, 
gilt top, ^2.00. 

Contents: Lessons of the War with Spain, 1898; The Peace 
Conference and the Moral Aspect of the War; The Relations of 
the United States to their New Dependencies; Distinguishing 
Qualities of Ships of War; Current Fallacies upon Naval Subjects. 

THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN 
SEA POWER, Present and Future. 

By Capt. A. T. MAHAN. With two maps showing 
strategic points. Crown 8vo. Cloth, gilt top, ^2.00. 

Contents: I. The United States Looking Outward. II. Hawaii 
and our Sea Power. III. The Isthmus and our Sea Power. 
IV. Anglo-American Alliance. V. The Future in Relation to 
American Naval Power. VI. Preparedness for Naval War. VII. 
A Twentieth-Century Outlook. VIII. Strategic Features of the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. 



LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY, 

P;:^^//V/?'^rj, 2 54 WASHINGTON ST., BOSTON, MASS. 



